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# GERMANY

## VOLUME II

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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GEOGRAPHICAL HANDBOOK SERIES
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# GERMANY

VOLUME II

## HISTORY AND ADMINISTRATION

*March* 1944

NAVAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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# PREFACE

In 1915 a Geographical Section was formed in the Naval Intelligence Division of the Admiralty to write Geographical Handbooks on various parts of the world. The purpose of these handbooks was to supply, by scientific research and skilled arrangement, material for the discussion of naval, military, and political problems, as distinct from the examination of the problems themselves. Many distinguished collaborators assisted in their production, and by the end of 1918 upwards of fifty volumes had been produced in Handbook and Manual form, as well as numerous short-term geographical reports. The demand for these books increased rapidly with each new issue, and they acquired a high reputation for accuracy and impartiality. They are now to be found in Service Establishments and Embassies throughout the world, and in the early years after the last war were much used by the League of Nations.

The old Handbooks have been extensively used in the present war, and experience has disclosed both their value and their limitations. On the one hand they have proved, beyond all question, how greatly the work of the fighting services and of Government Departments is facilitated if countries of strategic or political importance are covered by handbooks which deal, in a convenient and easily digested form, with their geography, ethnology, administration, and resources. On the other hand, it has become apparent that something more is needed to meet present-day requirements. The old series does not cover many of the countries closely affected by the present war (e.g. Germany, France, Poland, Spain, Portugal, to name only a few) ; its books are somewhat uneven in quality, and they are inadequately equipped with maps, diagrams, and photographic illustrations.

The present series of Handbooks, while owing its inspiration largely to the former series, is in no sense an attempt to revise or re-edit that series. It is an entirely new set of books, produced in the Naval Intelligence Division by trained geographers drawn largely from the Universities, and working at sub-centres established at Oxford and Cambridge. The books follow, in general, a uniform scheme, though minor modifications will be found in particular cases ; and they are illustrated by numerous maps and photographs.

The purpose of the books is primarily naval. They are designed first to provide, for the use of Commanding Officers, information in a

comprehensive and convenient form about countries which they may be called upon to visit, not only in war but in peace-time ; secondly, to maintain the high standard of education in the Navy and, by supplying officers with material for lectures to naval personnel ashore and afloat, to ensure for all ranks that visits to a new country shall be both interesting and profitable.

Their contents are, however, by no means confined to matters of purely naval interest. For many purposes (e.g. history, administration, resources, communications, etc.) countries must necessarily be treated as a whole, and no attempt is made to limit their treatment exclusively to coastal zones. It is hoped therefore that the Army, the Royal Air Force, and other Government Departments (many of whom have given great assistance in the production of the series) will find these Handbooks even more valuable than their predecessors proved to be both during and after the last war.

J. H. GODFREY
*Director of Naval Intelligence*
1942

The foregoing preface has appeared from the beginning of this series of Geographical Handbooks. It describes so effectively their origin and purpose that I have decided to retain it in its original form.

This volume has been prepared for the Naval Intelligence Division at the Cambridge sub-centre (General Editor, Dr H. C. Darby). It has been edited and largely written by Mr E. J. Passant, with contributions from Professor W. E. Collinson, Dr H. C. Darby, Dr C. P. Giles, Dr W. O. Henderson, Dr K. Lipstein, Mr F. J. Monkhouse, Dr G. M. Morant and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. The maps and diagrams have been drawn by Miss K. S. A. Froggatt and Mrs Marion Plant.

E. G. N. RUSHBROOKE
*Director of Naval Intelligence*

*March* 1944

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# Chapter I

# THE PEOPLE

*Race and Racial Theory in Germany :* The Racial Composition of the Germans : The Literary Study of Race : Racial Theory as a Political Weapon

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## RACE AND RACIAL THEORY IN GERMANY

### The Racial Composition of the Germans

The problem of the racial composition of the German people is of special importance at present because the Germans themselves have applied their theories of race with such intensity in the field of political propaganda and legislation. It is all the more necessary, therefore, to make a scientific appraisal of the situation. It may be stated at the outset that not even all non-German anthropologists are agreed about what are the exact racial constituents of any European population. But they are agreed in essentials on what is meant by the idea of race.

#### *The Scientific Study of Race*

Scientifically the term race is used to denote sub-groups into which the human species can be divided when that total group is considered from a zoological point of view. The object of making such divisions is to discover how populations are related to one another. The criteria used are attributes—usually called characters—of the body. In the case of living people the characters which have been found to be most suitable for the purpose are skin, hair and eye colours, and certain measurements of the head and body; and, of late, blood groups. In the case of series of skeletons, representing past populations, measurements of the skull and other parts of the skeleton are principally used. All these characters may be taken into account in classifying races.

In recent years the European races most frequently referred to by German and other writers are the Nordic, Mediterranean and Alpine. At one time these were supposed to be the primary groups from which the population of the continent was derived, but lately a few others of the same kind have sometimes been added. These are principally the Dinaric race, prominent in the Balkans, and the East Baltic race. The distinctions which such terms denote are those made by physical characters.

Acceptance of the theory of evolution affected racial classification, and the systematic collection of anthropological records soon followed. Techniques were laid down for making more precise the measurements and observations taken on living people and series of skeletons. Since 1860 anthropological surveys of living populations have been carried out in all parts of the world. In Europe nearly all such investigations have been of a national kind, the two most comprehensive being those for Norway and Sweden. The earliest survey on a large scale of the population of Germany was inspired by a pamphlet entitled *La race prussienne* (1871). It was written by A. de Quatrefages, a professor at the *Muséum d'Histoire Naturelle*, which had been damaged during the siege of Paris. The conclusion he reached was that Prussians are not Teutonic but that they are descended from Finns, of barbarian Mongol origin. In order to refute this theory the German government initiated a census of the hair, skin and eye colours of six million schoolchildren of the Reich.

*Blood Groups as Criteria of Race*

The only other extensive anthropological records covering all geographical sections of the population of Germany are those for blood groups. It was discovered during the first world war that certain tests carried out in connection with blood transfusion distinguish regional communities in Europe and other parts of the world. All four groups of what is called the *ABO* system are represented in every population, but the frequencies with which they occur differentiate populations and indicate distinctions in origin. This new line of racial research was taken up with particular enthusiasm in Germany. A society devoted to it was formed and its journal, started in 1928, was flourishing when the present war started. Although there was no state-supported survey, blood-group records for nearly 300,000 German people had been collected by then. This is larger than the total for any other country, and it is significant that the next largest total is for Japan.

Since blood groups are not familiar body characters some explanation of them is required. Blood consists of particles, called red blood cells, which are suspended in a liquid called the serum. The two constituents can be separated in the laboratory by using a centrifuge. Peculiar results are obtained if the separated parts of the blood of different people are mixed. The red blood cells of one person may be put in a saline solution so that an even suspension is obtained. If the serum of the same person is added the solution is unaffected. But if the serum of another person is added, there may either be no change, or else the red blood cells may come together in clumps, a phenomenon known as agglutination. The effect depends on the presence or absence in the red blood cells of two chemical structures called *A* and *B*. These structures are detected by substances, called agglutinins, which cause cells containing the structures to stick together, and such agglutinins are found in human blood serum. Appropriate tests can show whether the blood of a particular person contains *A* or *B*, or both *A* and *B* (group *AB*), or neither *A* nor *B* (group *O*). Any person can thus be assigned to one of four groups.

The group to which an individual belongs remains unchanged throughout life, and there is no advantage in belonging to any particular group rather than to another. These criteria are believed to be unassociated with any other physical characters. They are determined solely by heredity, and it has been shown that they depend on three hereditary factors (called genes) denoted by *p*, *q* and *r*. Every person has two of these. Unlike most anthropological characters, such as measurements, the blood groups are transmitted in a fairly simple way, and, if a particular population remains isolated, the frequencies of the four blood groups within it will be expected to remain practically constant for a large number of generations.

There are also extensive records for other characters. These are principally various measurements of the head and body for living people, and measurements of the skull and other parts of the skeleton for series representing past populations. Such evidence for Germany is uneven in scope, some parts of the country and some periods being far better documented than others. With regard to all this material, it can be stated that the descriptive records were honestly reported. There is no suggestion that the blood-group data or any others for Germany were deliberately falsified in order to favour any particular racial theory. If race is regarded as a biological concept—as it clearly should be—then it has to be judged from records of body characters, such as those referred to above. They are the primary and essential facts on which any racial classification must be based, though evidence of other kinds may have a bearing on the topic.

## *Racial Composition of Germans*

*Blood Groups.* The racial situation today has to be judged from the description of the bodies of living people. To appreciate the significance of such records it is simplest to consider the geographical distribution, within any region selected, of characters considered singly. In the case of Germany the evidence is most extensive for blood groups. If the total population is divided into a number of

regional populations, it is found that, when plotted on a map, the percentage frequencies of any one of the blood groups show a close approach to a regular sequence on passing from the west to the east of the country. The differences between the values for adjoining provinces are very small, but the general trend is clearly significant. The same sequences are continued without a break beyond the frontiers of Germany, and in this respect the Reich fits into the picture





Fig. 1. Frequencies of blood group gene $q$

Based on information in Haldane, J. B. S., ' The Blood-Group Frequencies of the European Peoples and Racial Origins ', in *Human Biology*, vol. 12, pp. 457–80 (Baltimore, 1940). The frontiers are those of 1938.

Blood tests assign any individual to one of four groups, denoted $A$, $B$, $AB$ and $O$. The relative frequencies with which these occur in a particular population are usually given as percentages, so that $\%A+\%B+\%AB+\%O=100$. The group to which a person belongs is determined by one of three hereditary factors (*genes*), denoted $p$, $q$ and $r$. The relative frequencies of the genes in the population can be calculated from the frequencies of the blood groups, and they are given as proportions of unity, so that $p+q+r=1$. The map shows values of gene $q$ for various populations.

presented by Europe as a whole. This situation is illustrated by Fig. 1, which shows the distribution of frequencies for one of the blood group genes ($q$), the frequencies of the three genes ($p+q+r=1$) for a particular population being obtained by calculation from the observed frequencies for the four blood groups.

*Pigmentation.* Similar sequences are shown by the skin-, hair- and eye-colour records for regional sub-groups of the population of Germany, but in these cases the trend is from north to south. It is a matter of common knowledge that people in the south of the continent tend to be darker than those in the north, and the same is true within Germany as within most other European countries. At the same time there are very considerable differences in pigmentation between different people belonging to any particular province. There are both fair and dark people in all parts of the country, but the percentage frequencies for any particular grade of colouring show regional gradation. Fig. 2 shows the gradations in pigmentation for Germany and surrounding countries.




Fig. 2. The pigmentation of hair and eyes

Based on Coon, C. S., *The Races of Europe*, pp. 270–1 (New York, 1939). The frontiers are those of 1938.

*Body Measurements.* The general situation is the same in the case of all other anthropological characters for which there are extensive records, though each character shows a distribution within Germany which is peculiar to itself. No body measurement gives an arrangement which is as simple as the west to east trend shown by blood groups, or the north to south trend shown by colours. Average statures tend to be higher in the north of Germany and lower in the south, but the picture presented in this case does not conform

closely with that for pigmentation. The cephalic index, i.e. the maximum breadth of the head expressed as a percentage of its maximum length, presents a picture which is roughly similar (Fig. 3). South Germans tend to have higher values of the index, though the distribution of regional averages within the country does not accord closely with that for any other measurement or non-metrical feature.





Fig. 3. Cephalic index

Based on Coon, C. S., *The Races of Europe*, pp. 258–9 (New York, 1939). The frontiers are those of 1938.

In the case of all these characters the sequences observed within Germany extend in a regular fashion beyond its frontiers. The general rule is that different characters classify European peoples in different ways, though all are alike in showing gradations. All the evidence should be taken into account in assessing the racial composition of Germany or any other country, and there is no general agreement among the authorities regarding the way in which this should be done. Since 1900, statistical methods, specifically designed to handle biological problems, have been worked out and are now widely used in physical anthropology. It is largely from this point of view that the available material is discussed in this chapter. But it is clear that, in whatever way characters such as head-form and skin or eye colour are treated in conjunction, they will still

present a picture of gradual transitions, with no abrupt divisions between populations which might be accepted as racial frontiers.

This anthropological view of the racial situation in modern times is entirely different from the popular view of a race being a detached population which is sharply divided off from all neighbouring populations. In reality there are no biologically isolated populations in Europe today. But, in spite of this, the anthropologist can estimate the degree of racial similarity of any two communities to each other from the records of their body characters. When all the evidence is considered it becomes clear that there is a much closer resemblance between some pairs of communities than there is between other pairs. It can safely be inferred that closer similarity of this kind shows a closer degree of racial relationship.

Applying this argument to Germany, it can be quite definitely said that Rhineland Germans and their non-German neighbours to the west (e.g. Flemings) are much more closely related than Rhineland Germans are to Prussians, while Prussians are much more closely related to their Slavonic-speaking neighbours (e.g. Western Poles) to the east than they are to Rhineland Germans. At the same time the populations bordering the western and eastern frontiers of the country are linked by populations with intermediate characteristics found in central Germany. It can also be said—again with assurance—that the population of Germany as a whole, far from being homogeneous, is racially more diverse than that of any other country in Europe; the extreme differences between the regional sub-groups are greater than those for any other country on the continent. Because Germany is so large an area and occupies a central position, this conclusion is not surprising.

*The Theory of Racial Types*

So far it has been assumed that racial relationship should be judged by comparing the body characters of the total populations of particular regions.

Some anthropologists, however, have treated the problem of racial classification in another way, thus complicating it further. According to this practice a 'racial type' is defined—usually in a very inexact way—by using small ranges of selected characters. The 'Nordic' type, for example, is said to be tall, fair and dolichocephalic ('long-headed'), the Alpine short, dark and brachycephalic ('broad-headed'), and so on. Individuals conforming to any one of these types will be found in varying proportions in a number of regional

populations, and hence a classification is reached which cuts across geographical groups. The German word *Rasse* has this meaning for nearly all modern German anthropologists. The best English equivalent is 'racial type', but 'race' is usually given in translations.

The theory of racial types is based on the idea that there were 'pure races' living in certain localities in Europe in early historical times. These are imagined to have been clearly distinguished from one another not only by differences in body characters, but also by inborn mental characters. The theory is that these pure races can no longer be found as regional groups owing to intermixture of the original populations, which has led to the racially impure populations of modern times.

But, according to an extension of this hypothesis current in Germany, each original pure race is represented by certain people living today. Their distinctive combination of qualities is presumed to indicate direct descent from a pure race, although the favoured individuals are now dispersed. In this way the pure races are imagined to be stubbornly persistent. It is, of course, admitted that most of the people among whom they are found today are racial hybrids.

In fact, however, this theory is not supported by any biological evidence. In general, the physical characters in question are not inherited in bundles, as it were, but independently. Some degree of association in inheritance between the colours of the skin, hair and eyes is known, but otherwise these colours, stature, head shape, and blood groups are not associated. It is an observed fact that these characters are uncorrelated in individuals. The genetic factors determining grades of the characters are reassorted in every generation, so that all possible combinations are found in people belonging to any given population (within the range of variation of that group). There is no justification for supposing that a set of individuals picked out because they are tall and have fair hair and blue eyes have really any distinctive ancestry. If that were so we should often have to conclude that two brothers had entirely different racial ancestries. The only scientific way of treating the populations is to compare them as wholes and not to draw inferences from specially selected individuals among them.

### *The Fallacy of the Pure Race*

The theory of racial types and its application to individuals is also fallacious for other reasons. According to the form of the theory

current in Germany, living people conforming to a particular type represent the survival of a so-called 'pure race' which formerly existed as a regional population. It is implied that such 'pure races' were living in Europe less than 2,000 years ago.

But this popular belief is contradicted by the most direct evidence. Anthropological literature has extensive descriptions of series of skeletons—or more often of skulls only—representing past populations, though it is only rarely that the numbers of individuals involved are large enough to give even rough estimates of their racial constitution and relationships. For Germany the late prehistoric period (Neolithic to Iron Age) is represented by remains of a few hundred individuals. As far as can be judged from these, there were no racial changes throughout the period. Nor were there any marked differences between the racial constitutions of communities occupying different parts of the region called Germany today. On the average, the people tended to be tall and to have low cephalic indices. In this sense they were of the so-called 'Nordic type'. But the average alone is misleading; the range of variation must also be considered, and, in this respect, great differences in stature and head form are found between the different individuals of any particular community. There is scarcely any evidence of the same kind for Germany in the early centuries of the Christian era, but there are records of several hundred *Reihengräber* skeletons of the Merovingian period (A.D. 500–800). Most of these came from western Germany and Bavaria, and they still tended to be of the 'Nordic type', being similar to the late prehistoric Germans and almost indistinguishable from the contemporary Anglo-Saxons. For the later medieval period the evidence is again scanty, but, after that, skeletal series conform to the records of living people from corresponding parts of the country. Today, throughout the greater part of Germany and particularly in the south, the people on the average are short rather than tall, and they have high rather than low cephalic indices. The 'Nordic' element must, therefore, have been displaced or assimilated by intermarriage with 'non-Nordic' peoples at some time later than A.D. 800.

Judging, then, from series of skeletons from Germany and other countries, the later prehistoric and early historic populations of Europe were almost as variable as any existing today. The people belonging to any one (such as the *Reihengräber* or Anglo-Saxon) differed among themselves in body size and proportions—and probably in colouring too—almost as much as do regional populations

of the same size now. Racial analysis in terms of 'pure races' is, in fact, entirely unscientific because there is no evidence that human communities which were appreciably less variable, and hence racially purer, than modern ones have ever existed.

## The Literary Study of Race

The anthropological problem of racial classification is very complex owing to the nature of the relevant biological evidence. The failure of the authorities to reach agreement regarding it encouraged certain writers to discuss the matter in another way. They supposed that racial origins and relationships can be judged not from what people are in themselves but from evidence regarding their activities. The cultures recognized by archæologists, the comments of early historians, and the distribution and affinities of languages were referred to principally in this connection. It is convenient to refer to this movement as the literary study of race.

The general concept of race suggested by literary evidence is essentially of a different nature from the concept of race derived from biological evidence. Distinct cultures, distinct national histories and traditions, and distinct language distributions inevitably suggest that different populations had distinct origins, and that there are clear-cut divisions between the groups today on account of their descent. But such ideas are incompatible with the biological evidence which shows gradual transitions, and a total absence of completely separate populations in the present or in any earlier age.

The racial theory most popular in Germany—the 'Aryan-Nordic' theory—is claimed by its supporters to be thoroughly scientific, but it presents a medley of biological and cultural terms. The term 'Aryan' was first used in the eighteenth century, and it came to denote the Indo-European family of languages, which includes nearly all those of Europe—Finnish and Hungarian being the principal exceptions—and several of western and central Asia. Max Müller, a German philologist who settled at Oxford, referred once to an Aryan race, and the phrase was rapidly adopted in spite of the fact that the author of it declared later that 'Aryan' should only be used with reference to languages.

### *The Aryan-Nordic Theory in Germany*

The form of the 'Aryan-Nordic' dogma, which has been orthodox in Germany since it was adopted by the Nazi party, had previously been current there for the greater part of a century. It was elaborated

by Gustaf Kossinna, a Berlin professor, and other writers. He asserted that a pure Nordic race, which spoke the ancestral language from which all Aryan languages were later derived, was located towards the end of the Ice Age, in the region which is now north-west Germany. This population is supposed to have spread in later times and to have been responsible for civilization and progress in all parts of Europe and, through European colonization, of the world. The best achievements of all countries are thus attributed to German 'blood'.

It is true that, from a comparison of the Aryan languages, philologists have reached the conclusion that the mother tongue was probably that of a people which lived in the Baltic region, and they may be presumed to have been there towards the close of the last glacial epoch. Since, too, the majority of the late prehistoric populations of Europe known from skeleton remains are of the so-called 'Nordic type', it may be allowed that the people in question are quite likely to have been mainly 'Nordic'. But their range of variation is such that they cannot be described as a 'pure' race in which each individual epitomized the ideal type.

So far there is a certain amount of support for the Aryan-Nordic theory, if it is granted that it must necessarily be a matter of vague conjecture. But the further assertion that this 'chosen people' were responsible for civilizing Europe is a gross misinterpretation of the facts. Progress towards modern civilization became possible when it was discovered that food could be produced by agriculture and stock-farming. This knowledge was first applied at some time rather before 5000 B.C. in the lands round the eastern Mediterranean. The change led to rapid progress in many ways, and it is a matter of common knowledge that for some thousands of years the peoples of that region remained far in advance of those of western and northern Europe. During the Bronze Age of this period archæologists record the diffusion from parts of Asia north of the Mediterranean of new elements of culture which spread over the whole continent. And they point out that its vitality in prehistoric times, as in the historic era, was not the monopoly of any particular race, but a result of the interaction of contributions made by many peoples. In these respects the exponents of the Aryan-Nordic hypothesis simply ignore evidence which is inconvenient for them, however well established it may be.

The assumption that modern Germans, whether as a whole, as groups, or as individuals are direct descendants of the supposed

pure Aryan-Nordics is in direct contradiction to the biological evidence already discussed, as well as to the historical evidence of the intermixture of the Teutonic tribes with other European peoples. Even where, as in north-west Germany, the average type of the modern population approximates to the 'Nordic' ideal, the approximation is not so close as that shown by the peoples of Scandinavia (excluding Finns and Lapps) and of Great Britain, whilst the population of southern Germany is almost as far removed from the 'Nordic type' as any in Europe.

The theory goes on to assert that members of the 'Nordic race' are superior to all other people. They are supposed to be endowed by nature with all the most desirable qualities of mind as well as of body, and it is implied that this superiority is common to all 'Nordics'. There is an extensive literature dealing in one way or another with psychological differences between populations. It may be divided broadly into literary discussions (including those dealing with national character), on the one hand, and scientific writings concerned principally with mental tests of various kinds, on the other. The primary problem considered in both cases is the assessment of distinctions between populations on account of natural, or inborn, differences between their members.

Although it has been long continued the literary discussion of this problem has signally failed to reach any final conclusion, and since the hypothesis makes it necessary to weigh the moral qualities of different peoples against each other it is not surprising that different writers still express markedly different views regarding it. The scientific treatment of the topic aims at being more rigorous, but it is beset with difficulties. In the interest of precision it is desirable that mental characters should be considered singly, but it is by no means clear how they should be defined and isolated. Then methods have to be devised to measure, or otherwise assess, the mental characters chosen. The next step is to examine how far each is determined in the individual by heredity, and to what extent it is influenced by his upbringing and environment.

The measurement of intelligence, as determined primarily by heredity, has made more progress than attempts to assess other psychological characters. So far as group comparisons of the results derived from intelligence tests have been made, the situation appears to be very similar to that observed for the physical characters used by anthropologists, such as stature and the cephalic index. All populations show great individual variation. For all of them the

range is from very able to very dull people, as it is from very tall to very short. Different populations may show differences in their averages, but these are certainly very small compared with the individual differences that may be found within any particular population. In other words all groups overlap to a marked degree.

Many other mental characters, including emotional traits, are probably determined more by social environment than by heredity. But the situation regarding group differences appears to be much the same for them as for intelligence and stature. All the evidence suggests that it is absurd to suppose for any quality that all members of any one European population are distinguished from all members of any other, so that there is no overlapping. The presumption that there are such distinctions is, in fact, contrary to common experience and to common sense. There is certainly no 'master race' of the kind postulated in the Aryan-Nordic theory.

## Racial Theory as a Political Weapon

The victorious wars of 1866 against Austria and of 1870–1 against France, as a result of which the German Empire was founded, were succeeded by the growth of a violent nationalism in Germany, which rapidly developed into expansionist imperialism (see Chapter IV). The Aryan-Nordic theory provides a pseudo-scientific basis for German ambitions and was eagerly adopted, long before the war of 1914–18, by many members of the Pan-German League (*All-Deutscher Verband*, founded in 1891). Before 1914 the most influential prophet of the doctrine in Germany was Houston Stewart Chamberlain, an Englishman by birth, whose book, *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, published in 1899, was hailed with enthusiasm by Kaiser William II as a masterpiece.

Chamberlain, who had married Wagner's daughter, lived long enough to meet Hitler, with whom he also corresponded and whose movement he encouraged. His ideas were adopted and developed both in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* and his speeches, and in the *Myth of the 20th Century*, by Alfred Rosenberg, one of Hitler's earliest political associates, who now holds office as Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories and is also the Führer's Commissioner 'for the supervision of all the spiritual and philosophical education of the Nazi Party, the German Labour Front and all affiliated organizations' as well as 'Leader of the wartime education of German youth'. Chamberlain had many other disciples, some,

like H. F. K. Günther, widely read. But, for Germany and for the world as a whole, the ideas of Hitler and Rosenberg are incomparably the most important, since, through the accession of the Nazi movement to power, they have been able to control the minds of German youth and to inflict the consequences of their theories upon Europe and the world.

*Nazi Racial Theory*

The main propositions, based on Aryan-Nordic racial doctrine taught by the Nazi leaders since 1919, may be summarized as follows:

(1) The history of mankind is that of a continuous fight (*Kampf*) between the 'higher' and the 'lower' races.

(2) The Aryan-Nordic race, of which the German and certain other peoples contain groups of 'pure' representatives, is the highest and most creative (*schöpferisch*) and is the force behind all the achievements of civilization.

(3) The Jews are the eternal and most deadly enemies of the Aryan-Nordics and of all the higher values of civilization.

Thus, in a conversation with Otto Strasser, Hitler said 'that there are no revolutions except racial revolutions...always and only it is the struggle of the lower stratum of inferior race against the dominant higher race'. Although he admits in *Mein Kampf* that 'unfortunately the German national being is not based on a single racial type', he adds that 'even now we have large groups of German Nordic people within our national organization, whose blood has not been mixed with the blood of other races. We must look upon this as our most valuable treasure for the future'. The pages of *Mein Kampf* are full of passages which reveal Hitler's passionate hatred of the Jews and his belief that they are hostile to civilization.* It is sufficient to quote the concluding words of the second chapter. 'Should the Jew, with the aid of his Marxist creed, triumph over the people of this world his crown will be the funeral wreath of mankind, and this planet will once again follow its orbit through ether, without any human life on its surface, as it did millions of years ago. And so I believe today that my conduct is in accordance with the will of the Almighty creator. In standing guard against the Jews, I am defending the handiwork of the Lord.'

The effect of this doctrine on the youth of Germany was increased by the tone of Nazi propaganda. 'The doom of a nation', Hitler

* See especially *Mein Kampf*, Chapter II, pp. 58–66, in the English translation by J. Murphy (London, 1939).

wrote in *Mein Kampf*, 'can be averted only by a storm of glowing passion; but only those passionate themselves can arouse passion in others'. In conducting their passionate propaganda of racial superiority the Nazi orators omitted the qualifications made even by Hitler himself.

The doctrine became coarsened and more crude and ended by persuading the vast majority of young Germans whose descent showed no Jewish blood, that they belonged to a Master-Race (*Herrenrasse*) intrinsically superior to their European rivals. 'Slavs' were lumped together and branded as non-Aryans of Tartar origin. The French, although admittedly Aryan-Nordic in part, were regarded as degenerate through intermixture with non-Aryan European and with negroid stocks. Conveniently leaving aside the Scandinavians and the British, the Nazi propagandist easily persuaded the youth of Germany to regard itself as the fighting vanguard of world civilization.

*Effects of Nazi Race Doctrine*

It is easily apparent that such a doctrine, though scientifically wholly valueless, was well adapted after 1918 to replace the sense of inferiority induced in a martial people by a great defeat in war. When it had been extended to include all Germans with Nordic 'souls' even in Dinaric bodies, it could be combined with, and gave a sharper edge to, pure German nationalism. Moreover, its doctrine of perpetual struggle as the law of human life could be fitted easily, if fallaciously, into the Hegelian, Darwinian and Nietzschean philosophies. It is always impossible to define precisely the limits of influence of any social philosophy. But there can be little doubt that the Nazi Aryan-Nordic racial doctrine has contributed largely to the character of Nazi policy both at home and towards other countries.

The most obvious consequence is the anti-semitic legislation of the regime, by which German Jews were deprived of their rights of citizenship, excluded from almost all means of making a livelihood, and, finally, during the present war have been deported, under conditions of extreme brutality, to almost certain death in the occupied eastern territories (see Appendix, pp. 490–1).

In the sphere of public health legislation (see Chapter VIII, p. 451), the desire to keep the German stock 'pure' and to increase its numbers has led to laws encouraging marriage between 'Aryan' Germans, granting bonuses for children of such marriages, and state

aid for illegitimate children if of 'Aryan' parents. At the same time both marriage and sexual relations between Germans and Jews have been laid under heavy penalties. The same train of ideas is also responsible for the laws providing for sterilization of the unfit, and for the 'mercy-killings' of aged, infirm, and chronically diseased people, which have been vigorously denounced since the present war began by Count Galen, the Roman Catholic Bishop of Münster.

Both educational policy (see Chapter VII) and religious policy (see pp. 51–62) have also been profoundly affected by the racial idea. For the Aryan-Nordic creed is inherently and necessarily hostile to the Christian religion, which proclaims that, in Christ, 'there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free'. It is not less so to the Christian doctrine of 'peace and goodwill amongst men'. The former invalidates anti-semitism and the doctrine of the Master-Race, the latter denies the primary law of human life asserted by Nazi racialism, the permanent racial struggle.

*Nazi Racialism and Foreign Policy*

It is this latter aspect which has most directly affected the world outside Germany. For Nazi racialism not only regarded pacifism as treason, but could not accept any international organization, such as the League of Nations, which aimed at a system of permanently peaceful relations between the states of the world. Hitler's withdrawal from the League, the rapid rearmament of Germany, the profoundly military training of German youth in school, in the *Hitler-Jugend*, in the Labour Service and the army, are all logical developments of his racial idea. So also is the renewed *Drang nach Osten*, the war against Poland and Russia, representatives of the Slavs or of 'Jewish-Bolshevism'. The evil effects of this racialism has been felt most acutely by the peoples of the occupied East, treated by their German rulers of the Master-Race as 'less valuable' (*minderwertig*) members of human society, as hewers of wood and drawers of water for the 'creative' leaders of civilization.

Further, the record of *Auslandsdeutschtum* (Germans outside Germany) as organized by the Nazi government under Bohle, State Secretary and Chief of the Foreign Organization in the Foreign Office, is sufficient to show that those Germans who are dominated by the racial idea are most unlikely to be prevented by any scruples from working against the nation or state within which they live. In Hungary, Roumania and Croatia, in South Africa and South America, even if in a less violent form in these countries than in the German

districts of Czechoslovakia, the doctrine of the *Herrenvolk* has proved a menace to the people of each country which harboured a German minority. In short, by its own logical consequences in action the Aryan-Nordic doctrine, as taught by the Nazi leaders, has proved itself equally incompatible with liberal humanitarianism, with any form of organized international order and with the basic social ideas of Christianity.

## LANGUAGE

### The Germanic Languages

German, in common with English, Frisian and Dutch, belongs to the western branch of the Germanic or Teutonic group of Indo-European languages. The other branches of Germanic are North Germanic, including the Scandinavian languages and outliers like Icelandic, and East Germanic which consists of languages spoken long ago by Goths, Vandals, and Burgundians but which are now extinct. The Germans themselves call their language 'deutsch', a term which first appears in the eighth century in the Latin forms 'lingua theodisca' and 'theodisce', referring to the vernacular or language of the people.

The history of the Germanic peoples from their emergence in the Neolithic period to the present day has been one of continual expansion with few recessions. Today, English, German, Dutch and the Scandinavian languages together have more speakers than any other groups of languages in the world. Their unity, however, has been irretrievably lost, and, at most, the Scandinavians can understand their Danish neighbours.

English and German have drifted far apart in the course of centuries. This has been due in part to the western orientation of English, to its insular individualism and to the blending on English soil of several different nationalities. In regard to actual sounds, the continental form of speech nearest akin to English is still that of certain Frisian dialects (see p. 32). The recognition of this affinity has been preserved in the old tag that 'Bread, butter and green cheese | Is good English and good Friese'. In sentence construction, on the other hand, English is nearer to the northern languages and has in addition

been affected by French. It is in vocabulary that the differences between English and German are most striking. English keeps for everyday needs in the home a stock of words still mainly Germanic, but for its literary and technical language it draws copiously from the classical and Romanic languages, so that it maintains in effect a double vocabulary. While German, too, has sometimes opened its doors wide to foreign intruders (see p. 28), the native German elements have in the end proved to be more vital, and the language has worked out means of using them effectively by composition and derivation. Altogether, it is not too much to claim that of all the Germanic languages, with the exception of Icelandic, the German *Hochsprache* of today represents the purest type.

## The Early Development of German Speech

During the older Bronze Age (1800–1200 B.C.) the home of the Germanic peoples appears to have been within a region comprising South Scandinavia, the Danish islands, Jutland, Schleswig and a broad strip of the plain from the Ems to the Oder. By 800 B.C. Germanic tribes had pushed out to the south-west as far as the Ruhr and the confluence of the Fulda and the Werra, and in the east to the Lower Vistula, thus occupying an area in Germany roughly corresponding to that of the Low German dialects of today.

By the first century of the Christian era, Germanic tribes were well established in central Germany from the Rhine to Thuringia and Silesia, and had even penetrated beyond the Rhine into the Netherlands and across the mountains into Bohemia. During the following five centuries there were vast migrations. Thus in the third century the Alemanni, coming down from the Upper Main, pierced the Roman fortifications and occupied all the south-west to the Alps on the Italian frontier. Franks from the Lower Rhine conquered Belgium and Gaul, but gradually became Romanized except in the north-eastern region. To the east of the Elbe, the southward migrations of other Germanic tribes created a vacuum into which there poured waves of Slavic immigrants—from the fifth century onwards Polish tribes occupied Pomerania, Serbs settled in Lusatia and Czechs in Bohemia. By the eighth century, the frontier of the Slavic tribes corresponded roughly to a line stretching from the Elbe to the Saale, then turning south-east to cross the Danube and from there south-west as far as the Adriatic. During the same period the chief tribes in the constricted German homeland had crystallized to form five groups, with a distance of nearly five hundred miles

separating the northernmost group from the most southerly. These tribal groups were:

(1) Saxons with their subdivisions into North Albingians (north of the Elbe), Westfalians, Engrians, and Eastfalians, all subdued by Charlemagne between 775 and 804.
(2) Thuringians.
(3) Middle and Rhenish Franks, Hessians and Eastern Franks.
(4) Alemanns, including Alsatians and Swabians.
(5) Bavarians.

These groups must have shown considerable local variations in their speech, although its essential unity was unbroken. By the eighth century, however, a change had occurred which made a clean cut between the northern and southern areas. This was a phonetic change which took place in the southern dialects, and it is usually referred to as the Second or High German Sound-Shift. It was primarily a change in the articulation of consonants, and it may probably have been caused by the influence of non-Germanic peoples on the Germanic speakers in the south. The result was that the German language now became clearly divided into two major groups. The dialects in the south which underwent the shift are called High German, while those which remained unaffected are called Low German. Thus High German became gradually differentiated from the other West Germanic languages, but Low German (together with the Franconian of the Lower Rhine) retained its consonantal likeness to English. The following examples show the main features of this basic difference between High and Low German:

| Low German (Old Saxon) | English | High German |
|---|---|---|
| opan | open | offen |
| tīd | tide | zeit |
| herta | heart | Herz |
| makōn | make | machen |
| etan | eat | essen |

Within the two main divisions of Low and High German there are further dialect groupings (Fig. 4).

## Low German Area

The chief line of demarcation between the major dialect areas today is the 'Benrath line', named after a town on the Rhine. It separates Low German from High German with a well-defined belt of phonetic





Fig. 4. Distribution of German dialects

Based on (1) Priebsch, R., and Collinson, W. E., *The German Language* (London, 1933); and (2) Tonnelat, E., *History of the German Language* (London, 1937). The frontiers are those of 1938.

differences in the west and less definite variations in the east. The Benrath line begins on the French language frontier south of Limburg, passes north of Aachen (H.G.), crosses the Rhine below Benrath, then proceeds north of Düsseldorf, Kassel (both H.G.) south of Magdeburg (L.G.), north of Lubben on the Spree, Fürstenberg

on the Oder and Birnbaum near the Warthe. In medieval times the line lay farther to the south; thus Halle and Wittenberg were in Low German territory in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Among the dialects of the German lowlands a distinction is made between Low German proper and Low Franconian, a group to which Flemish and the southern and western Dutch dialects belong.

*Low German*

The area of Low German in the narrower sense has two major divisions: (1) the Low Saxon nuclear lands west of the Elbe and in Schleswig-Holstein; (2) the area of dialects unaffected by the sound-shift east of the Elbe in the formerly Slavic and Baltic zones, some of which, however, were recolonized in the middle of the twelfth century. The line of demarcation was roughly from Lübeck (but with East Holstein belonging to the first group) to Magdeburg. The dialects grouped together in this area are called East Low German or Colonial Low German.

The subdivisions of Low Saxon are: (*a*) Westfalian, which includes the Frisian-Westfalian and Frankish-Westfalian extending from the Zuider Zee to the Ems, the dialects spoken in the Ems region, in the Münsterland and in Osnabrück; (*b*) Engrian, including the dialects spoken in and around Paderborn, Lippe, Göttingen, Grubenhagen, Hanover, Ravensberg and Waldeck; (*c*) Eastfalian separated from Engrian by the watershed of the Werra and Fulda and spoken in Hildesheim and Goslar; (*d*) North Low Saxon (also Nordalbingisch) including the so-called East Frisian between the Ems and the Weser in addition to the dialects of Oldenburg, Bremen, Lüneburg, Stade, Dithmarschen, Holstein and Lauenburg.

The subdivisions of East Low German are: (*a*) the dialects of Mecklenburg and Pomerania to the Oder; (*b*) those of the Priegnitz, the Altmark, Brandenburg and the Ukermark, but excluding a tongue of Middle German protruding from the south and coiling round Berlin and Potsdam; (*c*) a group between the Oder and the Vistula including the dialects of Further Pomerania and the basin of the Netze; (*d*) a group east of the Vistula including West Prussian and East Prussian up to the Lithuanian frontier.

Low German dialects have been revived for literary purposes by such well-known writers as Klaus Groth, a Holsteiner, whose *Quickborn* has given its name to one of the chief Low German societies, and the Mecklenburger Fritz Reuter. Modern translations of the New Testaments have appeared in East Frisian, in the Holstein

colloquial and in the Mecklenburg dialect. An attempt has been made to standardize for literary purposes the orthography of the whole North Low Saxon.

*Low Franconian*

Low Franconian dialects are spoken west of a line passing west of Olpe, between Barmen and Schwelm, Mülheim and Essen, Wesel and Dorsten and extending to the Zuider Zee. Three groups of dialects extend from the Netherlands into the Reich. They are: (1) Bergisch, spoken around Remscheid, Elberfeld, Solingen, Werden and Mülheim on the Ruhr; (2) the Limburg dialects extending to Düsseldorf in the south and to Krefeld and Venlo in the north; (3) Geldersch, including Cleves.

## High German Area

The area of High German speech is considerably more complex and diverse than that of Low German. Here the chief distinction is between Middle and Upper German, and it is based primarily on the retention in Middle German of *-pp-* and in the use of diminutive suffixes. Thus Middle German has *Appel* while Upper German has *Apfel*, and the Middle German dialects of the west, in the Rhineland, have *Pund* contrasting with Upper German *Pfund*. Again, Middle German forms its diminutives with *-chen* as against *-lein* in Upper German.

*Middle German*

The Middle German dialects occupy a wide belt of territory from the Belgian and French borderlands across the Middle Rhine through the centre of Germany to Poland, including in their area Luxembourg, part of the Rhine province, Hesse, Thuringia and Upper Silesia and sending outliers fanwise into countries in the east and south-east. They are usually subdivided into West Middle German of the old homelands and East Middle German of the colonized territories with Thuringia occupying a transitional position between the two. In the western group initial *p* remains unshifted (*Perd*), and in the eastern it is shifted to *pf* or even to *f* (*Ferd*).

*West Middle German.* The following dialects are included in this group: (*a*) Middle Franconian, which shows close kinship with Low Franconian and Low German. Its northern dialect, Ripuarian, is spoken round Cologne and Aachen. Moselle Franconian is spoken in Luxembourg, Thionville in Lorraine and Arlon in Belgium; in

Germany it occupies the Eifel, includes Trier and extends across the Rhine to the Westerwald and Siegerland. (*b*) Rhenish Franconian includes most of the dialects of Lorraine and the Palatinate extending to the Rheingau and Odenwald, Hesse and Nassau with some special peculiarities characterizing Low Hessian. Its chief centres are Mainz, Frankfurt, Heidelberg, Darmstadt, Giessen and Fulda. Goethe himself is said to have retained some of his native Frankfurt characteristics.

*East Middle German.* This group contains the following dialects: (*a*) Thuringian-Upper Saxon from the Thuringian forest in the west (but not including Sachsen-Meiningen which is East Franconian), and the lower course of the Werra northwards to the southern boundary of the province of Hanover and to the Harz mountains, shading off into Low German between the Harz and Torgau, the eastern boundary of the area being that of Lusatia and the southern line of the Erzgebirge. (*b*) East Middle German in the narrower sense comprises the dialects in Bohemia and Germany on both sides of the mountains (*Osterzgebirgisch-böhmisch*) and Lusatian-Silesian. Silesian has sent a large colony to the Ermland in East Prussia, south of the Frisches Haff reaching well inland round Allenstein.

*Upper German*

Upper German consists not only of the nuclear dialects of Alemannic and Bavarian-Austrian but also of South (Rhenish) and East Franconian which since the medieval period have steadily moved away from the Middle German dialects.

*Alemannic.* Low Alemannic dialects are spoken in Alsace except in the north, and in Baden south of Rastatt and north of the Feldberg. Swabian dialects radiate north and south from Württemberg and extend from the Black Forest to the Lech. High Alemannic includes, in addition to the German Swiss dialects, those of the southern region of the Black Forest and most of the Vorarlberg.

*Bavarian-Austrian.* These dialects are sometimes divided into North, Middle and South Bavarian. North Bavarian and the dialect of the Upper Palatinate, including the dialect of Nuremberg and certain Upper German dialects of Bohemia, are characterized by the change of *ie* to *ei* (*lieb* to *leib*) and *uo* to *ou* (*guot* to *gout* = *gut*). Middle or Old Bavarian occupies the territory between the Alps and the border of North Bavarian which lies north of the Danube and extends into Upper and Lower Austria, Salzburg, the Bohemian Forest and certain districts in southern Bohemia. This dialect has sent an offshoot to

the Silesian Riesengebirge through the Zillertal Protestants who found a home there in 1837. The term South Bavarian is applied to dialects of the Alpine region, for example the upper valleys of the Lech, Inn and Puster, the dialects of the Tyrol, of Styria, of Carinthia and of the Sette and Tredici Communi in northern Italy.

*Franconian.* Today there is no clear line of demarcation between Alemannic and Franconian, especially South Franconian. This is due to the evergrowing pressure exerted by the zone of the Upper Rhine and Swabia. East Franconian occupies a considerable area abutting in the north on the Thuringian Forest. It includes the Saxon Vogtland and the western districts of the Erzgebirge. It extends in the west to the Rhön, the eastern edge of the Spessart and almost to the Neckar. From the western Erzgebirge miners went in the sixteenth century to settle in the Low German region of the Harz. The East Franconian area also includes the dialects of the Taubergrund and of Henneberg.

## The Significance of the Dialects

With the growing unification of the German written language after the Reformation (see p. 98), the use of local varieties in literature greatly decreased. In seventeenth-century drama, only a few attempts were made to represent the speech of peasants. In lyric poetry, dialect was restricted to 'occasional' verse except in the well-known Low German satires of Lauremberg and in the song *Annke von Tharau.* The most important step taken to study dialect seriously was the publication, begun in 1767, of Tiling and Dreyer's *Versuch eines bremisch-niedersächsischen Wörterbuchs.* Through the *Stürmer und Dränger*, through Herder and through the Romantics, dialect in Germany was completely rehabilitated and henceforth held a position totally different from that of the dialects in France or England. German dialects are neither despised nor ignored, but rather cherished and fostered as well as intensively studied and recorded.

In 1876 a nation-wide survey of dialectal characteristics was set going by G. Wenker in his *Sprachatlas des deutschen Reiches.* Sentences in standard German were circulated to 40,000 different localities with a request that some local rapporteur (a teacher, clergyman or local official as a rule) should give the equivalents in the dialect of the place. The replies were collected at Marburg and

then recorded on maps. From 1926 onwards simpler maps than the originals were published.

Since the inauguration of the *Sprachatlas* much work has been accomplished both on larger areas like the Rhineland and on a number of individual dialects. Certain points have emerged from these investigations. It has been found for instance that, as in France, each larger area is marked by a criss-cross of phonetic variations. The old designations, like Frankish and Alemannic, still used for convenience of reference, are apt to obscure the fact that many dialect boundaries go back to territorial boundaries established between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, and are a reminder of German 'particularism'. Of the geographical features, the larger German rivers, like the Rhine and Danube, have been channels of linguistic influence rather than obstructions. Within the Rhineland, the valley of the Erft, the moorlands of the High Eifel and the Hunsrück have been the more important barriers. The Rhine itself has carried movements from Mainz and Frankfurt downstream to Cologne and upstream to Strasbourg and Basle, whereas the cultural movement upstream from Amsterdam almost spent itself in Cleves before reaching Cologne. Sometimes the Rhine splits up dialect areas which once formed a unit, e.g. Hunsrück and Taunus, Eifel and Westerwald. That the traditional names sometimes retain their significance for dialect emerges from the careful investigations made into the limits of 'Alemannic' and 'Bavarian'. The old tribal boundaries gain in importance if they coincide with natural barriers and if they were maintained in medieval times in political or ecclesiastical frontiers. To some extent the duchies of the sixth century embrace nuclear dialects (*Kernmundarten*) which tail off into transitional dialects (*Übergangsmundarten*) on the periphery. In the colonized lands with their scattered settlements (*Streusiedlungen*) the modern dialects are sometimes the result of a compromise between colonists from different regions and sometimes the result of the victory of one group, not necessarily the earliest settlers.

## Standardization of the Written Language

Towards the end of the twelfth century an attempt was first made to bring a degree of unity into the German language. Between 1170 and 1230, the leading poets, among whom were Hartmann von Aue, Wolfram von Eschenbach, Walter von der Vogelweide and Gottfried von Strassburg, showed a strong tendency towards a unified poetic

language on the southern German basis. The attempt was partly successful because it had the sympathetic support of court circles. The result, however, was a compromise whose nature was rather negative than positive, since it set out more to exclude local usages than to establish an exact standard of good diction. This literary language became the property of a relatively small social group, and its tradition was later broken. The subsequent unification had different presuppositions, and the development and consolidation of the modern German standard language, or *Hochsprache*, are the result of several convergent movements.

Under the Emperor Charles IV (1346–78) the language of the imperial chancellery or secretariat (*Kanzlei*) was standardized in form and style—partly by the efforts of the humanistic chancellor Johann von Neumarkt—on the basis of the East Middle German characteristic of Prague. This official dialect had the merit of combining the consonantal system prevalent throughout Central Germany from East Franconia to Silesia with a compromise vowel system which favoured the Middle German monophthongs (*gut* for *guot*, etc.) and Upper German diphthongs (*mein* for *mīn*, *Haus* for *Hūs*). The chancelleries of the Duchy of Wettin in Dresden, Torgau and Weimar were strongly influenced. By the end of the fifteenth century somewhat similar types had been adopted by the law courts in Upper Saxony and by the universities of Leipzig and Wittenberg. The influence spread to Thuringia, Silesia and even northwards to the Mark Brandenburg. Under Frederick III and his successors, when the chancellery had moved to Vienna, there was a regression to a more southerly type of German, but this could not permanently frustrate the ideal of 'das Gemeine Deutsch'.

The desire of printers for a wide circulation of their products likewise fostered standardization. In 1550 it was still possible to distinguish in Germany four *Druckersprachen*, namely, those of Bavarian-Swabian (Augsburg), Upper Rhenish (Basle and Strasbourg), Middle Rhenish (Worms, Mainz and Frankfurt) and Upper Saxon (Leipzig and Wittenberg). By 1557 the Upper German area, except Switzerland, which long went its own way, and the Middle German area, except Cologne, had fallen into line, helped by the centralization of the book trade at Frankfurt.

Luther, who had lived mostly in Thuringia and Saxony, used in writing the compromise forms of the official language of the Saxon electorate, and selected much of his vocabulary and phraseology, especially for his translation of the Bible, from the spoken language

familiar to him in East Middle Germany. Luther's deliberate choice of the written forms of the *kursächsisch* chancellery finally decided the victory of the East Middle German type. The great popularity of his writings and translations, which penetrated even into the domain of Low German, further strengthened the position of the printers.

The importance of East Middle German and in particular of the Meissen dialect as consolidating factors is in large measure due to the fact that the dialects spoken in Upper Saxony and Silesia are colonial dialects of settlers coming from both Middle and Upper Germany, from the Middle Rhine through Thuringia and from Bamberg and Regensburg through Plauen and Eger.

The grammatical forms of standard German owe much to the grammarians and stylists of the seventeenth century, especially to Schottel and Opitz. The vocabulary, particularly the opposition to foreign words, owes much to purists like von Spee and the various 'puristic' linguistic societies (*Sprachgesellschaften*) of the seventeenth century. During the latter century the language of the educated classes of Upper Germany (Meissen) became the norm, especially under the literary dictatorship of Gottsched, and even the Swiss, though with some reluctance, strove to follow it.

Lessing, who was born at Kamenz, continued the tradition which was subsequently followed by the Rhenish Franconian Goethe and the Swabian Schiller, both of whom came to live in Central Germany, but brought in a certain amount of colouring from outside. In many ways, the language of Goethe and Schiller accomplished in the nineteenth century what Luther's language had done two centuries earlier, and it became the standard for the written language. Later writers have here and there introduced expressions from both Low and Upper German, e.g. sea terms and mountain terms respectively, without altering the fundamental type. Though Austrian and Swiss writers, administrators and journalists have retained certain particular expressions not current in the Reich, the written language is essentially one that can be as easily read in Hamburg as in Vienna or Berne. The most recent development is the influence of National-Socialist ideology on the language both in the favouring of dynamic words like *Aufbruch*, *Durchbruch*, *Einsatz*, compounds of *Volk*, etc., and in the replacement of foreign words.

## The Spoken Language

In many regions of Germany the colloquial High German (*Umgangssprache*) of the educated is coloured by dialect. In addition, every

town in the German speech area has its own specific expressions. There are, however, for the details of everyday life, certain characteristic differences between the north (including the centre) and the south of Germany which have passed from the spoken language into literature and the south German form often appears to the north German to have a more literary flavour. But it is in pronunciation that the speaker is most apt to reveal his native region, especially in the melodic or elocutional qualities of his speech. Though there are characteristic differences of tone movements and tone intervals in different districts, it is mainly through the general voice level (*Stimmlage*), speed of utterance and voice quality that speakers differ, and these have not been as yet properly investigated.

The chief credit for working out a scheme of German pronunciation to serve as a general standard is due to Theodor Siebs who, in 1898, presided over a committee of actors, phoneticians and elocutionists with the aim of proposing a stage pronunciation (*Bühnenaussprache*) free from dialect. Siebs's treatise, *Deutsche Bühnenaussprache*, has gone through several editions; in the main, the pronunciation advocated in it, and now adopted by the wireless announcers and many schools, is that of the north Germans who, being remoter from the nuclear regions of High German, acquire the spoken language with greater care. Although the fairly general adoption of this scheme of German pronunciation has not yet removed provincial peculiarities of pronunciation from the speech of even highly educated Germans, it appears probable that, with the greater centralization of control and with the extension of wireless facilities, the ideal of 'Das Gemeine Deutsch' in its written form will be matched by that of the common spoken language, at least for all more serious purposes.

## Loan Words

From the earliest times and contemporaneously with the movement of peoples within Germany, there has been a constant interchange between Germans and the neighbouring nations. Even in Roman times west Germanic tribes took over from Latin many cultural words used in arts which had been acquired from the higher civilization; thus Roman influence can be seen on terms employed in agriculture, horticulture, poultry keeping, building, household equipment, cookery, military affairs, navigation, commerce, administration and jurisdiction. Christianity brought a further influx of Latin terms, some perhaps brought by Goths during the fifth and sixth centuries,

and some brought by Anglo-Saxon missionaries in the first half of the eighth century; examples of these are *Kirche*, *Pfaffe*, *Engel*, and *Teufel*. Under Charlemagne, too, the vocabulary was deeply influenced by Church Latin; not only were Latin words borrowed directly, but words of purely Germanic origin took on a Christian meaning.

Contact with the Slavs to the east brought furriers' terms (e.g. *Zobel* and *Kürschner*) in the Old High German period (i.e. from the eighth to the end of the eleventh century). On the whole, however, the Slavs on the eastern frontier influenced German less than they were influenced by it. Some dialects in eastern Germany retain Slavonic expressions borrowed after the thirteenth century—for example, *Kren*, 'horse-radish'; *Wruken*, 'beets'; and *Schmant*, 'cream'.

In the twelfth century, admiration for French chivalry enriched the language with words like *Abenteuer*, *Revier*, *fein* and *klar*. Most of the borrowings from French were taken from the dialects of eastern France, often by way of the courtly circles of Flanders and Brabant. German and French knights constantly met in the crusades and on other military expeditions taken in common.

Humanism and the age of scientific discovery filled the vocabulary with words from the classical languages like *Universität*, *Gymnasium* and *Teleskop*. In the seventeenth century, during the *à la mode* period when French became the language of polite circles, the language was flooded with French words. Many of these words were successfully eliminated by the later purists. Comparatively recent is the English contribution to German with terms from the spheres of parliament, dress, commerce, shipping and sport. Sailors, for example, use not only many Low German words but also English borrowings and anglicisms which are easily assimilated owing to their resemblance at least to Low German models.

Some foreign words are taken over in a form or meaning differing from the original while others are translated literally (*Lehnübersetzung*). Whole phrases, too, have been taken over, many of them dating from medieval times.

## The German Language outside Germany

According to computations made by Germans, the total number of German speakers in the world is about 94 millions. In Europe, the total German-speaking population has been estimated at 84 millions. The number in the Reich as it was in 1933 is given as 63,115,000, and

it is claimed that there were then 6·5 millions in Austria. The following table gives the estimated number in 1938 of German speakers in the main areas of outlying German speech:

| | |
|---|---|
| United States of America | 9,500,000 |
| Czechoslovakia | 3,230,000 |
| Switzerland | 2,700,000 |
| Poland | 1,400,000 |
| Soviet Russia | 1,250,000 |
| Roumania | 800,000 |
| Yugoslavia | 600,000 |
| Hungary | 550,000 |

A variety of dialect peculiarities is distributed throughout these outliers of German speech, but the differences serve to emphasize the vigour and resilience of the language. The main linguistic features may be summarized as follows:

*U.S.A.* The so-called 'Pennsylvania Dutch' is a High German dialect containing many English words, and it is spoken by the descendants of German speakers who emigrated from the Rhenish Palatinate to Pennsylvania in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

*Czechoslovakia.* East Middle German dialects are spoken in the Erzgebirge region of Bohemia, in the Sudetenland and in parts of Moravia, while Upper German dialects predominate amongst the Germans in western and southern Bohemia. Farther east, to the south-east of the Hohe Tatra, along the Poprad valley in the Spiš (Zips) region of Slovakia, East Middle German (both Upper Saxon and Silesian) and Upper German (Bavarian-Austrian) have been preserved by the descendants of colonists who came from Saxony in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

*Switzerland.* 'Schwyzerdütsch', which comprises the Walser, Züricher, Berner and Glarner dialects, belongs to High Alemannic, but Low Alemannic is spoken in and around Basle.

*Poland.* Low German dialects are spoken in the Polish 'Corridor,' and there are areas of East Middle German (Silesian) around Poznan.

*Soviet Russia.* West Middle Germans formed the majority of the colonists whom Catherine II of Russia invited to settle on both banks of the Volga, to the south and east of Saratov, between 1763 and 1773. There was a small contingent of Bavarians, Swabians and Saxons in addition. Between 1853 and 1874 their numbers were increased by Mennonites from the Danzig district. In 1931 the total number of Volga Germans was 425,000, and they formed 66·5 % of the population of the Autonomous Soviet Republic of the Volga

Germans. The Rhenish Franconian which was spoken by the eighteenth-century colonists is heard elsewhere in the U.S.S.R. From Upper Hesse, colonists took it to Chernigov and the Crimea; from the West Rhenish Palatinate to Odessa; from the South Palatinate to Kherson and from the East Palatinate to Melitopol. A South Franconian dialect, that of Baden-Durlach in northern Alsace, is spoken in the Molochnaya basin north of Mariupol, and Swabian dialects from the valley of the Neckar between Marbach and Reutlingen are still spoken by colonies of Württemberg separatists in Transcaucasia and in the regions of the Sea of Azov and around Odessa. North Bavarian from east of Nuremberg is still heard at Jamburg on the Dnieper while Low German colonists speaking West Prussian from the plains of the Vistula near Danzig have settled in Mariupol.

*Roumania.* The predominant German dialect in Roumania is the Moselle Franconian of the West Middle German group. It is spoken by about 200,000 people in Transylvania (Siebenbürgen); they are the descendants of medieval colonists from the Rhineland, from the Eifel uplands and from the Sauerland.

*Yugoslavia.* The so-called 'Swabian' dialect of the Banat is really a development of the speech of settlers from the Rhenish Palatinate and it belongs to the West Middle German group. South Bavarian is spoken in Gottschee.

*Hungary.* The majority of the German speakers in Hungary are descended from colonists who settled in the region of the Theiss in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, and their dialects belong to the South Bavarian division of Upper German.

## Other Languages Spoken in Germany

A variety of languages has been spoken in Germany during past centuries; some of them have remained, others have disappeared. Of the non-Germanic languages once spoken on German soil, but now extinct, the most important were Prussian and Polabian. Old Prussian constituted the southern branch of the Baltic group of the Indo-European languages, the northern branch of which survives in Lithuanian and Lettish. It once extended from the Vistula in the west to the Pregel in the east, but gradually receded after the subjugation of the country in the thirteenth century (see p. 87). By 1677 it is said that there was only one speaker of Prussian left in the Kurische Nehrung. Today the name Prussian is applied to the Low

and High German dialects of west and east Prussia. Polabian, from *pro Labi*, 'on the Elbe', is sometimes used in the wider sense for the dialects of all the west Slavic tribes between the lower Elbe and the Oder from the Baltic in the north, including a part of East Holstein and the islands of Fehmarn and Rügen. In the Hanoverian Wendland, or Drawehn, the people still retain Slavic costumes and usages. Polabian became extinct in that region—its last refuge, towards the end of the seventeenth century, merely leaving a few traces in the vocabulary of the Elbe fishermen.

Of the other languages now spoken in Germany, those which belong to the Germanic and Slavic groups are the most important.

*Germanic*

*Danish.* Danish belongs to the East Norse branch of the North Germanic group. Since Germany ceded to Denmark, after a plebiscite in 1920, the region of North Schleswig, the number of Danish speakers in the Reich has consistently decreased and in 1938 they numbered about 6,000.

*Frisian.* Of the non-*deutsch* (Anglo-Frisian) Germanic dialects once spoken in the coastal regions of the north-west, Frisian dialects have survived in a few areas. By the end of the twelfth century Frisians thrust out from their ancestral home between the north of the Rhine and the Ems, crossed the Lauwers and pushed on to the Weser. They became known as the East Frisians to distinguish them from the West (Lauwers) Frisians. They occupied the islands of Borkum, Juist, Norderney, Baltrum, Langeoog, Spiekeroog and Wangeroog. Though East Frisian flourished during the medieval period, from the Reformation onwards it could not stand against Low German, which in Oldenburg took the name of 'Ostfriesisch'. East Frisian proper is today spoken only in a small outlier in the Ems area. This, known as the Saterland, consists of three parishes with 4,000 Frisian speakers, and it is unlikely that an East Frisian dialect survives anywhere else.

The other varieties of Frisian spoken in Germany are: (i) the North Frisian dialects spoken along the coastal strip or 'marsch' of Schleswig and in the 'halligs' or low islands, almost awash at high tide, of Nordmarsch-Langness, Gröda, Oland and Hooge, and (ii) the Island Frisian spoken on Heligoland, Sylt, Amrum and Föhr. The first group of dialects is spoken by about 9,100 people, so that, with a total of island dialect speakers of 6,600, the grand total of these northerly Frisians is 15,700.

*Yiddish.* This term (*jiddisch, judendeutsch*) is the term generally employed to describe varieties of German modified by the Jews. According to some, the Rhenish Palatinate was its ultimate place of origin and it began to emerge in the medieval period on an East Middle German basis, thus showing some Upper German characteristics as well. On its way to Poland, Galicia, the Ukraine, Bukovina and the Baltic provinces, Yiddish appears to have been profoundly influenced by the Colonial East Middle German as well as by Hebrew and various Slavonic languages.

*Slavic*

Apart from Polish, which is spoken by about 800,000 people, and Czech, with some 31,000 speakers, there are smaller groups of West Slavic languages of which the remnants persist to the present day. These are Pomoranian and Wendish.

*Pomoranian.* Pomoranian is of an archaistic Polish type and is used in the north-east corner of Pomerania mainly by fishermen and peat cutters and in the Polish 'Corridor'. There are about 140,000 speakers of Pomoranian dialects, distributed between the northern branch (Slovinzian and North Cassubian) and the southern branch (including Saborian).

*Wendish* (or *Sorb*). The Wends have been settled since the sixth century in two regions, namely, in the Prussian administrative districts of Frankfurt-am-Oder (with Kottbus and Lubben) and Liegnitz (with Lower Lusatia), and in the Saxon administrative district of Bautzen (with Kamenz, Lessing's birthplace, and Upper Lusatia). Wendish, which is now spoken by about 62,000 people, is a language closely related to Czech; it is divided into Upper and Lower Wendish, each of which has developed a literary medium in Catholic Upper Lusatia or in Protestant Lower Lusatia respectively.

## RELIGION

### Religious Disunity—Distribution of the Confessions

Germany, 'the land of the Reformation', was also one of the lands in which the Counter-Reformation was most successful. The religious wars of the sixteenth century and the bloody and devastating Thirty Years' War (1618–48) were the result of this fact. They left bitter memories of intensive strife, and they contributed to perpetuate the territorial divisions which prevented German unity. The rise of 'Protestant' Prussia as a rival to 'Catholic'

Austria gave the religious question an acutely political character in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Bismarck's *Kleindeutsch* (Little German) solution of German unity, under Prussia's hegemony with Austria excluded, was repugnant even to many of Prussia's own Catholic subjects. '*Consummatum est.* Austria expelled from Germany . . . all my ideals are collapsing', wrote August Reichensperger, a Rhineland Catholic, in 1866. Even when the German Empire had been created a politico-religious struggle at once broke out. And it is no accident, though it is one of the ironies of history, that Adolf Hitler, a Catholic Austrian by birth, has, on the





Fig. 5. Religions in Germany

Based on Diercke, *Schulatlas*, p. 140 (Braunschweig and Hamburg, 1924). The frontiers are those of 1938.

one hand, fulfilled the dream of German Catholics of the nineteenth century by creating *Grossdeutschland*, but has only been able to do so as leader of a movement so fiercely nationalist that it seeks to undermine all forms of genuine Christian belief and to create a new national German Church, on a racial basis, from which Catholic and Protestant alike recoil in horror.

The geographical distribution of the three main religious creeds —Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist—in Germany cannot be described in simple terms of a Protestant north and a Catholic south (Fig. 5). The north-central plain, including Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg, Hanover, and the old provinces of Prussia—Brandenburg, Pomerania, and East Prussia—as well as Saxony, Brunswick, Thuringia, and the cities of Bremen and Hamburg—all have very large Protestant majorities, in some cases exceeding 85% of the population. In Oldenburg, Hessen-Nassau and Hesse, though they are predominantly Protestant, there are very substantial Catholic minorities. But, both to the west and east of the northern plain—in the Rhineland and Westphalia, as in Polish Pomorze and in Silesia—there are Catholic majorities. And in the south, although Bavaria is overwhelmingly Catholic, two-fifths of the people of Baden and a majority of those of Württemberg are Protestant. A comparison of the census figures for 1933 with those for 1939 shows the effects of Hitler's rule clearly in three respects. Firstly, the recovery of the Saar (1935) and the annexation of Austria (1938) and of the so-called 'Sudetenland' regions of Czechoslovakia in 1939 reduced the percentage of Protestants to Catholics in this

*Distribution of Population in Germany in* 1933 *and* 1939 *according to religious belief*

| Year | Total Population | Evangelical | Roman Catholic | Jews | God-believers (*Gott-glaübige*) | Without belief |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1933 | 65,218,461 | 40,865,258 | 21,171,991 | 499,682 | — | 2,437,043 |
| 1939 | 79,375,281 | 42,636,218 | 31,943,932 | 307,614 | 2,745,893 | 1,208,005 |

Source: Based on the official census returns issued by the German Reich Statistical Office.

*Grossdeutschland*, as compared with the *Kleindeutschland* of 1933, from 62–32 to 50–38. The German annexations since 1939—Alsace-Lorraine, Western Poland—continued this process, so that now *Grossdeutschland* has a ratio of Protestants to Catholics of 48·7–45·6. Secondly, despite the inclusion in 1939 of the once very large Jewish population of Vienna, there has been a sharp decline of 200,000 in the number of Jews as compared with 1933,

the figure for which had already shown a reduction of 65,000 on that for 1925 (564,379). In view of the ruthless deportation of the Jews to the east since 1939 it is probable that German Jewry has now almost ceased to exist. Thirdly, the new category of non-Christian believers (*Gottglaübige*) introduced into the census of 1939 refers to the new heathenism. Its growth no doubt accounts for the reduction of 50% in those who in 1933 officially described themselves as 'without belief' (*glaubenslose*).

## The Protestant Churches before 1933

Luther drew a sharp distinction between the spheres of religion and politics, and his reliance on the German princes for support against the Papacy and the Empire led to the acceptance by his followers at Augsburg (1555) of the principle 'cuius regio, eius religio'. The secular ruler was to decide the religion to be followed by his subjects and, in Lutheran states, he became the 'summus episcopus' with almost unlimited powers of control over the organization and discipline of the Church. The prominence of St. Paul's injunction 'Obey the powers that be, for they are ordained of God' in Lutheran thought and teaching has combined with other forces to stamp the Lutheran Churches with a character of political conservatism, which has persisted to the present time.

The growth of Calvinism, with its greater insistence upon the application of Christian ethics to social and political life, and its self-governing system of presbyteries, did something to correct the tendency to authoritarianism in politics in those parts of Germany, especially the Rhineland and Westphalia, where it was strongest. But it added to the religious divisions already existing and, not only in Nassau and the Palatinate, where it became dominant, but even more in the old Prussian provinces, where it remained a minority creed, German Calvinism came to rely on the support of the princes almost as much as Lutheranism itself.

The effect of the 'cuius regio, eius religio' principle was that no single, united Protestant Church ever developed in Germany. There were, instead, a large number of separate territorial *Landeskirchen* (Churches of a land or state). So deeply rooted was the territorial principle that, when Prussia annexed Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and Frankfurt-am-Main in 1866, all these states retained their separate Churches. Both in the constitution of the German Empire (1871) and in that of the German Republic (1919), religion was left to be dealt with

by the individual states or 'Lands' (*Länder*). The *Landeskirchen*, therefore, maintained their separate identities, and there were still twenty-eight in 1933, Hanover having two—one Lutheran, one Calvinist (Fig. 6).




Fig. 6. The territorial boundaries of Protestant Churches in Germany, 1927, including both Lutheran and Calvinist Churches

Based on Santoro, C., *Vier Jahre Hitler-Deutschland*, p. 295 (Berlin, 1937)

The Churches of the old Prussian union are numbered according to provinces, thus: Pr.1, Pr.2, etc. Churches of territories lost by the Treaty of Versailles, but remaining in communion with Churches of the old Prussian union, are numbered A.1, A.2, etc. Other Churches are numbered 1–24.

*Key to numbers :—*

*Old Prussian Union :* Pr.1, East Prussia; Pr.2, Brandenburg; Pr.3, Pomerania; Pr.4, Grenzmark; Pr.5, Silesia; Pr.6, Saxony; Pr.7, Westphalia; Pr.8, Rhineland.

*Territories lost at Versailles :* A.1, Memel; A.2, Danzig; A.3, Parts of former provinces of West Prussia and Posen; A.4, Upper Silesia.

*Other Churches :* 1. Lutheran Church of Hanover; 2. Calvinist Church of Hanover; 3. Schleswig-Holstein; 4. Hesse-Cassel; 5. Nassau; 6. Frankfurt-am-Main; 7. Bavaria; 8. Palatinate; 9. Saxony; 10. Württemberg; 11. Baden; 12. Hesse; 13. Thuringia; 14. Reuss; 15. Mecklenburg-Schwerin; 16. Mecklenburg-Strelitz; 17. Oldenburg; 18. Lübeck in Oldenburg; 19. Birkenfeld; 20. Brunswick; 21. Anhalt; 22. Waldeck; 23. Lippe-Detmold; 24. Schaumburg-Lippe; 25. Lübeck; 26. Bremen; 27. Hamburg.

*The Old Prussian Union*

The rigour of princely control of the Protestant Churches was somewhat relaxed during the eighteenth century. Frederick the Great, himself an agnostic, was willing to grant toleration to all faiths in his dominions. But the General Prussian Land Law of 1794, whilst recognizing the historic Churches as corporations of public law enjoying special powers and privileges, retained the king's control over the appointment of church officers, and a general right of supervision over all their public activities.

After 1815, Frederick William III of Prussia showed his determination to use his ecclesiastical power by imposing unity on his Protestant subjects. The tercentenary of the Reformation (1817) was made the occasion to unite in a single external organization the Lutherans and Calvinists of the Prussian provinces as they existed after 1815. But the royal attempt to impose uniformity of belief and of liturgy was strenuously resisted and had to be abandoned. The result was to add a third category of parishes (*Gemeinde*) to the two already existing. Besides Lutheran and Calvinist there came into existence a large number of united (*unierte*) parishes in which ' the creeds of the united Evangelical Church, in so far as they were in agreement with one another ' were accepted. The same result also occurred in the other states, which imitated Frederick William III's example (e.g. Hesse-Darmstadt, Baden, Palatinate).

Even within a single *Landeskirche*, therefore, there might be wide differences of theological outlook, and this was rendered the more certain by the fact that in some of them (e.g. Rhineland and Bremen) the adherence of a pastor to any confessional document (*Bekenntnisschrift*) was not insisted upon.

*Theological Diversity*

It is not surprising, therefore, that German Protestantism during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has presented striking divergencies of theological opinion amongst the clergy. Whilst, in the middle of the nineteenth century, pietism of a fundamentalist type became a power, particularly in central and eastern Prussia, where it still survives, the rapid and vigorous development of the higher criticism in Germany in the hands of such writers as Ritschl, Strauss, Bauer, and Harnack, naturally increased the variety of interpretation of Christian doctrine. In certain cases it led to extreme results. Before 1914 Pastor Kalthoff of Bremen, who denied

the historicity of Christ altogether, was preaching sermons on texts from Nietzsche and had joined with the scientist Haeckel in founding the League of Monists (*Monistenbund*). Though, in the large majority of Protestant parishes throughout Germany, both before and after the last war, a traditional form of Christian belief, Lutheran or Calvinist, continued to be taught, there can be little doubt that the spread of biblical criticism and of ' liberal ' theology prepared the way for the adoption, by passionate nationalists, of a German Christianity, adapted to national needs, and even opened the door to the new heathenism.

*Political Conservatism*

The close connection of the Evangelical Churches with the authoritarian rulers of the individual states inevitably fostered political conservatism. Moreover, ' crown ' and private patronage exercised a very wide influence. In Prussia, before 1914, the presentation to some 3,000 out of 7,315 parishes was alternately in the hands of the crown and of the parish itself, and that to over 2,000 more in private hands.

The rise of the Social-Democratic party, after 1871, with its definitely anti-religious propaganda, served to alienate many of the working class from the Churches, and in the years before 1914 some 15–20,000 withdrawals by public declaration of unbelief took place each year. Some of these may have been based on a desire to escape church taxation, but the lowest income levels were not taxed for church purposes and the very widespread abstention of the working class from church attendance indicated that there were many who had no active Christian belief. It was natural that the Evangelical Churches should resist Socialist anti-religious propaganda, but their efforts to attract the working class by other means were not very successful. The Christian-Social (*Christlich-Sozial*) movement was given an unfortunate anti-semitic twist by one of its founders, Pastor Adolf Stöcker, and when William II in 1894 withdrew his earlier directions to the clergy to concern themselves with social matters, the movement declined. Despite their control of religious teaching in the schools, the activities of the Home Mission, and the work of nursing sisterhoods, the Evangelical Churches never gained a hold over the industrial masses at all comparable with that exercised in the Rhineland, the Ruhr and Upper Silesia by the Roman Catholic Church through the Catholic (Christian) trade unions and other social and religious organizations.

*Evangelical Church Organization*

The constitution of twenty-eight different *Landeskirchen* cannot be examined here. It must suffice to examine the outline of that of the Old Prussian Union as it developed after 1815.

Frederick William III was a convinced absolutist and aimed at strengthening his control, as ' summus episcopus ', over all church life in his dominions. His creation of consistories and his appointment of General Superintendents (1828) for all the provinces were both measures for strengthening the disciplinary control of the king over the Church, and it was only unwillingly that he accepted the necessity of recognizing the presbyteries and synods of the Calvinist parishes (*Gemeinden*) of the Rhineland and Westphalia, where the influence of the Dutch Reformed Church had kept alive the spirit of independence and self-government. Under Frederick William IV (1840–1861), the revolutionary movement of 1848 and the grant of a constitution to Prussia seemed to threaten the old authority of the *Landesherr* over the Church. But the reaction which followed 1848, and the determined clinging of the Church itself to the royal authority, preserved it from the control of the *Landtag*.* The Prussian Ministry of Public Worship (*Kultusministerium*)† exercised a considerable administrative jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters. But the *Evangelische Obenkirchenrat* (Supreme Evangelical Church Council) created by the king in 1850 and responsible to him, exercised the royal control over church doctrine, worship, training and discipline of the clergy, and appointments, through the consistories and the General Superintendents of the provinces.

In 1873 and 1876, William I set up a complete system of synods for the parish, the ecclesiastical district (*Kreis*), the province and, finally, for all the provinces of the Old Prussian Union (the General Synod). Self-government, subject to the control of both the Supreme Church Council and of the Ministry of Public Worship, was thus thrust upon the Old Prussian Union by the king himself.

With the disappearance of the Prussian monarchy in 1918, the problem of ultimate authority in the *Landeskirchen* and of their relation to a democratic parliament had to be faced. The ' summus episcopus ' was gone, but his place was filled by asserting for the Church itself the full right of self-government over its own affairs.

* i.e. the Prussian ' Parliament '.

† *Kultusministerium* is not directly translatable. The Ministry dealt with education as well as with the affairs of the churches.

By September 1922, a complete constitution for the Evangelical Church of the Old Prussian Union had been worked out, which, together with the constitutions of the other *Landeskirchen* of Prussia, was given the approval of the Prussian State by a law of 8 April 1924. The parish (*Gemeinde*) was the basis of the whole (cf. article 4, 'The Church must, at every level of its organization, serve the parish') and was furnished with (1) an administrative council (*Gemeindekirchenrat*) consisting of the pastor and the (elected) elders, (2) an elected parish council, and (3) a parish general assembly (*Gemeindeversammlung*). From this basic unit a representative and an administrative system was built up.

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Parish* | Assembly | Representative Council | Pastor and elected elders (Presbytery) |
| *District (Kreis)* | Synod—consisting of Superintendent, Clergy of District. Twice as many laymen, elected by parishes | Standing Committee of Synod—consisting of Superintendent and four members elected by Synod | Superintendent |
| *Province* | Provincial Synod—consisting of :—<br>i. Members elected by corporate bodies of parishes<br>ii. One representative of Theological Faculty of University | Provincial Church—Council (President of Provincial Synod ; General Superintendents ; elected members) | General Superintendents and Consistory (all for life and appointed by Church Senate) |
| *The Church as a whole* | General Synod—consisting of :—<br>i. Members elected by Provincial Synods<br>ii. General Superintendents and Presidents of Provincial Synods<br>iii. Representatives of Theological Faculties of Universities and Associations concerned with religious instruction | Church Senate—consisting of :—<br>i. President of General Synod<br>ii. Presidents of Provincial Church Councils and of Consistories<br>iii. Ten members elected by General Synod<br>iv. President, Vice-President and two other members of the Supreme Church Council | |

A Supreme Church Council, elected for life by the Church Senate, with a president and two vice-presidents, one lay, one clerical, formed

the final stage of the structure, and was charged both with the representation of the Church towards the state and also with the ultimate supervision of the internal administration.

*The Evangelical Clergy*

In the normal life of the German Evangelical Churches, the general superintendents are the nearest equivalent to the English bishops, though the idea of episcopal succession is entirely rejected by Lutherans and Calvinists alike. In some *Landeskirchen* (e.g. Hanover, Württemberg, Bavaria before 1933, and in many others since), the title of bishop was adopted to designate the head of the regional church. The General Superintendents in each Prussian province exercised a wide authority over the Superintendents, who may be compared to English archdeacons, and over every aspect of church life. They conducted ordinations, confirmations and inductions, and took part, with others appointed by the provincial consistory, in the examination of candidates for the pastorate.

Such candidates must have spent three to four years studying in the theological faculty of a university, and, after a first examination, must then spend one year at a theological college and another as an assistant in a parish. A further examination followed, and a candidate was usually twenty-five before he became a full-fledged pastor (*Pfarrer*).

*The Evangelical Church from* 1918 *to* 1933

In general the German Evangelical Churches suffered little by the revolution of 1918 and, in gaining full self-government, gained much. Threats made in various states to suppress their financial contributions to the Churches were not carried out, and, after 1924, the more conservative character of the governments in the Reich and in most of the states removed this danger. Even in Prussia, where a coalition of the Social-Democrats and the Centre (Catholic) held office for many years, the hostility of the Social-Democrats to religion definitely waned, whilst the Centre were as anxious as the Evangelicals themselves to retain the influence of the Churches over religious instruction in the schools. Although the individual states retained important rights of supervision over the public activities of the Churches and over their administration of their finances, they also continued to give the aid of the civil power in the collection of church taxation.

The social work of the Protestant Churches continued to develop under the Republic. Its centre was the Home Mission, with its headquarters at Berlin-Dahlem, which in 1930 controlled 360 hospitals and a chain of homes and welfare institutions. It employed 42,000 deaconesses and a much larger number of welfare workers and its organization included the institute founded by Friedrich von Bodelschwingh (see p. 54) at Bethel (near Bielefeld), which had branches not only throughout Germany but also abroad.

The German Evangelical Churches also set up in 1922 a German Evangelical Church League (*Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchenbund*) with a central Church Assembly (*Kirchentag*), consisting of 210 members, of whom 150 were selected by the regional synods, whilst the remainder represented the theological faculties of the universities and other church organizations. There was also a smaller advisory Church Council (*Kirchenbundesrat*) and an executive committee (*Kirchenausschuss*) of thirty-six members, presided over by the president of the Old Prussian Evangelical Church Council. The League had offices in Berlin. It made no pretensions to providing a central government for the German Evangelical Churches, which remained wholly autonomous as before. But it provided a forum for the interchange of religious opinion and a machinery by which the German Protestant Churches could both co-ordinate their activities at home and speak to the Churches of other countries.

Despite the discomfort felt between 1918 and 1933 by many strongly nationalist clergy at living under a formally democratic government, the most immediate danger to the Churches came no longer from the political Left but from the overheated nationalism of those, both within and outside the Churches, for whom God was a tribal German God, and Hitler was his prophet. Not until too late did the majority of Evangelical clergy and religious laymen awake to the fact that what they had regarded as the extravagances of the extreme Nazis were of the essence of the movement itself.

## The Roman Catholic Church before 1933

The relations of the Roman Catholic Church with the states of Germany naturally varied according to the religious complexion of the population and the attitude of their rulers. From 1815 to 1870, however, the position of Catholics in Germany tended to improve steadily. A concordat was concluded between the Papacy and

Bavaria in 1817, and an agreement of narrower range between the Papacy and Prussia in 1821. There was a serious struggle between the Prussian state and the Catholic Church over the question of mixed marriages in 1837, as a result of which the Archbishop of Cologne was arrested, and in 1844 a nationalist German-Catholic movement began in eastern Germany and rapidly created congregations in most of the larger German towns. But a compromise was reached on the question of mixed marriage and the German-Catholic movement faded away rapidly, and never constituted a real threat to German Catholicism. The liberal movement of 1848, and especially the Prussian Constitution of 1850, brought new gains. The Roman Catholic Church in Prussia now stood on a level of approximately legal equality with Protestantism, and was able to possess and administer funds for religious, cultural, educational and charitable purposes. A Catholic section was created in the Prussian Ministry of Public Worship (*Kultusministerium*), and Catholics exercised considerable influence at Court during the reign of Frederick William IV and the early years of William I.

These good relations ended in 1870. The vigorous condemnation of liberal ideas by the uncompromising Pope Pius IX, in the *Syllabus Errorum* (1864), and still more the Declaration of Papal Infallibility as an article of faith at the Vatican Council of 1870, profoundly stirred German Protestant opinion. A Protestant Association (*Protestantenverein*) was formed, many of the leaders of which were also prominent members of the National Liberal party. On the other hand, the defeat of Catholic Austria in 1866 and the creation of a united Germany, dominated by Protestant Prussia, alarmed Prussian Catholics and led to the formation of the Centre (Catholic) party in 1870, which adopted an attitude of opposition in the first Reichstag of the new German Empire.

### *The Kulturkampf*, 1871–90

Despite the strong feelings of his fervent Protestant allies in the National-Liberal party, aflame with nationalist pride after the victories over Austria and France, there can be little doubt that Bismarck had no intention in 1871 of endangering the newly-won national unity by entering upon a prolonged attack upon the Roman Catholic Church. But he was willing for many reasons to put that Church ' in its place '. Abroad Russia had broken off relations with the Vatican after the Polish insurrection of 1863, and Austria was

deeply offended by the Pope's attack on her new constitution of 1867. To cement relations with Russia; to improve them with Austria; to strike a blow at French clerical-nationalists and at the same time at the Centre party, with its following of 'disloyal' Poles, was attractive enough. But, if the vindication of the secular authority against Papal 'imperialism' also brought with it the enthusiastic support of the vast majority of Protestant Germans, and of his political allies, the National-Liberals, in particular, the grounds for action were even stronger.

In July 1871, by suppressing the Catholic section in the Prussian *Kultusministerium*, Bismarck entered upon what came to be known as the *Kulturkampf*, the cultural struggle. From the first the Prussian state took its stand on principles which its Catholic subjects could not possibly accept. After the promulgation of the dogma of Papal infallibility had been pronounced, a small minority of German Catholics refused to accept it. But, when the Prussian Minister of Public Worship announced that he proposed to treat teachers, who by refusing their adhesion to the new dogma had become heretics in Catholic eyes, as still members of the Roman Catholic Church and tried to force the teaching of such teachers on their Catholic pupils, he was, in effect, claiming for the Prussian state the right to decide the terms of membership of the Catholic Church. It is not surprising that the Catholic bishops of Germany, at their annual assembly at Fulda, the shrine of St. Boniface, unanimously protested.

From this false start, Bismarck went doggedly on. In November 1871, the Reichstag adopted, for the Empire as a whole, a new clause in the criminal code against the misuse of their pulpits by the clergy for political ends.* But it was in Prussia that anti-clerical legislation was fully developed. In March 1872, a school inspection law asserted the state's right to appoint all school inspectors, and in June by an administrative decree of doubtful legality the new and vigorously anti-Catholic Prussian Minister of Public Worship, Falk, forbade all members of religious orders to teach in schools. In May 1873, the campaign was carried much further. Four laws (the 'May laws') were passed: (1) limiting the rights of Catholic bishops to exercise ecclesiastical discipline; (2) prescribing the conditions of training and of state recognition of the clergy; (3) erecting a royal High Court of Ecclesiastical Discipline, with

* This clause, known as the *Kanzelparagraph*, was only repealed in 1927, but the Nazis reimposed it in a more drastic form after they came into power.

no appeal to Rome; and (4) providing for easy withdrawal from the Church by a simple declaration before a judge. At the same time the clauses of the Prussian Constitution, which safeguarded the rights of the Churches, were drastically modified in favour of the state.

*Catholic Passive Resistance*

So severe were these measures that even the Evangelical Supreme Council, as well as the Catholic episcopate, protested against them. For the Roman Catholic Church the only path open was that of passive resistance to laws, obedience to which violated the dictates of conscience. They continued to act as though the May laws had not been passed, and the Prussian state was forced both to imprison them and to pass further laws to deal with the administration of dioceses and livings whose bishop and priests had been arrested. Further state pressure was applied by a law of 1875, withholding state contributions to the salaries of all those condemned to loss of office for breach of the laws, and in May of that year all Orders and Congregations were banned from Prussia. Finally, it became necessary to pass a law of civil marriage, which was as distasteful to orthodox Protestants as to Catholics.

*Bismarck's Retreat*

Yet, despite every form of pressure, Catholic resistance continued. By 1876, eight Prussian sees were vacant and over 1,400 parishes were without lawfully appointed priests. But neither the Catholic Church in Germany, nor even the Centre party, was broken and Bismarck had begun to realize that the whole policy was misconceived. After Pius IX's death in 1879 he quickly opened negotiations with the new, and more conciliatory, Pope Leo XIII. In 1880, 1882 and 1883 laws substantially modifying the 'May laws' were passed, and in 1886–7 further legislation restored many of the rights previously enjoyed by German Catholics. Some losses which the Catholic Church in Prussia had suffered were not made good. The clauses of the Prussian Constitution were not restored, and the Jesuits and their allied Orders remained excluded.* The state, too, retained the right to object to all ecclesiastical appointments. But, in the main, the end of the

* The anti-Jesuit law was modified in 1904, but was only repealed in 1917 when the importance of good relations with the Vatican, in view of Germany's critical situation, was regarded as outweighing all other considerations.

*Kulturkampf* was a defeat for Bismarck and for the nationalist Protestants who had supported it.

### *The Roman Catholic Church from* 1888 *to* 1933

During William II's reign, the Catholic Church in Germany was able to live and work in peace and, indeed, to grow in prosperity and numbers. William II was determined to enlist the loyalty of his Catholic subjects by allowing no discrimination against them. Although the Pan-German movement in Austria under Schönerer embarked on a '*Los von Rom*' (Away from Rome) propaganda in the '90's, it met with no official encouragement from Germany, and no similar movement developed there. The political influence of the Centre party and of the Christian trade unions continued to grow, as did the social and educational activities of the Catholic Church.

The passage from the Empire to the Republic in 1918–19 was easier for the Roman Catholic Church than for the Protestant *Landeskirchen*, traditionally based on the princely authority of the secular ruler. Moreover, the democratic system, in a parliament divided into many parties, placed the Centre party on the fulcrum of power. In every Reich government from 1919 till 1933 there was at least one Centre party minister, and a series of the party's leaders—Wirth, Fehrenbach, Marx, Brüning—became Chancellors of the Reich. In Prussia, too, by effecting a coalition from 1920 to 1932 with the Social-Democrats, the Church retained its influence over its confessional schools and extended its influence in local and municipal government. Further concordats were successfully concluded with Bavaria (1924), with Prussia (1929) and with Baden (1932). That with Prussia was followed by a reorganization of the Catholic hierarchy in North Germany and the creation of new dioceses in areas which had previously been retained under the direct control of Rome. As a result, the whole of the German Reich was now organized in ecclesiastical provinces, each with an archbishop at its head (Fig. 7).

Since no one primate existed for Germany as a whole, the annual meeting of the German bishops at Fulda became the occasion of issuing pastoral letters from the whole episcopate to German Catholics. In addition to this meeting of the bishops, a meeting of delegates from all the lay associations, the Assembly of German Catholics (*Deutscher Katholikentag*), was held annually from 1880 up to the accession of the Nazis to power.

The religious and social activities of the Catholic Church under the Republic is shown by the membership of its monastic orders and social organizations. In 1927, the monastic orders had 7,428 houses with 91,881 inmates; in 1929, the central association of





Fig. 7. The Roman Catholic Church in Greater Germany

Based on official sources.

The metropolitan sees are named in full, the episcopal sees by the following abbreviations: A=Aachen; Au.=Augsburg; B=Berlin; Ba.=Bautzen; Br.=Brünn; Bu.=Budweiss; D=Danzig; E1=Eisenstadt (Church Province of Bamberg); E2=Eisenstadt (Church Province of Vienna); F=Fulda; Fr.=Frauenburg; G=Graz; H=Hildesheim; I=Innsbruck; K=Katowice; Kl.=Klagenfurt; Kö.=Königgrätz; L=Luxembourg; Le.=Leitmeritz; Lim.=Limburg; Li.=Linz; Lo.=Lodz; M=Meissen; Mü.=Münster; Mz.=Metz; O=Osnabrück; P=Passau; Pe.=Pelplin; Pl.=Plock; R=Regensburg; Ro.=Rottenburg; S=Speyer; Sc.=Schneidemühl; St.=Strasbourg; St. P=St. Polten; T=Trier; W=Würzburg; Wl.=Wloclawek.

Christian trade unions (*Gesamtverband der Christlichen Gewerkschaften*) had eighteen branches and 778,000 members; in 1926, the Catholic journeymen's unions had 4,327 local branches and 120,000 active members; the St Borromeo societies (*Borromausvereine*) for adult education had 4,327 branches and 200,000

members; the Caritas union (*Karitasverband*) had 80,000 welfare workers and an annual budget of 150 million marks; and in 1930, the German Youth-Strength (*Deutsche Jugendkraft*) movement, a 'blanket' organization for the sport activities of young Catholics, had 5,987 local branches and 700,000 members. All these and other associations were linked in the international association of the Catholic Church for social work, Catholic Action.

The prosperity resulting from the tacit alliance of German Catholicism with the republican system was to prove dangerous to the Church. Early in the *Kulturkampf* the nationalist *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* had spoken of Catholic priests as 'men without a fatherland' (*Vaterlandslose*). With the rise of Hitlerism and the development of a still fiercer nationalism than that of the '70's, the political activities of the Centre party laid the Catholic Church in Germany open to attack. The part played by Erzberger, the left-wing leader of the Centre, in the Reichstag peace resolution of 1917, and the fact that he had signed the armistice, were used to suggest lack of patriotism in all Catholics. And the supra-national organization of the Roman Catholic Church, the religious allegiance of its members to a foreign pope, were used as propaganda against it. Both its nationalism and its racial philosophy made National-Socialism, in or out of power, even more necessarily hostile to the international Roman Catholic Church than to the more national Protestant Churches of Germany. Before 1933, some at least of the Catholic bishops of Germany had recognized the danger to Christianity represented by the Nazi creed; the Bishop of Mainz in 1930 had told the faithful of his diocese that no Catholic should be a member of the Nazi party, that no priest should allow members of the party to take an official part in church ceremonies, and that no Catholic holding the principles of the party should be admitted to the sacraments. In February 1931, the eight Bavarian bishops issued a pastoral to the faithful of their diocese condemning five 'false doctrines' of National-Socialism which put race before religion, reject the Old Testament, deny Papal primacy, cherish the plan of an undogmatic National German Church and, in Article 24 of the Party programme, elevate the moral feeling of the German race above the criterion of Christian morality, which is essentially universal.

But German Catholics and the German bishops were not unanimous in regarding a reconciliation with National-Socialism as hopeless. The archbishop of Freiburg, Dr Gröber, and the

bishop of Osnabrück both clung for a long time to the hope that all would be well, and in Rome itself the present pope, then Cardinal Secretary of State, who had been Papal Nuncio in Berlin, also recommended a policy of 'appeasement'. Despite its close connection in the past with the Centre party, neither the Catholic hierarchy nor the Catholic laity were unaffected by the great wave of nationalist feeling which carried Hitler to power. The fact that Papen, the practising Catholic and ex-deputy of the Centre, had been the instrument of bringing Hitler into office, and himself was Vice-Chancellor, assisted many Catholics to ignore the racialist and anti-Christian Nazi propaganda and to delude themselves with vain hopes of arriving at a working compromise between the claims of the party and those of the Church.

## German Jewry

The emancipation of the Jews and the grant of full rights of citizenship took place later in Germany than in western Europe. In Prussia, Jews were recognized as citizens during the war of liberation, but the law of 1812 was whittled away during the period of reaction after 1815, and it was not until 1848 that they gained equality of rights. Between 1848 and 1866, most of the other German states followed suit, and after the foundation of the Empire in 1871 a Reich law extended full citizenship to Jews throughout the Empire.

The religious organization of the Jewish, like that of the Christian Churches, was a matter of state, not of Reich law. Under a Prussian law of 1847, its congregational basis was recognized in the old Prussian provinces, and *Synagogen-Gemeinden* (Synagogue Congregations) acquired the position of public corporations.

After the revolution of 1918, a union of Jewish congregations was formed in Prussia (*Landesverband Jüdischer Gemeinden*) in 1922. It consisted of some 700 congregations with a central office in Berlin. Its organs, built up from elected representatives of the congregations, included a provincial council in every Prussian province, and a central representative Assembly (*Verbandstag*) elected for four years by secret, universal and proportional ballot; the latter met once a year. This assembly in turn chose a central Council (*Rat*) of thirty-five members, which included six rabbis and two university teachers. It also constituted committees to deal with religion, education, welfare and legal questions. Similar organizations were created in the other German states.

Outside their own communion the religious influence of German Jewry was not greatly felt, despite the great ability and prominence of many Jews in public life and in the professions. The ruthless persecution of the Jews in Germany, as a result of Nazi racial doctrines and of their need for a political scapegoat, is described on pp. 490–1.

## The Churches under the Nazis

### *Nazi Policy*

So far as the official pronouncements of the Nazi party were concerned the Churches might seem to have little to fear, and much to hope for, from the accession of the Nazis to power. Point 24 of the party programme ran: 'We demand the freedom of all religious confessions (*Bekenntnisse*) in the state, so far as they do not endanger its stability (*Bestand*) or conflict with the sense of social propriety* and morality of the Germanic race. The party, as such, represents the standpoint of a positive Christianity, without committing itself to any particular confession. It fights the Jewish-materialist spirit within and outside us (*in und ausser uns*) and is persuaded that a lasting recovery of our people can only succeed from within outwards on the basis of common advantage before personal advantage (*Gemeinnutz vor Eigennutz*)'.

Not only was the party thus committed to 'positive' Christianity but the Führer himself had shown, in *Mein Kampf*, a genuine appreciation at least of the strength and importance of religious belief and had explicitly condemned the *Los von Rom* (Away from Rome) movement of the Pan-German Schönerer in the '90's in Austria for its failure to realize the depth and strength of religious forces.† Even since 1933, Hitler has been careful to refrain from identifying himself in public with the more extreme manifestations of anti-Christian doctrine and practice indulged in by other party leaders. Though it is almost certainly true that he is a thoroughgoing believer in Alfred Rosenberg's ideology and may well have said to Kurt Ludecke 'Of course I myself am a heathen to the core',‡ Hitler has refrained from openly attacking either the Protestant or

* The word used, *Sittlichkeitsgefühl*, is untranslatable. Its meaning includes the sense of what is 'proper', 'decent', 'right'.

† Hitler's religious outlook, as revealed in *Mein Kampf*, has been summarized by Professor N. Baynes in his translation of Hitler's speeches, Vol. I, pp. 333–340 (Oxford, 1942).

‡ Kurt Ludecke, *I Knew Hitler*, p. 465 (London, 1938). It is obvious that any book purporting to record conversations, but published much later, must be treated with reserve.

Catholic churches, whilst giving his subordinates all the necessary powers to carry through the ultimate Nazi aim—the establishment of a single German National Church based on the National-Socialist *Weltanschauung* (philosophy of life) as expounded by Alfred Rosenberg in his *Myth of the Twentieth Century*.

The appointment of Rosenberg to be the Führer's 'delegate' (*Beauftragter*) for the whole spiritual and philosophical education of the Nazi party gives his views on religion and religious policy the highest official backing and, taken in conjunction with the utterances of Baldur von Schirach, former Reich Leader of the Hitler Youth and still Reich Leader of the educational training (*Erziehung*) of the Youth, there can be no doubt about the objects at which that education aims. Moreover, the statements of other party leaders, more especially of Ley, who is not only head of the Labour Front and of its adult education organization, but is also directly responsible for the Adolf Hitler schools (the special training schools for young Nazi leaders), as well as the bitter anti-religious propaganda of the very important S.S. paper *Schwarze Korps*, reveal a community of mind and intention amongst the most powerful leaders of the party which has been amply confirmed by the actual treatment of the churches since 1933.

Judging then both by their words and their actions, the Nazi programme is to create a single German National Church on a strictly racial-nationalist basis. The figure of Christ would, at least temporarily, be retained but in the guise of an heroic Nordic leader, done to death by the Jews, misunderstood and misinterpreted by the Jew, St Paul. For the universal appeal of Christianity would be substituted the call of the blood within the German racial group; for its characteristic virtues of meekness and charity, the heroic virtues suitable for war—pride of race, hardness, and hate of all non-German forces; for its doctrines of repentance and redemption through Christ, the denial of any need for repentance or of any reality in the doctrine of sin.

The task of creating such a German National Church might well have seemed hopeless in 1933, and the Nazi leaders were aware of the difficulties with which they were faced. They have, as in all other spheres, adjusted their tactics to the situation. A direct frontal attack on the Churches, with an open avowal of their aims, would have been fatal to their hopes of success. They recognized that the Catholic Church would be the more difficult to destroy and therefore made a Concordat with the Pope in 1933. They knew that the

small frankly pagan groups, which had emerged before they came to power, would have no appeal to the great mass of the German people. But they had, in the German Christian Movement (*Glaubensbewegung Deutsche Christen*)* led by Pastor Hossenfelder, and in its origins blessed by Rosenberg's predecessor, H. S. Chamberlain (see p. 13) himself, a possible means of capturing the German Evangelical Churches for a nationalist anti-semitic form of Christianity. Meanwhile, by the steady suppression of the activities of all religious youth organizations, by the absorption of all the children of Germany in the Hitler Youth, and by the substitution of 'undenominational' for confessional schools, they could hope to paganize the rising generation and thus to lay the foundation of the German National Church of the future. In this policy the weapons used by the party have been many. One of the most potent has been to denounce any protest by the Churches against Nazi pagan propaganda, or any activities on their part which impinged on social life as 'political', and therefore beyond their competence. But there have been many others, from malicious slander to the concentration camp. The Nazi *Kulturkampf* against Christianity has proved far more persistent, malignant and dangerous than that of Bismarck. For Bismarck had neither the desire nor the intention to destroy the bases of Christian belief. The Nazi leaders aim at nothing less than this.

### *The Nazis and the Evangelical Churches*

More strongly than the Catholic, the Protestant pastors and clergy were affected by the nationalist enthusiasm that swept Germany in 1933, and their confidence in their new rulers might seem even better founded than that of the Catholics. For the aged President was a pious Protestant and the majority of the ministers were Protestant nationalist laymen, one at least (Schwerin-Krosigk) a devout member of Pastor Niemöller's congregation at Dahlem. But Nazi methods and German-Christian principles and practices soon undeceived them.

In April 1933, the German-Christians held a conference in Berlin, under the patronage of Göring and Frick, at which the demand was put forward for new church elections, for the summons of a Reich synod to take in hand the task of creating a united Church

* The movement was begun in 1921 as the League for a German Church (*Bund für Deutsche Kirche*), confined to Evangelical Christians. Hitler had objected to this limitation and the League was renamed in 1932.

under a Reich bishop, to consist of 'Aryan' German Christians, thus excluding those of Jewish race. At the same time, Ludwig Müller, an army chaplain from East Prussia, was appointed Hitler's special representative (*Vertrauensmann*) and plenipotentiary in matters relating to the Evangelical Churches.

Meanwhile the German Evangelical Church League (see p. 43) appointed a committee to draft a unified constitution for the Churches. The committee co-opted Müller, and in May issued a manifesto calling for the union of the *Landeskirchen* and for the appointment of a Reich bishop who, with the aid of a spiritual ministry and of a national synod, should direct the Church's activities. But, when Müller claimed to be appointed to the office, his demand was rejected in favour of Dr von Bodelschwingh (see p. 43) and a large majority of the representatives of the regional Churches confirmed this choice. In reply the Reich Minister for Education, Rust, appointed a lawyer with strong German-Christian sympathies, Dr Jäger, as state Commissar for the Prussian Evangelical Church with wide powers. Jäger at once put the clergy under police supervision and dismissed the General Superintendent of the Old Prussian Union, Dr Dibelius,* from office. This interference of the state in church affairs led von Bodelschwingh to resign. The quarrel between the Protestant Churches and the National-Socialist state had begun.

It was in an atmosphere of police terror against the opponents of the German Christians, supplemented by threatening bands of young S.A. men and by intense party propaganda, that the Church elections of 23 July 1933 were held. The German Christians obtained large majorities and the work of *Gleichschaltung* (co-ordinating) the German Churches with the state was pressed rapidly forward. Already (28 June) Müller had assumed the office of president of the German Evangelical Church League and on 7 July had been appointed by Jäger head of the Old Prussian Union. On 14 July 1933 a new constitution for a single Reich Church was proclaimed as a Reich law. It embodied the *Führer-prinzip* by abolishing all elected synods and appointing, under the Reich bishop, a bishop as 'Leader' of each of the state Churches. On 6 September the 'Aryan' clause was applied to all officials, spiritual

* Dr Dibelius had been the preacher at the Potsdam service held to celebrate the establishment of the new Hitler government on 21 March 1933. It was significant that Hitler and Goebbels attended neither the Protestant nor the Catholic services held on that occasion. Instead they placed a wreath on the grave of the Nazi 'hero' Horst Wessel.

as well as temporal, so that not only converted Jews but anyone with a Jewish grandparent would henceforth be unable to hold office in the German Churches. Finally, on 27 September 1933, the National Synod, which had resulted from the July elections, met at Wittenberg, the scene of Luther's labours, and acclaimed Müller as Reich bishop (popularly abbreviated to 'Reibi') of a united German Evangelical Church. For a moment it seemed that the Nazis had succeeded in founding a single German-Christian National Church on a racial basis.

But disappointment was at hand for the Nazis. A strong religious opposition to the whole process of 'co-ordination' by the state had been forming. The Young Reformation Movement (*Jung-reformatorische Bewegung*), founded in May 1933, developed rapidly and, under the leadership of Pastor Niemöller, submarine commander of the last war, a Pastors' Emergency League was formed, with a 'brethren's council' as an administrative body. Two conferences held at Ulm (April 1934) and at Barmen (May 1934) resulted in the definite rejection of the Reich bishop's authority and led to the creation of the Confessional (*Bekenntniss*) Church. The fundamental principles of this opposition were loyalty to the Bible and to the creeds, and a refusal to accept the dictation of the state in matters of faith.

This movement of protest was greatly assisted by the scandal created by a speech of Dr Krause at a great gathering of German Christians in the Sport Palast in Berlin (13 November 1933). Krause's outspoken attack on the Old Testament as Jewish and the violence of his racialism opened the eyes of the great body of Evangelical Germans to the danger threatening their religion. Since members of the new Supreme Church Council had attended the meeting, and had made no protest at it, they were regarded as involved and the flood of protests both at home and abroad against Krause's speech discredited the German Christian movement as a whole. Krause was at once dismissed from his offices, and the Reich bishop Müller himself sought for a moment to placate religious opinion. Thus, on 16 November, Müller issued a law suspending the application of the Aryan clause in the state Churches. But his essential insincerity was shown by his further measures. On 19 December 1933, he assented to the incorporation of the Evangelical Youth organization, 700,000 strong, in the Hitler Jugend under Baldur von Schirach, who had been appointed Reich Leader of the Hitler Youth in June 1933. Since von Schirach had already

declared that he was neither Catholic nor Protestant but believed only in Germany, Müller's action constituted a gross betrayal of the Christian cause. His other actions, which included the reimposition of the Aryan clause, confirmed the orthodox leaders in their suspicion and dislike of the Reich bishop's attitude. The Pastors' Emergency League took up the challenge and their struggle with the state has continued ever since.

In its early stages the struggle was a fluctuating one. In October 1934, Jäger, having failed to secure the *Gleichschaltung* of the Lutheran Churches of Württemberg and Bavaria, resigned in face of the popular support given to Bishops Wurm and Meiser, and at the same time the Confessional Church formed a provisional government of the German Evangelical Church (*Vorlaüfige Leitung der Deutscher Evangelischer Kirche*), which refused to recognize the acts of the Reich bishop, of his spiritual ministry, or of the National Synod. But in July 1935, a Reich Ministry for Church Affairs was created and a German-Christian lawyer, Hans Kerrl, appointed as Minister. He was given such wide powers to issue decrees with binding force under two laws of 24 July and 27 September* that the statement of the moderate Lutheran bishop of the Hanoverian Church, Mahrarens, that this marked 'the factual transition to state Christianity' has been only too fully justified in the event.

*Kerrl's rule as Minister for Church Affairs*

Kerrl's advent was followed by the disappearance of Müller 'on long leave' in January 1936, but the eclipse of the 'Reibi' indicated no change in Nazi policy. Though Kerrl made some efforts at conciliation they inevitably broke on the refusal of the Confessional Church to accept state interference in church doctrine and discipline, or to tolerate the flagrant heresies of German-Christian neo-paganism. As a result Kerrl adopted more and more severe measures of persecution. In 1936, the Provisional Church Government was declared an illegal body, and in 1937 a fierce persecution of the resistant clergy was undertaken. Some 800 pastors were arrested and either sent to concentration camps or tried for various offences, and on 1 July Pastor Niemöller, the leader of the Pastors' Emergency League, was arrested. Though,

* In typical Nazi fashion they were entitled a law 'for the safeguarding of the German Evangelical Church' and a law 'for restoring orderly conditions in the German Evangelical Church and the regional Evangelical Churches'.

having been eight months in prison before he was brought to trial, he was held to have served the seven months' sentence passed by the court for violations of the 'pulpit clause' (see p. 45), and though acquitted on the charge of 'underhand attacks on state and party', Dr Niemöller was seized by the Gestapo as he left the court and taken to a concentration camp where, despite the most urgent appeals to Hitler, he has been detained ever since. The fate of Niemöller did not break the resistance of the Confessional Church. But, throughout the years which have followed, the pressure of persecution has increased. In July 1937, a financial department of the Evangelical Church government was given power to attack recalcitrant clergy through their pockets. On 23 November 1937, Kerrl appointed another lawyer, Dr Friedrich Werner, a bitter opponent of the orthodox clergy, to be president of the Evangelical Church Chancery and of the Prussian Supreme Church Council, as well as chairman of the Reich Church Finance Department. On 11 December 1937, Werner was given power to 'direct all Reich church matters, excepting those of public worship and belief, but including the appointment and dismissal of Reich church officials' subject to Kerrl's approval.

From this time, until war broke out, Werner was virtual dictator of the German Churches. In April 1938, he demanded that the pastors and church officials should take the civil servants' oath of allegiance to Hitler, and though this demand was resisted and the time limit had to be extended, many of the pastors have in the end submitted. For their position has been weakened by internal division, as well as by the increased difficulty of resisting the government in a critical period. The issue of a form of prayer for peace by the Confessional Church at the time of Munich, which included expressions of repentance for national sins, created such a storm of protest and abuse in the Nazi Press* that the Lutheran bishops of Hanover (Mahrarens), Württemberg (Wurm) and Bavaria (Meiser) hastened to repudiate it. There can be little doubt that they did so largely to retain the remains of autonomy for their own Churches. But the effect was serious for the Church opposition. Whilst the acting head of the Provisional Church Government, Pastor Müller, Niemöller's colleague at Dahlem, stood firm and was arrested, convicted and dismissed from office

* Headlines used in the Nazi Press were 'United Evangelical Front against Treacherous Knaves', 'Rascals at the Altar, Intercession Service organized for Treasonable Purposes'.

and other pastors suffered with him, the attitude of the three bishops could not fail to cause both bitterness and discouragement.

Moreover they had seriously weakened the whole cause for which they had stood, and Werner was swift to take advantage of this fact. In October 1938, decrees were issued by Kerrl depriving Confessional pastors of the state subsidies, which had formed a large proportion of their salaries, and refusing admission to ' unreliable ' candidates to pastorates. In March 1939, Werner issued a decree taking power to transfer pastors and to override the parish council in appointments ' if justifiable claims for the spiritual care of a parish cannot be met in any other way '*. In April 1939, the German-Christians issued a declaration which revealed their general position. It asserted that : (1) every supra-national or international form of Church of a Roman Catholic or World-Protestant kind is a debasement of Christianity by rendering it political ; (2) the Christian faith is the uncompromising opposition to Jewry ; and (3) National Socialism's fight against every claim by the Churches to political power and its striving for a *Weltanschauung* (philosophy of life) according with the nature of the German people, is on the politico-philosophical side the continuance and completion of Luther's work. And they proposed to set up : (1) an institute for research into, and for the removal of, Jewish influence in the Christian life of the German nation ; (2) a church centre to combat the misuse of religion for political purposes ; and (3) a religious-political seminary to investigate the connection between politics, philosophy and religion. This document was signed by Werner himself, and by the German-Christian leaders of the majority of the state Churches.

When war broke out in September 1939 the opposition to the Nazi subversion of evangelical Christianity still continued, but the defenders of orthodoxy were in an almost desperate position. Many pastors were in prison or in concentration camps ; more had had their salaries reduced or cut off ; the seminaries for training new clergy were being closed ; church periodicals were being suppressed ; the children of Protestant families were being paganized in the Hitler Youth, and the confessional schools were being closed. The leaders of the party, the S.S. and its powerful paper the *Schwarze Korps*, held up the faith to scorn and ridicule. Any and every protest against these measures involved a charge of forbidden

* i.e. a German-Christian pastor could be appointed to a parish which had chosen a Confessional pastor who was regarded as ' unreliable ' by Werner.

political activity and the courts had ceased to give any protection. It is small wonder that, in 1939, a Confessional Church leader said 'We must face the possibility that in the near future the Church will be broken into ruins and rendered destitute'. But he added, with a resolute adherence to conviction too rare in other walks of German life, 'We have but one anxiety—lest we should become disobedient to our Lord'.

*The Nazis and the Roman Catholic Church*

It was the good fortune of the Nazis that, when they came to power, the reigning pope, Pius XI, having been Papal Nuncio at Warsaw during the Russian invasion of Poland in 1920, was very strongly anti-Bolshevik, and was surrounded by a group of Cardinals who were warm sympathizers with Fascism. The proposal from the new German government of the National Revolution for the conclusion of a Concordat to cover the relations of the whole Reich with the Holy See was, therefore, welcomed in Rome, and the appointment of the Catholic Vice-Chancellor, Papen, as plenipotentiary to negotiate with the Papal Secretary of State, Cardinal Pacelli, seemed a guarantee of good faith.

The German bishops did not share the illusion of Rome that the Nazis were acting in good faith. Twice during the summer of 1933 they issued from Fulda pastoral charges, which sought to define the limitations of the claims of German nationalism, rejecting the totalitarian demands of the Nazi party on the training of German youth, the excessive application of the racial principle at the expense of justice, and the idea of a united 'undogmatic' National Church on a racial basis. But, though these documents may have served to give Rome warning of the difficulties ahead, the negotiations proceeded. Not even the fact that S.A. men tore off the shirts of Catholic workmen as they left a hall (11 June) in Munich after being addressed by Papen himself, nor the arrest of all the prominent members of the (Catholic) Bavarian people's party, served to halt the negotiations. On 20 July 1933, the concordat was signed. It is a bitter commentary on that event that, on 14 July, a sterilization law, fundamentally incompatible with Catholic doctrine, was approved by the Reich government, and that its promulgation was deferred until 25 July, five days after the signature of the concordat itself.

The terms of the concordat appeared to guarantee full liberty to the Roman Catholic Church for all its religious activities. It was

to have ' freedom of faith and of the public exercise of the Catholic religion ' ; bishops were to have freedom to communicate with the pope and to publish pastoral letters to the faithful ; secrecy of the confessional was recognized by the state ; Catholic organizations could remain or become corporations of public law ; the religious Orders were to be free to carry on pastoral, educational and charitable work ; the property of the Catholic Church was guaranteed ' according to the general law of the Reich ' ; Catholic religious instruction by Catholic teachers and the continuance of the Catholic schools were to be preserved.

By Article 31, ' those Catholic organizations and associations which serve exclusively religious, purely cultural and charitable ends are protected in their establishments and activities ', and other Catholic associations serving social and vocational purposes were also protected, provided that their activities were ' outside any political party '. The precise existing associations intended by this article were to be defined by future negotiations. In return for these concessions from the state, the Church on its side agreed that none but German citizens should be appointed as active clergy, that its bishops should take a general oath of loyalty and that none of its clergy should be members of a political party or should engage in political activities.

On the face of it, the Church lost little and gained much from this agreement with the new masters of Germany. But everything turned upon the intention of Hitler and his colleagues to interpret the concordat in good faith. The history of the years which have followed leave no doubt that they entered into the agreement with no intention whatever of abiding by its terms. Freedom of communication between the bishops and the pope has been interfered with ; pastoral letters have been forbidden publication, as well as diocesan magazines and other literature ; religious orders have been suppressed, their property confiscated, their hospitals, schools and charitable organizations closed or secularized. Catholic education has been almost completely abolished and, by well-managed campaigns of intimidation and bribery, Catholic parents have been induced to vote out of existence the confessional schools. In Bavaria, in 1933, 89% of parents voted for the confessional schools. But as a result of persistent propaganda and pressure, economic as well as political, the number dropped to 66% in 1935, 35% in 1936 and 4% in 1937, when all the confessional schools of this formerly most Catholic state were converted into ' undenominational '

schools, in which none but a Nazi German religion could find expression.

Similarly, the activities of the Catholic lay associations have either been reduced to nothing or the associations themselves have been dissolved. Not only the Christian trade unions, but many of the local journeymen's associations, the Catholic civil servants' and teachers' unions, the associations of Catholic women and mothers, have been directly suppressed, whilst the others have been indirectly reduced to impotence by prohibiting Nazi party members from belonging to them, as Hess did in connection with undergraduate unions of students in 1936. The treatment of the great Catholic charity union (*Karitasverband*), with its provision of hospitals, convalescent homes and orphanages, infant crèches and other activities, is typical of the whole Nazi method of slow and unscrupulous suppression. In 1934, its right to collect donations was cut to one week in the year ; in 1935, its collectors were assaulted by uniformed S.A. in the streets ; in 1937, it was only to collect for two days in the year ; in the same year, party members were forbidden to belong to it, whilst it is reported to have lost during that year ' two hospitals, six sanatoria, two clinics, two convalescent homes, two crèches, eight kindergartens, three students' hostels, six orphanages, six reformatories, two apprentices' hostels, and three schools for domestic economy '. It was evident that the Nazi party would tolerate no competition with its own Winter Help (*Winter-Hilfe*) relief fund, or with its National-Socialist People's Welfare (*National-Sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt*) association.

But perhaps the most potent weapons against the Roman Catholic Church have been the calculated use of slander and ridicule to arouse prejudice and hostility towards it. As soon as the Catholic Saar had been safely reincorporated in Germany and conscription had been reintroduced, a series of prosecutions was instituted against religious houses and priests on the charge of breaches of the regulations forbidding the unauthorized export of German currency. There is no doubt that offences against the regulations had been committed, some at least as a result of the desire of the religious concerned to pay their debts to foreign creditors. But the significance of the trials was that they were used by the Propaganda Ministry and the Nazi Press to represent all Roman Catholic clergy and monks as swindlers in currency.

Though this first campaign of slander appeared to have little success with the thoughtful, however much it succeeded in

influencing the lads in the Hitler Youth, a more sinister form of it was used in 1936. Two Franciscans were summoned and sentenced for sexual offences against children. This case was followed by mass trials at Koblenz of members of the Franciscan and other Orders. The controlled press was instructed to make the most of these cases, and did so, whilst the official party paper, *Völkischer Beobachter*, descended to depths of pornography hardly exceeded by Julius Streicher's notorious *Der Stürmer*. Ministers, including Frick, Goebbels and Kerrl, made speeches grossly exaggerating the number of convictions for sexual offences by talking of all convictions, including those for ' political ' offences, as though they had all been for the same cause. In view of the known prevalence of homosexuality amongst certain leaders of the Hitler Youth, the use made of these ' immorality trials ' to slander the Catholic clergy as a whole was a peculiarly mean business.

By the end of 1936 not only had German bishops, who had earlier been friendly to National-Socialism, been completely disillusioned, but the pope himself had become aware that the Church was facing in Germany an enemy not less dangerous than atheistic Marxism. On 21 March 1937, there was read from all the Catholic pulpits of Germany a Papal Encyclical, known from its first words as ' *Mit brennender Sorge* ' (with burning anxiety), which condemned racialist doctrine, extreme nationalism, and the conduct and tactics of the Nazi government with equal severity. One passage at least may have been directed to Hitler himself. ' He cannot be considered a believer in God who uses the name of God rhetorically, but he only who unites to that sacred word a true and worthy idea of God '.

The Papal Encyclical did not stop and it may even have intensified the persecution of the Roman Catholic Church in Germany. The persecution has continued to the present time on parallel lines to that of the Evangelical churches, and has not abated even since Germany went to war in 1939 (see Appendix, pp. 492–4). Nor can it cease so long as the government of Germany is in the hands of fanatics of nationalism, whose God is their country, in whose service they are prepared to commit every crime necessary to attain their end. An English writer has said, ' The religion of the state is for those who have no other '. For the Nazis, from Hitler, who describes himself as a ' deeply religious man ',* to the last recruit in the Hitler Youth, the faith in ' One Reich, one Folk, one *Führer* ' and in one national racial German Church, can only be broken by defeat and may, in some cases, survive even that verdict.

* Compare his speech on 8 November 1943.

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# Chapter II

# HISTORICAL OUTLINE BEFORE 1815

*Medieval Germany :* The Origin of the Holy Roman Empire : Failure in Italy : The Ruins of a State : The Eastern Frontier : Towns and Town Leagues

*The Religious Struggle:* The Reformation : The Counter-Reformation : The Thirty Years' War

*The Rivalry of Austria and Prussia:* The Rise of Prussia : The Growth of Austria : The End of the Holy Roman Empire

*Bibliographical Note*

## MEDIEVAL GERMANY

The partition of Charlemagne's empire forms a convenient beginning in the history of the separate states of France and Germany. In A.D. 843, Charles the Bald took the lands in which the Romance language prevailed, and Louis the German took most of the lands in which a Teutonic language was spoken. It was from this eastern territory that the future realm of Germany was to take its territorial shape. Later partitions in 870 and 887 only confirmed this separation from 'France', and the difference was to grow as the years went by (Fig. 8).

The eastern unit possessed no organization proper to a state, and still less the conscious personality essential to a nation. There was, it is true, a union under an elective king, but the real strength lay with the territorial lords who carried on the work of local organization and defence that the central government found itself unable to perform. At the beginning of the tenth century there were five great entities—the dukedoms of Franconia, Saxony, Swabia and Bavaria, and the border kingdom of Lotharingia (Lorraine). To these must be added Thuringia, a dependency of Saxony, and Carinthia, sometimes independent and sometimes associated with Bavaria (Fig. 9). Only among the Frisians was there no tradition of political unity. Over all these units the descendants of Charlemagne continued to reign until the male line became extinct in 911. Then, Conrad, duke of Franconia, and after him Henry, duke of Saxony, were elected to the kingship, and it was with the establishment of the Saxon dynasty that the greatness of medieval Germany began.

## The Origin of the Holy Roman Empire

### *Internal Disunity*

The position of the new king, known as Henry the Fowler, was difficult. As king he was scarcely more powerful than he had been as duke. He had no machinery for governing the whole realm from one centre through his own officials. There was no choice but to





Fig. 8. The partitions of Charlemagne's empire

Based on (1) Longnon, A., *Atlas historique de la France*, plates v and vi (Paris, 1885); and (2) *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iii, map 28 (Cambridge, 1922).

The map for A.D. 806 is that of a partition proposed by Charlemagne but never carried out. On all maps, the eastern frontier is only roughly indicated. The facts do not warrant a definite line, and authorities differ in their estimate of where it should run.

allow the units to manage their own affairs according to their own customs. Even his claim to be regarded as head of a confederate Germany was not yet accepted by the dukes of Bavaria and Swabia. The latter was not induced to submit until 921, and only then on

favourable terms. Moreover, the kingdom of Lorraine was none too firmly welded to the rest, and it was not fully secured until 928, when the title ' Duke of Lorraine ' was created. But uneasy though the union was, it did, at any rate, provide a check against the complete break-up of the Teutonic realm.

When Henry the Fowler died in 936, his son Otto was elected to




Fig. 9. Germany in the tenth and eleventh centuries

Based mainly on *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. iii, map 33 (Cambridge, 1922).

Of the five historic entities, Lotharingia (Lorraine) and Franconia had been divided into two by this time. The unit of Bavaria separated the northern marklands from those of the south.

M.M. = Merseburg Mark.

succeed him, and all the dukes were present at the coronation ceremony. This, it has been said, 'was a festival of the highest significance: it was a public recognition of the union of the German tribes, the foundation of the German monarchy'.* But the dukes, whatever their part in the official ceremony of coronation, intended to remain as independent as possible. In 938–9 the new king had to face risings in Franconia, Lorraine and Bavaria. In Lorraine, there was

* *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. III, p. 187 (Cambridge, 1922).

always a party ready to support the French king, and the decade 940–50 was full of Otto's preoccupations with western affairs; a little later Lorraine was divided into two—Upper and Lower. In 953–5 Otto had to face rebellion in Swabia, Bavaria, Franconia, and even in Saxony, and the issue was decided only by the appearance of the Magyars (see p. 69) which rallied the German forces together. By 960, his rule in Germany was firmly established.

During these years, Otto, called 'the Great' even by his contemporaries, attempted to consolidate this hard-won power in numerous ways. His children were married into the families of the





Fig. 10. Ecclesiastical lands in Germany in the thirteenth century

Based on *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. vi, map 59 (Cambridge, 1929).

B = Bamberg; C = Cologne; Ca. = Cambrai; F = Fulda; L = Liége; Lu = Lübeck; M = Metz; Ma. = Mainz; S = Strasbourg; Sa. = Salzburg; T = Trent; U = Utrecht; V = Verdun; W = Worms.

dukes. Royal counts were instituted to watch over royal interests in the duchies, and to form a counterpoise to the authority of the dukes. Above all, Otto relied upon the Church to provide him with officials for establishing an efficient administration. Ecclesiastics were well suited for this task by their education and by the fact that their celibacy prevented them from founding territorial families. Henceforward, the role of princely ecclesiastics was destined to be a prominent one in the history of Germany (Fig. 10).

*Relations with Italy*

While the monarchy in Germany had imposed some check on disruption, no such influence had been at work south of the Alps. There, the disintegration following the break-up of Charlemagne's empire had continued unchecked, and, in 951, Otto was asked to interfere in the factions of the plain of Lombardy. As a result, he was crowned king of Italy at Pavia, and returned north with this newly won honour. He did not come south again for eleven years. Then, in 962, the pope, faced with faction fights in the city of Rome itself, asked for help, and the reward for Otto's assistance came on 2 February 962 when he was crowned emperor. The tradition of the Roman Empire, carried on by the imperial coronation of Charlemagne, was made manifest once more. In 962, the 'Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation' came into being, to last for nearly a thousand years. Otto's rule in Germany was firmly established, and the way appeared clear for progress towards a consolidated state. From the confusion of the ninth century it seemed as if a stable unit was to emerge.

*The Eastern Frontier*

Internal consolidation and relations with Italy were not the only problems that Otto had to face. A third group of problems was connected with the defence of the eastern frontier, and in this, too, he achieved conspicuous success (see p. 82). To the east, two groups of peoples constituted a menace to the safety of the frontiers. These were the Slavs in the north and the Magyars in the south. The raids of the Magyars extended with Asiatic ferocity to Italy and even to southern France. Their defeat by Henry in 933 had provided a breathing space, and Otto's resounding victory over them on the Lech in 955 secured the German realm for ever from their depredations. After this, the Magyar tribesmen settled down into the Hungarian nation. To the north, the constant pressure of the Slav tribes had to be withstood, and both Henry and Otto established a series of frontier 'marches' and organized a systematic policy of frontier defence. The future was to see the recovery of these eastern lands beyond the Elbe and the Saale, and there is a sharp distinction in the history of medieval, and even of modern, Germany between the 'old' Germany of the west and the 'new' or colonial Germany of the east

## Failure in Italy

### *The Saxon Emperors*

The fate of medieval Germany followed from the Italian policy of Otto the Great. The German kingship was now connected with the imperial title and with valuable possessions south of the Alps.* This new office brought great prestige to the Saxon kings, but also great danger to the German realm. The area of Germany was already larger than could be effectively controlled from one centre under medieval conditions of communication. The addition of Italy meant that any attempt to endow this great empire with a closely knit organization was to break down completely. Left to themselves, the German kings might have founded a national monarchy resembling France to the west. But henceforward their ambitions were constantly drawn to the south. As Bryce has said, they 'crossed a huge mountain barrier into a land of treachery and hatred. But Rome's glittering lure was irresistible, and the disunion of Italy promised an easy conquest†'. The attempt to secure unity, begun under Henry the Fowler and Otto the Great, was destined to end three centuries later in nothing other than feudal anarchy.

After 962, Otto spent scarcely more than two out of the last twelve years of his life in Germany. His successor, Otto II (973–83), died in the middle of plans for extending the imperial power into southern Italy. Otto III, 'the wonder of the world', fixed his residence in Rome, and dreamed of universal empire, while Germany suffered from internal disorder and from inroads along her eastern frontier. He was the last descendant in the male line of Otto the Great, and, after some dispute, Henry II of Bavaria was elected king (1002); he was able to make his power felt in Germany and then in Italy only after a struggle, and he did not receive the imperial crown until 1014.

### *The Franconian Emperors*

On the death of Henry II, a Franconian count was elected to the throne as Conrad II (1024–39). His reign was notable for the addition of Burgundy to the German realm (1034), not that the power of the central authority was very effective in these outlying territories. He attempted to keep the great magnates in order by supporting the lesser vassals, but as there was no firm royal administration to replace

* There is an excellent account of the contacts between Germany and Italy during the early Middle Ages in J. E. Tyler, *The Alpine Passes*, 962–1250 (Oxford, 1930).

† Bryce, Viscount, *The Holy Roman Empire*, p. 147 (London, 1928).

the power of the dukes, this merely meant that the small vassals, in due course, became independent. Not even the vigour of his successor, Henry III, could prevent the breaking up of the realm into small fragments. The 'German' policy of these two kings, Conrad II and Henry III, had probably come too late to arrest the disintegration of the realm. What promise their efforts held was to be finally destroyed by a new turn in affairs that made recovery and the consolidation of the German kingdom impossible.

In his preoccupation with German affairs, Henry III had not neglected Italy. He was a man of deep piety, and the deplorable condition of the Church, and the disgraceful competition among claimants for the Papacy, had provoked his interference. In putting the affairs of the Church in order, however, Henry III was but sharpening a sword whose keen edge was to be used against his son. The new popes were influenced by a campaign for better living which was especially associated with the monastery of Cluny in France, and which now broadened into a great movement of Church reform. Hitherto, the emperors had dominated and protected the Papacy, but now, with the revival of the medieval Church, they found themselves involved in a desperate quarrel that was to destroy the Empire in all but name. The struggle was all the more important because the emperors relied so much upon churchmen for their administrative services, and because ecclesiastical territories had grown so great in Germany.

At the root of the struggle was the question of power. In 1073, Cardinal Hildebrand, the champion of Cluniac ideas, had become pope as Gregory VII, and he went so far as to say: 'The Roman pontiff has the right to depose emperors'. The contest between Henry IV and Gregory VII opened the great struggle between emperors and popes to define their respective spheres of authority. At the outset, the critical issue was that of 'lay investitures', i.e. the practice by which laymen appointed their own candidates to bishoprics and other ecclesiastical benefices. The emperor, with his realm unorganized for effective action, was unable to combat the influence of the papacy. Old feuds leaped to life in Germany. Many of the German nobles, not loth to curb the power of their lord, were on the side of the pope; Saxony was in open revolt: and to retain and recapture the loyalty of his vassals, it was imperative for Henry to free himself from the sentence of excommunication which Gregory VII had passed on him. Crossing the Alps in winter, he appeared as a penitent before the castle of Canossa where the pope was staying.

'With bare feet and clad only in wool', Henry waited for three days outside the castle gates (at any rate, that is what legend says); and at length he was absolved, and received once more into the Church. It was an event that made a great impression upon the imagination of medieval Europe.

But the 'Penitence of Canossa' in 1077 marked only the beginning of a long struggle that lasted for two centuries. At times, the popes declared the emperors to be deposed, and set up rivals; the emperors replied by setting up anti-popes. While the battle continued, the feudal nobility in Germany, always the enemy of royal power, were gaining more and more independence; the emperors, too, were increasingly involved in the politics of Italy, where the popes supported the rebellious cities of the Lombard plain. There were lulls in the struggle, and the Concordat of Worms (1122) brought the investiture question to a close by a compromise. The years that followed, however, were years only of comparative peace and were marked by disorder in Germany itself. Saxony, for example, was in full rebellion in 1122. The Franconian dynasty died out with Henry V in 1125, and after a protracted struggle, Lothair, duke of Saxony, was chosen to succeed him. As Lothair II (1125–38), he immediately attempted to interfere in Bohemia, but met with disaster. His authority was disputed in Lorraine and even in his own land of Saxony, and he had also to overcome the resistance of the dukes of Swabia and Franconia. But this bitter civil war did not prevent the vassals on the eastern frontier from pushing actively against the Slavs, and the twelfth century saw a great advance in the German colonization of the eastern lands (see p. 84). At Lothair's death there was another disputed succession. The princes aimed at keeping Lothair's powerful son Henry, duke of both Bavaria and Saxony, from the throne; and by a hasty election in 1138, Conrad of Hohenstaufen, duke of Franconia, was chosen king, and the Hohenstaufen line continued to hold the imperial office until 1268.

*The Hohenstaufen Emperors*

Throughout his reign, Conrad faced opposition from Bavaria and Saxony. He took part in the Second Crusade, but had done little to stem the rising disorder at home when he died in 1152. His successor was Frederick Barbarossa, destined to become one of the greatest of the German sovereigns. Two years after his election he crossed the Alps and was crowned at Rome in 1155; but his was a vigorous personality, and the papal quarrel leaped once more into

flame. The best years of his life were spent in Italy engaged in a desperate struggle. A common enemy drew the Lombard cities and the Papacy together, and the net result of a conflict lasting some twenty years was the humiliation of Barbarossa at St Mark's in Venice in 1177. It was exactly one hundred years after the more famous ' Penitence ' at Canossa, and the triumph of the Lombard cities ended the second phase in the struggle between the Empire and the Papacy.

In Germany, the reign of Frederick was marked by greater success than might have been expected in view of his Italian preoccupations. The great development of the cities (see p. 93) provided him with powerful allies against the feudal nobility. In 1180, he succeeded in breaking up the powerful dukedom of Saxony, so long a source of trouble to the German emperors. With the fall of Henry the Lion, the old duchy of Saxony disappeared and was replaced by a medley of smaller states. Elsewhere, too, the historic 'tribal' duchies had broken up, partly by grants to spiritual and temporal lords and partly with the rise of territorial counts. The title 'duke' was losing its significance; there were now many dukes, and also many other powers equal in authority if not in rank—landgraves, margraves, counts and so on. One of the most solid duchies was Bavaria, given to Otto of Wittelsbach, and it remained in the family until 1918; but even Bavaria was cut short by the creation of three dukedoms out of its territory—Carinthia, Styria, Austria (Fig. 11). All these lesser magnates of Germany became direct vassals of the crown, but this only increased the division of the realm, for there was no tradition of centralized administration, and no large body of imperial officials, to control this increasing mass of feudal principalities. Germany, though more at peace at the end than at the beginning of his reign, was in a more disorganized condition. In his quest after the phantom of empire, Frederick failed to provide the German monarchy with a centralized bureaucratic machine.

Frederick had succeeded in marrying his son to the heiress of the kingdom of Naples and Sicily. This was a good move to counteract the influence of the pope, but it only served to implicate the German monarchy even further in the affairs of Italy. Moreover, Henry VI (1190–7) inherited all his father's ambition of turning the Holy Roman Empire into a political reality. He even tried to make the imperial crown hereditary in his family, but this aroused much opposition and, at his death, his son was not elected. The vacant throne was disputed by rivals who gave away much of the property




Fig. 11. The Holy Roman Empire under the Hohenstaufen, 1138–1254.

Based on (1) Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, p. 72 (London, 1930); and (2) Muir, R., and Philip, G., *Historical Atlas*, pp. 24–5 (sixth edition, London, 1927).

The pecked lines are the boundaries of the three constituent kingdoms of Arles, Italy and Germany.

M. La. = Mark of Lausatia; M.L. = Mark of Landsberg; M.M. = Margravate of Meissen; S = Duchy of Spoleto; L. of Thuringia = Landgravate of Thuringia. The following towns are indicated: F = Frankfurt-am-Main; G = Genoa; L = Lübeck; M = Mainz; Mn. = Milan; P = Pisa; S = Speyer; W = Worms.

Corsica belonged to Pisa until about 1285, and then to Genoa; Sardinia changed hands between Pisa, Genoa, and Aragon.

of the crown in order to secure support. Even the shadow of centralized government was in abeyance for fourteen years, and it was not until 1212 that the son of Henry VI was able to succeed to the throne. This son, Frederick II, had been born and educated in Sicily, and, now, he aimed at restoring the Empire with Sicily as the main centre of his imperial system. The whole interest of his remarkable personality was centred in Italy, where he was soon engaged in a bitter conflict with the pope and with the Lombard cities. Of the thirty-eight years of his reign, fewer than eight were spent in Germany. Nobles and clergy were allowed to rule as they willed. In 1220, and again in 1232, he had been forced formally to grant them what amounted to practical sovereignty in their own territories; such authority as was left to the emperor, he could exercise but feebly from a distant land. The power of centralized authority was broken into a bewildering multitude of principalities, ruled over by archbishops, bishops, abbots, dukes, marquises and counts, together with many imperial cities.

When Frederick II died in 1250, the struggle with the Papacy was still undecided. There were, moreover, various claimants to the throne, and the political story becomes even more complicated than before. All semblance of order had departed from the German realm, and every floodgate of anarchy was opened. The period 1250–73 is commonly known as 'The Great Interregnum'. Frederick II's son and grandson continued the struggle in Italy, but with the defeat and murder of the latter at the battle of Tagliacozzo in 1268, the male line of the Hohenstaufen came to an end.

After 1268, the German emperors ceased to interfere effectively in Italy, but their expulsion had come too late to save Germany. The association of the national monarchy with the tradition of the Roman Empire had proved fatal. In France, and England, the efforts of a series of strong monarchs, who equipped themselves with an efficient bureaucracy, secured the centralization of authority. In Germany, even the strong kings spent their energies in trying to realize the imperial dream and so failed to build up a permanent central organization; hence political union became so weak as to be almost non-existent. The German kingdom had broken down beneath the weight of the Roman Empire. At length, in the midst of general anarchy and private war, a comparatively obscure nobleman, Rudolph, count of Hapsburg, was elected to the vacant throne in 1273. But the Holy Roman Empire, as an institution, had lost most of its effective political authority with the last of the Hohenstaufen. Its titles, it is true, were

to linger on for nearly 600 years as part of the empty trappings of the German kingship. But this piece of venerable antiquarianism, as Voltaire said, was neither Holy nor Roman nor an empire.

## The Ruins of a State

### *The German Families*

After 1273, the emperors for the most part restricted their activities to Germany itself, but, even so, they did not succeed in reconstructing a national state. The cause of this failure lay partly in the history of the previous 300 years—since Otto had accepted the imperial title—and partly in the fact that successive emperors made family aggrandisement the foremost object of their policy. Not, indeed, that family aggrandisement was confined to the emperors. The way was always open for other families to build up aggregations of territory through marriage, purchase, or otherwise (Fig. 12). The great power of the *Welfs* in Bavaria and Saxony was broken in 1180, and from that date the *Wittelsbachs* ruled in Bavaria until 1918 (see p. 241). The duchy of Saxony disappeared, to be represented by the smaller duchies of *Brunswick* and *Lüneburg*, and it was from this latter that the later electorate of Hanover grew. The House of *Hapsburg* came to Austria in 1282 to stay also until 1918. The *Wettin* family, who obtained the mark of Meissen in the eleventh century, became, after 1423, rulers of Saxony on the middle Elbe, a new Saxony that in no way represented the older duchy of that name. In the north, the *Ascanian* dynasty in Brandenburg had died out in 1319, but from 1411 onward, again until 1918, the *Hohenzollerns* ruled in Brandenburg with fateful consequences for the rest of Germany. The House of *Luxemburg*, coming from its county in the west, ruled in Bohemia (and other places too) from 1306 to 1437. In the fifteenth century, the acquisitions of the dukes of *Burgundy* almost succeeded in building up a middle kingdom between France and Germany. Other German families were the counts of *Württemberg* who gained much of Swabia after the fall of the Hohenstaufen dynasty in the thirteenth century and who were raised to ducal rank in 1495. Finally, the dukes of *Mecklenburg*, the only ruling princes of Slavonic origin in Germany, were descendants of a son of Henry the Lion (see p. 73) and a Slav princess. These were the main territorial families, but the list could be greatly extended, e.g. the family of *Baden* increased its territories in the later Middle Ages and remained an important territorial factor in Germany until 1918. But any account of German

families is most confusing, for family aggregations of territory were only too often broken up by partitions between members of the same family, and rejoined or regrouped by subsequent reunions.

## *The Golden Bull*, 1356

Imperial elections continued to be disputed after 1273, as before, and there was no essential change in the political condition of Germany. It remained a loose aristocratic federation divided within itself and complicated by papal interference. Each election caused





Fig. 12. The main German territorial families, *c.* 1462
Based on *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. viii, map 78 (Cambridge, 1936).

disputes, and sometimes even civil war. In theory, an election was made by the nobles, and the legal line between those who were and those who were not entitled to vote was not clear. In practice, the right to choose had passed into the hands of a small body of electors (seven appeared in the election of 1257), though how this came about is obscure and has aroused much controversy. In the German assembly or 'Diet', therefore, two colleges were becoming separate —a college of princes and one of electors. But the whole constitution seems to have been ill-defined and a matter for dispute.

This state of affairs did not continue without some attempt to improve, or at any rate define, the constitution of the empire, with the hope of avoiding disputed elections. In 1347, Charles IV of the House of Luxemburg became emperor and, under him, the imperial constitution was at last defined by the Golden Bull of 1356. Bryce says that the bull but 'legalised anarchy and called it a constitution'.* Charles, however, only acknowledged publicly the futility of pretending to revive the empire in any practical way. Much of the bull




Fig. 13. The Seven Electorates, 1378

Based on Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, pp. 78–9 (seventh edition, London, 1930).

dealt with small matters of precedence and procedure, but, in addition, it laid down certain principles upon which the future political life of Germany was to rest. The number of electors was now definitely fixed at seven, and the votes of a majority were held to make an election valid. The seven were the archbishops of Mainz, Cologne and Trier, the margrave of Brandenburg, the king of Bohemia, the count palatine of the Rhine, and the duke of Saxony (Fig. 13). In order to prevent disputes between the princes of a single house, the lands held by each elector were declared to be indivisible and

* Bryce, Viscount, op. cit. p. 246.

their inheritance was to be governed by the rules of primogeniture. It was further declared that these electors were supreme in their own territories; appeal by their subjects to the imperial tribunal was allowed only in special cases.*

During its whole history, the Holy Roman Empire had no 'capital'. The imperial diet met in widely separated places according to the exigencies of the moment. It was held most frequently, however, in the cities of the Rhine valley near the confluences of the Main and the Neckar, a rich fertile area at the meeting place of many trade routes. Here, therefore, lay what may be regarded as the 'metropolitan centre' of medieval Germany, containing the cities of Worms, Speyer, Mainz and Frankfurt. The Golden Bull declared Frankfurt to be the seat of all imperial elections, and so it remained (with only five exceptions out of twenty-two elections) until the end of the empire in 1806. The diet itself continued to be held in different places until 1663 after which year it remained in permanent session at Regensburg (Ratisbon).

The Golden Bull, although it benefited the electorates, did nothing to mend the divided state of the realm; at one time (1410), for example, there were three rival emperors. Not only was there internal disintegration, but some outlying provinces began to separate. The people of the Netherlands and the Swiss were forming into distinct nations; Bohemia became very largely independent; the country of Holstein was united in a personal union with the crown of Denmark (1460); in the south-west, the Dauphiné and Provence passed to France; the possessions of the Teutonic Order along the eastern frontier became tributary to Poland (1466).

* It may seem surprising that a vote was not assigned to Bavaria, but in 1255 the possessions of the House of Wittelsbach had been divided between the two sons of Otto II, and so the branches of Bavaria and the Palatinate of the Rhine had been founded. At the election of 1257, the duke of Bavaria and the count palatine had voted jointly, and there followed disputes about the electoral vote of the family until the Golden Bull of 1356 assigned it to the Rhenish Palatinate. In any case, the history of Bavaria for 250 years after 1255 was a record of numerous family partitions and, consequently, of weakness. The later history of the electors may be summarized thus : During the Thirty Years' War, the vote of the Protestant count palatine was transferred to Bavaria. By the Peace of Westphalia, Bavaria retained this, but an eighth vote was created for the count palatine. In 1692, a ninth vote was created for Hanover, but the grant did not become effective until 1708. In 1778, on the extinction of the Bavarian House of Wittelsbach, the counts palatine succeeded to the duchy, so the number was again reduced to eight. In 1806, the electors ceased to hold office with the abolition of the Holy Roman Empire. The landgrave of Hesse-Cassel had been made an elector in 1803, and, despite the change of 1806, the meaningless title was retained until the conquest of the area by Prussia in 1866.

*The Rise of the Hapsburgs*

It was in the midst of this confusion that, in 1438, Duke Albert of Austria was elected emperor, and he began the continuous series of Hapsburg emperors that was to last as long as the Holy Roman Empire itself. There had been Hapsburg emperors before; from now onward, the imperial title was to remain in the Hapsburg House, although in theory the empire remained elective. Albert's successor, Frederick III, was the last emperor to be crowned at Rome; his long and calamitous reign did nothing to redress the turbulence of Germany; indeed, he did not attend the imperial diet for nearly thirty years. But this weakness was in contrast to the strength of his son Maximilian who, by marriage, acquired Burgundy and the Netherlands in western Germany, and who, on the death of his father in 1493, ruled over wider territories than any other prince in the Empire. From Maximilian's accession the Empire exercised an importance in the affairs of Europe that had not belonged to it for centuries. The reason lay not in the strength of the Empire itself, but in the fact that the imperial crown was now in the hands of an increasingly powerful family. With Maximilian began the ascendancy of the Hapsburgs in Europe.

The end of the fifteenth century saw an attempt to improve the imperial constitution. The need for reform was everywhere visible in the private warfare that went on unchecked, and in the lack of any central direction in affairs. All through the long reign of Frederick III, projects of reform had been discussed, but, in the confusion of opinion, they had come to nothing until they found a champion in the new elector of Mainz appointed in 1484. Berthold of Mainz, more of a statesman than a churchman, was dominated by the idea of a united German state under an efficient central government, with a supreme court of law and an ultimate court of justice. His aim was to set up a body that would have resembled the council of a federal state. Maximilian, refusing to have even his vague prerogative weakened, placed all obstacles in the way of these ideas. He, too, wished for reform, but in a manner that would make the central administration more closely dependent upon himself. On these lines he did much to unify the administration of his hereditary Austrian domains, but he accomplished little for the German realm as a whole. His most successful attempt at reorganization was the division of Germany, in 1512, into 'circles' for administrative purposes, but it was some time before the system came into working order, and it

was never very effective (Fig. 14). While this fumbling for a constitution was going on, and in the middle of these attempts to strengthen the German state into a centralized monarchy, a new cause of disunion, greater than any already existing, appeared in the Reformation. The wreck of the Empire was to founder completely on these rocks that lay ahead.




Fig. 14. The imperial circles about 1512

Based on Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, p. 113 (seventh edition, London, 1930).

But although the story of the later Middle Ages in Germany is one of political failure, there was much progress in other directions. Economic progress was not incompatible with political decomposition, and the prosperity of the towns was in startling contrast to the feudal chaos around (see p. 93). The towns became centres not only of

commerce but of civilization. German architecture reached its height in the great churches and civic buildings of the fourteenth century; universities were founded. Moreover, along the eastern frontier, the work of colonization continued with vigour. In any attempt to appraise the conditions of medieval Germany, these economic achievements must be balanced against the political failure.

## The Eastern Frontier

The 'Germania' of Roman times was roughly a square stretching northwards from the Danube and bounded on the west by the Rhine and on the east by the Vistula. But during the great migrations of the fourth and fifth centuries, this situation changed; the German peoples (e.g. the Franks, Burgundians, Vandals and Lombards) moved westward and southward into the lands of the Roman Empire; the eastern frontier of the German realm retreated, and the vacant lands to the east of the Elbe were filled by Slav peoples moving westwards. By A.D. 600, the line of the Elbe-Saale had become the frontier between the German and the Slav worlds. But for the recovery of these lands in later times, the German realm would have remained a narrow strip of territory lying to the west of the Elbe. While the political history of medieval Germany is the story of the failure to create a state, the history of its eastern frontier is a story of brilliant success, of nothing other than the making of three-fifths of modern Germany (Fig. 15). In this way were important political elements added to the German kingdom—Brandenburg, Silesia, East Prussia, Bohemia and Austria.

### *Brandenburg*

'The great deed of the German people in the Middle Ages', said the German historian Lamprecht, 'was the expansion of the German race eastward over the Slavonic nations'. Analogy has been drawn between this advance and the expansion of the American people westward from the Atlantic seaboard. What the new west meant to young America in the nineteenth century, that the new east meant to medieval Germany. What Professor Turner, in writing of American history, has called the 'common sequence of frontiers' was true also of medieval colonial Germany—first, towns and manufactures; then farming ; then cattle-raising or swine-herding; then fortified trading depots often built on the sites of former Slav villages just as Indian settlements were occupied in America; beyond these posts, 'the

German pack-trader, with whom furs were an important article of trade, threaded the Slavonic wilderness just as his American successor pierced the Alleghany watershed into the plains of Kentucky





Fig. 15. The German expansion eastwards, A.D. 800–1400

Based on Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, p. 80 (seventh edition, London, 1930).

The dates of some of the south-eastern outposts of German settlement are indicated.

and Ohio'. Although historical analogies are notoriously misleading, this comparison does emphasize the colonial character of the German frontier; and although the analogy cannot be pressed in all its details, the two movements had this in common, writes an American historian—both were fundamentally 'a search for free and cheap land by a farming people. For it is estimated that land values in Germany rose forty per cent between 900 and 1300, especially in the rich Moselle and Rhine lands'.*

The advance had begun in Charlemagne's time, but the break-up of his empire, and the evil days of civil war, of Norse invasion and of Magyar raids, arrested the process. The movement was not resumed until the German monarchy had become established in the ninth century under Henry the Fowler and Otto the Great, and then it was strengthened by the active missionary enterprise of the Church. The Sorbenland, between the Saale and the upper Elbe, was the first territory to be won from Slav tribes known as the Wends. Beyond the Elbe, in 928, Henry the Fowler captured the Slav stronghold of Brunabor and converted it into a *burg*; that is the origin of the town of Brandenburg. To the north, at about the same time, the Saxons crossed the lower Elbe into what is now Mecklenburg.

This eastward progress was not without setbacks, and border warfare was a characteristic feature of the area. In 983, the Slavs rose and destroyed many German settlements. There was another rising in 1018 when the border posts were devastated and even Hamburg was threatened. There was a third great rising in 1066, and, after this, the Germans did not cross the Elbe again until the twelfth century. In the meantime, the bishops of the newly created dioceses could only hold their sees 'in partibus paganorum'. But with the accession of Lothair of Saxony to the German kingship in 1125 (see p. 72), a new and formidable advance was made, and within the next generation the resistance of the trans-Elbean Slavs finally collapsed. Mecklenburg, Brandenburg and Pomerania were settled by increasing numbers of immigrants, some of whom came from as far away as Holland, and the chronicler Helmold has painted a vivid picture of the hardy life of these frontiersmen. They were active not only in draining marshes and clearing woodland, but also in building new towns. Thus Berlin, Dresden, Leipzig and Rostock, with their carefully laid out rectangular streets in contrast to the tortuous ways of the western cities, are examples of the new planning in the east.

* J. W. Thompson, *An Economic and Social History of the Middle Ages*, 300–1300, p. 518 (New York and London, 1928).

This work of extending the eastern frontier was performed not by the emperor himself but independently by his vassals. The movement was therefore but little, if at all, affected by the weakness of the central government. The whole frontier was defended by a series of 'marks' whose rulers had special powers for defence and for the extension of the frontier (cf. the Lords Marchers against Wales). From the Baltic southwards stretched a belt of marks—the mark of the Billungs, the North Mark,the Ost Mark, the mark of Lausitz, the mark of Meissen (Fig. 9). These constituted, so to speak, the political framework within which the work of colonization proceeded; and, as time went by, one of these marks came to occupy a dominating




Fig. 16. The Mark of Brandenburg, 1320–1415

Based on Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, p. 85 (seventh edition, London, 1930).

This shows the loss of territory during the period of anarchy 1319–1411 (see p. 86). The Mark was granted to Frederick of Hohenzollern in 1411, and confirmed in 1415.

position. It was the North Mark, traditionally founded by Henry the Fowler in 928, that profited most from the extension of the frontier in the twelfth century, especially under Albert the Bear (1134–70). To this, by now known as the Altmark, others were added—the Mittelmark, the Vormark (Prignitz), the Ukermark, and, later beyond the Oder, the Neumark (Fig. 16). In 1157 the margravate

of Brandenburg was created to include the territories of the growing North Mark. The origin of Berlin itself (in the Mittelmark) is obscure, but it may date from the early years of the thirteenth century.*

Despite these successful beginnings, the state of Brandenburg was facing a very precarious future. It was surrounded by powerful neighbours—Mecklenburg, Pomerania and Poland. In 1319 the vigorous Ascanian dynasty, as the descendants of Albert the Bear were called, came to an end, and the territory passed through diverse hands, to the House of Wittelsbach and then, until 1411, to the Bohemian crown. In the dismal record of mismanagement and internal anarchy that marked the period 1319–1411, one event stands out—in 1351 the margrave was made an elector of the empire. Still, when in 1411 the emperor assigned the mark to Frederick of Hohenzollern, burgrave of Nuremberg, the future seemed doubtful enough. His subjects at first jeered at the 'toy of Nuremberg', but within ten years he was master in his house. The expansion that followed was the result not of master strokes or the brilliance of this or that elector, but of a steady endeavour. Successive electors negotiated about small pieces of neighbouring territory; they married with care and with an eye to the future ; the record of acquisitions was prosaic enough, but it was continuous; and, ultimately, this persistent effort brought its reward. From these humble beginnings, the House of Hohenzollern was to dominate the whole of Germany. But that time was not yet.

### *Silesia*

From the north, the German settlers turned southwards down the valley of the Oder into Silesia. This border province, after some fluctuations between Bohemia and Poland, had become definitely Polish in the tenth century, but was independent after the division of the Polish kingdom in 1138. Henceforward it came increasingly under German influence, and its dukes encouraged German settlers. During the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it has been estimated

* The linguistic map of modern Germany reveals an isolated relic of this Slav realm to the south-east of Berlin (Fig. 4). These Slavs, completely surrounded by German-speaking people, are known as Wends or Sorbs (see p. 33). Their speech is divided into Upper Sorb and Lower Sorb, and the dialects stand intermediate between Polish and Czech. There was a revival of Sorb speech early in the nineteenth century, and in 1847 a literary society was founded. Some Sorbs are Protestants, but the Sorbs of Saxony are mostly Roman Catholic.

that some fifteen hundred German villages were founded in Silesia.* The founding of the Cistercian house of Leubus in 1175 can be regarded as the turning point in the history of the province. Hitherto, Silesia had been a waste land of sand and swamp but sparsely populated. Henceforward, it became increasingly prosperous; swamps were drained and the land was made to yield rich harvests; mining and weaving industries were developed; and this was achieved, in the words of a contemporary chronicler, 'not in war with the sword', but by peaceful methods. The growing resources of the area are indicated by the strength of the army with which Henry II, duke of Lower Silesia, broke the force of the Mongol invasions at Liegnitz in 1241. On this occasion, Breslau was destroyed, but it received a large influx of German colonists, and soon recovered its prosperity. This economic progress was in contrast to the political anarchy of the region. It became split up into numerous principalities as a result of successive partitions; and, in the fourteenth century, it was incorporated into the Germanized state of Bohemia, and so it remained until it was invaded by Prussia in 1740 (see p. 110).

*East Prussia*

By the thirteenth century the German advance along the northern plain had spent itself. Poland was penetrated by German colonists and civilization, but its inhabitants did not suffer the fate of the trans-Elbean Slavs. In two areas, however, German missionary enterprise found new fields of activity—on the south-eastern shores of the Baltic. In the northern area, around the Gulf of Riga, lived scattered groups of people called Letts and Lithuanians, and into this region, according to a contemporary chronicler, came German immigrants, round about the year 1186, 'from Saxony, from Westphalia, from Frisia, prelates and priests, soldiers and merchants, rich and poor'. Riga itself was founded in 1201, but the whole country of Esthonia, Livonia and Kurland was far from being subdued. In the following year, Bishop Albert of Riga established the Military Order of the Brethren of the Sword; the northern crusade was sanctioned by the pope in 1204, and within twenty years the area was dotted with German fortified towns. To this activity, the German Balts mainly owe their origin.


But between this northern outpost and Germany lay the territory of the heathen Prussians, also a Lettish people but more fierce than

* Jastrow, J. und Winter, G., *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Hohenstaufen*, vol. ii, p. 637 (Stuttgart, 1901).

the northern Letts and harder to conquer.* The first German colony to be planted here was the monastery of Oliva near Danzig (1170). For fifty-four years it continued in peace, but the heathen Prussians, alarmed at the growing menace of the Christian power, attacked the community and then invaded Poland. The Poles, remembering the bishop of Riga and the Brethren of the Sword, appealed to the Teutonic Knights. This Order had already done missionary work in the Holy Land and in Hungary, and its arrival (1231) in what was to become known as East Prussia was followed by some fifty years of almost unremitting warfare. The method of the conquest was a repetition of what had already taken place in Mecklenburg and Brandenburg. It was the last chapter in the history of medieval colonization by the Germans in the north. Its consequences were fateful for the later history of Europe, for this new sphere of colonization was separated from the main body of Germans by West Prussia, inhabited by Poles and later to be known as the 'Polish Corridor'. It is one of the ironies of history that the Corridor should owe its origin to an invitation given by the Poles themselves to a German Missionary Order.

The subsequent story of the two Orders becomes complicated. They were united in 1237, and, by the addition of surrounding territories, developed into a powerful unit on the shores of the Baltic, thus cutting off Poland from the sea (Figs. 17, 18). The rise and strength of this unit aroused considerable hostility, and in 1411 the power of the Orders was broken by a mixed army of Poles, Lithuanians and others. In 1466, the work was completed by a partition of Prussia; West Prussia and Ermland went to Poland; East Prussia was retained by the Orders under Polish suzerainty. It was in vain that the Teutonic Knights attempted to organize their holdings into some close union. In 1515, the two Orders separated. The northern Order became the Livonian Knights under their own Grand Master, and the history of this area is henceforward bound up with that of Poland, Sweden and Russia. The southern Order was now under Grand Master Albert of Ansbach, one of the Hohenzollern family. With the Reformation came a chance of greatly strengthening his power. He turned Protestant, secularized the

* The old Prussian tongue had affinities with Lithuanian and Lettish. The last man to speak it died in the seventeenth century. Its literary remains consist mainly of three catechisms and two vocabularies, and are hardly sufficient to permit of any proper reconstruction of its grammar—Berneker, E., *Die preussische Sprache* (Strassburg, 1896). The German ' Preussen ' (Prussia) is derived from the Latin ' Borussia '.







Figs. 17, 18. The German Orders in the south-east Baltic, A.D. 1300-1467

Based mainly on (1) Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, p. 88 (seventh edition, London, 1930); and (2) Putzger, F. W., *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, p. 68 (fifty-seventh edition, Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1939).

Oliva and Riga were founded in 1170 and 1201 respectively. The other dates indicate the periods when the various territories were held by the Orders.

possessions of the Order in 1525, and converted himself into a lay prince as duke of Prussia under Polish overlordship. Members of the Hohenzollern family now ruled in Brandenburg and East Prussia. The future was to see the union of these separate territories under one rule and, with that union, the beginnings of the Prussia which created modern Germany (see p. 107).

*Bohemia*

In the time of Charlemagne it appears that the Slavs of Bohemia, or part of them, were forced to pay a yearly tribute to the Frankish empire. Subsequent relations are obscure until 928, when the land was forced to acknowledge the suzerainty of Henry the Fowler. An attempt to become independent was checked by Otto the Great in 950. From this time onward Bohemia became a constituent part of the Holy Roman Empire. During the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the dynastic conflicts of the native Premyslid family provided every opportunity for German interference. In 1085, the Emperor Henry IV granted the title of king as a personal title to Duke Vratislav II; this royal title was revived again in 1198, and in 1212 the position of Bohemia in relation to the empire was clarified by a document which reserved to the Bohemian nobility the power to choose their own king.

As early as the eleventh century, Bohemian dukes had appeared at elections of the German emperor, and now, in the thirteenth century, their successors played an increasing part as the idea of seven electors began to be established (see p. 77). Nor was this all. Upon the extinction of the native House of Premyslid in 1306, the Bohemian throne was occupied by the Luxemburg family, and in 1347 a member of this new line became emperor as Charles IV. It was this emperor who was responsible for the Golden Bull of 1356 (see p. 78). This solemnly proclaimed the Bohemian king as one of the seven electors of the empire, and gave first place among the lay electorates to Bohemia itself.

These close political contacts had ethnographical results. The immigration of German colonists into Bohemia began on a large scale in the twelfth century, and seems to have been encouraged by the Bohemian rulers to counteract the power of the native aristocracy. The Germans came partly as peasants clearing land and occupying the waste, and partly as miners. Whole districts along the borders were settled by these miners, and this German element has remained a prominent feature of the ethnic map of Bohemia up to the present day. The silver mines of Bohemia went far to explain the splendour

of the Bohemian court and the importance of Charles IV in the German empire. In addition to miners and farmers, came German traders; but despite this varied influx, and despite the importance of German civilization and culture, the Bohemian Slavs never lost their identity as did those of Silesia and Brandenburg to the north.

The relation between the language and cultures of Czech and German is an internal Bohemian story. In the movement of protest against the Church that culminated in the Hussite wars (1420–33), full scope was given to the antagonism of the national Czech towards the German intruder, but these religious differences did not prevent the continued immigration of Germans later in the century, nor did they affect the political position of the kingdom within the Empire. The Luxemburg dynasty came to an end in 1437. The history of the years that followed is extremely complicated. There was constant conflict between rival parties of the nobility, and a succession of settlements and truces. From the confusion, one of the Hussite nobles, George Podebrady, emerged as leader of the national party, and his reign (1457–71) saw the triumph of the Czech element in the public life of Bohemia. In the hope of obtaining help from Poland, he offered the succession to a Polish prince, Vladislav, who, on Podebrady's death in 1471, was elected king, though not without opposition.

In 1490, Vladislav of Bohemia was elected king of Hungary, and soon he had to face the peril of the Turkish advance in south-eastern Europe. His successor was defeated and killed at Mohacz in 1526, and then the throne was offered to Ferdinand of the House of Hapsburg. There was opposition, but the succession of this dynasty to the crowns of Bohemia and Hungary had long been prepared by family treaties and dynastic marriages. Now, in 1526, the Bohemian kingdom was attached by yet one more tie to the German realm of the Holy Roman Empire.

### *Austria*

In the south, between the Danube and the Adriatic, the eastern frontier of Charlemagne's realm was defended by the marks of Carniola, Carinthia and Austria, founded about the year 800 against the southern Slavs and the Avars. Just as the Slav rebellions of 983, 1018 and 1066 undid the work of colonization across the Elbe, so, in the south-east, the progress of Bavarian settlement was interrupted, particularly by the Magyars who arrived from the east into the plain of Hungary about 896. The raids of the Magyars were not

effectively checked until the victory of Otto the Great in 955 (see p. 69). It was he who refounded the Ostmark of the south to protect Bavaria ; and his son, Otto II, entrusted the defence of the mark to the Babenberg family. The Babenbergs directed a steady stream of German colonists into the Danubian lands, but information is more scanty than about the lands across the Elbe. The success of their work, however, may be seen by the advance of their capital from Pöchlarn to Melk, then to Tulln, and finally about 1140 to Vienna itself. In 1156, the mark was raised to the rank of a duchy by Frederick Barbarossa (see p. 73).

The Babenbergs continued to enlarge and strengthen their territory, and when the line came to an end in 1246 a solid principality had been formed. Disputed succession was followed by warfare, and, for a time, the duchy was in the hands of Ottakar of Bohemia. The power of Ottakar was broken by the Hapsburg emperor Rudolph, who, in 1282, gave the duchy to his sons ; at this time the duchy included not only Austria but also Styria and Carinthia. It was a most important date in European history. The Babenbergs had nursed the Ostmark into a duchy; now, the Hapsburgs were to transform this federal unit into the vast Austro-Hungarian empire.

The history of the House of Hapsburg is a double one. On the one hand, there is the story of the dukes of Austria in the Holy Roman Empire. From 1438 until the end of the Empire in 1806, successive Austrian dukes were elected emperors with only one short break of three years (see p. 112). On the other hand, there is the story of the dukes of Austria as local territorial rulers who gradually accumulated the vast personal possessions that came to form the Austro-Hungarian empire. Some of these gains were within Germany; thus in 1360, the duchy of Carinthia and the county of Tyrol were obtained. But the greater part—and the most permanent part—of the Austrian acquisitions were to lie outside the German realm. The advance of the Ottoman Turks in the Balkan peninsula in the fifteenth century once more gave Austria the role of an 'Ostmark'. In 1526, the Turks defeated and killed the king of Bohemia and Hungary at Mohacz, and Austria acquired the double crown, although the greater part of Hungary, it is true, was soon in Turkish hands. The Turks were even besieging Vienna in 1529; and they again besieged it for a second time as late as 1683. But in due time the Ostmark had its reward. As the bulwark of Christendom, it fell heir to the spoils that became available with the decline of Turkish power (see p. 114).

## Towns and Town Leagues

### *The Growth of Towns*

The development of commerce and industry in the eleventh and twelfth centuries is one of the capital events of European history. One result of this progress was the rise of a new social element that stood in contrast both with the rival agricultural peasantry and the territorial nobility. It is with the appearance of this new category of artisans and wealthy merchants that the rise of towns was associated. Hitherto, 'towns' were mainly military and administrative centres or the seats of bishoprics, but, now, a new element was added to the castle or the cathedral. The town in an economic and social sense was coming into being, and in a legal sense, too, for it demanded corporate rights and privileges from the feudal lords. Despite their many differences, the towns of Italy, France, England and Germany were all manifestations of the same spirit of collective association for the purposes of manufacture and trade.

The territorial lords had tried at first to administer these centres of growing prosperity without making allowance for the new conditions. But the laws and customs that controlled the lives of peasants and serfs could hardly be applied to organized artisans and moneyed traders; the towns soon succeeded in obtaining autonomous municipal administrations. The earliest grants of communal rights in the German realm were at Cologne in 1106 and at Goslar in 1107. By the middle of the twelfth century, the great period of town foundation had begun, and it continued throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Some towns were episcopal cities, early freeing themselves from the yoke of a bishop and forcing him either by persuasion or revolt to grant rights of independence. In this struggle these cities were aided by the emperors whom they supported against the Church. This is the history of Worms, Mainz, Strasbourg, Cologne, and Magdeburg. Other towns grew up on the imperial domain itself, and in the anarchy after the fall of the Hohenstaufen they easily won complete independence. This is the origin of the free imperial cities of Germany; of such were Aachen, Frankfurt-am-Main and Nuremberg, but the term 'free cities' came to be used more widely and without the historical distinction (Fig. 19). Thirdly, there were the cities that sprang up on the lands of the feudal nobility. They were found all over the realm, both in western Germany and in the new colonial east (see p. 84).

*Town Leagues in Southern and Western Germany*

The life-blood of a town was trade, and consequently the townsmen were always at the mercy of political disturbance and heavy tolls, to say nothing of robber barons and river pirates. The anarchy




Fig. 19. Imperial cities in Germany, *c.* 1500

Based on Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, pp. 86–7 (seventh edition, London, 1930).

A = Aachen ; Au. = Augsburg ; B = Besançon ; Br. = Bremen ; C = Cologne ; F = Frankfurt-am-Main ; H = Hamburg ; L = Lübeck ; M = Metz ; N = Nuremberg ; S = Strasbourg ; Sp. = Speyer ; U = Ulm ; V = Verdun ; W = Worms.

The boundary of the Holy Roman Empire is marked.

of the Interregnum (1250–73) aggravated the difficulties of the time; thus it has been estimated that the number of tolls on the Rhine rose from nineteen to sixty-two, and that as much as 60% of the value of a cargo went in dues. It is not surprising therefore that the German cities should have formed leagues for mutual protection; it was a symptom of the failure of the central government to maintain

public order. As early as 1226, the towns of Mainz, Worms, Speyer, Strasbourg and Basle formed a league for the protection of the commerce of the Rhine. It was short-lived, but it had started a new practice in the German realm. Similar associations arose elsewhere, consisting sometimes of only two cities. One of the greatest of these leagues had its origin in 1254 when Mainz, Worms and Oppenheim founded an association out of which grew the League of the Rhine. Within a few years this came to include nearly one hundred cities in the Rhineland, and formed a body powerful enough for a time not only to police the Rhine but to interfere in imperial politics.

In southern Germany, the cities to the north of the Alps were likewise finding the value of co-operative action; various groups of cities were formed, sometimes merely to meet a specific need. In 1331, a larger union appeared in Swabia, when twenty-two cities joined together in an association that foreshadowed the great Swabian League of 1376; at its height this included some eighty cities. At the same time, a new league of Rhine cities from Mainz to Speyer included forty members, and the two leagues entered into a close alliance for political as well as economic purposes. These powerful confederations alarmed the territorial princes of the south, who took advantage of the different interests of the towns to defeat the leagues in 1388. The emperor, too, turned against the cities, and the leagues were dissolved as 'contrary to God, the King, the Empire and the Law'. But the princes, though strong enough to prevent the cities from achieving a common political development, were not able to absorb them.

Although these leagues were dissolved, the cities remained important individual elements whose contribution to the economic and cultural progress of Germany was immense. Their power, too, received some recognition when in 1486 they were admitted to the imperial diet as a third estate along with the two estates of the electors and the princes. But they failed to make any permanent contribution to the problem of German consolidation; they were never able to achieve any large-scale urban political structure; they left the political map of Germany as multicoloured as ever. Historically, the origin of Switzerland bears much resemblance to the foundation of the Rhenish and Swabian leagues, only it was a league of cantons interested in the control of the Alpine passes. Protected by its mountains, it was the only one of the thirteenth-century leagues to achieve permanent political form.

*The Hanseatic League*

The greatest of all the city leagues was the Hanseatic League of northern Germany. Two factors made the rise of this remarkable commercial association possible. One was the development of commercial enterprise in the northern seas from London to Riga. The other was the work of colonization which brought the German people to the Baltic coasts. The origin of the League may be found in the informal associations of north German merchants which arose in the second half of the twelfth century. German merchants from different cities and their *Hansa* (=group or association) appeared in London, Bruges, Wisby, Novgorod and later in Bergen. These associations seem to have fused with similar associations in Germany itself, and from this dual origin grew the Hanseatic League. The first formal alliance in Germany was made between the cities of Lübeck and Hamburg in 1241; a little later, in 1259, the merchants of Lübeck, Rostock, and Wismar founded a similar league of defence against piracy. The success of these defensive alliances made the practice popular, and records of the fourteenth century in England, Flanders, Norway and Russia make frequent reference to the 'Hansa of German merchants'.

It is difficult to say how many cities belonged to the League, for the number was constantly fluctuating, but the usual estimate, at the height of the League's power, is about eighty (Fig. 20). They were governed by a council which met, theoretically at any rate, at Lübeck every three years. Trade routes were patrolled; courts of arbitration were set up; common regulations for controlling weights and measures were devised; economic privileges were arranged between different cities. The Hansa merchants could apply powerful economic sanctions to any recalcitrant kingdom or feudal lord.

Yet, despite its power, the League did not form an organic whole. It never developed political institutions. It had no permanent officials, no permanent navy, no treasury, no centralized executive. Within the League there were divergences of interest between different cities. Lübeck's presidency was challenged by Cologne; and the inland cities did not always agree with those of the sea coast. Bearing this defective constitutional structure in mind, it is not surprising that signs of decay began to appear in the fifteenth century. Moreover, the union of Poland and Lithuania in 1386, and of Norway, Denmark and Sweden in 1397, were blows to Hanseatic supremacy in Baltic lands. And, again, the Hohenzollern electors of

Brandenburg compelled their towns to sever connection with the League in the fifteenth century.

Even nature itself seemed to conspire against Hanseatic power. By 1425, for some mysterious reason, the heavy shoals of herring left the Baltic and, instead, took to spawning in the North Sea. Amsterdam was to gain what Lübeck had lost. And as the fifteenth





Fig. 20. The Hanseatic League in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries

Based on Putzger, F. W., *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, p. 68 (fifty-seventh edition, Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1939).

B = Bremen ; H = Hamburg ; L = Lübeck.

Other towns with Hanse privileges, not shown on this map, were La Rochelle, Rochefort, Bordeaux and Lisbon.

century drew to a close, Dutch and English maritime enterprise was competing with that of the Hanse. So that even before the great oceanic discoveries, ' most of its teeth were out and the rest loose ', as one English observer in Germany put it. Yet the League survived for over another century. Its last council was held in 1669. It had been essentially a medieval creation, and, like the city leagues of southern Germany, it could neither be transformed into a single state itself, nor yet be made to contribute to a solution of the territorial problem of Germany.

## THE RELIGIOUS STRUGGLE

### *The Reformation*

It was in October 1517 that a professor of theology in the university of Wittenberg, named Martin Luther, was roused by the sale of Indulgences in Germany, and nailed to the doors of Wittenberg Cathedral his famous ninety-five theses or arguments against the practice. Hitherto a loyal son of the Church, he little knew what forces his action was to let loose. But the time was already ripe for





Fig. 21. The Hapsburg territories, *c.* 1560

Based on Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, pp. 118-19 (seventh edition, London, 1930).


The greater part of Hungary was at this date in Turkish hands, and so is not shaded as Austrian, although the Austrian emperor included ' King of Hungary ' among his titles.

some great changes. There had long been discontent with many abuses in the Church ; the work of Wycliffe in England and of John Hus in Bohemia were symptoms of unrest. During the fifteenth century, there were various proposals for ecclesiastical reform, and there was a growing feeling in Germany against papal exactions. Now, in the sixteenth century, the spirit of the Renaissance was everywhere apparent in a questioning of old beliefs and practices.

The novel art of printing, too, provided a new instrument for the spread of new ideas. The number of books issued from German printing presses in 1523 was twelve times that issued ten years earlier, and four-fifths of these were devoted to the cause of reform. Luther's translation of the New Testament was issued in 1521, and the whole Bible appeared in 1534.

Not all Germany was ready to support the movement for reform; but many of the princes were resentful of the flow of money to Rome, and, from its early days, the movement was identified with the spirit of local independence. The attack on the practices of the Church soon passed into an attack on dogma, and the breach was thus irreparable. There was, moreover, no effective central government that could, with one voice, accept or reject the new attitude; the Emperor Charles V (1519–56) was too involved in war with France and with the Turks, and too occupied with the government of the vast Hapsburg lands to give the internal affairs of the realm his full attention. In 1490, the Austrian Hapsburgs were exclusively a German power ruling over Austria and its associated territories together with the Netherlands, which had been acquired by marriage. But in 1496, Maximilian of Austria married his son Philip to Joanna of Spain, and their son, Charles, inherited both the Spanish (1516) and the Austrian (1519) dominions. The Hapsburg empire under Charles V thus became a vast aggregation of territories (Fig. 21). In 1521, these possessions were partitioned; Charles handed over the Austrian lands to his brother Ferdinand, but retained the Netherlands together with the imperial title in Germany. But only once in this critical period of twenty years did Charles appear in Germany,

*The Hapsburg Dynasty*



and then, in 1530, he declared against the new faith. The result was to divide the already divided principalities of the Empire with fresh antagonisms. The north of Germany was becoming an almost solid Protestant block, and the rebel doctrine was spreading also in the south into Württemberg and even into the Austrian lands themselves (Fig. 22). The supporters of the new faith came to be known as Protestants from their protest against Catholic and imperial claims.

In order to protect themselves and their new beliefs, the Protestant states formed the famous Schmalkaldic League for mutual support, and gained considerable success. Meantime, the hand of the emperor continued to be tied by renewed war with France and by the Turkish menace. Not until 1547 was he free to attack the league, and in that year its army was defeated at Mühlberg. But this military success brought no unity of faith to Germany. Attempts to heal the breach by various compromises had no success; behind the religious discord were the old animosities of the princes. Charles V abdicated from the imperial title in 1555; whereas he had attempted compromise, his brother and successor, Ferdinand, accepted the necessary fact of division, and so by the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 a religious peace was secured. The first phase of the Reformation in Germany was over. By this treaty, the principle of 'cujus regio, ejus religio' was adopted, and the government of each state was allowed to decide between Catholicism and Lutheranism as its form of religion. An important point to be decided was the status of the ecclesiastical properties that had been secularized during the revolt, and it was agreed that all Church property secularized before 1552 should remain in lay hands; the rest was to be restored to the Church.

The Peace of Augsburg was the final blow, if final blow were needed, to complete the break-up of Germany. With unity of faith had perished all possibility of reforming the constitution, and of turning the German realm into a national monarchy. The treaty, moreover, left many questions open. In particular, it did not recognize the non-Lutheran Protestants who, by now, were reaching considerable numbers in Germany. From the first, the Protestants had been divided amongst themselves both by doctrinal and by political differences. Martin Luther had not been alone in his protest against Rome. There was, in particular, the teaching of the Frenchman John Calvin, who preached at Geneva from 1536 to 1564. Many Germans, particularly in the Rhineland, had been converted to these teachings, and the Calvinistic doctrine was becoming a serious competitor of Lutheranism; but despite this, it was ignored by the settle-

ment at Augsburg. The peace did one thing however; although religious enthusiasms and political rivalries remained unsatisfied, a respite from civil war was secured for some fifty years.

*The Counter-Reformation*

The Protestant revolt had not come to success without some influence upon the Roman Church itself. Many Catholics had themselves long felt the need of reform, and as reconciliation with the Protestants became increasingly out of the question, the Church as a whole began to improve and strengthen itself to resist the spreading heresy. It is this movement of reform within the Catholic Church itself that is known as the Counter-Reformation. One of the main symptoms of the spirit of reform is seen in the numerous religious Orders that appeared during the sixteenth century, especially in the 'Society of Jesus' founded by a Spanish nobleman, Ignatius Loyola, and sanctioned by the Papacy in 1540. The Jesuits, organized on an almost military basis, formed the shock troops in the revival of Catholicism against the Protestant danger. From the middle of the century onwards, the Jesuits were establishing schools in the German towns—in Vienna, in Munich, and along the Rhine and the Main —and these schools were centres of propaganda as well as study.

Another great force that worked for the consolidation of the Catholic faith was the Council of Trent which met between 1545 and 1563. It was the last of the great Church councils that were so prominent in the Middle Ages, the last until the Vatican Council of 1869. The Emperor Charles V had desired that the issues between Catholicism and Protestantism should be debated in a general council, and now, faced with the Protestant revolt, the Church restated its doctrine in clear and emphatic terms. With the Council of Trent, the search for doctrinal compromise was over, and the severance between the two worlds of faith was complete. The modern Catholic Church has been described as largely the result of the Council of Trent.

A third great force working towards improvement was the character of the popes themselves. It was Paul III who had established the Jesuits and summoned the Council of Trent. And then Paul IV and Pius IV devoted themselves to the work of practical reform. The austerity of Pius V, who came after, provided a personal example to his cardinals and indeed to the whole Church.

The Catholic reaction was successful in eliminating all Protestant rites from much of southern Germany; and, in Austria, the Jesuits

obtained a control over education that lasted for centuries. Ferdinand of Styria, the pupil of a Jesuit college, was governed by the single purpose of bringing the whole religious life of his realm under Jesuit control; in 1617 he became king of Bohemia, though his election was disputed, and in 1619 he became emperor as Ferdinand II. Having





Fig. 22. The religious situation in Germany, *c.* 1618.

Based on Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas*, p. 120 (seventh edition, London, 1930).

*Note.*—(1) The map shows conditions at the opening of the Thirty Years' War in 1618. The course of the war, however, saw changes; thus after the battle of the White Mountain (1620), Roman Catholicism was entirely re-established in Bohemia.

(2) Brandenburg was predominantly Lutheran, though its Electors were Calvinist.

captured the imperial office itself, the Jesuits had gained a great strategic victory, and the Catholic reaction was at its height. The first excitement of Protestant enthusiasm was over, and the Protestants were divided among themselves by doctrinal differences and personal

animosities. The stage was thus set for an attack by reformed Catholicism in an aggressive temper. The uneasy peace since 1555 came to an end in 1618 with the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, just one hundred years after the theses of Wittenberg in 1517 (Fig. 22).

### *The Thirty Years' War*, 1618–48

The spark that began the Thirty Years' War was struck in Bohemia. The kingdom had been the scene of violent anti-Catholic feeling long before the Reformation. It was only to be expected therefore that Protestant beliefs should find a quick support in the land of John Hus (see p. 91). Ferdinand, on becoming king in 1617, immediately began repressive measures against the Bohemian form of Lutheranism. Protestant churches were demolished, and there was rioting in Prague. The Bohemian Protestants sought allies from their German brethren, from Hungary and even from the Turk; but the aid that came proved ineffective, and at the battle of the White Mountain in 1620 the Bohemian cause was lost. Until the Czech revival in the nineteenth century, Bohemia remained under Austrian cultural, as well as political, domination. The emperor (for Ferdinand had become emperor in 1619) now determined to wipe out all trace of heresy from the land, and the Austrian officials and Jesuit priests were triumphant.

Once the spark had been struck, the smouldering fires of German Protestantism soon broke out into flame. There were many grievances on both sides. The treaty of 1555 had given toleration only to Lutherans, but Calvinism had gained a strong hold in Germany since that time, and was still unrecognized. And again, the treaty had decided that all ecclesiastical property secularized after 1552 should be handed over to the Roman Church, yet eight bishoprics, for example, had been secularized since that date and still remained in the hands of their Protestant rulers. But neither these grievances nor even the challenging force of the Counter-Reformation itself, were the only factors responsible for thirty years of exhausting warfare. The religious motive was supplemented and ultimately replaced by purely political interests. Ferdinand II had identified imperial authority with the suppression of Protestantism, but in doing so roused the fears even of Catholic princes lest imperial absolutism should result from the success of the Catholic cause. Moreover, before the German rivalries had spent themselves, they had become involved with the ever wider issues of European politics.

France, under Richelieu, welcomed the opportunity of weakening the Hapsburgs who threatened her both from Austria and Spain. The struggle for ascendancy between Hapsburg and Bourbon was fought out upon the battlefields of Germany.

Denmark interfered early both from religious and political motives, but the victories of the imperial general Wallenstein enabled the emperor in 1629 to force a peace which declared that all Church lands secularized since 1555 must be restored to the Church. This overwhelming success served only to arouse disquiet among the principalities of the Empire, Catholic and Protestant alike, and to fan the suspicions of Sweden and France about Hapsburg power. Gustavus Adolphus, with an eye on the north German coast, entered Germany in 1631, but within four years, despite the victory of Gustavus at Lützen (which cost him his life) the Swedish forces had been defeated. The Lutheran princes, always jealous of Swedish influence in northern Germany, secured guarantees for their worship and their estates from the emperor, and pledged themselves to drive out their allies from the German realm. It was at this moment, when the triumph of Austria seemed complete, that France interfered to support the Protestant cause and, not least, to challenge the dominant position of Austria in Germany. There was, indeed, little religious spirit left in a war in which Catholic France and Protestant Sweden, to say nothing of the Protestant Netherlands, were allied against Lutheran Germany and the Catholic powers of Austria and Spain. The issues at stake were not points of belief, but whether Sweden should hold Pomerania and whether France should secure the imperial rights and cities in Alsace. The years following 1635, like those before, were full of marches, of sieges and of the looting of civilians by a starving soldiery until, in 1648, long-drawn-out negotiations were concluded at Münster and Osnabrück. These treaties have since been collectively known as the Peace of Westphalia.

### *The Peace of Westphalia*, 1648

Peace had come at last, but the thirty years had left a staggering legacy, both economic and political, to the German realm. The economic consequences were enormous. Conservative estimates say that at least one-third of the population of Germany had perished.*

* ' The old legend that the population dropped from sixteen to four million people, rests on imagination ; both figures are incorrect. The German Empire, including Alsace but excluding the Netherlands and Bohemia, probably numbered about twenty-one millions in 1618, and rather less than thirteen and a half millions in 1648 '.—Wedgewood, C. V., *The Thirty Years' War*, p. 516 (London, 1938).

Reasonably accurate figures show a decline in Württemberg from 440,000 in 1622 to 121,000 in 1645, and there were parts of Germany that had suffered worse than Württemberg in the wars.* There were dozens of ruined towns; Magdeburg, Würzburg, Heidelberg, Speyer and Mannheim among them. Thus at Magdeburg, the greater part of the inhabitants had been killed and the whole town, with the exception of the cathedral and some 120 houses, burned to the ground. Outside the towns, whole areas of countryside had been laid waste. Roads had ceased to be repaired; river channels were neglected, and to the physical difficulties of communication were added the political difficulties of many tolls. Moreover, what the armies had begun, pestilence and famine completed. The whole economic life of Germany sank into a torpor that remained for the rest of the seventeenth and during the greater part of the eighteenth century.

The political consequences of the peace were no less fundamental than the economic consequences of the war. The struggles of the Reformation had ended in a drawn battle. The 'secularization' question was settled by adopting the year 1624 as the dividing line; for Baden, Württemberg and the Palatinate, however, the date was 1618. Thus the long chapter of the religious struggles was closed. Henceforward, Catholic, Calvinist and Lutheran states were to exist side by side, and not only to exist, but to exist with sovereign rights. Even the medieval disintegration was nothing to the complete sovereign independence that was now characteristic of the German states. It has been computed that the Peace of Westphalia left some 360 principalities in Germany; the whole land became a melée of little despotisms. The imperial diet became a mere congress of envoys, not a national assembly of principals. This internal ruin was completed by external loss. Switzerland and the Netherlands, long independent in fact, were now formally acknowledged to be so. Alsace, or what amounted to virtual control of it, passed to France. In the north, Bremen, Verden and West Pomerania went to Sweden. Of the many states that remained, most were small, some were still of considerable size (Bavaria, the electorate of Saxony and Württemberg for example), but two stood out pre-eminent. In the south, Catholic Austria had lost territory and prestige as a result of the war, but was still the leading state; her ruler held the dignity, if nothing more, of the imperial title, and controlled considerable non-German lands in the east as well as the family possessions in Germany itself. In the

* Clapham, J. H., 'Charles Louis, Elector Palatine, 1617–1680', *Economica*, vol. vii, pp. 381–96 (London, 1940).

north, Brandenburg had gained considerable territory (Fig. 23), but was not yet sufficiently consolidated to challenge the Hapsburg power. Still, a strong Protestant state had appeared in northern Germany to become a rallying point against Austrian predominance. Already, the beginnings of a struggle between these two leaders of Germany can be discerned.

## THE RIVALRY OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA

There is a good deal of parallel between the rise of Austria and that of Prussia. Both were, in origin, outpost sites—one the 'mark' of Bavaria, the other the 'mark' of Saxony. Both territories came into the possession of Swabian families—one of the Hapsburgs, the other of the Hohenzollerns. In both cases the new family identified itself with the new outpost territory, and built up a considerable domain. The lands of both were partly within the Holy Roman Empire, but to a considerable extent outside it, in non-German lands. And, finally, both attempted the leadership of Germany.

### The Rise of Prussia

*Brandenburg up to* 1640

The clue to the history of Prussia, and indeed of the modern German empire, is the outpost of the North Mark traditionally founded by Henry the Fowler in 928. It was not until 1411 that this unit, now expanded into the electorate of Brandenburg, came into the hands of the Hohenzollern family. During the next two centuries the 'mark' consolidated itself in an unspectacular fashion (see p. 86). Surrounded by powerful duchies (Mecklenburg, Pomerania) and by Poland, its future did not appear promising. And there was little to compensate for this political precariousness. The soil of Brandenburg was poor; the glacial sands were fit only for rye and oats, and there were numerous marshes. There seems to be a great deal of geographical truth in the statement that 'God never intended Prussia'.

Between 1411 and 1619, ten electors ruled in Brandenburg. They were competent and practical, but there was nothing remarkable about their achievements, certainly nothing to foreshadow the great future that was in store for their state. They added piecemeal to their territories, they intermarried with other German families, but they contributed little that was remarkable to the great formative


forces that moulded German life during the religious struggles. Yet the years 1618–19, which saw the opening of the Thirty Years' War, were fateful to Brandenburg in a very special sense. When Elector John Sigismund died in 1619, his successor inherited a claim in a dispute about some territory in the west of Germany. This Cleves-Jülich-Berg inheritance was composed of all kinds of genealogical conundrums, but the net result was that Brandenburg obtained a share. These territories were remote from the Brandenburg homeland, but they gave the electors an interest in the rich Rhine traffic and in the west generally. But this was not all that the year 1618 brought with it, for, as a result of a family compact among the Hohenzollerns, the duchy of East Prussia passed to Brandenburg at the extinction of the Prussian branch of the family (see p. 90). Thus the electors of Brandenburg, as heirs to the enterprise of the Teutonic crusaders, became dukes of Prussia under the king of Poland, though for many a long day the hold of the electors upon the duchy was extremely precarious. It was by chance, then, in 1618 that these three areas, separate in their history and institutions, came together under one ruler (Fig. 23). But what chance had brought together, an efficient government was later to consolidate.

Despite these gains in 1618, Brandenburg did not play any outstanding part in the Thirty Years' War. The electorate had early on become Lutheran in sympathy; then Elector John Sigismund himself became Calvinist, but the mass of his people retained their Lutheran sympathies, and the religious life of the state was marked by toleration. The weak and incapable Elector George William (1619–40) refused to take any decisive stand in the great storm that was bursting over Germany, and sought refuge in neutrality—not that this benefited him greatly, for his lands were ravaged by both parties. Between 1631 and 1635 he was forced into war on the Swedish side, but before and after he was, if anything, a supporter of Austria. His successor, Frederick William, described him as being utterly unable to rule.

### *The Great Elector*, 1640–88

Frederick William himself, known both to his contemporaries and to history as the 'Great Elector', came to the throne in 1640. Extricating himself from the Austrian alliance and making a truce with the Swedes, he was able to emerge at the Peace of Westphalia with gains at the expense of both. He could rejoice with the rest of Protestant Germany in the freedom from imperial catholicism, and,

too, he obtained East Pomerania from Sweden. Indeed, he had claimed the whole of Pomerania by virtue of an earlier agreement made in 1571, and so he was given the secularized bishoprics of







Figs. 23, 24. The rise of Prussia, 1411–1720

Based on Putzger, F. W., *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, pp. 147–8 (fifty-seventh edition, Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1939).

H=Halberstadt (1648); M=Magdeburg (1680); Mi.=Minden (1648).

Halberstadt, Minden and Magdeburg* in the west as compensation. Despite the sorry part it had played in the war, Brandenburg emerged from the Peace not only with an increase of territory but as the potential leader of the northern Protestants.

The 'Great Elector' passed the rest of his reign in the work of reconstruction after the devastation of thirty years. The constitution and the administration were revised and reorganized; the loosely knit provinces of his domain were brought under the control of a central bureaucracy. In 1657, East Prussia was relieved of Polish suzerainty. Agriculture and industry were encouraged. Persecuted Protestants from all parts of Europe (and even persecuted Catholics) found a home on the sandy wastes of the electorate. Marshes were drained, forests cut down, and commerce stimulated. Frederick William even started a small navy in 1680, and, in the following year, he established a settlement on the Guinea coast of Africa. The permanent army was increased and drilled and equipped to make good what nature denied, for, as had been well said, 'the frontiers of Prussia were her armies'. With her scattered territories, straddling the north German plain and surrounded by other powerful states, it could hardly be otherwise. An estimate of the Great Elector's work has been given us by no less a person than Frederick the Great himself—if he was not always master of the first move, he was master of the second.

### *The Prussian Kingdom*

The work of internal organization was continued by Frederick I (1688–1713) and by Frederick William I (1713–40). The reign of the former is notable for the fact that he crowned himself 'king in Prussia' (1701); he was also able to obtain some small acquisition in the west—Lingen (1702), Tecklenberg (1707), and Upper Gelderland (1713), though he did not live to see the transfer of this last area completed. Frederick William was able to realize an ambition which his father and grandfather had been unable to fulfil. They had interfered in the greater politics of Europe but not with decisive result. Now, in 1720, the brief flowering of Sweden in the Baltic was over, and King Frederick William I was able to obtain part of West Pomerania (Fig. 24). At home, the work of the 'Great Elector' was carried to still further heights of efficiency under the domineering

* The position of Magdeburg, however, was somewhat different from that of Halberstadt and Minden. It was not to fall to Brandenburg until the death of its administrator; and this did not happen until 1680.


personality of Frederick William. His aim was, in his own phrase, to make his sovereignty as solid as bronze. As part of the discipline of subordinating everything to the state, the army received his greatest solicitude. He raised the permanent force from 30,000 to 90,000 men, and drilled and punished it into an efficient fighting machine. In 1733, a system of district conscription was set up, by which military districts were required to furnish fixed quotas to serve under a privileged officer class of Junkers. At Berlin the *Kadettenhaus* was founded to train the sons of the nobility to be officers.

*Frederick the Great*, 1740–86

This was the military machine that Frederick the Great inherited in 1740, and at once there came an opportunity of using it. Repudiating a guarantee, given by his father, to recognize Maria Theresa's succession in Austria, Frederick occupied the province of Silesia with a cool cynicism. As he confessed later, ambition whispered to a listening ear. The spoils of his robbery were well worth having—an area of great agricultural and industrial value, covering some 15,000 square miles and including one and a half million people. Hitherto, the scattered possessions of Brandenburg had covered only about 50,000 square miles and contained about two and a half million people. The invasion of Silesia was followed by the War of the Austrian Succession, and at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, Frederick was allowed to keep the province. Nor was this increase all. In 1744, upon the extinction of the male line in East Friesland, a fief of the empire, he was able to add the province to his possessions; it was not a wealthy area, but it helped to increase the western orientation of Brandenburg's outlook.

Despite these gains, Frederick was far from being satisfied with his realm. As he wrote: 'the greatest part of my territories is dispersed or divided in such a manner that they cannot mutually assist one another'. The frontiers of the state, therefore, even more than under the 'Great Elector', became the armies of the king. But whereas Frederick William had great talents, Frederick had great genius. His religion was the state and, above all, the army. He raised the permanent force to 150,000, and it was reformed and drilled into superb precision. 'Ready to a gaiter button' was his maxim, and when the crisis came with the Seven Years' War (1756–63) he was able to emerge from a conflict against Austria, France, Sweden and Russia with the *status quo* undisturbed. The events of 1740, sanctioned by the peace of 1763, had opened the eyes of all Europe to a new force

in the German realm. The rivalry of Austria and Prussia became henceforth the mainspring of German affairs.




Figs. 25, 26. The rise of Prussia, 1720–1815

Based on Putzger, F. W., *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, pp. 147–8 and 149–50 (fifty-seventh edition, Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1939).

K = Kulmerland.

Their rivalry did not prevent them from combining together when policy dictated. The partitions of Poland gave an opportunity of

gain to both. In 1772, Frederick was at last able to bring East Prussia into territorial connection with Brandenburg by the acquisition of West Prussia and Ermland. Thus the medieval failure to link up this outpost to the German realm was at last made good—at any rate in a political sense. Frederick died in 1786, but the further acquisition of ' South Prussia ' (1793) and ' New East Prussia ' (1795), at the second and third partitions of Poland, carried on his work. These acquisitions gave the king of Prussia greater territories outside Germany than within. Taken together they formed a vast and strange state, stretching from the Rhine to the Niemen, and standing as a challenge to the historic leadership of Austria in German affairs (Fig. 25).

## The Growth of Austria

With the Peace of Westphalia, the last vestige of imperial control in Germany disappeared. All that was left of the empire of Otto was a string of sounding titles. 'Properly speaking', says Bryce, 'it was no longer an Empire at all, but a Federation, and that of loosest sort. For it had no common treasury, no efficient common tribunals, no means of coercing a refractory member; its states were of different religions, were governed according to different forms, were administered judicially and financially without any regard to each other.'* Although in theory the imperial throne was still elective, and although several projects were formed to set the Hapsburgs aside, the crown continued from 1438 onwards to be handed down in the Austrian line. A change would have been difficult. The expense of the office ruled out those without a substantial patrimony. The heads of Protestant states like Hanover and Prussia were in any case excluded by the majority of Catholic electors in the imperial diet. For one brief moment only was the succession broken when, during the reign of Maria Theresa, the crown was worn for three years by Elector Charles of Bavaria; but in 1745 her husband became emperor, and their son succeeded him.

Despite the decline in imperial authority, Austria still remained the leading German state. It is true that a rival was emerging around Brandenburg. It is true, too, that Austria had lost heavily in ceding Lusatia to Saxony (1635) and in yielding the imperial cities of Alsace to France (1648), and even more heavily when in 1740 Prussia took Silesia, and the Treaty of Paris (1763) confirmed the theft. Yet

* Bryce, Viscount, *The Holy Roman Empire*, p. 390 (edition of 1928, London).

she had gained the southern provinces of the Netherlands, and also considerable rights in Italy in 1713. She was still one of the most important elements in the European states system, balancing the power of France. The Hapsburgs, says Bryce, comported themselves in European politics 'not as the representatives of Germany, but as the heads of the Austrian monarchy'.* Indeed, at the very time that Austria was losing in fact, if not in theory, her 'holy empire' in Germany, she was gaining a new and more personal empire from the Turk, as well as remaining (till 1866) an important power in Italy.




Fig. 27. The growth of Austria to 1914

Based mainly on Muir, R., and Philip, G., *Historical Atlas*, p. 40 (sixth edition, London, 1927).

B=Bukovina; C=Carinthia; Cr.=Cracow; Cro.=Croatia; H=Hapsburg; I=Quarter of the Inn; La.=Lausitz; S=Salzburg; T=the bishopric of Trent; V=Vorarlberg.

The shaded area represents Austria in 1914. The dates are those of the first acquisition of a territory; for the changes during the Napoleonic era, see Fig. 30.

The acquisition of Bohemia, and especially that of Hungary, in 1526, had placed Austria in an entirely new position (see p. 92). The Ostmark was once more the outpost of Europe against the infidel, and for the next 350 years, the policy of Austria was oriented as much

* Bryce, Viscount, op. cit. pp. 396–7.

towards the Turk as it was towards the rest of Germany. The Hapsburgs, in Bismarck's phrase, were gravitating towards Buda-Pesth ever since the annihilation of the Empire in the Thirty Years' War. But this distraction towards the south-east brought with it great profit (Fig. 27). In 1550, Hungary was a mere western strip of territory, although it extended southwards to include part of Croatia; the rest was yet to be reclaimed from the Turk, and, beyond this, there were still further provinces to tempt ambition. After intermittent though sometimes savage warfare, the recovery of the greater part of Hungary, together with Transylvania and a great part of Croatia and Slavonia, took place at the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699. German settlers poured into the newly won lands, as into Bohemia to the north. In 1718, at the Peace of Passarowitz, came another substantial addition, some part of which, however, had to be given back to the Turk in 1739 (Fig. 27). After this, the frontier was stable until the nineteenth century, except that Bukovina in the east was obtained in 1777. Nor is this the whole story. Just as Austria advanced against the Turk in the south, so she gained at the expense of the Slav in the north. The additions of territory at the partition of Poland in 1772 and 1795 were very considerable. Finally, in the eighteenth century also, the Dalmatian coast was obtained from Venice (1797).

Thus the Ostmark continued its frontier mission to the end, and the result was a vast and cumbrous empire, compounded of many races, and bristling with problems of internal administration. Ultimately, it was destined to break up under the explosive forces of nationalism.


## The End of the Holy Roman Empire

### *The Age of Napoleon in Germany*

The French revolutionary wars began a series of wide-reaching and bewildering territorial changes in Europe. Successive treaties registered the process until, by 1810, an entirely new political map of Germany had resulted. As part of his ' new order ' in Europe, Napoleon completely changed the political system of Germany.

Among the German princes, at any rate, the outbreak of the Revolution had produced horror, and by 1792 both Austria and Prussia were at war with France. Prussia, however, distrustful of Austria, and intent on preserving her recent Polish gains, withdrew from the war in 1795 ; the Treaty of Basle, in that year, ceded to France the Prussian territories west of the Rhine, on condition that

prussia should be allowed compensation in the lands to the east of the Rhine; the western territories, however, were not definitely




Figs. 28, 29. Prussia in the Age of Napoleon, 1795–1806–1810

Based on Putzger, F. W., *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, pp. 147–8 and 149–50 (fifty-seventh edition, Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1939).

K = Kulmerland; S.P. = Swedish Pomerania.

incorporated into France until 1801, and Prussia did not finally receive compensation until 1803 (Fig. 28). Austria continued in

the war but, after successive defeats, was forced to conclude the Treaty of Campo Formio in 1797. By this, she surrendered the Austrian Netherlands Milan and her Rhenish possessions to France, but she was allowed Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia as compensation (Fig. 30). Austria, moreover, agreed to acquiesce in




Fig. 30. Austria in the Age of Napoleon

Based on Robertson, C. Grant, and Bartholomew, J. G., *An Historical Atlas of Modern Europe*, p. 20 (second edition, Oxford, 1924).

The dates on the map itself indicate the acquisition of Dalmatia, Istria, Salzburg (S), the Bishopric of Trent (T), and Venetia.

the French annexation of all German territory west of the Rhine; and the German princes, who were thus to lose their lands, were promised indemnification elsewhere in Germany. Within two years, Austria, in alliance with Britain and Russia, was at war with France again, only to be defeated by Napoleon himself at Marengo (June 1800) and by Moreau at Hohenlinden (Dec. 1800). The Treaty of Lunéville, which followed, confirmed the provisions of Campo Formio, and also ceded the Austrian province of Tuscany to Parma.

## GERMANY DURING THE AGE OF NAPOLEON

(The thick black lines indicate periods of war with France)

| PRUSSIA | | AUSTRIA |
|---|---|---|
| | 1789 | |
| | 1790 | |
| | 1791 | |
| | 1792 | |
| | 1793 | |
| | 1794 | |
| *T. of Basle* (5 April 1795) | 1795 | |
| | 1796 | |
| | 1797 | *T. of Campo Formio* (17 Oct. 1797) |
| | 1798 | |
| | 1799 | |
| | 1800 | B. of Marengo (14 June 1800)<br>B. of Hohenlinden (3 Dec. 1800) |
| | 1801 | *T. of Lunéville* (9 Feb. 1801) |
| | 1802 | |
| Act of Mediatization (25 Feb. 1803) | 1803 | Act of Mediatization (25 Feb. 1803) |
| | 1804 | |
| *T. of Schönbrunn* (15 Dec. 1805) | 1805 | B. of Austerlitz (2 Dec. 1805)<br>*T. of Pressburg* (26 Dec. 1805) |
| B. of Jena (14 Oct. 1806) | 1806 | Confederation of the Rhine (12 July 1806)<br>End of H.R.E. (6 Aug. 1806) |
| *T. of Tilsit* (9 July 1807) | 1807 | |
| | 1808 | |
| | 1809 | B. of Wagram (6 July 1809)<br>*T. of Vienna* (14 Oct. 1809) |
| | 1810 | |
| | 1811 | |
| | 1812 | |
| | 1813 | |
| | 1814 | |
| *Congress of Vienna* | 1815 | *Congress of Vienna* |

The treaties of Basle, Campo Formio and Lunéville but prepared the way for the sweeping changes of 1803. It was partly to provide territorial compensation for the German princes who had lost territory west of the Rhine, and partly to simplify the existing political geography in the interests of France, that the German Diet, at the dictation of Napoleon, attempted to reconstruct the states-system of Germany in February 1803. The details were embodied in the so-called " Act of Mediatization ". By this the ecclesiastical states were secularized and the imperial cities were ' mediatized ' ; thus the smallest principalities lost their independence and were incorporated within the larger states ; altogether, some 112 states were suppressed. To balance the strength of the two leading powers, Austria and Prussia, several strong but secondary states were left—Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg, Saxony, Hanover and Hesse-Darmstadt ; Hanover, however, was occupied by the French in 1803.

These changes were but a prelude to a great reduction in the power of both Austria and Prussia in Germany. In 1805 Austria, in association with her old allies, once more appealed to arms, but in vain. Her defeat at Austerlitz (2 Dec. 1805) was followed by the crushing Treaty of Pressburg (26 Dec. 1805). She lost Tyrol and the lands nearby to Bavaria ; her newly acquired Venetia, Istria and Dalmatia went to the new kingdom of Italy ; the remaining Austrian lands in the west went to Württemberg and Baden ; in return she received only Salzburg and some nearby territory (Fig. 30). What is more, in the following year most of the western states of Germany (Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and others) definitely separated from the Holy Roman Empire, and formed the Confederation of the Rhine, ' protected ' by Napoleon and supporting him with an army organized by French officers (July 1806). Finally, on 6 August 1806, Francis II of Austria formally resigned the imperial dignity, and became instead ' Emperor of Austria '. Thus the Holy Roman Empire came to an end. ' There was a time ', says Bryce, ' when this event would have been thought a sign that the last days of the world were at hand. But in the whirl of change that had bewildered men since A.D. 1789 it passed almost unnoticed '.*

In the meantime, the Prussians had held aloof from the struggle against France. By the Treaty of Schönbrunn (15 Dec. 1805), Prussia received Hanover in 1805–6, although she lost Ansbach and

* Bryce, Viscount, op. cit. p. 410.

that part of Cleves on the right bank of the Rhine (Fig. 28). But now, faced with the Confederation of the Rhine, and nervous lest she should become the next victim, Prussia declared war on France. A campaign of only three weeks' duration ended in swift disaster at Jena (14 Oct. 1806). The military prestige bequeathed by Frederick the Great was destroyed at one blow, and the defeat was completed by the Treaty of Tilsit in July 1807. The Prussian territories west of the Elbe were lost (the momentary possession of Hanover among them), and they were added to the new kingdom of Westphalia which became part of the Confederation of the Rhine; Bayreuth was also ceded to France (but went to Bavaria in 1810). Most of Prussia's Polish lands were also abstracted to form part of the new grand duchy of Warsaw; a little territory went to Russia; Danzig became a free city. The net result was to reduce the Prussian territories of 1805 to about one-half their size (Fig. 29).

Austria, waiting for revenge ever since Austerlitz, renewed war on Napoleon in 1809, but was heavily defeated at Wagram (July 1809), and the Treaty of Vienna that followed still further dismembered the Hapsburg lands. The greater part of Carinthia, Carniola, Croatia, Istria and Dalmatia went to form the 'Illyrian Provinces' annexed directly to the French empire; Salzburg and some nearby lands went to Bavaria; while part of Austria's gains from the partition of Poland went to the grand duchy of Warsaw and to Russia (Fig. 30). How absolute Napoleon's power now was in Germany may be seen from his annexation to the French empire, in 1810, of the whole north coast of Germany as far as the Elbe.

To sum up: by 1810 the complexity of the Holy Roman Empire had been reduced to three elements—the Confederation of the Rhine and the much reduced states of Austria and Prussia; the left bank of the Rhine, moreover, had now been incorporated into France (Fig. 31). Not until after the disastrous retreat of Napoleon from Moscow in October 1812 did the opportunity come for a war of liberation. First Prussia, then Austria, joined the allies against Napoleon. After some reverses their victory at Leipzig in October 1813 left Napoleon's protegés, the minor German states, ready to turn against him, and before the end of the year the allies had crossed the Rhine into France. By March 1814 they had entered Paris itself, and within a fortnight Napoleon had abdicated (11 April). Napoleon's attempt at recovery in March 1815 was defeated at the battle of Waterloo (18 June 1815).

## *The Settlement of* 1814–15

Not all these changes survived the defeat of Napoleon in 1814–15, but his essential work remained. His achievement had been to get rid of the medieval burden of the Holy Roman Empire, to sweep away some three hundred petty principalities, and to leave the





Fig. 31. Europe in 1810

Based on Muir, R., and Philip, G., *Historical Atlas*, p. 69 (sixth edition, London, 1927).

M = Montenegro.

possibility of some more satisfactory political organization in Germany. The Congress of Vienna that met in 1814–15 made numerous territorial modifications, but made no attempt to return to the territorial chaos of the eighteenth century; instead of some 360 states, there were now only thirty-nine left in Germany. The real interest of the settlement, however, lies not in the changes of the limits of Bavaria, Hanover, Württemberg and so on, but in the provisions affecting the two great rivals in Germany.

Prussia recovered part of her lost Polish lands, but had to yield the rest to Russia, and so demanded compensation in the west. There

she obtained not only her old territories, but considerable additions which enabled her to dominate northern Germany, and to provide a check against any future French aggression. But for Austria's opposition, she might have gained even more territory. Although greatly strengthened, Prussia still remained a straddling collection of territories, and was thus left with every temptation to consolidate her position (Fig. 32).





Fig. 32. Austria and Prussia in 1815

Based on Robertson, C. Grant, and Bartholomew, J. G., *An Historical Atlas of Modern Europe*, pp. 14 and 21 (second edition, Oxford, 1924).

L=Lucca ; M=Modena ; P=Parma.

Austria, too, underwent territorial changes. She relinquished her claims to the southern Netherlands, but regained her former possessions in Italy and Dalmatia, and added Lombardy to them. In Germany itself, her losses to Bavaria were also recovered. But more important than territorial questions was the creation of a new constitution to replace the Holy Roman Empire. Austria, under Metternich, had no liking for the revival of the old imperial title, long a

byword for impotence. A Confederation was therefore formed on the lines of that of the Rhine, but with boundaries roughly the same as those of the old empire. This new body was placed under the presidency of Austria, and Metternich hoped it would guarantee both the peace of central Europe and the continued preponderance of Austria.

These arrangements were at best a makeshift. Austria might be the titular head of the new federation, but by acquiescing in the establishment of Prussia in the Rhineland, she had abdicated the defence of the German realm against France. Moreover, Austrian interests in south-eastern Europe pulled her away from Germany, and her entanglements in Italy were but a source of weakness. Prussia, on the other hand, was more exclusively German; her loss of some Polish territory was really a strength in making he rest more German. In the growing nationalism of the nineteenth century, it was Prussia that was to stand for German interests, Prussia rather than the amorphous polyglot empire of Austria, torn by internal dissension and distracted by foreign interests. The Germanic Confederation was to prove but a temporary expedient.

## Bibliographical Note

1. Whole libraries have been written about the history of Germany, and this bibliographical note does nothing more than indicate a few books that might provide a stimulus and a guide to further reading. The relevant chapters in the *Cambridge Medieval History* (Cambridge, 1911–36) and *The Cambridge Modern History* (Cambridge, 1902-12) provide authoritative surveys.

2. It is difficult to make a selection from the vast number of works in German itself. One short survey has been translated into English, and is published in the Everyman's Library—Pinnow, H., *History of Germany* (London, 1936). It was first published in Berlin in 1929; the English translation by M. R. Brailsford has a summary of events between 1918 and 1936 by H. A. Piehler.

3. The classic account of *The Holy Roman Empire* by Viscount Bryce was first published in 1864, and has been reprinted many times since. It makes delightful reading and, despite the great increase in our knowledge since 1864, it still remains the best introduction to a study of this great political idea.

4. A clear and attractive account of the earlier history can be obtained from H. A. L. Fisher, *The Medieval Empire* (2 vols., London, 1898). The economic and social history of this period has been more recently treated in J. W. Thompson's *Feudal Germany* (Chicago, 1928); the latter half of this book is devoted to the expansion of the eastern frontier, and its footnotes make extensive reference to the great body of German scholarship dealing with the Middle Ages. A good supplement to the more ordinary historical account is K. Kretschmer, *Historische Geographie von Mitteleuropa* (München und Berlin, 1904).

5. There is a short but valuable account of *The Thirty Years' War* by S. R. Gardiner (London, 1874). There is also a recent and very full study with the same title by C. V. Wedgewood (London, 1938).

6. An outline of the rise of Brandenburg-Prussia is given in *The Evolution of Prussia*, by J. A. R. Marriott and C. G. Robertson (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1937). This includes references for further reading at the end of each chapter.

7. An account of the rise of Austria is given in A. W. A. Leeper, *History of Medieval Austria* (Oxford, 1941).

8. There are some excellent German historical atlases which naturally pay a great deal of attention to Germany: von Spruner-Menke, *Hand-Atlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der Neueren Zeit* (Gotha, 1880) ; Droysen, *Allgemeiner Historischer Atlas* (Bielefeld und Leipzig, 1920) ; Putzger, F. W., *Historischer Schul-Atlas* (57th ed., Bielefeld und Leipzig, 1939). The following English atlases are also very useful : Poole, R. L., *Historical Atlas of Modern Europe* (Oxford, 1902) ; Shepherd, W. R., *Historical Atlas* (7th ed., London, 1930) ; *The Cambridge Modern History Atlas* (2nd ed., Cambridge, 1924) ; *The Cambridge Medieval History : Volume of Maps* (Cambridge, 1936).

# Chapter III

# HISTORICAL OUTLINE, 1815–1871

*Germany in* 1815: Political disunity and social conservatism: The German Confederation

*Austrian Leadership*, 1815–58: The First Reaction: The Revolutions of 1830 and the Second Reaction: The Movements for National Unity, 1840–48: The Revolutions of 1848 and the Third Reaction

*The Victory of Prussia in Germany*, 1858–71: William I and the Constitutional Conflict in Prussia: The Defeat of Austria by Prussia: The Completion of the Prusso-German Empire

*Economic Development*, 1815–71: Economic Position in 1815: Prussian Economic Policy and the Zollverein: Austria and the Zollverein: Development of Communications and Shipping: Growth of Capital and Machine Industry: Social Effects of Industrial Development: German Society in 1871

*Note on the Three-Class System of Voting in Prussia*

*Bibliographical Note*

## GERMANY IN 1815

### Political Disunity and Social Conservatism

In 1815, the term 'Germany', like the word 'Italy', was hardly more than a 'geographical expression'. The great reduction effected by Napoleon in the number of petty states still left the German people parcelled out amongst thirty-nine competing sovereignties. And, although the dominance of French power during the Napoleonic era had done something to stir a feeling of nationalism amongst the Germans, the local loyalties to the local rulers reasserted themselves as soon as the danger was past. Moreover, the territorial princes were only the more anxious to preserve the independence of their states because of the reduction in their number. Those princes who, like the rulers of Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden had received accessions of territory or dignity during the Napoleonic period, when the rulers of Bavaria and Württemberg became kings, were determined to preserve and, if possible, extend their advantages; those who returned from exile, or had lost territory (Saxony), were equally determined to reassert their old rights and to preserve every privilege which remained to them.

The two German Great Powers, Austria and Prussia, were rivals both inside and outside the German lands, and neither would subordinate itself to the leadership of the other in the interests of German national unity. To the emperor of Austria the primacy of Austria in German affairs was axiomatic in view of the long centuries

in which the Hapsburg House had ruled as Holy Roman Emperors. Prussia was an upstart state, which had made its fortune at the expense of its neighbours, more especially of Austria herself by Frederick the Great's rape of Silesia. To the Prussian kings and their advisers the subordination of Prussia to Austria was equally unthinkable, for it would undo the patient work and hard-won gains of all the Prussian rulers since the Great Elector. The cause of German nationalism would move neither ruler to sacrifices at the expense of Austrian or of Prussian power.

Both the German Great Powers, too, were not merely German and, in the case of Austria, not even mainly German (Fig. 32). Austria had become steadily more multi-national and, after 1815, the non-German nationalities—Magyar and Czech, Slovak and Pole, Serb, Slovene and Italian—outnumbered the Germans of the old Ostmark. To a state so composed the doctrine of nationality, in the political sense of a right to national self-government, meant utter dissolution. By her very make-up Austria must oppose nationalism at all costs, and German nationalism as much as any other. Metternich described German unity as 'an infamous object' at which to aim.

To Prussia also the doctrine of nationalism presented grave difficulty. It is true that, in 1815, the new territories acquired by Prussia were mainly German in character—Lower Saxony, Swedish Pomerania, the important territories east and west of the Rhine. But, in the east, the territories incorporated since the partitions of Poland and now recognized by the Congress of Vienna as Prussian were of the highest strategical importance to Prussia. They represented the culmination of the age-long Prussian struggle with the Slavs of the east and north-east. They joined the 'colonial' land of East Prussia to the main body of the monarchy, they gave command of the mouth of the Vistula and of the port of Danzig, and they were inhabited predominantly by Poles. If to recognize the doctrine of nationality and to assume the leadership of it in Germany meant even the risk of losing these newly-won lands to a revived Polish state, no Prussian ruler would espouse the cause.

Because of their non-German populations both Austria and Prussia were compelled to rely on the authority of the dynasty, and of the state, as the principle of their internal unity. Personal loyalty to the monarch and obedience to the law administered by his officials could be demanded of all subjects of whatever nationality. And, in both states, it was easy for the German population, and for the nobles and upper classes in particular, who provided the army officers and higher

civil servants, to give such loyalty. For, in Prussia's eastern provinces, the system made the Prussians masters of the Poles and, throughout the Austrian empire, it placed the German-Austrians in a position of advantage over the non-German national groups.

These national differences within the two German Great Powers also made their governments hostile to any representative democratic system, which would provide the non-German populations with the means of expressing and furthering their national aims. But even the rulers of the wholly German states, such as Bavaria, Saxony or Mecklenburg, were equally opposed to the liberal-national idea, both because its realization would involve the reduction of their authority and power, even if it did not lead to their elimination, and because, as in Austria and Prussia also, the principle of monarchical authority was based upon and sustained by a deeply conservative social order.

Ever since 1648 the courts of the multitudinous German princes had formed the centres of social, as of political, life. Nobility of birth meant even more, and was more rigidly insisted on, as Mme de Staël noted, in the German lands than in pre-revolutionary France and far more than in England. The nobles regarded intermarriage with commoners as *mésalliance* and clung to the privileges they had inherited from the past. Their social and political importance was challenged before 1815 by the centralizing tendencies of the state, particularly in Prussia, and by the growth of the class of higher officials needed for its service, though many of these were also nobles. But the officer class in the armed forces remained almost wholly noble; they still sought to fill the chief places in their prince's councils; and their social pre-eminence was admitted by the classes below them.

The middle class was beginning to develop both in numbers and in wealth. But as yet it was bound by interest and sentiment alike to the existing order and found its centre in the court. The town population had become sharply stratified, and, even in the Free Imperial Cities, power in local government had passed into the hands of wealthy, hereditary oligarchies. In Prussia and many of the smaller states, the rights of local self-government won in earlier times had been replaced in fact, if not in form, by the power of the ruler. The degree of dependence of the population of a capital city on the court can be illustrated by an analysis of the population of Berlin in 1785. Out of a total population of 141,000, over a third of the population (57,000) depended directly on the court, and there were only 10,000 citizens with full rights. Multiply this situation by the number of courts in Germany and it will be seen how strong a

vested interest in their own preservation had been created by the princes of Germany.

In the countryside, too, where three-quarters of the German population still lived in 1815, society was, over wide areas, in the feudal stage. The Prussian decree of 1808 for the emancipation of the peasantry lost most of its force by later 'interpretative' ordinances, and what freedom the peasants obtained they had, quite literally, to buy at heavy cost to themselves. In Austria and Bavaria serfdom was not 'abolished' till 1848, and even then the process of emancipation was far from complete. Seignorial jurisdiction lasted on in the eastern provinces of Prussia until after 1918, and, although there was greater freedom amongst the peasantry of the Rhineland, the society of the German countryside was, on the whole, still more static and stratified than that of the towns. In it, too, the influence of the courts and the nobility was predominant.

Thus the German movement of ideas towards nationalism and liberalism, which had appeared during the War of Liberation in Prussia, and is associated with such names as those of Stein and Humboldt, was everywhere the work of a minority. To the main body of the nobility and even of the middle class, nationalism, with its threat to the local court and to the traditional ordering of society, and with its levelling implications as deriving from the French Revolution, was as repugnant as to the sovereign prince himself. There were, in 1815, it may be said, many Austrians, Prussians, Bavarians and so on. But, as yet, there were few Germans willing to subordinate their local loyalties to the ideal of national unity. And if there were few Germans there were still fewer democrats. The existing order had been largely created by, and revolved round, the sovereign prince. Lutheranism and Catholicism alike preached the duty of submission to his authority. The ravages of the Napoleonic wars had stirred some few to demand a strong and united nation capable of resisting any future invader. But, in 1815, and for long years after, the majority of Germans clung to the existing authorities to give them peace and security, and trusted to the wisdom of their princes to organize and harmonize the interests of the individual states so as to provide for the defence both of the Germany which was vague to them, and of their 'narrower fatherlands', which they knew and loved.

## The German Confederation

It is not surprising, therefore, that the organization constructed for 'Germany' in 1815, made little provision for united national action.


Various drafts were discussed in Vienna, and the influence of Hardenberg, the Prussian Foreign Minister, was at the outset directed towards securing a constitution which would satisfy some at least of the aspirations of German nationalism, and even of German liberalism. But the influence of Metternich was too strong for him. The Federal Act of 1815 did, indeed, pledge the German rulers to grant their subjects constitutions but, since the time limit of a year included in the original draft was cut out during the discussions, the final Act gave the German people what Görres rightly described as no more than 'an unlimited right of expectation'.

For the rest, the constitution created by the Federal Act was only too reminiscent of that of the old Empire. Austria was awarded the permanent Presidency of the new Confederation; the only organ of government was a Federal Diet in permanent session at Frankfurt-am-Main; this consisted of delegates of the thirty-nine sovereign states of the Confederation; and all the most important decisions concerning 'fundamental laws, organic institutions, individual rights or religious affairs' required a unanimous vote. Since each representative was bound by the instructions of his government and could neither speak nor vote as an individual, the *Bund* could only function when all the governments agreed. It is small wonder that the Frankfurt Diet became a byword for impotence and dilatoriness and that, during its history of fifty years, it never succeeded in organizing the primary object of its existence—a Federal army to safeguard Germany from external attack.

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* Based on a contemporary map, *The German Confederated States* (London, 1839).

The lower map is an enlargement of the area within the square on the upper map; the two illustrate the territorial complexity in Germany during this period. The states are numbered as follows: (1) Austrian Empire; (2) Kingdom of Prussia; (3) Kingdom of Bavaria; (4) Kingdom of Saxony; (5) Kingdom of Hanover; (6) Kingdom of Württemberg; (7) Grand Duchy of Baden; (8) Electorate of Hesse-Cassel; (9) Grand Duchy of Hesse-Darmstadt; (10) Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg (to Kingdom of Denmark); (11) Grand Duchy of Luxembourg (to Kingdom of the Netherlands); (12) Duchy of Brunswick; (13) Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg (Schwerin and Strelitz); (14) Duchy and Principality of Nassau, Usingen and Nassau-Weilburg; (15) Grand Duchy of Saxe-Weimar; (16) Duchy of Saxe-Gotha; (17) Duchy of Saxe-Coburg; (18) Duchy of Saxe-Meinungen; (19) Duchy of Saxe-Hildburghausen; (20) Grand Duchy of Holstein; (21) Principalities of Anhalt (Dessau, Bernburg, and Kothen); (22) Principality of Schwarzburg; (23) Principality of Hohenzollern; (24) Principality of Lichtenstein; (25) Principality of Waldeck; (26) Principality of Reuss; (27) Principality of Lippe (Schaumburg and Detmold); (28) Principality of Hesse-Homburg; (29) Principality of Layen; the Free Towns of Bremen (30), Frankfurt-am-Main (31), Hamburg (32), and Lübeck (33).




* Figs. 33, 34. The lesser German States, 1815

Moreover, the German Confederation neither included all the territories of the German states nor were its members wholly German. On the one hand both Austria and Prussia kept large parts of their dominions outside the Confederation (Fig. 32) so as to preserve their independent sovereignties from Federal interference. And, on the other hand, foreign monarchs were members of the Confederation for their territories within its borders—the king of Denmark for Holstein, the king of England (until 1837) for Hanover, the king of Holland for Luxembourg. Thus, the German Confederation was hardly more national and hardly less politically impotent than the institution which Napoleon had destroyed in 1806. It could only act if the influence of one of the two German Great Powers became dominant over all the states of the Confederation or if both agreed to act together. (Figs. 33, 34.)

## AUSTRIAN LEADERSHIP, 1815–58

### The First Reaction

In 1815, Metternich appeared to have some reason to fear the possibility of nationalist and liberal movements in the German states. In addition to the promise of constitutional government contained in the Federal Act, individual German rulers had not only given their own subjects separate promises but, in some cases, had proceeded to fulfil them. Thus Saxe-Weimar (1816), Württemberg (1817), Bavaria (1818), Baden (1818) and Hesse (1820) all received constitutions granting limited rights to more or less representative bodies, but in no case responsible government, within a few years of the peace, whilst Frederick William III had promised on more than one occasion and, most impressively, in 1814, to grant representative institutions to Prussia.

Moreover, Alexander of Russia was still under the influence of liberal ideas and had himself granted a constitution to the Polish kingdom incorporated in Russia by the Treaty of Vienna. Since Russia was unquestionably the strongest military power on the continent in the years immediately after 1815 the attitude of the Czar was of the highest importance.

The extremely limited provision for united action by all the German states made by the Federal Act aroused protests from such writers as Görres, editor of the *Rheinische Merkur*, who published a work on *The Future German Constitution* in 1816, and the desire for

greater national unity was felt ardently by some of the younger generation, who formed the student class at the Universities. In 1815 some of the students of Jena founded an association of University students called the *Burschenschaft*, of which the aims were both patriotic and, at first, liberal. In 1817 the Wartburg Festival, held as a celebration of the tercentenary of the Reformation and of the victory over Napoleon at Leipzig (1813), led to the formation of the *Allgemeine Deutsche Burschenschaft* (General German Students Association). By breaking away from the older student associations based on local loyalties (see p. 397), and by seeking to organize a national movement, the students of the *Burschenschaft* gave sufficient offence to Metternich. But, at the Wartburg, they added to this by burning emblems of the reaction, amongst others a book on German history by Kotzebue, who had at various times been in Russian employ. When, in 1819, this was followed by the murder of Kotzebue by a member of the *Burschenschaft*, Karl Sand, Metternich was given the opportunity for which he had been waiting to organize reaction. Even Hardenberg exclaimed that a Prussian constitution was now out of the question, and Metternich hastened to take advantage of the situation.

By 1819 Alexander's liberalism had already begun to wane, and the murder of Kotzebue assisted his conversion to reaction. Metternich was able, therefore, to bring his great powers of persuasion to bear on Frederick William III of Prussia without fear of counter-influence from Alexander. He found his task sufficiently easy. Frederick William already repented of his promise to his subjects, and was increasingly dominated not only by his own naturally repressive temperament, but by the influence of ultra-conservative feudalists at the Prussian court. In March 1818 the Prussian king had announced in a Cabinet Order that the time for further constitutional reform had not yet come. Now, after meeting Metternich at Teplitz in July 1819, he instructed his Chancellor Hardenberg to concert with the Austrian minister the necessary measures for preventing the spread of revolutionary doctrines and practices in Germany. Acting together at a conference held at Carlsbad (August 1819), under Metternich's leadership, the two Powers next secured the assent of the larger German states to a series of repressive decrees embodying their aims and, with the assistance of this wider circle of allies, they obtained the unanimous assent of the Federal Diet to the publication of these decrees under the authority of the Confederation.

The Carlsbad decrees sealed the ascendancy of Austria and of reaction in Germany for the next thirty years. Not until the 'year of Revolutions' (1848) was the influence of either seriously shaken, and, even though Metternich fell in 1848, a further period of reaction (1850–8) under Austrian leadership was still to follow. During those thirty years the states of Germany all became, if they had not been so before, police states. The press and education were rigidly controlled. Professors, however patriotic, who dared to demand national unity were ejected from their chairs. The *Burschenschaft* ceased to have serious political importance and soon became little more than a bourgeois replica of the drinking and duelling clubs (*Korps*) of the students who were nobles. The hopes of national unity and popular representation in a central national assembly lingered on in a few thoughtful minds and revived again after 1840. But the very ease with which the Carlsbad decrees were accepted and enforced even in the 'liberal' states of south Germany shows how weak was the desire for liberty in German breasts, how strong the principle of monarchical authority.

By associating himself with the Emperor Francis and Metternich, Frederick William of Prussia made it clear to his subjects that he had no intention of introducing liberal institutions or parliamentary government into the Prussian monarchy. The Provincial Assemblies, at last summoned in 1823, were heavily weighted on the side of the nobility; the urban representatives were drawn only from urban landowners, and the peasantry was in a hopeless minority. These assemblies had no legislative power though they could tender advice to the provincial governor and through him to the king, who was free to accept or reject at his own pleasure. But their main functions were strictly limited to local affairs and no central assembly for the whole of Prussia was called into being. For this the Prussian people had to wait till 1847. Not only was there no constitutional development worth the name, but, until Frederick William III's death in 1840, Prussia almost ceased to count as a Great Power, so subordinate was her policy to that of Austria. The period of so-called Dualism in German affairs is more properly described as that of Austrian leadership.

## The Revolutions of 1830 and the Second Reaction

In 1830 revolutions broke out in France and Poland; there were also risings in Italy, in the Papal states, Modena and Parma. In every

case these movements were inspired by nationalism and liberalism working together.

These events had their influence in Germany. In Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick relatively liberal constitutions were obtained in 1831 and 1832, and the accession of William IV in England was followed in Hanover by the adoption of a very conservative constitution drafted by the historian Dahlmann. But the rulers of Hesse-Cassel and Brunswick were so scandalously selfish, corrupt and greedy that even Metternich and the German Diet could not decently disapprove of some restrictions being imposed on their power over their luckless subjects, whilst the developments in Hanover, still ruled by the king of England, were a natural corollary of the passage of the Reform Bill of 1832 in England.

Metternich's policy was unshaken, indeed it was reinforced, by the revolutions of 1830. In Italy, Austrian troops intervened to restore the pope's control over the Papal states and to repress the movements in Modena and Parma. On the east, Prussia mobilized part of her army to patrol the Prussia-Russian frontier in Poland, rejected an appeal from the Polish insurgents for assistance, and interned the Polish troops which crossed into Prussian territory after defeat at Russian hands. Moreover, in 1833, Russia, Prussia and Austria signed the Treaty of Münchengrätz by which the three powers guaranteed each other's Polish possessions. The danger of liberal-national revolution cemented the ties between the autocratic powers and, until the Crimean War (1853–6), all three Powers presented a united front against the spread of liberal ideas or institutions within their dominions.

Similarly, within the German Confederation, the events of 1830 and the succeeding years were used by Austria and Prussia to strengthen the machinery of repression. In 1831 the *Burschenschaft* revived their political activities and in 1832 held a Festival at Hambach in the Bavarian Palatinate. With the black-red-gold banner of the *Burschenschaft* flying, the flag which became the symbol of German liberal-national movements and was adopted by the Weimar Republic in 1919, a meeting was held at which speeches in favour of free institutions and international fraternity were delivered. Polish and French revolutionaries of 1830 took part. In itself the demonstration might appear to any strong government harmless enough, but it represented to Austria and Prussia the revolutionary spirit, and both governments decided on further repressive action.

Metternich and Ancillon, the Prussian Foreign Minister, with the

support of their monarchs, drew up six Articles which greatly enlarged the control of the Federal Diet over the internal affairs of the German states and pledged their rulers to make no concessions to liberalism. The kings of Bavaria and Württemberg were induced to support the six Articles and they were passed by the Federal Diet at Frankfurt. In addition, other repressive measures were enacted which forbade public meetings and revolutionary badges, placed suspicious political characters under surveillance, renewed the edicts controlling the Universities and the press, and assured help to sovereigns threatened with revolutionary movements. The Federal Diet, which in 1815 Metternich had feared as a possible instrument of German nationalism and liberalism under Prussian leadership, had, by now, owing to the alliance of the rulers of Austria and Prussia, become the instrument by which these two Powers enforced their anti-national and anti-liberal policy upon the German nation. In doing so, it lost its last claim to the respect or affection of all Germans who hoped for national unity and free institutions. So long as Prussia acted as Austria's faithful ally in the policy of repression no way, except that of organized popular revolt, lay open for the realization of these aspirations.

For sixteen years more (1832–48) Metternich was able to keep his system in being, and on the surface the German states during the thirties appeared to be becoming less, rather than more, liberal. In Hesse-Cassel the new constitution was rendered ineffective by the Prince Regent and his much-hated minister, Hassenpflug. In 1837 the accession of Queen Victoria in England brought her uncle, Ernest Augustus, duke of Cumberland, to the throne of Hanover, and he at once declared the constitution of 1833 null and void since he had been no party to it. The historian Dahlmann, and six of his colleagues of the University of Göttingen, protested against this edict and were expelled from their professorships for doing so. In Bavaria, too, King Lewis passed over into the reactionary camp, and his minister, Abel, enforced the policy of repression with severity. Only in Baden, Württemberg and Saxony did a certain limited liberalism maintain itself in the years 1830–40.

## The Movements for National Unity, 1840–8

But, from 1840 onwards, a change set in. On 7 June of that year Frederick William III died and was succeeded by his erratic son, Frederick William IV, to whom the late German Kaiser bore so

strong a resemblance. The death of the old king, out of respect for whom many demands had been suppressed, created an atmosphere of expectancy throughout Prussia. At last, it was thought, the Prussian government would take a line more liberal, more national, more independent of Austria. These hopes were raised still further by the new king's actions. Arndt, who both in prose and verse had proclaimed the need for national unity, was restored at last to his professorship at Bonn; Dahlmann was soon appointed to a chair there and the brothers Grimm, who had been expelled with him from Göttingen, were called to posts in Berlin. Boyen, veteran of the War of Liberation, was reappointed Minister of War, an office which he had been compelled to give up at the time of the Carlsbad decrees. It was small wonder that the liberal-national forces in Prussia believed that a new era had begun.

At the same time German nationalism received a double stimulus. Difficulties with France led to threats in the French press and Chamber against the Rhineland and called forth, in reply, the two famous songs of Becker ('Sie sollen ihn nicht haben, den freien deutschen Rhein') and of Schneckenburger ('Die Wacht am Rhein'). The crisis in relation to France soon passed, but the enthusiasm for national unity went on growing and soon received new impetus from the opening of the problem of the relationship of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein to the Danish crown.

*The Schleswig-Holstein Problem*

In 1839, Christian VIII succeeded to the Danish throne, and it was known that a strong party in Denmark would press the new king to change the personal union of the two duchies with Denmark into complete unification within the Danish state. Holstein was a member of the German Confederation, though Schleswig was not. The population of Holstein was almost wholly and that of Schleswig was preponderantly German in speech, character and outlook, and there was a strong desire in the duchies both to insist on their indivisibility from each other and to extend the connection of Holstein with the German Confederation to Schleswig also. Both in the duchies themselves and throughout north Germany agitation against the plans of the Danes grew from 1839 onwards. The situation became critical only at the death of Christian VIII in January 1848 and must be discussed more fully later. But the sense of the impotence and sluggishness of the Federal Diet in dealing with the possible, and even probable, loss of two 'German' provinces to a foreign power

contributed largely to the spread of the movement for national unity between 1840 and 1848. In 1846 the Federal Diet passed a resolution calling on the Danish king to pay due regard to the rights of the Confederation and of the Holstein estates, but it also requested the German states to restrain the patriotic enthusiasm of their subjects. Even this qualified protest was only made four years after the Danish king had issued an 'open letter' claiming that Schleswig was governed by the same rule of succession as the rest of the Danish kingdom. And, in view of the lukewarm attitude of Austria to the problem and of the military impotence of the Confederation, there seemed little likelihood that either would intervene effectively if the Danish king, who enjoyed the support of Russia and France, proceeded to assimilate the duchies to the rest of the Danish monarchy. 'Schleswig-Holstein became, for long years together', writes Erich Marcks, 'the symbol of all German wrongs, the bleeding wound, whose pain gave the nation no rest, the sharpest sting in all spiritual resistance, in all new will to unity.'

The chief internal force making for national unity at this time was the growth of an educated middle class engaged in the free professions and in industry and commerce, to whom the divisions of Germany, both political and social, were at once a logical absurdity and a serious hindrance to their activities. The rise of the Zollverein (Customs Union) (see pp. 165–74) under Prussian leadership, from 1834 onwards, contributed to the desire for still closer national unity. The very incompleteness of the Zollverein and the problem of Austria's relation to it, were all stimulants to thought on the ultimate form of German national unity. And in 1841 Fredrich List's *National System of Political Economy* appeared, which advocated the national state as the natural unit of economic production and the imposition of high tariffs to foster German industries.

The particularist selfishness of the German rulers, and not least of those of Austria and Prussia, together with the influence of England, led the nationalist German middle class to combine their demands for national unity with that for free representative institutions, for a German 'Parliament'. Only a nation-wide movement resulting in an assembly representative of the whole people could, they felt, overcome the reluctance of the rulers of the German states to make any sacrifice of their individual sovereignties.

As early as 1839 meetings began to be held for the discussion of common problems by representatives from different German states; in the autumn of 1847 a meeting of radical politicians from different

states met at Offenburg, and one of more moderate liberals at Heppenheim, and formulated programmes. A journal, the *Deutsche Zeitung*, was published at Heidelberg to express the views of these more moderate liberals, and the origins of the later National-Liberal Party are to be found here.

The liberal-national tide was rising. The dams and dykes erected by Metternich were threatened with the flood, and neither Austria, nor Metternich himself, was in a condition to prepare against it. Since the death of the Emperor Francis in 1835, the feebleness of his successor (Ferdinand) allowed bitter rivalry to develop between Metternich and the other Austrian ministers with the result that Austria almost ceased to have any coherent government at all—merely a series of state departments. In this condition of affairs, and with nationalist movements rising in the non-German dominions of the Hapsburgs, it was impossible for Austria to undertake the task of uniting Germany, or to be regarded by German liberal-nationalists as the basis of the united Germany for which they longed. Yet no German nationalist, especially if he were a Catholic, could with equanimity adopt a solution of the problem of German unity from which the Germans of Austria would be excluded. It was practical necessity, at the expense of national sentiment, which alone led some Germans to regard a 'Little German' (*Kleindeutsch*) solution, with Austria excluded, as more practicable than the 'Great German' (*Grossdeutsch*) solution which the heterogeneous character of the Hapsburg dominions rendered impossible.

### *Prussia and the National Movement*

Between 1830 and 1848, therefore, the minds of Germans who desired unity had been turning towards Prussia as their natural leader. Though Prussia's policy had been not less selfish or politically reactionary than that of Austria, the Prussian state was far more German than its southern rival. Prussia stood guard on the Vistula and Niemen against the Slav, on the Rhine against the French. Her government, if autocratic, was at least efficient, and her bureaucrats, however much disliked, commanded respect by their thoroughness and freedom from corruption. It was in Prussian territory—particularly in Silesia and the Rhineland—that some of the greatest industrial developments were taking place, as it was Prussia which created and maintained the Zollverein. Now, after 1840, the new king's actions seemed to promise a liberalizing policy and the fulfilment of his father's promise to give Prussia a constitution. If

only these hopes proved well-founded a liberal Prussia might, with the support of the nation, create a united liberal Germany, even in the teeth of the opposition of Metternich and the German princes.

Events soon showed the vanity of these hopes. Frederick William IV's views on government were those of an unhistorical mystical feudalism. He believed profoundly in Divine Right, and his vision of a united Germany was that of a revived Holy Roman Empire, in which the emperor of Austria would enjoy the honorific primacy whilst the king of Prussia would act as his deputy. Upon the details of the organization of a united Germany, Frederick William IV was far from clear, but he was as definite in his opposition to any attempt to exclude Austria from the Confederation as in his determination to make no concessions to the principle of popular sovereignty.

Yet the demand for a constitution for the whole monarchy was strong enough in Prussia to induce Frederick William, in 1842, to summon committees of the provincial estates to meet in Berlin, only to find that this measure was far from satisfying their demands. In 1847, therefore, against the advice of both Metternich and of his brother and heir, William, prince of Prussia, the future first German emperor, he issued a Cabinet Order summoning a Combined Diet, comprising the members of the Provincial Estates, to meet in Berlin in April. Frederick William opened the meeting of this body himself, and in order to make his intentions perfectly clear declared: 'Never will I allow a written document to come between God in Heaven and this land in the character of a Second Providence, to govern us with its formalities and take the place of ancient loyalty.' The powers granted to the Combined Diet were extremely restricted and, when its sittings ended in June 1847, the general feeling throughout Prussia was that the king's schemes were wholly inadequate to meet the constitutional needs of the country. On the eve of the great year of revolutions, which swept Europe as well as Germany, Prussia was far from having adopted the principles of constitutional government which might make her leader of the liberal-national movement in Germany.

## The Revolutions of 1848 and the Third Reaction

The widespread nature of the dissatisfaction felt with the existing governmental systems of the German states individually, and of the Confederation as a whole, manifested itself with startling suddenness

all over the Germanies in the spring of 1848. On 22 February a revolution broke out in Paris, and within a few weeks revolutions had occurred in almost all the German states. On 13 March Metternich resigned and had to leave Vienna secretly for England, whilst his successors promised Austria a democratic constitution; on 18 March Frederick William IV promised his people both a liberal constitution and the reform of the Confederation under Prussian leadership; and, during March and April, Baden and Württemberg, Bavaria and Saxony, Hanover and the Hesses and the Hanse towns introduced sweeping changes in a liberal direction into their constitutional life. Moreover, the Federal Council blessed the idea of reform of the Confederation itself, and the governments of Austria and Prussia as well as of the lesser states allowed their citizens both to take part in the preliminary meetings of German liberals at Frankfurt (the *Vorparlament*), at which the steps for reform of the Confederation were discussed, and also to elect representatives to the National Assembly of the German people which met at Frankfurt in May. For a few brief months it appeared as though the liberal-national millennium had arrived, and that Germany was to endow itself, almost without bloodshed, with national union and responsible government on a democratic basis both in the central government of a truly Federal state and in the state governments as well. Yet by 1850 the concessions made by the German sovereigns to their subjects had been almost everywhere withdrawn. The movement for national unity had broken down and the National Assembly had been dissolved. The divisions amongst the reformers and their political inexperience were in part responsible for this. But fundamentally it was the strength of those conservative forces described above (pp. 126–7), together with the rivalry of Austria and Prussia, which brought the hopes of German liberalism to nothing.

*Revolution and Reaction in Austria*

In the Austrian Empire several revolutions broke out simultaneously. The Italian provinces under Austrian rule were swept directly into the Italian national movement and, when the king of Sardinia adopted their cause, the Hapsburg Empire was faced not only by rebellious subjects but by a foreign power. The fact that Radetzky and many of the best Austrian troops were occupied in Italy until the Austrian victory at Novara in March 1849 explains much of what happened at Vienna during 1848. There, after the initial concessions made by the imperial government in March, a

constitution for the whole monarchy was issued on the emperor's authority in April which granted a two-chamber Parliament to which the ministers were to be responsible. Under pressure from the revolutionaries both the proposed Parliament (Reichstag) and the electoral law were, in May, revised in a democratic sense and, on 17 May, the emperor and his family fled to Innsbruck. For some months a committee of students and National Guards was virtually the only government in Vienna until the Reichstag met on 22 July and began deliberations on the constitution. But the outbreak of revolts in Hungary and Bohemia and the divisions between the subject races of the empire allowed the Imperial government to reassert its control.

After suppressing a revolt in Prague (June 1848) Windischgrätz was appointed commander of all the Imperial troops outside Italy, moved his army on Vienna and, by 31 October, had occupied the city and arrested the democratic leaders, of whom twenty-four were executed. Windischgrätz's brother in law, Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, a strong supporter of autocracy, now became Prime Minister. The Reichstag, after being removed to the small town of Kremsier in Moravia, was allowed to continue its debates for some time. But, on 2 December 1848, the Emperor Ferdinand abdicated and was succeeded by the young Francis Joseph, aged 18; on 7 March 1849, the Reichstag at Kremsier was dismissed and Schwarzenberg issued a constitution, on the new emperor's authority alone, for the whole Monarchy. On 23 March 1849, the Italian rebels and their Sardinian allies were decisively beaten at Novara and, before the end of August, the Hungarian national movement, led by Kossuth, had been crushed by the combined action of Austrian and Russian armies. Once order had been restored the Imperial constitution was treated as abortive and was abolished by decree in December 1851. Meanwhile Schwarzenberg devoted all his energies to the congenial task of re-establishing the old order in the German Confederation and in its component states.

*Revolution and Reaction in Prussia*

In Prussia the concessions of the king to the populace of Berlin (March 1848), his homage to the bodies of the Berliners shot by his troops, his theatrical procession through the streets swathed in the national flag—the black-red-gold—and his speech in which he declared that 'Prussia is dissolved (*geht auf*) into Germany', had given evidence of his adhesion, at least for the moment, to the cause

of national unity. But Frederick William's emotions were unreliable and his will uncertain, whilst the Prussian military caste was determined to preserve their state both from a democratic system and from dissolution in a democratic Germany. The fate of Prussia and of Germany depended on the strength, unity and rapidity of action of the liberal forces in the Prussian National Assembly and in the German National Assembly at Frankfurt. Unhappily the liberals were disunited both in Berlin and at Frankfurt, and in neither assembly was swift action taken. Both settled down to prolonged constitutional discussions and, during the months that these continued, the opportunity of the liberal-national movement passed.

In Prussia, though a National Assembly, elected on the basis of manhood suffrage, met on 22 May, and a liberal ministry, in which two Rhineland industrialists were the chief figures, took office, the prolonged debates on the future constitution gave the Prussian conservative forces time to organize themselves. In August a meeting of Prussian conservatives, mainly nobles and landowners—the so-called *Junkerparlament*—at which Bismarck was present, formed a league 'for King and Country' whose object was to demand the dissolution of the Prussian National Assembly, if necessary by force of arms. By October, whilst the Assembly continued its constitutional debates, the king and his conservative advisers, supported by the army, were ready to act.

On 31 October the king dismissed his liberal ministers and replaced them by a wholly conservative Cabinet, with Otto von Manteuffel as Foreign Minister. On 9 November the Assembly was informed that it was to be removed to Brandenburg. Next day General Wrangel occupied Berlin and dissolved the Civic Guard, and when the rump of the Assembly met at Brandenburg it was faced on 5 December with a decree for its own dissolution and a constitution of a very limited character granted (*octroyée*) by the king. Even this constitution was not conservative enough for the king, and in April 1849 the basis of election was changed by the introduction of the famous Prussian Three-Class system* of voting, which remained in force in Prussia until the last days of 1918. Frederick William IV was only persuaded with difficulty by his ministers to take the oath to the constitution, and in the three years from 1849 to 1852, during which reaction was in full flood, the *octroyée* constitution was still further modified in a conservative sense.

* See Note at the end of this Chapter on the Three-Class system of voting in Prussia.

*The Frankfurt National Assembly*

The effort of the liberal-national movement to secure unity for Germany as a whole on a constitutional basis was made by the National Assembly which met at Frankfurt on 18 May 1848. Its task was complicated by the political divisions amongst its members, who comprised extreme conservatives and extreme republicans, with every intermediate shade of opinion; but, above all, by the difficulties arising from the rivalry of the two great German Powers—Austria and Prussia. Since the Assembly had no direct control of any armed forces its decisions depended for their execution on the willingness of the governments of Austria and Prussia—and to a lesser extent of the smaller states—to carry them out. During the summer of 1848, whilst Austria was crippled and Prussia was giving limited support to the national idea, an illusory progress towards a solution of the problem of unity was made. But by the time the Assembly had made up its mind about the form this unity should take, the reaction had set in both in Austria and Prussia and the opportunity had passed.

As soon as the National Assembly met at Frankfurt it was at once faced with the problem of creating a central government. On 27 June the Assembly decided to ignore the governments of the states and to elect a Regent (*Reichsverweser*) who should appoint a Ministry responsible to the Assembly. On 29 June the Archduke John of Austria was chosen Regent and, during July, the Ministry was appointed. But it was significant and unpromising at the outset that, although the *Reichsverweser* was recognized by the German governments, the king of Prussia refused to allow his troops to swear allegiance to him.

Throughout the remainder of 1848 the National Assembly devoted itself to constitutional discussions, mainly on the fundamental rights (*Grundrechte*) of the German people, a set of propositions asserting what we have come to regard as the commonplaces of political liberty. Finally proclaimed as law on 27 December 1848, they were embodied in the draft constitution. Under its provisions there would have been an hereditary emperor; a Reichstag of two Houses—one representing the states, one the nation as a whole; a responsible Ministry; and complete control by the Federal authority of foreign affairs, army, the decision on war and peace, with a taxing power adequate to the needs of the Federal government. The success of the proposed constitution rested on its acceptance by both Austria and Prussia

but, before it had been adopted, events in Schleswig-Holstein showed how little reliance could be placed on the Prussian king's devotion to the cause of national unity.

*The Reopening of the Schleswig-Holstein Question*

In January 1848 Frederick VII succeeded to the Danish throne and on 28 January promulgated a general constitution bequeathed to him by the late king for the Danish monarchy. Under this instrument the two duchies, whilst retaining their estates for purely local purposes, would be incorporated into the Danish monarchy for general purposes of taxation and legislation, whilst Holstein would be detached from the German Reich. Protests were at once made in Schleswig and Holstein, followed by preparations for armed resistance. The next heir to the duchies, in the male line, Duke Christian of Augustenburg, obtained from Frederick William IV, on 27 March, recognition both of the independence and indivisibility of the duchies and of the principle that the succession to them was in the male line. The Danes now sought to limit their plans of incorporation to Schleswig and promised a separate constitution for Holstein, as a member of the German Confederation. Not only Prussia, but the *Vorparlament* at Frankfurt, espoused the cause of the duchies and, during April and May, Prussian and Federal forces, under the Prussian General Wrangel, drove the Danes from the duchies and entered Jutland. At this point, however, the opposition of the Czar and of Great Britain to the extension of German power in the Baltic and North Sea led the Prussian government to draw back. After prolonged negotiations a truce was signed at Malmö on 26 August, which was accepted only with the greatest reluctance by the National Assembly at Frankfurt, and almost equally reluctantly by the Danes. Its importance in the history of Germany lies in the fact that it was very widely regarded by German patriots at the time as a betrayal of the national cause by Prussia.

*The Refusal of Frederick William IV to become Emperor*

Further light on the attitude of Prussia and its king to that cause was provided in March 1849. The National Assembly at length made up its mind in that month to pass the draft constitution and to proceed with the organization of united Germany. This involved a final choice between *Grossdeutsch* and *Kleindeutsch* ideas, since an hereditary emperor must be chosen for the new Federal state. The selection of Frederick William IV as emperor by 290 votes, with

248 abstentions, on 28 March marked the victory of the *Kleindeutsch* idea by a narrow margin, and a deputation set off to offer the crown to the king of Prussia. But, since the March days in Berlin, Frederick William had reverted to his fixed political views. He genuinely believed that Austria should retain an honorary primacy in Germany; he would not accept what he called a 'crown of shame'—one that emanated from the people; he must be selected by his fellow-rulers; and the military leadership, which he desired for Prussia, must be established with their consent. Holding these views he gave an answer so hedged with qualifications that the delegation rightly regarded it as equivalent to a refusal. The Austrian government at once withdrew its members from the National Assembly (5 April). The kings of Bavaria, Württemberg, Saxony and Hanover gave the new constitution no recognition. In May both Prussia and Saxony also withdrew their deputies from Frankfurt, and a body of the most active constitutionalists, led by Dahlmann, followed suit. The breakdown of the movement for unity was greeted with passionate resentment by the democrats of the Left and attempts at armed revolution broke out in May 1849, in Saxony, Baden and the Bavarian Palatinate. Despite the fact that there were disturbances in Prussia also, Prussian troops quelled the revolts and brought to an end the struggle for the constitution. The cleavage between the Prussian monarchy and the popular movement for unity and freedom was complete.

*The Prussian Scheme for Unity*

Yet Frederick William, if he would accept nothing from below, still wished to do something for the national cause—and that of Prussia—from above. His scheme was to effect a Union with the other purely German states, of which Prussia should be the head, and a perpetual alliance with the whole Austrian monarchy to meet the Hapsburg claims. It was the solution of 1870, but it had been rejected in advance by Schwarzenberg, when in March 1849 he proposed the admission of the whole of the Austrian dominions into the Confederation. It should have been apparent both to the Prussian king and to his adviser, Radowitz, that Austria, now rapidly recovering from the national revolts in Hungary and Italy, would oppose an uncompromising resistance to any scheme which robbed her both of her place and of her pre-eminence in the German Reich.

In pursuit of their policy Frederick William and Radowitz, in May 1849, invited the other states to send plenipotentiaries to a

Conference at Berlin and succeeded in inducing the kings of Hanover and Saxony to accept a draft German constitution more conservative in character than that of Frankfurt, but recognizing the headship of Prussia in the proposed Federation. Since, however, the Austrian representative withdrew after the first day and the Bavarian remained without instructions, the significance of the qualified adhesion of Hanover and Saxony was greatly reduced and they also withdrew before the end of the year. The Prussian Union had now shrunk to Prussia and the minor north German states, and Schwarzenberg was emboldened to press on with his real policy, the restoration of the old system in its completeness.

*Olmütz and the Re-establishment of the Confederation*

The decision of this struggle for supremacy in Germany between Austria and Prussia came in the autumn of 1850. In September the inner Council of the old Federal Diet resumed its activities in Frankfurt, and there can be little doubt that Frederick William himself was beginning to regard the Union as a lost cause. The test case was now provided. The elector of Hesse-Cassel dismissed his ministers and, when the Estates of his duchy refused to vote a budget, the items of which they were not allowed to see, the elector declared them guilty of rebellion under a Federal law of 1832, which had been abolished in 1848. When a large percentage of officers of the elector's army refused to break their oath to the constitution of their little state, the elector deprived them of their commissions and called on the resuscitated Federal Diet to order a Federal execution. Schwarzenberg was delighted to agree and Prussia was placed in a position of acute difficulty, for Hesse-Cassel was still nominally a member of the semi-defunct Prussian Union and the little state was traversed by two military roads which Prussia alone had the right to use. Was Prussia tamely to acquiesce in a Federal execution or to challenge it and to risk war with Austria?

At first it seemed that Prussia would stand firm. When Bavarian troops occupied Hanau, Prussian troops occupied Fulda and Cassel. But, though mobilization was ordered, the Prussian government had, in fact, decided to give way, for they knew that Austria was supported by the Czar. A meeting was arranged at Olmütz on 28 November between Schwarzenberg and Manteuffel and, on the next day, the two ministers signed the Punctation of Olmütz, by which Prussia accepted the substance of the Austrian demands. The Federal execution in Hesse was to go forward; the Union was to be dissolved;

the Schleswig-Holstein issue was to be settled by joint Austro-Prussian action; a conference of governments was to discuss the future organization of Germany. When the Conference met, the Federal Diet was formally re-established (16 May 1851) under the forms prescribed by the Federal Acts of 1815 and 1820.

*The Schleswig-Holstein 'Settlement'*

The humiliation of Prussia at Olmütz and the re-establishment of Austrian influence in the Federal Diet involved the disappointment of German national sentiment in the Schleswig-Holstein question. Despite the Truce of Malmö, there was still hope, in the early part of 1849, that the cause of the duchies and of Germany might prevail and, when the Danes denounced the Malmö truce in February, and hostilities were resumed in April, a Federal army of Prussians, Saxons and Bavarians under a Prussian general, von Prittwitz, at first scored striking successes and was able to advance into Jutland. But Frederick William IV was now more anxious to conciliate Russia and Austria than to defend the national cause, and he had little sympathy with a revolt of subjects against their ruler. On 10 July 1849, therefore, another truce was signed between Prussia and Denmark followed, a year later, by a peace treaty (2 July 1850) which, whilst formally reserving the rights of the two Powers, effectively left the duchies at the mercy of the Danish king. Though the provisional government of the duchies carried on the struggle until January 1851 they then evacuated Schleswig, resigned their powers into the hands of an Austro-Prussian Commission of pacification, and left Holstein from January 1851 until February 1852, in the hands of an Austrian force, with a Prussian division attached to it. Schwarzenberg, in accordance with his legitimist and conservative policy, had no intention of taking up the cause of German nationalism in the duchies and, in May 1852, an agreement (known as the London Protocol) was reached amongst the Great Powers—Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain—by which the integrity of the Danish monarchy was recognized as well as the right of succession to the duchies of the next heir to the Danish crown. On their side, the Danes recognized that Schleswig and Holstein were united only by a personal union with Denmark and that the duchies should have special rights of self-government through their Provincial Estates in all 'affairs not common to the monarchy as a whole'. The settlement was accepted, under Austrian influence, by the revived Federal Diet. But it was repugnant to all liberal-national Germans and it left open possibilities of further

trouble. For its durability rested on the moderation of the Danish king and people and their observance of the special rights of the duchies. Moreover, the London Protocol was signed by Austria and Prussia as independent Great Powers, not as representatives of the German Confederation. The Federal Diet was presented with the *fait accompli* and induced to accept it. But the German nation and its sentiments were completely ignored by its many rulers both before and after the event. The fate of the Germans in Schleswig and Holstein was decided according to the immediate interests of the Austrian and Prussian governments, who both regarded the principle of nationality as revolutionary.

### *The Revolutions of* 1848 *and German Nationalism*

The signature of the London Protocol, which had been immediately preceded by the death of Schwarzenberg (7 April 1852), seemed to stamp the combined movements of liberalism and nationalism in the Germanies, begun in 1848, with complete failure. So far as liberal institutions were concerned the central representation of Germany was still confined to the governments through the inadequate machinery of the Federal Diet. And, in the individual states, the Austrian constitution had already been abolished; the Prussian constitution was of so conservative a character as to appear incapable of providing adequate representation of liberal opinion; and most of the gains made by the liberals in the smaller states were lost again by 1852. In no single German state had the principle of a government responsible to the elected Chamber been established as a result of the revolutions of 1848.

Nor did it appear that the cause of national unity had been in any way advanced. The rivalry between Austria and Prussia, which prevented national union, had been openly displayed, but the victory of multi-national Austria seemed to postpone indefinitely the dream of a united German state. Nor had the rulers of the smaller states shown any greater willingness than those of Austria and Prussia to sacrifice their power and privileges to the national cause. There were other discouraging lessons for the liberal-nationalists. The divisions in their own ranks had contributed largely to their failure. Still more, it had been made abundantly plain that, so long as the German rulers could rely on the loyalty of their armed forces, and so long as none but a handful of ardent radicals were ready to oppose them in the field, a unified liberal-national Germany would never be attained. Nothing but a great national uprising, prepared if necessary to fight

and depose the existing rulers of Germany, and armed with the means to do so, could hope for success. But the whole social structure of Germany, as well as the outlook of the middle class, who would have had to lead such a movement, precluded any possibility of a 'French Revolution' on German soil. Nor, in judging the event, should it be forgotten that no 'French Revolution' has occurred in any great modern state, except in Russia—and there only at the end of a prolonged and disastrous war, and against a system of government even more absolutist in spirit and far less competent in administration than the governments of Germany in 1848.

Further, the events of the years 1848–52 had shown that Russia was ready to assist in the suppression of liberal or national movements in the Germanies which might threaten her hold over her Polish subjects, or even, ultimately, the Czar's autocracy itself. Behind the rulers of Germany stood a great military power, still able to put greater armies in the field than either Austria or Prussia. The conservative coalition of the Treaty of Münchengrätz (see p. 133) was still in being.

In face of these facts German liberal-national thinkers for some years lapsed into a sense of helplessness. When their hopes revived they still looked, for the most part, to a liberalized Prussia to carry them into effect and still failed to realize the great strength of the conservative forces, not only in Prussia but in all the German states, opposed to their solution. It was to be Bismarck's triumph to turn their liberal-nationalism into a national-liberalism in which the liberal idea was to be subordinated to the ambitions of conservative Prussia to unite and dominate Germany.

*The Reaction in Prussia*

The remaining years of Frederick William IV's rule are amongst the most depressing in Prussian history. Influenced by a pietistic group of friends the king engaged in a persecution of everything liberal. His Minister of the Interior made ruthless use of government influence against politically objectionable candidates for seats in the Landtag. In alliance with the Junkers the system of local government in the countryside was restored to the situation before 1850, under which the landowners exercised a feudal jurisdiction, whilst prosecutions against intellectuals and politicians were supported by the perjured evidence of police agents. Education from the university to the village school was strictly supervised. If Frederick William had had his way he would have abolished the constitution to which

he had sworn observance. Indeed, when he died, he left behind him a document in which he adjured his successors, who would not have bound themselves as he had by oath, to abrogate the instrument which he had created.

In one field only during these years—that of foreign policy—did Prussia show wisdom. During the Crimean War (1853–6) the attitude of Austria and Prussia became a question of great importance both for Russia and for the Western Powers. Whilst Austria, forgetful of the help given her by Russia in 1848–9, aligned herself, though without declaring war, with the West, Prussia preserved a neutrality far more 'benevolent' towards Russia than towards France and England. For once Frederick William IV's filial piety, dynastic sentiment (the Czar was his brother-in-law) and religious feelings—his repugnance to help the Turks against a Christian power—did Prussia good service.

Bismarck, then Prussian representative at the Federal Diet, advised this course. 'We must look abroad for allies', he wrote, 'and among the European Powers Russia is to be had on the cheapest terms; she wishes only to grow in the East, the two others (viz. Austria and France) wish to grow at our expense'. In the cynical school of Federal politics at Frankfurt Bismarck had already learnt that Prussia must sooner or later fight Austria if she desired to unite Germany under her leadership. The policy of friendship with Russia was more than an insurance against the triumph of liberal principles in Prussia. It safeguarded Prussia's eastern frontiers and paid handsome dividends in the struggles with Austria (1866) and France (1870).

## THE VICTORY OF PRUSSIA IN GERMANY, 1858–71

### William I and the Constitutional Conflict in Prussia

In 1858 Frederick William IV's mind gave way and his brother William, prince of Prussia, who was already 62 years old, became regent. He was above all things a soldier, a conservative, a Hohenzollern. His attitude to Austria was, at first, hardly less loyal than that of his brother, though it had no romantic trappings. But he was surrounded by liberal influences. His son Frederick, who was married to a daughter of Queen Victoria, wished to see Prussia lead Germany to unity by liberalizing her own institutions and by a policy of moral conquest, and William himself was not wholly averse from this course. His first act as regent was to dismiss his brother's

ministers and appoint a more liberal Cabinet, and he gave instructions that the government influence should no longer be brought to bear at elections. Once again it seemed that a 'New Era' of greater liberalism had set in in Prussia. The success of the Italian struggle for unity against Austria (1859) stimulated liberal-nationalists throughout Germany, and in 1859 the National Association (*Nationalverein*) was founded by Rudolf von Bennigsen of Hanover and other liberals. As before 1848, and now with even greater strength, the movement for national unity on a liberal basis revived. Propaganda meetings for the national idea, and meetings of delegates from different German states to concert plans, were held, and expectant liberal eyes were turned towards the new ruler of Prussia.

But the regent drew different lessons from the defeat of Austria by France and Sardinia. During the war Prussia mobilized her forces to defend the Federal territory but, even in her hour of need, Austria would not yield the leadership of the German Confederation or of its armed forces into Prussian hands. The result of the Italian war was to reveal Austria's obstinate determination to thwart Prussia in Germany, and also the military weakness of both the German Great Powers. For, if Austria had been beaten by the French and Sardinians, the Prussian mobilization had been slow and inefficient and had strongly reinforced William's conviction that Prussia's greatest need was a drastic reform of her military system.

On 12 January 1860, therefore, in the speech from the Throne to the Prussian Parliament (*Landtag*), army reforms, the work of von Roon, were outlined. Their effect was to increase the field army from 200,000 to 371,000; to lengthen the period of military service from two years to three; to provide for thirty-nine new regiments of infantry and ten of cavalry; and to require an added annual expenditure of $9\frac{1}{2}$ million thalers (about £1,500,000). The reorganization involved, too, a great reduction in the strength and importance of the militia reserve (the *Landwehr*), to which many Prussians were sentimentally attached, and fewer exemptions from the obligation to military service. The Prussian army was also to be equipped with more modern weapons, and the effect of the reorganization, when completed, would be to double the military power of Prussia. William was inflexibly determined that the whole scheme should go through.

The Liberals in the lower chamber of the Prussian Landtag at first hoped to secure concessions. They made a provisional grant to cover the cost of the scheme in 1860 but were determined to secure its

modification before the next budget. They objected on economic and personal grounds to the lengthened term of service, and on political grounds to the increased power of the crown and the military class which would necessarily result from the scheme. But, supported by the Upper House, by his military advisers, and by his own interpretation of his duty William pressed forward his proposals. On 2 January 1861, he became king on his brother's death. In the same month a new, more democratic, party was founded in Prussia, the Progress (*Fortschritt*) Party, and, at the elections at the end of the year, the government was faced with an overwhelming majority against it in the lower chamber, to which only twenty-four Conservatives were returned. Early in 1862 this Liberal majority demanded an itemized budget and the reduction of the term of military service to two years. William dissolved the Chambers and used governmental pressure against his opponents at the elections with no success, for only twelve Conservatives were now returned. His more liberal ministers refused to accept his policy and resigned, and William was warned not to rule without a budget by his son and other advisers. There seemed to be only two alternatives—to abandon the scheme of army reform and thus, in effect, to accept the Parliamentary system in Prussia, or to abdicate in favour of his son. It was at this critical moment that, following Roon's advice, William decided to send for Bismarck.

*Bismarck and his Policy*

Born in 1815 of an old Pomeranian Junker family, Otto von Bismarck was 47 when he became Minister-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Prussia on 23 September 1862. As Prussian representative at Frankfurt he had learnt to know the strength and weakness of Austria and was already convinced that only by defeating Austria in war could Prussia unify Germany. In the years immediately before 1862 he had been Prussian Ambassador at St Petersburg and Paris, and, in both capitals, had strengthened the position of his country and had acquired an intimate knowledge of the foreign policies and probable action of both in a European crisis. In particular he had weighed Napoleon III's character, upon which he passed judgment in the phrase 'People exaggerate his intellect, but underrate his heart'. Bismarck's one consuming passion was the greatness of Prussia, to be achieved by the strength of her army and the subtlety of his diplomacy. When, therefore, his king consulted him, with his abdication already written out should Bismarck fail

him, Bismarck persuaded William to tear up the abdication and took office on the understanding that the king would not resign under any circumstances and would give him his full support in the struggle with the Landtag.

That struggle rapidly came to a head. On 30 September, in a speech that was intended to be conciliatory, Bismarck tried to woo the Liberals from their intransigeance, but he added, on the national question, that 'Germany did not look to Prussia's liberalism but to her power', and that 'the great question of the time will be decided not by speeches and the resolution of majorities—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by blood and iron'. The Prussian Liberals were only the more alienated by this repudiation of their movement for national unity by democratic means, and by the appeal to force. They rejected the budget by a large majority, and were prorogued, whilst Bismarck continued to rule without a budget in defiance of the constitution. When, after a further year's resistance to the government proposals, the Landtag was dissolved in September 1863, Bismarck used every form of government pressure against the Liberal candidates—but in vain. Thus Bismarck's ministry opened as the complete negation of all that German Liberals had hoped for. So far from Prussia seeking to win moral victories by her liberalism, her king and minister had engaged in a bitter struggle with the elected representatives of her people in defiance of public opinion within and without Prussia and at the cost of alienating not only the heir to the Prussian throne, who withdrew for a time from the Crown Council, and the Prussian people, but the minor states and liberal opinion which were being organized for national unity by the National Association.

*Austria's Schemes for Federal Reform*

Bismarck's policy seemed the more foolhardy because Austria was anxious to take advantage both of the revived national movement and of Prussia's difficulties by sponsoring a reform of the Federation. The Emperor Francis Joseph had, indeed, made it clear, when he met William at Teplitz in 1860, that Austria was not prepared to make any concessions in regard to the primacy of the Federation and when, in reply to an impracticable scheme put forward in 1861 by Beust, the Foreign Minister of Saxony, Prussia proposed a narrower union under her own leadership, Austria and some of the lesser states protested (February 1862). The signature by Prussia, in August 1862, of a commercial treaty with France, which greatly diminished Austrian

hopes of ultimately entering the Zollverein (see p. 172), rendered Austro-Prussian relations still worse and, in December, Bismarck, during a series of conversations with Karolyi, the Austrian Ambassador, bluntly suggested that Austria's proper centre of interest was Buda-Pesth rather than Vienna. The serious internal conflict in Prussia, which reached its most acute point in 1863, was, therefore, welcomed in Austria as providing an opportunity of carrying through a reform of the Confederation favourable to Austrian interests. Against the advice of the Austrian Foreign Minister, Rechberg, who was nevertheless weak enough to remain in office, Francis Joseph issued an invitation to the princes of Germany to meet at Frankfurt on 16 August 1863, to discuss a scheme of reform.

The meeting of princes (*Fürstentag*) was duly held under the emperor's personal presidency. But the popular enthusiasm at first shown was damped by the limited nature of the proposals—a chamber of princes under Austrian presidency, and a chamber of delegates elected by the parliaments of the several states—and the proposals were accepted only against the votes of a minority of states—Baden, Weimar, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Oldenburg and Waldeck. This minority might be unimpressive. But there was not only a minority present, there was a vitally important absentee. Despite an invitation from the whole body of German princes brought to William by the king of Saxony himself, Bismarck would not allow his king to attend. The resolutions of Frankfurt, in Prussia's absence, were, he knew, worth nothing. They only showed, in Friedjung's words, 'how little Austria had to offer the German nation', and Bismarck countered them brilliantly. Under his direction the Prussian Ministry drew up a set of counter-proposals, by which Prussia was to have an equal place with Austria in the Federal Directory, but in which, too, the chamber of delegates was replaced by a national assembly directly elected on a population basis in every German state. At the height of his conflict with the Prussian Landtag, elected on the Three-Class system, Bismarck appealed to the liberal-national principle of universal suffrage. But, though the proposal was received with scepticism by the Liberals, it was not merely cynical. Given the necessary conservative controls it represented a genuine intention.

### *The Schleswig-Holstein Question*

Yet the position of Prussia in 1863 seemed hazardous enough, in view of her internal dissensions, and she was now to be faced with another critical question, that of Schleswig-Holstein. On

15 November 1863, the death of Frederick VII reopened the whole question of the duchies in an acute form, for the first act of his successor, Christian IX, was to sign a new Danish constitution, by which Schleswig was incorporated in the Danish state, while Holstein, as a constituent state of the German Confederation, remained united only by a personal union with the Danish crown. The threat of this change in their status had already aroused violent feelings in the duchies, which had always maintained the view that they were entitled to self-government apart from the rest of the Danish kingdom. The position was further complicated by the fact that the new constitution was an undeniable breach of the Protocol of London, signed by Austria and Prussia and the other Powers in 1852 (see p. 146), and still more by the fact that Frederick of Augustenburg, whose father's renunciation of his hereditary claims had been bought in 1852, now claimed the duchies on his own account, on the ground that his father's renunciation was personal and could not bind his heirs.

From the outset the main mass of German public opinion, ignoring all legal niceties, passionately supported the claim of Duke Frederick, as he now styled himself, and demanded a final settlement of the whole question by the complete separation of the duchies from Denmark and their incorporation as a united state in the German Confederation. This solution, which was backed by the National Association and other bodies, took no account of the recognition accorded to the rights of accession of Christian IX, or of the guarantee of the integrity of the Danish kingdom by the Great Powers under the Protocol of London; and it involved warlike interference by the Federal Diet in the affairs of Schleswig, which had never been part of the Confederation. To be carried out it required the support of either Prussia or Austria since, without this, the forces of the Federal Diet drawn only from the minor states would be insufficient to conduct a war.

On the other hand, Bismarck, from the outset, was clear in his aims. At the first meeting of the Prussian Crown Council after the death of Frederick VII, he reminded William that each of his ancestors had increased Prussian territory and urged him to seize the duchies. 'The king', Bismarck wrote in his Reminiscences, 'seemed to think that I had spoken under the Bacchic influence of a good lunch and would be glad to have my words consigned to oblivion. But I insisted that they should be placed on record, which was done. While I was speaking the Crown Prince threw up his hands, as though he doubted my soundness of mind; my colleagues sat in dead

silence.' Bismarck was, without doubt, fully aware that the king was not ready for any such solution as yet, nor would he himself, at that moment, have pressed for military action. But he intended, if possible, to secure the duchies for Prussia and he sowed the seed of desire in William's mind at the earliest moment. In public, however, whilst refusing the Landtag's request to recognize the Augustenburg claim, since this would close the door to Prussian profit, he pursued the policy of acting with Austria on the basis of the London Protocol of 1852 and of demanding that the Danish king should observe the promises therein made of a special regime for the duchies. Since this involved withdrawing the new Danish Constitution it was very likely that the Danes would provide a *casus belli* by refusing. It was Bismarck's calculation that, if Austria and Prussia then occupied the duchies to vindicate their treaty rights, the other Great Powers could hardly object. At the same time the Federal Diet would be excluded from interference and the Augustenburg claims to the duchies would not have been recognized. The disposal of the duchies would rest in the hands of Austria and Prussia. That this policy ran counter to the declared wishes of the German liberal-nationalists was for Bismarck a positive advantage. He intended to teach them that national aims could best be obtained by the agency of Prussian might.

The Austrian acceptance of this point of view was based on a determination to prevent Prussia extending her sway over the duchies if possible. Joint occupation and ultimate joint disposal of booty appeared the best insurance. And Bismarck's skilful use of the appeal to treaty rights as against radical democratic demands met with a warm response from Francis Joseph, already tired of his Minister Schmerling's semi-constitutional views. Acting together at the Federal Diet, Austria and Prussia were able, in December 1863, to force through by the narrow margin of one vote a motion that a Federal execution should take place in Holstein to oblige the new Danish king to carry out his promises under the London Protocol of 1852.

With the same end in view Bismarck secured a treaty with Austria for joint military action against Denmark if Christian IX refused, as he almost certainly must refuse, the joint Austro-Prussian demand that he should honour the pledges given for the benefit of the duchies in the London Protocol. And in this treaty (16 January 1864) the Austrians also accepted a clause which left the fate of the duchies after the war completely open. Article V provided that: 'In case of hostilities against Denmark and the consequent lapse of the treaties

between Denmark and the German Powers, the courts of Austria and Prussia reserve to themselves the establishment of the future condition of the duchies only by mutual agreement.' Under this treaty the claims of Frederick of Augustenburg were ignored, the Federal Diet was excluded from dealing with the disposal of the duchies, and the liberal-national solution of recognizing the Augustenburg claims and admitting the duchies as a united whole to the German Confederation was ruled out in advance unless Austria and Prussia both agreed to accept it. It was in vain that, on 14 January, the Federal Diet rejected by 11 votes to 5 the policy upon which Austria and Prussia, under Bismarck's skilful guidance, had agreed. On 16 January the two Powers presented an ultimatum to Denmark demanding the withdrawal of the new Danish Constitution and, when this was refused, their troops entered Schleswig.

Bismarck's policy had secured the great advantage to the German Powers of the neutrality of the other Great Powers. By basing their claims strictly on the enforcement of the London Protocol Austria and Prussia had made it almost impossible for Russia and England, who were parties to that instrument, to interfere forcibly on Denmark's side. The Danes, therefore, received no military assistance and, though they fought bravely, the Austro-Prussian forces rapidly overran Schleswig and entered Jutland where, on 18 April, the Danes were defeated. At this point, with the duchies in their hand, Austria and Prussia agreed to a truce and to a Conference of the interested parties in London.

Here Bismarck began by denouncing the London Protocol of 1852 as no longer valid because of the Danish breach of its terms, with the result that the whole future of the duchies was now open for discussion. A series of solutions was examined, but, in the end, as he had hoped, the Conference broke up without reaching agreement and on 25 June the war was resumed. Bismarck had succeeded in his immediate aims. He now knew that neither Russia, England nor France was likely to aid Denmark by force of arms. He had torn up the London Protocol of 1852 and, with it, Prussian recognition that the duchies formed part of the Danish monarchy. Now, when the Danes had been finally defeated, the fate of the duchies would depend wholly on an agreement between Prussia and Austria. And, despite negotiations with Frederick of Augustenburg, Prussia was not committed to his claims.

The renewed war went ill for the Danes, and on 20 July 1864 they were compelled to accept an armistice. When the final terms

were signed in Vienna, on 27 October, Denmark ceded to Austria and Prussia the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein and Lauenburg—some two-fifths of the area of the Danish monarchy (Fig. 35).




Fig. 35. Schleswig-Holstein, 1864

Based on *The Cambridge Modern History Atlas*, map 116 (second edition, Cambridge, 1924).

The northern part of Schleswig was ceded to Denmark after a plebescite held in 1920.

The question of the ultimate disposal of these territories had now to be decided. The condominium of the two German Great Powers was unlikely to prove a satisfactory permanent solution. On his side Bismarck was determined to gain the duchies for Prussia, if possible

without war, but if necessary, and if he could carry King William to the point of war, he was prepared to risk the gamble for so rich a prize. But he was in no hurry. Prussia was not, in 1864, ready for hostilities, and the next two years were occupied in a series of negotiations between Austria and Prussia for a solution of the tangled problem.

### The Defeat of Austria by Prussia

Bismarck was assisted during these years by the weakness and the vacillation of Austrian policy, but he had powerful forces against him in Prussia itself. The king hated the idea of war with Austria; the Crown Prince and both Prussian and German public opinion at first supported the recognition of Augustenburg's claims; the Prussian Landtag refused obstinately to vote money for the army and would almost certainly not vote war credits. And, though Prussian assistance to Russia in suppressing the Polish insurrection of 1863 as well as the Austrian attitude during the Crimean War (see p. 149) had made Russian intervention against Prussia unlikely, the uneasy ambition and unsatisfied appetite of Napoleon III made a war with Austria a hazardous undertaking. Moreover, the attitude of the other German states, particularly of Saxony, Bavaria and Hanover, was unlikely to be favourable to a war by Prussia for the annexation of the duchies and for her own aggrandisement at the expense of the national cause. There was every reason for caution.

During the early months of 1865 war between the two Powers seemed inevitable, for Austria now supported the Augustenburg claim. But, in July, a change of Ministry took place in Austria and the new government withdrew support from Augustenburg and agreed to the Treaty of Gastein (14 August 1865). By this treaty Prussia acquired the Duchy of Lauenburg for $2\frac{1}{2}$ million thalers, and the joint rule of the Powers in both duchies was superseded by that of Prussia in Schleswig and of Austria in Holstein. Prussia also acquired the harbour of Kiel in Holstein and control of military roads through Holstein into Schleswig. Prussia had the best of the bargain. Yet the treaty made no final arrangement for the duchies—Bismarck described it as 'a papering over the cracks'—though it also had other than material compensations for Prussia. Austria had lost face throughout Europe, as well as in Germany, by abandoning her support of Augustenburg's claims and by yielding much of the Prussian demands.

But, if Bismarck were to achieve his final object, he yet had to bring William to the point of readiness for war and to ensure Prussia's international position if it came. He began by visiting Napoleon III at Biarritz in October 1865 and left him under the false impression that Prussia might consent to some sacrifices in the Rhineland in return for French neutrality. Next he signed a commercial treaty with Italy (December 1865), and when the Austrians replied, foolishly enough, by once more allowing the Augustenburg agitation to be conducted in Holstein, Bismarck brought the period of co-operation after Gastein to an end by sending a strong note to the Austrian government denouncing it for allowing a 'seditious agitation' against Prussia to take place in the duchies. This was immediately followed up by negotiations both with France and with Italy, and in March 1866 both Austria and Prussia began a partial mobilization. By 8 April Italy had pledged her support to Prussia for three months, and to this treaty Napoleon III had given the Italians his assent, for he was convinced that Austria and Prussia would exhaust each other and that, probably without war, the threat of French intervention would bring France territorial gains on the Rhine frontier. In this delusion he received every encouragement from Bismarck.

With the signature of the Italian treaty Bismarck's stage was almost set. It remained only to provoke Austria to such a degree that she would declare war on Prussia and thus persuade King William that she, and not Prussia, was the aggressor. To this end Bismarck now (9 April) made proposals for the unification of Germany under Prussian leadership, with Austria excluded and a national parliament elected on the basis of manhood suffrage. The response of Germany was disappointing and, under pressure from the Crown Prince and from public opinion, William himself began to doubt the wisdom of his minister's policy. Negotiations with Austria continued during May and June and, to prevent Napoleon's immediate intervention in the war, Bismarck consented to his proposal for a European Congress, which Austria, however, refused. At length, the Austrian government solved Bismarck's problem for him. Unable to face the cost of prolonged mobilization the Austrian government suddenly determined to take a strong line in the Schleswig-Holstein question in the hope of securing the support of the smaller German states against Prussia. They proposed to the Diet of Frankfurt that the Confederation should decide the fate of the duchies. Bismarck's reply was to say that, Austria having violated the Convention of Gastein, the earlier system of joint administration was automatically

in force, and he marched Prussian troops into Holstein (7 June). The Austrians replied by declaring the entry of Prussian troops into Holstein an act of war and by proposing a Federal execution against them. Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover, Württemberg, Baden, the Hesses and Nassau gave qualified support to Austria, and Bismarck therefore declared Prussia's withdrawal from the Confederation. At last he had his way—and his war. As Cavour had goaded the Austrians into war in 1859, so did Bismarck in 1865–6, and, in doing so, he had been able to overcome William's last scruples.

*The War of* 1866 *and the Peace of Prague*

The Six Weeks' War which followed crowned Bismarck's diplomacy and endorsed his political judgment. From the first the Prussian armies were everywhere successful. By the end of June, Hanover had been overrun, and on 3 July the main Austrian forces were decisively defeated at Königgrätz (Sadowa) in Bohemia. At the cost of under 2,000 men killed in this battle, and a little over 7,000 wounded, Prussia, if allowed to exploit her victory, had changed the face of Germany and altered the balance of Europe. The danger now was of French, or Russian, interference. But, though Napoleon intervened as mediator, his armies were not ready to act. The speed of the Prussian victory had upset all his calculations and, already weakened by the Mexican expedition, France was in no position to take the swift and decisive action which could alone avail. Napoleon was, therefore, forced to consent to the enlargement of Prussia in north Germany, provided that Austria, apart from Venetia, remained intact. Bismarck has told, in his Memoirs, of his difficulties in persuading the king and the soldiers to be content with a moderate peace. But, with the Crown Prince's aid, he prevailed, and the final peace was signed at Prague on 23 August and ratified on 30 August. The long struggle between Austria and Prussia for predominance in Germany was over and the 'shame' of Olmütz was most amply revenged.

By the terms of peace Prussia obtained the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in full sovereignty, with the single reservation that Prussia was to restore to Denmark, after a plebiscite, that part of Schleswig which was Danish speaking. This plebiscite was never held, and in 1879, when the Austro-German Alliance was formed, Austria renounced the right to demand it. Prussia made no further territorial demands on Austria, and received a very moderate indemnity. Bismarck agreed, too, to leave Saxony and the southern

states intact. But the treaty, in its second article, recognized Prussia's right to organize north Germany in a new Confederation, from which Austria should be excluded, whilst the south German states were to be free to decide their relation to it. In addition, Prussia annexed outright Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and Frankfurt, thus





Fig. 36. The formation of the German Empire, 1864–71

Based on (1) Robertson, C. Grant, and Bartholomew, J. G., *An Historical Atlas of Modern Europe*, p. 13 (second edition, Oxford, 1924); and (2) Putzger, F. W., *Historischer Schul-Atlas*, pp. 100–1 (fifty-seventh edition, Bielefeld and Leipzig, 1939).

A=Anhalt; B=Bremen; B.P.=Bavarian Palatinate; Br.=Brunswick; H=Hamburg; Hesse C.=Hesse-Cassel; Hesse D.=Hesse-Darmstadt; L=Lübeck; La.=Lauenburg; L.D.=Lippe Detmold; O=Oldenburg; Thur. S.=Thuringian States.

giving her territories unbroken continuity from Königsberg to Cologne. What mattered more even than the gains in territory (1,300 sq. miles) and population (3,170,632) was the unchallengeable superiority she now possessed in Germany, and the direct control of the policy and military resources of the other member states of the new North German Confederation (Fig. 36) provided by the

constitution of that body which was passed by the new Reichstag on 16 April 1867.

Bismarck's victory over Austria was also a victory over the forces of liberalism in Prussia, though this was not recognized at the time. He sought and obtained from the Prussian Landtag an indemnity for having raised taxes without the Landtag's consent since 1862. But, in asking for the indemnity, he made it clear that neither he nor the king admitted the principle of the responsibility of ministers to the elected house and he asserted the right, and even the duty, of the crown to act independently if a parliamentary deadlock occurred. After 1866 there was no further question of responsible parliamentary government in Prussia until the collapse of 1918. It was still more important that the constitutions both of the North German Confederation and of the German Empire followed the Prussian model in practice and that, in course of time, the National-Liberal party adapted itself to this situation and ceased even to struggle for the principle of responsible government either in Prussia or in the Reich.

## The Completion of the Prusso-German Empire

The three years 1867–70 can only be regarded as a period during which Bismarck prepared for the struggle with France which he regarded as inevitable if German unity were to be completed. Napoleon III had suffered a severe reverse by the mere creation of so powerful a force as the new North German Confederation on France's western border. It was a political necessity for him to secure compensation, and he had already indicated, both in his negotiations with Austria and with Prussia in 1866, that his eyes were fixed on the Rhineland. That the French treasury was empty, and the army ill-equipped and worse organized, Bismarck knew, probably better than Napoleon himself. And, whilst willing to make minor concessions to the French emperor, Bismarck was determined to cede no foot of German soil and to be ready for immediate action in case war should become necessary.

Napoleon's first move during the Austro-Prussian conflict had been to demand the cession of Mainz, part of the Palatinate, and the Saar territory as compensation for his neutrality. The answer was a blunt refusal, and the further result a series of treaties between Prussia and the southern states providing that the king of Prussia should be commander-in-chief of the German armies in the event of war.

Bismarck arranged, too, that Napoleon's demands should 'leak out' in the Paris *Siècle* and, in face of the indignation they caused in Germany, Napoleon drew back. But he next sought to negotiate Prussia's consent to his annexation of Belgium and Luxembourg. Bismarck again allowed him to commit himself and, then, at the risk of war, refused to consent. Napoleon, since he dared not fight, fell back on a negotiation with Holland for the purchase by France of the province of Luxembourg, in which, since 1815, the Prussians had maintained a garrison. When Prussia resisted even this compensation, Napoleon III was forced to consent to a conference in London from which he acquired merely the withdrawal of the Prussian garrison from the fortress of Luxembourg and the neutralization of the province itself.

It was Napoleon's last glimmer of success. Between 1867 and 1870 his relations with Italy were worsened by Garibaldi's attempt on Rome, defeated by French troops at Mentana, and his negotiations with the Austrian court were rendered inconclusive by the recent reorganization (1867) of the Austrian empire on the basis of the 'Dual Monarchy', for the Hungarians were unwilling to fight for a renewal of Austrian predominance in Germany, which had always been associated with German hegemony in the Austrian empire itself. Thus Napoleon remained isolated in face of the new German Power, for his intrigues to obtain Belgium were not unknown either in Belgium itself or in England, whilst Russia's attention was fixed upon the Balkans and she continued to regard conservative Prussia with benevolence.

France, therefore, had every reason for prudence, and Bismarck for confidence, when, in 1870, Franco-Prussian relations became acutely strained by the proposal that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen should become king of Spain. To Frenchmen, this was to revive the empire of Charles V and to encircle France on both sides. At an interview with King William at Ems, on 9 July 1870, the French ambassador, Benedetti, presented the French standpoint courteously but firmly, and received William's assurance that, as head of the Hohenzollern house, he had already entered into negotiations with Prince Leopold's father, and that he expected the withdrawal of the candidature. The incident appeared closed.

But, both in France and in Germany, a war party existed. In France the Duc de Grammont was intent on securing not only the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature but also a pledge that it would not be renewed—and a diplomatic rebuff for Prussia. In

Germany, Bismarck, Roon and Moltke, confident in the knowledge that their army was ready 'to the last button on the gaiters' waited for a mistake by the French diplomatists which would enable them to arouse public opinion on both sides and force the French to declare war. The demand made by de Grammont that Benedetti should secure a promise that the candidature would not be renewed furnished their chance.

Benedetti reluctantly sought another interview with King William to receive this further assurance but the king refused, as a reflection on his honour, to give pledges for the future and would make no further concession. The colourless official account of these facts, which at first threw Bismarck, Roon and Moltke into deep gloom at the prospect of peace, was reworded by Bismarck so as to suggest that the French ambassador had been rebuffed by the king. At the same time the German press, and the correspondents of French papers in Germany, received a highly coloured version of the incident, and the war fever, which was already subsiding in France, broke out with such renewed fury that the war party in the French government easily carried the day and war was declared on Germany by France on 19 July 1870.

As in 1866 the Prussian army, supported now by Bavaria, Württemberg and Baden, rapidly showed its efficiency and its superiority over the French. Again, in a little over six weeks, the decisive campaign was over. Before the end of August Bazaine, in command of the main French army, was shut up in Metz and, on 2 September, Napoleon and MacMahon were forced to surrender at Sedan, with 80,000 men. Revolution at once broke out in Paris, a republic was declared, and although a government of national defence carried on resistance for some months Jules Favre was compelled to sign an armistice on 29 January 1871. On 26 February Thiers and Jules Favre signed the preliminaries of peace and on 1 March, by a vote of 546 to 107, the French National Assembly accepted them. France yielded Alsace and Lorraine, promised to pay an indemnity of 5,000 million francs within four years, and accepted the occupation of certain of her eastern provinces until this indemnity had been paid. The French Second Empire had crashed to the ground. The 'Second Reich' began its history amidst its ruins. For, on 18 January 1871, King William of Prussia, at the request of the ruling princes of all the German states, excluding Austria, was proclaimed German Emperor in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. Bismarck had negotiated with the governments of the southern states during the autumn and, by

making concessions to their particularism more important in appearance than in substance, had secured their adhesion to the new empire (Fig. 36). The necessary changes were made in the constitution of the North German Confederation and the constitution of the new empire came into force on 1 January 1871.

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1815–71

### Economic Position of Germany in 1815

At the close of the Napoleonic wars, Germany showed few signs of her future economic greatness. The Germans possessed many qualities necessary for material progress but they were hampered by adverse geographical, economic, political and social factors. Both agriculture and industry suffered from geographical difficulties. Much of the north German plain was infertile. The bogs and heaths west of the Elbe and the swampy valleys east of that river presented special problems to the farmer. Important mineral resources lay on the periphery of the country and could not be exploited until improved transport was available. Germany's chief coastline was on the Baltic, the trade routes of which were of minor importance, and in the days of sailing ships her North Sea ports of Hamburg and Bremen were unable to compete successfully on the Atlantic trade routes with more favourably placed British and Dutch ports.

Further difficulties restricting economic development were presented by poor communications within Germany, by lack of capital for investment in industry, by the survival of medieval social institutions both in the countryside and in the towns, and by the evil effects of political divisions, with their resultant customs barriers. Although Article 19 of the Federal Act of 1815 provided that 'the Confederated States reserve to themselves the right of deliberating...upon the manner of regulating the commerce and navigation from one State to another', the Federal Diet at Frankfurt took no steps to organize German economic life, and the individual states were left to work out their own economic salvation.

### Prussian Economic Policy and the Zollverein

Like the other German states Prussia suffered severe economic depression after 1815. Though she had gained territories, such as the Rhineland and Westphalia, which were to prove of immense economic

importance in the future, these were as yet undeveloped, and the great distances between Memel on the east and Trier on the west, combined with poor communications and the lack of territorial continuity between the western and eastern provinces, presented problems of great difficulty. The Prussian state took active steps, by negotiating trade treaties, by building roads and by securing information of technical progress abroad, to overcome them. But the most important step taken was the enactment of Maassen's Tariff Law of 1818.

Under this law many internal dues were abolished and customs duties were now collected at the frontiers, which involved some loss of revenue but facilitated trade between Prussia's two separate groups of provinces. Most raw materials were admitted duty free, whilst manufactured articles paid only 10% import duty *ad valorem* and the products of tropical countries from 20 to 30%. These duties were low enough to make smuggling unprofitable and to avoid offending powerful neighbours. Goods which crossed Prussian territory (without being consumed) paid 1*s.* 6*d.* a cwt., a tax on international commerce which was a useful source of revenue as well as a weapon which could be used against small German neighbours.

The Tariff Law brought no immediate relief to Prussia's agriculture or industry but ultimately it facilitated economic expansion. Shortly afterwards various small enclaves were absorbed into the Prussian customs system. They accepted the Prussian tariff (administered by Prussian officials) and received a share of the joint revenue calculated upon the ratio between their population and that of Prussia's eastern provinces.

*Customs Unions* (Fig. 37)

The existence of many independent tariff units was so inconvenient that several states undertook negotiations in the twenties for the formation of customs unions. Three were formed in 1828. The first—between Bavaria and Württemberg—fell short of the great South German Union originally planned. The second was between Prussia and Hesse-Darmstadt, and was on the same lines as the arrangements made to include enclaves in the Prussian customs system, except that Hesse-Darmstadt retained her own customs officials. The third was the Middle German Commercial Union which included Hanover, Brunswick, Saxony and several small states in central Germany. It had no common tariff and its object was to prevent Prussia from controlling the main roads from the North Sea ports to the markets

of Frankfurt-am-Main and Leipzig. But Prussia defeated the union's plans. She facilitated commerce between north and south Germany by herself constructing roads through the principalities of Meiningen





Fig. 37. The three customs unions of 1828

Based on Henderson, W. O., *The Zollverein*, p. 30 (Cambridge, 1939).

H=Hamburg; L=Lübeck; La.=Lauenburg; L.D.=Lippe Detmold; Lu.=Luxembourg; W=Waldeck.

and Gotha from Prussia to Bavaria, Württemberg, and Frankfurt-am-Main, and by taking the lead in negotiations with the Dutch for reducing the tolls levied on shipping on the Rhine. This was the work of Motz, who was Prussian Finance Minister between 1825 and 1830. The extreme confusion in tariff boundaries involved in the territorial divisions of the German states is illustrated by the case of Frankfurt (Fig. 38).

### *Prussia and the Foundation of the Zollverein*

The Middle German Commercial Union collapsed under these blows. Hesse-Cassel deserted to the Prussian customs system in 1831,

and so an economic link was forged between Prussia's eastern and western provinces. Saxony and the Thuringian states followed suit. Meanwhile Prussia and the southern states were drawing closer





Fig. 38. The free city of Frankfurt-am-Main, and neighbouring territory in 1833 (after August Ravenstein).

Based on Henderson, W. O., *The Zollverein*, p. 115 (Cambridge, 1939).
The map well illustrates the territorial confusion in Germany at this time.

together. In 1834 Bavaria and Württemberg formed a customs union with Prussia and the two Hesses. This union—the Zollverein—had an area of 162,870 sq. miles and a population of nearly $23\frac{1}{2}$ millions (Fig. 39). Within eight years it had been joined by Baden, Nassau, Frankfurt-am-Main and Luxembourg. But Hanover, Brunswick and Oldenburg, the rump of the defunct Middle Union,

remained aloof and formed the Tax Union, whilst other states which retained their economic independence were the three Hanse towns (Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck), the two Mecklenburgs, Schleswig





Fig. 39. The Zollverein and the Tax Union, 1834

Based on Henderson, W. O., *The Zollverein*, p. 80 (Cambridge, 1939).

B = Bremen; H = Hamburg; F = Frankfurt-am-Main; L = Lübeck; La. = Lauenburg; Lu. = Luxembourg; S = Schaumburg principalities, etc.

and Lauenburg. Between 1837 and 1844 the Brunswick lands joined the Zollverein (Fig. 40).

The establishment of the Zollverein was not the direct result of the growth of German national consciousness. Many states entered the Prussian customs system only because they could in no other way alleviate their financial and economic embarrassments. They jealously guarded their sovereign rights and prevented Prussia from gaining any substantial political advantages from her position as the leading state in the Zollverein. Only slowly did the beneficial effects of the Zollverein on industry and trade become apparent, but the financial advantages derived from membership of the Zollverein were more

immediately obvious. With the exception of Saxony and Frankfurt-am-Main nearly all members of the Zollverein normally drew more revenue from the customs union (calculated on a population basis) than they collected in duties. This, more perhaps than any other factor, prevented recalcitrant members from breaking away from it.




Fig. 40. The adhesion of Brunswick to the Zollverein, 1837–44.
Based on Henderson, W. O., *The Zollverein*, p. 156 (Cambridge, 1939). The dates indicate when various Brunswick lands entered the Zollverein.

There were two weaknesses in the organization of the Zollverein. First, unanimity and not a majority decision was necessary for a proposal to be passed by the Zollverein Congress. This *liberum veto* was a weapon which small states could use effectively against Prussia. Secondly, the original Zollverein treaties only ran for eight years and were subject to renewal for fixed periods so that a dissatisfied state could try to remedy its grievances by threatening to leave the union when the Zollverein treaties expired.

Both in the early fifties and early sixties the Zollverein came near to dissolution. The assaults upon it were inspired by mixed motives. Some states desired to weaken Prussia by wrecking the Zollverein even at the cost of reviving tariff barriers throughout Germany.

Others wanted the Zollverein to be absorbed into a greater union including all Germany and Austria, just as they desired a 'Grossdeutsch' solution of the problem of political unity (see p. 137). The popular demand for the complete economic unification of the country found expression during deliberations of the Frankfurt National Assembly in 1848–9, and the draft constitution of March 1849 provided that the Reich 'shall be united for purposes of commerce and tariffs and shall be surrounded by a customs frontier. All internal dues shall be abolished'. But 'the Federal authority may exclude certain places and districts from the customs union'. The attempt to establish a unified Germany failed and the constitution of 1849 remained a dead letter.

## Austria and the Zollverein

After 1850 Austrian statesmen were anxious to wrest from Prussia the economic as well as the political leadership of Germany, and the attempt was made by Bruck, who had helped to found the Austrian Lloyd shipping company, and was one of the ablest leaders in the growing Austrian world of business. He became Austrian Minister of Commerce in November 1848 and prepared to abolish the Austro-Hungarian customs frontier and to reform the prohibitive Hapsburg tariff as necessary preliminaries to the establishment of a customs union with Germany. He planned the economic unification of the Hapsburg Empire, the Zollverein, the Tax Union and those German states which still retained their economic independence. In the Hapsburg Empire Bruck's scheme was supported by the Magyar landowners (who welcomed the prospect of wider markets for their agricultural products) and by those manufacturers who did not fear German competition. But it was opposed by industrialists in Lower Austria and Bohemia. In Germany Bruck's scheme was sympathetically received by protectionists and was opposed by free traders. The southern states would have accepted the plan only if they got as much revenue from it as they received from the Zollverein. Prussia was implacably hostile for, if Bruck's scheme had succeeded, Prussia would have fallen under Austrian control in economic policy. In Delbrück, a brilliant young official in the Prussian Ministry of Commerce, Bruck met his match.

Delbrück strengthened Prussia's position by securing the adhesion to the Zollverein of Hanover and her associates. Hanover was given 75% more of the Zollverein revenue than she would have secured

on the basis of population. But Prussia made the financial sacrifice to gain a useful free trade ally in the struggle with protectionist Austria and to complete the economic links between her eastern and western provinces. If the southern states deserted her, Prussia was at least assured of the economic control of Germany north of the Main. The southern and central states, however, eventually renewed the Zollverein treaties and no Austro-German customs union was founded. All that Austria secured in the Austro-German commercial treaty of February 1853 was that negotiations for such a union should begin in 1860, and that new tariff concessions made by one of the contracting parties to a third state were to be automatically enjoyed by the other contracting party.

Prussia had kept Austria out of the Zollverein and had absorbed the tax union. While in the political field Austria had recovered her ascendancy in Germany at Olmütz (see p. 145), in the economic sphere she failed to shake Prussia's supremacy. Further commercial negotiations in the late fifties between Prussia and Austria resulted only in the formation of a German monetary union which sought to fix the relationship between the country's three main currencies.

In 1862 Prussia endeavoured to make an Austro-German customs union impossible by signing a commercial treaty with France which was to come into force three years later. Provision was made for changes in the Zollverein tariff, many import duties being reduced. In return France agreed that normally her imports from the Zollverein should pay duty at the reduced rates recently conceded to Britain and Belgium. While Saxony welcomed the proposed changes in the Zollverein tariff, Bavaria, Württemberg and Hanover at first refused to agree to them and, in July 1862, Austria revived Bruck's proposal for an Austro-German customs union with a protectionist tariff. She desired far higher import duties than those proposed by the Franco-Prussian commercial treaty. Prussia rejected this proposal since it involved the loss of her supremacy in the Zollverein and the sacrifice of the French commercial treaty.

On the Prussian side the negotiations were skilfully conducted. Bismarck, who became Minister President in 1862, appreciated the political necessity of keeping Austria out of the Zollverein, and the southern states were brought to heel by giving them the choice of accepting the French treaty or of leaving the Zollverein, with the result that the Zollverein was renewed by all its former members in October 1864.

Austria and Prussia came to terms in April 1865. The preamble of the treaty referred to a future 'general German customs union' but no one seriously imagined that this could now be achieved. The preferential duties of the treaty of 1853 were replaced by a most-favoured-nation clause, and Austria, even before her military defeat by Prussia, surrendered the dominating position in German economic affairs that Bruck had sought to win for her.




Fig. 41. The new Zollverein, 1867

Based on Henderson, W. O., *The Zollverein*, p. 305 (Cambridge, 1939).

A=Altona; B=Bremen; L=Lübeck; La.=Lauenburg; Lu.=Luxembourg.

The constitution of the North German Confederation provided for a customs union, except that Hamburg, Bremen, and the Prussian city of Altona, though within the confederation, were outside the customs union; they paid a special contribution to the exchequer of the North German Confederation in lieu of customs duties.

The South German states and Luxembourg (not members of the North German Confederation) joined the new Zollverein by various treaties.

The defeat of Austria and her allies in the Six Weeks' War followed in 1866, and Prussia's political and economic supremacy in Germany was now unquestioned. The Zollverein treaties had

automatically ended when hostilities began, and legally the customs union was dissolved, though actually it remained in being. Customs duties continued to be collected, and the proceeds were sent to Berlin and were shared between members of the Zollverein as before, a remarkable example of 'business as usual' in wartime.

*The Zollverein after* 1866 (Fig. 41)

The North German Confederation under the domination of Prussia, swollen by the annexation of Hanover and other German territories, was also a customs union, though Hamburg and Bremen, whilst becoming members of the Confederation, retained economic independence. The states south of the Main, though politically independent of the Confederation, joined with it to form a new Zollverein. The old General Congress (with its *liberum veto*) was replaced by a Federal Customs Council where decisions were taken on a majority vote. Moreover, a popularly elected Customs Parliament was established and held its first meeting in 1868—the first meeting of popularly elected representatives from the whole of Germany excluding Austria since the Frankfurt Assembly of 1848. But it was the scene of serious disputes on political and economic matters between the northern and southern states, which showed that differences still existed between the states on either side of the Main. The gulf was only bridged by the Franco-Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire in 1871.

## Development of Communications and Shipping

The development of the Zollverein had an important influence on the genesis of the German industrial revolution. Equally important was the improvement of communications. In the early nineteenth century the poor transport facilities—particularly east of the Elbe—hampered economic progress. The first German metalled road had been made in Bavaria in 1753. Prussia began to improve her main roads forty years later. Napoleon constructed military roads in western Germany—such as the one from Metz to Mainz and Bremen. In the twenties Prussia embarked on a road-building programme to foster industry and trade and to defeat the plans of the Middle German commercial union. Over 2,800 miles of new main roads were built between 1817 and 1828. By 1845 an English traveller was referring to roads in the Rhineland as 'luxurious'. But the great age of Prussian road-building was from 1845 to 1870, when the total

length of the Prussian main roads rose from 8,000 miles in 1837 to 18,000 miles in 1862. Whereas Britain and France had completed their networks of main roads before the coming of railways, in Germany the development of roads and railways went hand in hand.

Since many roads were so poor in the early nineteenth century the rivers—particularly the Rhine and the Elbe—were a useful means of transport. But the main rivers crossed the frontiers of various German and foreign states and transit duties hampered the expansion of their traffic. Agreements made between 1821 and 1831 regulated dues on the Rhine, Elbe and Weser, but it was not until the sixties that these vexatious impositions were either greatly reduced or abolished on the principal rivers. A steamship made the journey from Rotterdam to Cologne in 1816. Fourteen years later a dozen steamships plied on the Rhine. Steamship traffic also appeared on the Danube. The first river steamers carried passengers, but subsequently the transport of goods, such as coal from the Ruhr, became more important. In 1841 a company provided a service of tugs to draw barges on the Rhine. In addition to the improved facilities for river traffic some canals were also constructed, the most ambitious being that joining the Rhine, Main and Danube, which took nine years to build (1836–45) and cost £1,500,000.

*The Development of Railways*

It was the railways, however, that really made possible Germany's modern industrial development. They 'first shook the nation out of its economic stagnation, completing what the Zollverein had surely begun. So vigorously did they influence all habits of life that by the forties Germany had already assumed a completely different aspect' (Treitschke). The first German railways were short suburban lines—Nuremberg-Fürth, Berlin-Potsdam and Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel—but in 1839 Dresden, the capital of Saxony, was joined by rail to Leipzig, the chief commercial city of the kingdom, 70 miles away, and at the end of 1846 over 2,000 miles of railways were open. By the sixties the trunk lines were complete. Three railway systems linked west and east Germany—one across the north German plain (Aachen-Berlin-Königsberg), one through central Germany (Essen-Dresden-Beuthen), and a third in the south (Mannheim-Munich-Vienna). Three systems linked north and south Germany, one in the east (Stettin-Berlin-Prague), one in central Germany (Hamburg-Cassel-Munich) and one in the Rhine valley (Amsterdam-Cologne-Basle). Railway building fostered the heavy industries, for rails and

sleepers had to be constructed, engines and carriages had to be built, and coal had to be provided—though here, as elsewhere, keen foreign competition had to be met. When the railways were completed there were new opportunities for the development of Germany's economic resources—particularly in frontier regions such as Silesia. The railways helped to bring closer together Germans living in different states, and weakened the particularism which was so characteristic of Germany's political and social life in the nineteenth century. 'The German Empire', declared Wilhelm Raabe, 'was founded with the construction of the first railway system between Nuremberg and Fürth'.

*The Growth of Shipping*

While the railways promoted internal trade, the mercantile marine fostered overseas commerce. Recovery from the paralysis produced by Napoleon's continental system was slow, and for some time Germany's sea-borne trade was largely in British and Dutch hands. The petty rivalries of the German coastal states, the stringent navigation laws and differential harbour dues of her rivals hampered the development of German shipping. In the thirties and forties Prussia's shipping expanded with the revival of the Baltic corn trade. More important was the rise of the shipping of Hamburg and Bremen in the Atlantic trades, and between twenty and thirty German vessels were bringing sugar and coffee from Brazil in the early thirties. At this time Bremen was Germany's leading port. Under Burgomaster Smidt's able leadership Bremen constructed the outport of Bremerhaven in 1827 and became the principal port from which emigrants left for the new world; in 1852 nearly 60,000 of them passed through the harbour.

While Bremen was primarily a shipping centre Hamburg was mainly a commercial centre. It has been said that in the first half of the century the Hamburgers were merely 'the commission agents of England', and certainly her trade and shipping at that time were dominated by British interests. Her prosperity was temporarily checked by the fire of 1842, but the founding of the Hamburg-America Company (1847) and the North German Lloyd (1857) marked the beginning of a new era of prosperity for the Hanse towns. By the fifties Hamburg firms—particularly those of Wm. O'Swald and Carl Woermann—were active in West and East Africa, and a commercial agreement was made with the Sultan of Zanzibar. The Hamburg house of Godeffroy was gaining control of the Samoan

copra trade in the late fifties. These were only modest beginnings, and as late as 1870 the German mercantile marine was still smaller than that of France and her steam tonnage was quite insignificant in comparison with that of Britain.

*Mercantile Tonnage of Germany, Britain, U.S.A. and France*

| | 1850 | 1870 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | Total tonnage | Steam tonnage |
| Germany | 139,000* | 982,000 | 82,000 |
| France | 688,000 | 1,072,000 | 154,000 |
| Britain | 3,565,000 | 5,691,000 | 1,113,000 |
| U.S.A. | 1,586,000† | 1,517,000 | 193,000 |

* Hamburg and Bremen only. † Foreign trade only.

Source: Clapham, Sir J. H., *Economic Development of France and Germany* (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 112, 356.

## Growth of Capital and Machine Industry

Another factor influencing the genesis of the Industrial Revolution was the provision of capital. In the early years of the nineteenth century Germany was a poor country compared with Britain and France. Capital for industrial enterprise was provided by the states (e.g. various royal mines in Silesia and the royal foundry in Berlin) and by individuals and families (e.g. manufacturing establishments set up by Krupp at Essen, Borsig at Berlin and Harkort at Witten). Then came sleeping partnerships—particularly in the mining industries—and joint-stock companies. Except in the Hanse towns (which had adopted the French commercial code) joint-stock companies in Germany each required at first a special state charter. But a railway company law was passed in Prussia in 1838 and a general law for joint-stock companies in 1843. In the fifties financial institutions were established on the lines of the French *Crédit foncier* (which made advances on the security of land) and of the *Crédit mobilier* (which promoted joint-stock enterprises). The Austrian Credit Institute and the Darmstadt Bank were organizations of this kind. In Prussia banks of a rather different type were established (e.g. the *Diskontogesellschaft*, *Berliner Handelsgesellschaft* and *Schlesischer Bankverein*). The share capital of banks founded in Germany in 1853–7 amounted to £30,000,000. By 1860 there were in Germany some 320 recently founded companies (joint-stock and

sleeping partnerships) with an estimated capital of £120,000,000. It was at this time, too, that Frankfurt became an international centre for the exchange of state bonds.

Foreign capital, too, played its part in the rise of Germany's industries. In the middle of the nineteenth century British, French, and Belgian companies were established in western Germany. At least nineteen English mining companies were founded along the Rhine in the fifties. The 'Hibernia' and 'Shamrock' mines flourished under the management of an able Irishman (W. T. Mulvany). For a generation Prussia had tried to learn from those of her neighbours with industries more advanced than her own. Beuth, an official who has been described as the 'schoolmaster of Prussian industry', encouraged the formation of the Association for the Promotion of Industrial Knowledge (*Verein zur Beförderung des Gewerbefleisses* 1821), and established technical schools in Berlin and the provinces. He picked the brains of English manufacturers in every way possible, and he was not too scrupulous in his methods.

### *The Rise of Heavy Industry*

The exploitation of Germany's coal and lignite resources and the development of her iron, steel and allied industries laid the foundations of her industrial expansion. 'The German Empire was built more truly on coal and iron than on blood and iron' (Keynes). The Ruhr, Saar and Aachen coalfields were worked effectively on a small scale in the late thirties. In 1846 Prussia produced only 3,200,000 tons a year—much less than either France or Belgium—but as the German network of railways was completed, so the production of coal increased. Lignite, too, was successfully exploited. In the sixties Germany had drawn ahead of her Continental rivals as a coal producer but was still far behind Britain.

*Output of Coal (metric tons)*

| | Britain | Germany and Luxembourg | | France | Belgium |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Coal | Lignite | | |
| 1860 | 81,300,000 | 12,300,000 | 4,400,000 | 8,300,000 | 9,600,000 |
| 1871 | 118,000,000 | 29,400,000 | 8,500,000 | 13,300,000 | 13,700,000 |

Source: Clapham, Sir J. H., *Economic Development of France and Germany*, (Cambridge, 1928), pp. 280–1.

The German coal industry was capturing the home markets—the Rhine valley, where Belgian and even English coal were competitors, and south Germany, where wood had been used as fuel. Only in the coastal towns did English coals hold their own.

In the early nineteenth century the craftsmen engaged in the old-established metal industries still possessed a considerable degree of traditional skill, but when the gild system was abolished the efficiency of the workers declined. The ironworks of Silesia and the Siegerland, the steelworks of Solingen and the silver mines of the Harz were small concerns run on the handicraft system, but by the forties a few large-scale iron, steel, engineering and machine-making establishments had already been set up. A new era in these industries was heralded by the development of railways and by the increased use of coke instead of charcoal for smelting. The railways themselves needed iron and steel goods. They helped to bring iron and coke together and linked the metal industries with new markets.

It was, however, only after 1860 that these industries expanded rapidly as modern large-scale enterprises. Whereas in 1850 Germany produced only 529,000 tons of pig-iron as compared with France's 898,000 tons, by 1875 Germany produced 2,000,000 tons and France only 1,448,000 tons. The growth of the manufacture of machines paved the way for the modernization of other industries such as textiles.

### *The Textile Industries*

In the textile industries progress was uneven. The manufacture of linen, hemp and wool, which involved the use of home-produced raw materials, long remained in the hands of peasant craftsmen who worked at home. In the woollen industry the professional urban handicraft weaver was becoming more important than the part-time peasant weaver. On the other hand, the manufacture of cotton and silk, where the raw materials were imported, was necessarily conducted on a larger scale. The organization of the distribution of the raw materials to spinners, weavers, and dyers could be done only by clothiers who were the middlemen (*Verleger*) possessed of some capital. Factories were still small and primitive. In the forties only two of the ten cotton mills in the Krefeld district were worked by steam, six of the others by hand and two by horse-power. It was not until after 1845 that power-driven mills were gradually introduced into the linen and woollen industries, and spinning by hand survived the founding of the Empire. Between 1850 and 1870 important

changes in woollen manufacture were introduced and, as modern technical knowledge was applied on a large scale in the late sixties, the home production of wool failed to keep pace with the demand for raw material. The cotton industry also developed rapidly after 1840. At that time only 15,000–16,000 tons of raw cotton were imported annually, but twenty years later (1861) the amount had risen to 67,000 tons. There were over 300 cotton-spinning factories running two and a quarter million spindles and employing 34,663 persons: there were also over 150,000 hand-loom weavers. The depression caused by the shortage of cotton, when the southern ports of the United States were blockaded during the American Civil War, had important results upon the development of the industry. Spinners had to adapt more of their machinery to Indian cotton. In Saxony large factories with modern machinery replaced small concerns. The introduction of power for spinning and weaving was encouraged by the drifting of hand-loom weavers to other industries and by the temporary cheapness of English textile machinery. An official Prussian report stated that the cotton famine had 'considerably furthered technical improvements, particularly in spinning'. By the early seventies the industry was using 116,000 tons of cotton a year—rather more than one-sixth of the consumption of the British industry.

*The Chemical and Electrical Industries*

The development in the fifties and sixties of two other groups of manufactures—the chemical and electrical industries—was of special significance for the future. Scientific research in the first half of the century provided the knowledge indispensable to the growth of these industries. Germany was richly endowed with the raw materials of the chemical industry. The Stassfurt deposits of potash salts for example were rapidly developed after 1861, and the output of crude salts rose from 2,000 tons in that year to 375,000 tons ten years later. In the electrical industry the period of preliminary research fell in the sixties, when Werner von Siemens invented the dynamo, and that of the growth of manufacture in subsequent decades.

*Agriculture*

The period under review also saw substantial progress in agriculture. Between 1840 and 1870 the open-field system under communal management (with its three-course rotation of rye, barley, fallow) gave way to enclosed fields under individual management.

The improvement of agriculture owed much to the work of Albrecht Thaer and Justus von Liebig. Thaer stressed the importance of such reforms as enclosures, deep ploughing, improved crop rotation and better implements. Liebig was the father of modern agricultural chemistry. He showed how chemical manures could improve soils and increase the yield of crops. This new scientific knowledge was spread through the experimental stations of university agricultural departments, agricultural schools and special 'winter schools' where short courses were held at a time of year convenient to young farmers. The success of these efforts to educate the German farmer is illustrated by the development of the sugar-beet industry, which makes unusual demands upon the skill and knowledge of the cultivator. In the late sixties two and a half million tons of beet were handled and 211,000 tons of raw sugar were produced every year.

## Social Effects of Industrial Development

### *Growth of Population*

These changes in industry and agriculture were influenced by, and in turn themselves influenced, the growth and movement of Germany's population. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Germany had a population of less than 25 millions. By the middle of the century it had risen to 35 millions, and when the empire was founded it was 40 millions.

*Growth of Germany's Population*, 1815–70

| | Germany | Prussia | Saxony | Bavaria | Württemberg |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1815 | 24,833,000[1] | 10,319,993 | — | 3,707,966[2] | 1,410,327 |
| 1825 | 28,113,000 | — | — | — | — |
| 1835 | 30,802,000 | 13,692,889[3] | 1,595,668[3] | 4,251,118[3] | 1,627,122[3] |
| 1845 | 34,290,000 | — | — | — | — |
| 1855 | 36,138,000 | 17,202,637 | 2,039,176 | 4,547,239 | 1,669,720 |
| 1865 | 39,548,000 | 19,254,649[4] | 2,337,192[4] | 4,807,440[4] | 1,747,187[3] |
| 1875 | 42,518,000 | — | — | — | — |

[1] 1816. [2] 1818. [3] 1834. [4] 1864.

Sources : Benaerts, P., *Les Origines de la Grande Industrie Allemande* (Paris, 1933), p. 136 ; Stolper, G., *German Economy* 1870–1940 (London, 1940), p. 38.

This increase was due mainly to the high birth-rate and not to any decline in the death-rate. An analysis of the composition of age groups shows that Germany was a country of young people. In 1868,

45% of Prussia's population was under twenty years of age. The growing population provided the man-power necessary for the expanding industries and increased the size of the home market for manufactured goods. On the whole urbanization proceeded at a leisurely pace. In Prussia the urban population only increased from 26·5 % of the total population to 32·5 % between 1816 and 1870. In the sixties, however, the modern population map of Germany was clearly emerging. There were three chief concentrations of population, the Rhineland, Saxony and Upper Silesia, though the state capitals and old medieval cities were still much larger than the new industrial centres.

*Growth of Certain German Towns*, 1800–80

| | 1800 | 1850 | 1880 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Munich | 30,000 | 110,000 | 230,000 |
| Cologne | 50,000 | 97,000 | 145,000 |
| Essen | 4,000 | 9,000 | 57,000 |
| Chemnitz | 14,000 | 32,000 | 95,000 |
| Düsseldorf | 10,000 | 27,000 | 95,000 |

Source: East, W. G., *An Historical Geography of Europe* (London, 1935), p. 415.

*Social Problems*

In the growing towns were to be found the social problems which generally accompanied the industrial revolution. In the forties 'complaints were already rife concerning starvation wages, child labour, the maltreatment and exploitation of workpeople' (Treitschke). Wages declined in the early fifties but subsequently rose steadily. There was, however, much distress among the worse paid men and those who clung to dying trades. The sixties saw the founding of Lassalle's General German Labour Union (which disappeared shortly afterwards) and of the Social Democratic Party (1869) which was to play a significant part in the politics of the country.

Neither industry nor agriculture expanded rapidly enough to enable the whole of the increased population to maintain its existing standard of living. There was considerable emigration from Germany in the middle years of the nineteenth century, particularly between 1847 and 1854. In 1847 alone some 90,000 persons left the country. This migration has sometimes been ascribed to political causes but, in fact, these causes were of only subsidiary significance. The main cause was the unsatisfactory conditions in certain agricultural districts. Political revolution and reaction occurred all over Germany

in 1848–54, but emigration was mainly from the rural districts in the south-west of the country. Between 1830 and 1860 over a million Germans went to the United States—most of them settling in the old North-West (north of the Ohio and east of the Mississippi) and in Texas. Others went to the provinces of Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil) and Valdivia (Chile). Several societies were founded to exercise some control over German emigration.

*Overseas Emigration from Germany*, 1821–70

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1821–30 | 8,500 | 1851–60 | 1,075,000 |
| 1830–40 | 167,000 | 1861–70 | 832,700 |
| 1841–50 | 469,300 | | |

Source: Stolper, G., *German Economy* 1870–1940, p. 39 (London, 1940).

## '*Booms*' *and* '*Slumps*'

As Germany became more industrialized she began to experience that more or less regular recurrence of ebb and flow in trade and of periodic commercial panics which constitute the 'trade cycle'. This puzzling and disquietening phenomenon had been observed and discussed by economists and statesmen in England since the end of the eighteenth century. When Germany began to take her place among the manufacturing states of the Continent it became evident that similar forces were at work. There was distress in 1817, 1847, 1857 and 1866. The distress in 1817 marked the beginning of a depression in farming which lasted throughout the twenties. The depression of the late forties was also mainly agrarian in origin—the potato harvest of 1845 had been a failure—but the collapse of firms in Hamburg, Bremen, Frankfurt-am-Main, Karlsruhe and Mannheim was connected with the English financial crisis of 1847. The depression of 1857 showed how closely the fortunes of German commerce were being linked with world trade. It was a financial crisis and it hit Hamburg with special force. A hundred and fifty firms collapsed with total liabilities of £15,000,000. The important firms of Palmié Brothers (Berlin) and Boskowitz (Vienna and Budapest) went bankrupt. The depression of the early sixties was largely confined to the cotton industry and was due mainly to the sudden shortage of the raw material during the American Civil War. The crises between 1847 and 1866 caused much distress, but they led to the disappearance of small firms working with out-of-date machinery and so ultimately promoted industrial efficiency.

## German Society in 1871

At the foundation of the empire, Germany, excluding the Austrian empire, had already laid the foundation of the industries which, during the next fifty years, were to make her the greatest industrial nation in Europe. By the creation of the Zollverein and because the new industries, particularly the heavy and chemical industries, drew their raw materials from her soil and the technique of their manufacture from the brains and vigour of her scientists and entrepreneurs, Prussia increased the predominance which her size and population gave her in any case in the empire which, under Bismarck's direction, she had created. The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, in 1871, brought with it new forces of industrial power, in the shape of the iron ore of Lorraine and the textile industry of Alsace. These in turn hastened the rapid industrial development already in progress and enabled Germany to outstrip France and to rival both England and the United States as a manufacturing country before the war of 1914–18 (see pp. 203–16).

Yet the late impact of the Industrial Revolution upon Germany could not change the authoritarian-feudal outlook of her governing classes. In the Prussian eastern provinces the large landowners, from whom the officers of the Prussian army and the administrators of the Prussian state were largely drawn, continued to exercise an authority over their labourers far more stringent than that of any French or English landowner. The 'Gutsherr' (lord of a manor) in East and West Prussia was not only 'the master' in an economic sense, but he represented also the public authority through his rights of jurisdiction, and was, in many cases, judge in his own cause. Moreover, the Servants' Ordinance (*Gesindeordnung*), promulgated at the time when the edict of emancipation from feudal services was to become operative (1810) and reinforced by a law of 1854, placed the landless labourers so much at the mercy of their lords that Dawson could say in 1908 'though the name of serfage is no longer used, this condition exists in spirit and to some extent in fact'. Nor was this state of affairs confined to Prussia, for 'most of the German states have their Servants' Ordinances and the legal process of emancipation from feudal dues was actually later in Bavaria than in Prussia itself'.

In addition to the labourer's disabilities in face of the rural lord it must also be remembered that the right of free migration to the towns and to industrial employment was not granted until after the establishment of the North German Confederation, and that, in the

towns themselves, the gild system, including compulsory apprenticeship, outlived the revolutions of 1848 and, in Prussia, was given new life by a law passed in 1849.

Both in town and country, therefore, despite the relatively freer society of the Rhineland, on which the influence of French occupation and of the Napoleonic code had left its mark, the Germany which was united in 1871 was still in certain respects a profoundly conservative society from the economic as well as from the political point of view. The enterprising capitalists, who organized the new machine industry, were, indeed, far from conservative in their adoption of the most advanced industrial techniques. But in their relation to the 'hands', who flowed into industry from the countryside to 'better themselves', the entrepreneurs were ready to adopt the authoritarian principles of the landowners towards their labourers, whilst the 'hands' themselves, many of them only a generation removed from serfdom and none of them accustomed to a free society, were ill qualified to struggle either for social or political rights. The fact that the industrial revolution, with the organization of large units which it involves, came to the German people whilst they were still so largely influenced by feudal institutions and ideas and before they had ever tasted civil, still less political liberty, is of great importance in their later development.

## Note on the Three-Class System of Voting in Prussia

This system of voting was devised in 1849 as the basis for elections to the lower or representative house (*Abgeordnetenhaus*) of the Prussian Parliament, the Landtag. It provided for indirect elections —i.e. the body of voters chose electors, in the ratio of one elector to every 250 voters, and these electors then chose the representative. But the voters were first divided into three classes, according to the amount they paid in direct taxation. The total sum paid by the electoral district (*Uhrwahlbezirk*) was first added up and then divided by three.

The wealthier voters, those who paid the first third of the total, were placed in the first class of voter; those who paid the next third in the second class; and the remainder in the third class. Each class then chose separately one-third of the electors to which the electoral district was entitled, and these electors then chose their representative. As a result of this system the number of voters in Class 1 and Class 2, consisting of those who paid most in

direct taxation, was very much smaller than that in Class 3, although each class chose one-third of the electors. In 1908 the total of voters in Class 1 was 293,000; in Class 2, 1,065,000; in Class 3, 6,324,079. Out of some 7,500,000 voters, 1,350,000 possessed two-thirds of the effective voting power. Moreover, so ineffective did the poorer taxpayers feel their votes to be that large numbers abstained from voting at the elections for the Landtag, and even the first two classes felt secure enough to make little personal effort. In 1913 the percentage of voters who exercised their right to vote in the three classes was 1, 51·4; 2, 41·8; 3, 29·9.

A comparison of the numbers of the parties on the Prussian Landtag with the numbers returned by the same parties for Prussian constituencies to the Reichstag shows clearly that it was the Conservative and National-Liberal parties on the right which benefited most from the system, and the Social Democrats on the left who suffered most from it. The Centre and the Progressive parties were less affected. Since the elections to the two assemblies took place at different dates the comparison cannot be exact. But, leaving aside the smaller parties, the returns for the years from 1881–93 give the following results :—

| | Conservatives | National-Liberals | Centre | Left Liberals | Social Democrats |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| R 1881 .. .. | 42 | 16 | 59 | 39 | 4 |
| L 1882 .. .. | 117 | 67 | 98 | 37 | 0 |
| R 1884 .. .. | 63 | 16 | 56 | 42 | 10 |
| L 1885 .. .. | 141 | 70 | 99 | 44 | 0 |
| R 1887 .. .. | 63 | 35 | 24 | 57 | 8 |
| L 1888 .. .. | 130 | 89 | 30 | 99 | 0 |
| R 1893 .. .. | 54 | 24 | 54 | 24 | 22 |
| L 1893 .. .. | 149 | 90 | 91 | 20 | 0 |

R = Reichstag. L = Landtag.

Source : Lowell, A. L., *Governments and Parties in Continental Europe*, vol. 1, p. 307 (London, 1917).

It will be observed that the Conservatives obtained twice as much representation in the Landtag as in the Reichstag, and the National-Liberals averaged about three times as much. On the other hand the Social Democrats were not represented at all in the Landtag during these years. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why

the Conservatives and National-Liberals in Prussia clung to the system down to 1918. Combined with the system of open voting it left the way open for pressure on the voters both by government, by industrial firms and by individual employers. The effect of its abolition in 1918 was immediately reflected in the fact that, after that date, the Centre, Democrats (Left Liberals) and Social Democrats formed a majority of the Landtag throughout the period of the Republic (1919–33).

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# Chapter IV

# HISTORICAL OUTLINE, 1871–1939

*The Age of Bismarck:* The Bismarck System: Bismarck and the Parties: The National Minorities: Effects of Bismarck's System on the Parties: Bismarck's Conservative Foreign Policy: The Beginnings of Expansionism: Bismarck's Fall

*Germany's Economic Development*, 1871–1914*:* The New Empire: The Heavy Industries (Coal, Iron and Steel): Chemical and Electrical Industries: Textile Industries: Growth of Industrial Organization: Foreign Trade: Communications and Mercantile Marine: The German Colonial Empire

*The Reign of William II:* The 'New Course': Conservatism and Expansionism: The Isolation of Germany: German Dependence on Austria: Sarajevo and the Outbreak of War, 1914: The Political Situation in Germany in 1914

*The War of* 1914–18*:* The War on Land: The Naval War and the Blockade: German Success and Failure: The Dictatorship of Ludendorff and the German Revolution

*The Weimar Republic:* The Democratic Constitution and the Versailles Treaty: The Stresemann Period, 1923–9: The Young Plan and its Opponents: National-Socialism before 1929: Nazis, Nationalists and the Economic Crisis: The 'Presidential' Experiment and the 'National Revolution': Why did the Republic fail?

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*Bibliographical Note*

## THE AGE OF BISMARCK

### The Bismarck System

'The domestic and foreign policy of a state cannot be distinguished from one another since both alike are the expression of the social forces in power in the state.' These words of an acute German historian apply with particular force to the German Empire as Bismarck constructed it, and the history of Germany since 1871 is unintelligible without some understanding of the disposition of political forces not only as provided for in the Imperial constitution (see also Chapter VI) but as they operated in practice. The essential feature of Bismarck's work was that Prussia dominated the new Empire, and that Prussia remained unchanged, ruled itself by the king, so far as he had enough strength of character to enforce his will, and by the largely noble military-bureaucratic caste. The Three-Class system of voting (see

pp. 185–7) maintained the ascendancy of the Prussian Conservatives in the elected house of the Prussian Landtag, whilst the Upper House was their preserve. Prussia had an absolute veto in the new Federal Council (*Bundesrat*) upon any constitutional change, and by her influence over the smaller states could be practically certain that no measure to which the Prussian government objected would ever become law. Further, whilst Prussia had nothing to fear from the opposition of the smaller states, their preservation in a monarchical-conservative form served to buttress the power of the Prussian king himself within the boundaries of his own state. The preamble to the constitution of 1871 makes clear the conservative nature of the new Prusso-German Empire. It does not emanate from the German people. It is a grant from the rulers of the several states. Bismarck had arranged that Prussia should not 'be dissolved' in Germany (see p. 140), particularly in a democratic Germany. The preservation of the lesser dynasties was, in itself, an insurance for the Hohenzollern kingship of Prussia.

In the new Prusso-German Empire, then, the king of Prussia remained the Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian army, and personally controlled the appointment of its general staff and superior officers. He became also in 1871, with some limitations on his control in Bavaria and the southern states, the War Lord of United Germany. The methods and discipline of the Prussian army were extended to the contingents of the other states, and the influence of the social outlook of the ruling classes in Prussia was spread over the Empire. The power to declare war and to make peace were in the Kaiser's hands and, since Prussia formed three-fifths of the Reich, none of the lesser states was likely to oppose his will. The popularly elected Reichstag had formally wide powers of legislation and budget control. But the active head of the government, the Imperial Chancellor, was not responsible to it, but to the Kaiser, and, as Minister-President of Prussia and President of the Federal Council, spoke to it with a voice of impressive authority. Divided from the first into many parties, with no clear and united majority ever likely to emerge in time of peace, the Reichstag was powerless to control policy, although it could to some degree influence it, and has been justly described as no more than 'a democratic plaster' applied to the iron structure of Prusso-Imperial government. Bismarck, in framing the Imperial constitution, had institutionalized himself. He possessed, under William I, greater power than either an American President or even an English Prime Minister. By his

services and his personal force he had made himself indispensable to William I, whom he could always bring to heel by threats of resignation. In effect, therefore, he wielded himself the great political powers of the sovereign as well as those attached to his own office. He towered over his colleagues in the Prussian Ministry, whilst the Imperial Vice-Chancellor and Secretaries of State were definitely his subordinates. All policy, domestic and foreign, was in his hands, and, apart from the wishes of the Kaiser, the sole limitation on his power was the need to maintain working majorities in the lower house of the Landtag and in the Reichstag.

There were two deep flaws in Bismarck's system. The enormous powers which he, quite literally, enjoyed as well as exercised, depended on the Kaiser's will, and either he, or a future Chancellor, might find a new Kaiser less easily controllable than William I. In that event Germany, and Europe, might be endangered if the new Kaiser's character or ability was unequal to his task. In the second place, the dominance of the Prussian army and Junker class was bound to cause a political cleavage in the Reich itself. The development of democratic ideas in the Reich and in Prussia could not fail to create a demand that the very basis of Conservative power—the Three-Class suffrage in Prussia—with its gross inequalities should be assimilated to the system of manhood suffrage granted by Bismarck himself for elections to the Reichstag. No logical justification could be found for a system in which a Prussian citizen was, in Prussia, unable to secure fair representation for his views, whilst in the Reich he could do so.

### Bismarck and the Parties

In fact, immediately the new Empire began to function, the grant of manhood suffrage and of the secret ballot gave rise to a misunderstanding and an inner conflict. His old Conservative friends in Prussia feared that Bismarck had decided to move towards Parliamentary government; his new National-Liberal allies hoped through their powerful representation in the elected house to extend the slender powers granted to the Reichstag in the constitution. Both were deceiving themselves. Bismarck was as determined as any Prussian Junker to maintain the power of the monarchy and the ruling class, but he had seen in 1866 the need to enlist the support of the wider movement for national unity represented by the National-Liberals in his task of unifying Germany, and, especially from

1866 to 1870, he was anxious to secure the support of the Liberals in the southern states. He was determined, however, to make no further concessions to liberalism. He intended to stand himself, and to keep the monarchy, above all parties, including even the Conservative parties, and to use them all, except those which he regarded as fundamentally hostile to the state, for the state's purposes. The years 1870–8, which have been regarded as Bismarck's 'liberal' period, do not, in fact, deserve the title. It is true that he relied largely on National-Liberal votes, both in the Prussian Landtag and in the Reichstag, for carrying through his domestic policy. But it was what he regarded as the factious opposition of his old Prussian supporters, their failure to understand the absolute necessity of a minimum of concession to liberalism, in order to secure the unity of Germany without sacrificing the basic conservative-monarchical institutions of Prussia, which forced him to rely more than he desired upon National-Liberal support.

*Anti-liberal Aspects of Bismarck's Policy*

Nevertheless, his policy was only superficially liberal. His attack on the Catholic Church (the *Kulturkampf*, see Chapter I, pp. 44–7) was directed against what he regarded as a political monstrosity—a political party on a religious basis. Moreover, this Catholic party, the Centre (*Zentrum*), represented every anti-Prussian force, both in external and internal affairs. As Catholic it might ally itself with the *Grossdeutsch* forces in recently defeated Austria, or with the Catholic monarchists in France. It was openly in alliance with the Poles of Prussia's eastern provinces, with the irreconcilable representatives of the newly annexed Alsace-Lorraine and with the Hanoverian legitimists who protested against Prussian annexation of their state. The attack upon Catholicism was, indeed, supported enthusiastically by the National-Liberals, with whom Falk, the Prussian Minister of Public Worship, and author of the 'May Laws' (1873), was in close touch. The National-Liberals, like Bismarck himself, were more concerned for the defence of the national state against the threat from a foreign Power contained, in their eyes, in the doctrine of Papal Infallibility, declared as an article of faith by the Vatican Council on 19 July 1870, the day France declared war on Prussia, than for truly liberal principles. A liberal party which supports exceptional measures directed against the convictions of a religious community is likely to find itself in grave difficulties when similar measures are proposed against a political party.

*From Free Trade to Protection*

Nor was Bismarck's 'free-trade' policy of these years any more truly liberal. Unversed in economic theory he had left the direction of policy in this sphere to his able assistant, Delbrück, a convinced free-trader. But, when the last duties (on iron) were about to fall, the economic situation changed. Prussian agrarians found themselves threatened by the competition of American, Canadian and Russian corn, and in 1875 German manufacturers, after the temporary boom resulting from the French indemnity, formed the Central Union of German Industrialists and began to agitate for tariffs. At the same time the United States, Russia and France all moved into the protectionist camp. All these facts weighed with Bismarck, but there were also other factors in the general political situation which decided him to adopt a protective policy.

By 1878 the *Kulturkampf* had proved a failure, and Bismarck had come to recognize this. The Centre Party was stronger than ever, and the policy of repression had only stimulated the devotion of Catholics to their Church. Moreover, the repressive policy had necessitated laws of civil marriage and school inspection which had roused strong opposition amongst the Prussian Conservatives. Bismarck had promised the Reichstag that 'we shall not go to Canossa',* but the death of the uncompromising Pius IX in 1878 and the accession of the more diplomatic Leo XIII opened a path to a compromise settlement. Bismarck beat a slow and wily retreat, but, before his fall in 1890, most of the anti-Catholic legislation of these years had been repealed.

*The Breach with the National-Liberals*

Apart from his need to end the *Kulturkampf*, Bismarck also wished to free himself from any dependence on the National-Liberals whose leader, Bennigsen, when invited to join the Prussian government in 1877, sought to bring in with himself several other prominent National-Liberals. These negotiations, carried on by Bismarck without consulting the Kaiser, earned him a sharp reprimand, but they also revealed the National-Liberals' hopes of a further approach to parliamentary government. When, therefore, a Reichstag majority in favour of protective tariffs emerged during the winter of 1877–8, consisting of Conservatives, Centre and some National-Liberals,

* The allusion was to the journey of the Emperor Henry IV in 1077 to seek absolution from Pope Gregory VII, then staying at Canossa (see pp. 71–2).

Bismarck saw the means of reconciling himself with his old friends and of dividing the National-Liberals on the tariff issue. At the same time, two attempts on the Kaiser's life in the spring and summer of 1878 gave him a further rallying cry for the Conservative forces. By pinning the responsibility for the attacks on the Social-Democratic party and demanding an anti-Socialist law for their suppression, he could still further bind the Conservatives to him and still more effectively split the Liberal forces. At the same time the Centre, essentially Conservative in its leaders—Catholic prelates, nobles and industrialists—could be gradually brought into the circle of government supporters.

*The Attack on the Socialists*

In 1878, therefore, a stringent anti-Socialist law was passed, and renewed at intervals until 1890, which sought to repress every public activity of the Social-Democratic party and of the trade unions allied with it. An attack on the rapidly increasing urban proletariat was substituted for the attack on the Catholic minority. In 1879 a law for protective tariffs was passed, at the expense of this same section, but to the advantage of the Junkers and peasant proprietors, who now began their alliance with the new industrial magnates, particularly in the heavy industries, which has had such sinister consequences for Germany and the world. One mitigation, indeed, Bismarck offered to the working classes, a system of social insurance against sickness, accident and old age, initiated by a special message from the Kaiser in 1881, and carried out in laws passed in 1883, 1884 and 1887. But, so far as their purpose was to wean the working class from Social-Democracy they failed, and the view expressed by Liebknecht that they merely represented 'the night-watchman state, the beadle state, which stands as a prison guard over the subject people' was widely shared.

*The Conservative System Established*

By 1881, then, the essential features of German government at home had been worked out in practice and, thereafter, continued unchanged, except for a brief interval under Caprivi, until 1918. Bismarck had renewed his alliance with the Prussian Conservatives, had widened the alliance by including the right-wing National-Liberals, and, in a less cordial relationship, the Centre. He had preserved his independence of all these allies, had broken the National-Liberals and induced his supporters amongst them tacitly

to abandon their remaining shred of liberalism, the demand for responsible parliamentary government. Through the controlled press and at elections the whole influence of government was thrown against the parties of the Left, whilst the Socialists had to face the provisions of the anti-Socialist law. The bureaucracy and the police, armed with powers far wider than in this country, were a further force of government repression, whilst the educational system, from the university downwards, was carefully supervised and its teachers controlled. Behind all was the alliance of the agrarians and industrialists, who supplied the members of the officers' corps, the higher bureaucracy and the directors of industry. To the interests of all these alike responsible parliamentary government spelt danger unless they could, as in England, organize a great national party, which, by a system of compromise and concession, should create a unity transcending class differences. But the Prussian Junker retained his feudal outlook and had no gifts of compromise or sympathy, and the new lords of industry, bred in the same system of ideas, extended the master-subject relationship from the farm to the factory. Commanding the Prussian Landtag they clung to an anti-parliamentary system, since they feared their own countrymen of the working class, increasingly attached to the Marxian doctrines of Social-Democracy, as well as the national minorities—Poles, Danes and Alsace-Lorrainers—of east, north and west. They found bargaining with an irresponsible Chancellor safer and more profitable for their interests than an attempt to build a majority of their countrymen into active support of the state.

## The National Minorities

### *The Poles*

The tension inherent in this situation inside Germany was increased by Bismarck's policy towards the national minorities within the Empire—the Poles on the east, the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine on the west. The abandonment of the attack on the Catholic Church involved no relaxation of Bismarck's policy of repression towards Polish political aspirations, and in 1886 he adopted the idea of 'internal colonization' of the Polish provinces by a process of land purchase by the Prussian state, for which 100 million Reichsmarks were allotted, and of the settlement of Germans on the lands purchased from Polish ownership. The results were disappointing, for the German settlers were not of the highest quality and some married

Polish wives and their children became Polonized. But, in addition, the Poles were stirred to greater activity in self-defence and began to organize co-operative societies and to develop a greater consciousness of their separate nationality.

*Alsace-Lorraine*

In Alsace-Lorraine Bismarck's policy was equally unsuccessful. The annexed provinces were given a special constitutional status as a 'Reichsland' directly under the authority of the Kaiser, represented by his Viceroy (*Statthalter*) at Strasbourg. But, despite early efforts at conciliation, such as the revival of Strasbourg University (1872), the attachment of the provinces to France continued to be strong and when, in 1874, they were allowed representation in the Reichstag they sent a *bloc* of fifteen deputies who had to be added to the other irreconcilable groups, the Poles and Social-Democrats, to whom the German Empire in its existing form was, for national or social reasons, unacceptable.

*The Danes of Schleswig*

Bismarck's treatment of the Danes of Schleswig was no more tactful. The plebiscite provided for in the Treaty of Prague, by which the Danes of North Schleswig were to be given an opportunity of deciding their own fate, was never held, and release from the obligation to hold it was one of Bismarck's conditions in the alliance made with Austria in 1879 (see p. 198). The Danish 'optants', who had the right to choose Danish citizenship, were forced to do military service in the Prussian army or to leave the country, and the Danish language was steadily displaced by German in the schools. Though the Danes of Schleswig presented no military danger to the Empire, his treatment of them remained a moral stigma on Bismarck's policy. Wherever, on its frontiers, the German Empire included non-Germans there were harshness and repression on the one side, discontent and hostility on the other.

## Effects of Bismarck's System on the Parties

The results of Bismarck's determined opposition to any extension of parliamentary government in the new Empire, or in Prussia, were serious. The parties, deprived of any responsibility for the policy of the state or of any opportunity of learning by experience the art of government, increasingly became mere interest groups,

whose main function was to exert pressure on the Chancellor on behalf of the sections of opinion which they represented. The Conservatives, and to a lesser extent the Free Conservatives, represented agrarian interests; the National-Liberals, 'big business'; the Left Liberals, the professions and those in commerce who were in favour of free trade; the Centre, the defence of Catholicism; the Social-Democrats, the interests of the working class. As a result the parties considered every question rather from the angle of tactical advantages for themselves than from that of the national welfare as a whole.

Moreover, the divorce of the parties from the practical work of government helped to strengthen the grip of the central Party Committees, consisting of the established leaders, over their followers, since new talent for the task of administration was not required. The unreality of party strife under Bismarck's system compared with that of a country like our own in which the fate of the government is at stake, encouraged the German tendency to regard each political party as an expression of a *Weltanschauung* (philosophy of life), and to insist on its separateness from all other parties.

Even Bismarck found his system difficult to work. After 1879 he was able to rely on the steady support of the Conservatives and National-Liberals, but the Centre, still smarting from the *Kulturkampf*, was never a reliable ally, and the Left Liberals still hoped that the Crown Prince Frederick would admit the principle of parliamentary government when he succeeded to the throne. But, by appeals to patriotism, as after the attempts on the Kaiser's life (1878) or over the danger of a French attack (1887), Bismarck was able to maintain a majority for his measures. And, at the worst, he was prepared to consider more drastic steps towards reaction such as he recommended to the young Kaiser in the early months of 1890 (see p. 202).

## Bismarck's Conservative Foreign Policy

### *Basic Ideas*

Whilst Bismarck was moulding the internal forces of the new Empire into the conservative pattern just described, he was also engaged in the task of guiding the Empire in its external relations. Here, too, he started from an essentially conservative outlook in two senses. Not only was he anxious to secure the support of the Russian and Austrian Empires, both representing the autocratic principle, but, having accomplished German unity, he regarded the German

Empire as a 'satiated state' which must refrain from adventures and devote its energies to the task of conserving the territories and the position it had won.

Above everything, therefore, Bismarck aimed at preventing any coalition of states which might threaten his creation. To this end he set out to isolate France, where dreams of revenge for 1870 were bound to arise, and to draw both Russia and Austria into the German orbit. Since, at first, he steadily refused to consider a policy of colonial expansion it was possible to remain on good terms with England and to divert France from the idea of recovering the lost provinces by encouraging her colonial aspirations in Indo-China and Africa.

These basic ideas of foreign policy were not consistently followed out by Bismarck himself, for the logic of events was too strong for him. The idea of a conservative Three Emperors' League (*Dreikaiserbund*) was given some substance, but no documentary form, by conversations in 1872 in Berlin between the three rulers and their Foreign Ministers, and later on, in 1881, it took written form in a treaty between the three empires, by which Russia's special interest in Bulgaria was recognized and Austria's in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The treaty also provided for the benevolent neutrality of the other partners if one of the three was attacked by a fourth Power.

*French Revival after* 1871

But, before the agreement of 1881, two events had shown the difficulty of isolating France effectually, and of persuading Russia and Austria to work together. The rapid recovery of France after 1871, the payment of the indemnity (1873) and the consequent withdrawal of the German troops of occupation, were followed by provocative articles in the French press which led both Moltke and Bismarck to think of a preventive war. But, when a kite was flown in the Berlin *Post* in April 1875, by an article headed, 'Is war in sight?', both Queen Victoria and the Czar intervened personally with Emperor William and, the war scare having died down, the Russian Foreign Minister, Gortchakoff, issued a despatch to all the Russian legations in Europe saying, 'Maintenant la paix est assurée', implying both that Bismarck had desired war and that he had been prevented by Russian intervention from carrying out his designs. The incident showed clearly that France's isolation was only relative, and that Russian policy was set against further Prusso-German aggrandisement.

*Germany and Russia*

Further, Bismarck's attempt to act 'the honest broker' at the Congress of Berlin (1878) brought upon him and upon Germany the resentment of the Czar and of wide circles in Russia, to whom it seemed that his influence was exerted almost wholly on the Austrian side. The painful necessity to give up, under pressure from England and Austria and with little or no help from Bismarck, some of the gains won from Turkey by the Treaty of San Stefano (1877) was regarded by Russia as a poor return for her benevolent neutrality towards Prussia in 1866 and 1870–1. So strongly did the Czar express himself that, in 1879, Bismarck opened negotiations for a defensive alliance with Austria and, by threats of resignation, forced William I to accept this alliance in October 1879. The existence of the treaty became known in Russia before the end of the year, and the old relationship of confidence between Russia and Germany was never fully re-established. The *Dreikaiserbund* of 1881 represented a *détente* between the three empires, but, though renewed in 1884, it failed to prevent an acute crisis in 1885–6, when Russia's Bulgarian protégés attacked the Serbs, then under Austrian protection, and was not renewed again in 1887. The rivalry between Russia and Austria in the Balkans was too acute for Bismarck's idea of the alliance of the three conservative Powers to retain much vitality, for movements of nationalist sentiment—Pan-Slavism *v.* Pan-Germanism—were beginning to appear. He was, indeed, able to 'keep the wire open' to St Petersburg by his so-called 'Reinsurance Treaty' of 1887. But that treaty was extremely difficult to reconcile with Germany's obligations to Austria and was kept strictly secret, whilst its limited effectiveness was shown, before Bismarck's fall, by the first steps, in the form of loans and sale of rifles, to a rapprochement between Russia and France. Despite all his skill Bismarck's nightmare of a coalition hostile to Germany was beginning to acquire form and substance.

*Formation of the Triple Alliance*

As against the increasing difficulty of keeping both Russia and Austria in alliance with Germany, Bismarck could set the widening of the Austro-German Alliance into the Triple Alliance by the inclusion of Italy (1882), and also the Austro-Roumanian Treaty of 1883, to which Germany acceded in the same year. But both treaties tended to drive Russia and France still more into each other's arms, and the value of Italy's signature depended largely on the maintenance of

good relations with England, for it was qualified by a Mediterranean agreement (1887) between Italy, Austria and Great Britain, and by the firm determination of every Italian Foreign Minister before Mussolini to risk no action which might entail a conflict with British naval power.

## The Beginnings of Expansionism

### *Bismarck and the Colonial Question*

If Bismarck's union of conservative Powers and his attempt to isolate France proved difficult to accomplish, he himself began to abandon his basic principle that the German Empire was a 'satiated' Power during the eighties, and entered into the competition for colonial expansion in Africa and the Pacific which made more difficult his own, and his successors', task of preventing combinations hostile to Germany. As late as 1880 Prince Hohenlohe, then Statthalter of Alsace-Lorraine, after a conversation with Bismarck wrote: 'Now, as before, he will not hear of colonies. He says we have not an adequate fleet to protect them. He also spoke of my report on the French designs on Morocco, and declared that we could only be pleased if France took possession of the country.' In accordance with this policy Bismarck encouraged the French declaration of a protectorate over Tunis (May 1881), which had the further advantage from his point of view of embroiling France with Italy, and was equally benevolent towards the British intervention in Egypt (1882) which ultimately led to the establishment of British control. But there were forces developing in Germany, such as those which founded the German Colonial League in 1882, which led Bismarck to change his views radically in the next few years. The rapid process of the partitioning of Africa, and the claims of German explorers, missionaries, and merchant-traders for government backing, raised the question whether Germany ought not to claim her share of the spoils. At the same time, German overseas emigration, which had been very small in the seventies, was increasing rapidly until, in one year, 220,000 Germans passed under foreign jurisdiction. In response to these facts Bismarck changed his attitude. In 1882 he gave a pledge to Lüderitz, a Bremen merchant imperialist, of government support in what was to become German South-West Africa, and, as a result, Lüderitz and his colleagues acquired, by treaties with the native chiefs, rights over most of the coast between Portuguese West Africa and Cape Colony during the next two years.

*The German Colonial Empire* (Figs. 42, 43)

Between 1884 and 1890, when Bismarck fell, the bulk of the German colonial empire had been acquired. German South-West Africa, Togoland and the Cameroons were all annexed in 1884, and the Marshall, Brown and some of the Solomon Islands in 1885. In that year also, acting in agreement with France, a conference was held in Berlin which placed the whole of the Congo basin in the





Fig. 42. German colonies in Africa, 1914

B=Basutoland (British Protectorate); F.P.=Fernando Po (Sp.); K=Kabinda (Port.); P=Pemba (Brit.); R.M.=Rio Muni (Sp.); S.T.=São Thomé (Port.); Sw.=Swaziland (British Protectorate); W.B.=Walfish Bay (Brit.); Z.=Zanzibar (Brit.).

Note the change in the boundary of the Cameroons in 1908.

hands of the African International Association, created by King Leopold of Belgium, as the Congo Free State, and thwarted British ambitions for control of the mouth of the Congo. Again, in 1885, an agreement with England recognized German sovereignty over a large part of New Guinea (Kaiser Wilhelm's Land) and over the Bismarck Archipelago in the Pacific. Finally, the conversations which

led to the agreement with regard to German East Africa (Tanganyika), concluded by Caprivi in July 1890, had been begun before Bismarck's fall.

This rapid expansion overseas had not been accomplished without a severe strain on Anglo-German relations. British governments resented, somewhat unreasonably, the appearance of a new rival; the Australians felt bitterly the absorption by Germany of the islands off their coasts. The new policy was a flat contradiction of Bismarck's earlier principles. It marked the vigorous beginning of a new German expansionist movement. But, in one fundamental respect, Bismarck





Fig. 43. German colonies in the Pacific, 1914

Only German colonies are named.

set bounds to German ambitions. He took no steps to construct a fleet capable of being a challenge to British naval supremacy, and there can be no doubt, from many of his utterances, that he would have refused to engage in war on a colonial question. The difficulties of Germany's European position were too constantly in his mind. Nor should it be forgotten that it was Bismarck who said: 'The most important political fact in the modern world is that the British and Americans speak the same language.' It is possible that the bitter experience of two great wars may at length convince Bismarck's successors of the truth of his remark.

## Bismarck's Fall

### *The Accession of William II*

The death of the aged Emperor William I in 1888, and of his son and successor Frederick III in the same year, brought to the throne Frederick's son, William II, then 29 years old. Vain, romantic, versatile, self-willed, rash in utterance, alternating between excessive self-confidence and nervous depression, William II had qualities strongly reminiscent of his great-uncle Frederick William IV, and his character exercised a powerful influence on events. For he loved the *métier du roi*, and, without that capacity for unremitting toil and close attention to affairs which had made Frederick II 'the Great', he was determined to enforce his will and to see that his Chancellor obeyed it. Bismarck, now over 70, accustomed to regard himself as indispensable and to be the controller and initiator of policy, was unlikely to fit easily into the new situation.

### *William II's Breach with Bismarck*

After a brief 'honeymoon', during which the new Kaiser paid a round of visits, difficulties began to emerge during the winter of 1889–90. There were those in the Kaiser's entourage who whispered that the real issue was whether the Bismarck dynasty, or the Hohenzollern, was to rule Germany. And, at bottom, the issue was that of the final control of policy. The immediate cause of the breach was that the Kaiser wished to pursue a policy of social reform and conciliation, whilst Bismarck urged upon him a policy of conservative resistance and, if necessary, an open breach with the constitution of 1871, a concerted declaration by the rulers of the German states abolishing universal suffrage, and the promulgation of a new constitution with a great reduction in the rights of the Reichstag. It is difficult to decide how seriously Bismarck meant his proposals to be taken, but their effect was to reveal sharply the underlying issue. Was the Kaiser or the Chancellor to control policy? When William, to assert his authority, demanded the abrogation of a Prussian Cabinet Order of 1852, which gave the Prussian Minister-President the right to be present at any audience between the king and another minister, the naked issue appeared. In face of Bismarck's resistance the Kaiser demanded his resignation and, on 18 March 1890, the great Chancellor resigned. The critical moment in the history of the Prusso-German Empire had arrived, and the famous *Punch* cartoon 'Dropping the Pilot' indicated its nature.

*Bismarck's Legacy*

So long as Bismarck was Chancellor the Prusso-German Empire had had unity of direction, for he had dominated the Kaiser, the soldiers, the Prussian Ministers and bureaucrats, the rulers of the lesser states and the Reichstag alike. Now control was to pass into the young Kaiser's inexperienced hands, and the new ruler's instability of mind and temperament made it probable that he would neither show Bismarck's wisdom nor be able to provide the coherence in policy and control of affairs which the great Chancellor's personality had enforced.

Moreover, the legacy Bismarck left was a difficult one. At home and abroad he had acted on the principle 'divide and rule'. But, abroad, the outline of a coalition against Germany was beginning to take shape, and he had by his colonial policy whetted German desires for expansion. And at home, though the internal divisions of party, nationality, creed, class, and local loyalties remained unhealed, a great industrial development was in progress which gave new force and urgency to the desire for expansion but also sharpened the social antagonisms within the state. Before the reign of William II is reviewed it is necessary to consider the background of economic expansion which profoundly affected Germany's policy in the years before 1914.

## GERMANY'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1871–1914

### The New Empire

Between 1871 and 1914 the development of industrial capitalism in Germany, the beginnings of which have already been described (see pp. 165-85), proceeded with such rapidity that she caught up and, in certain spheres, passed countries like Great Britain, where the industrial revolution had begun earlier. A very rapid growth in population assisted this development by providing the necessary 'hands' for industry. Whereas, in 1871, Germany's population was 41 million, it had, by 1915, increased to nearly 68 million, whilst that of France, which, then including Alsace-Lorraine, had been larger than that of Germany before 1870, had only reached 40 million on the eve of the war of 1914–18. This rapidly expanding population, of whom, in 1915, one-third were under fifteen, produced in Germany a sense of the need for an equally rapid and continuous expansion in new markets to meet the increasing production of German industry.

The establishment of the German Empire, in 1871, contributed to this rapid expansion. For the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine provided large new iron-ore deposits, which could be worked in conjunction with the existing heavy industry of the Ruhr and Saar basin and with a flourishing cotton industry, whilst, in the nineties, the valuable potash deposits of Alsace were discovered and began to be developed.

The political unity achieved in 1871 also produced effects which encouraged economic expansion. The unified customs administration, post office and consular service all contributed to stimulate economic activity. The chaotic systems of currency and of weights and measures were swept away; the *Thaler* and *Gulden* gave place to the *Mark*, and the metric system of weights and measures was adopted. Although the system of taxation under the Federal government left direct taxes to the individual states, and special privileges to some of them, the Imperial control of tariff policy was a most important factor in German trade expansion, and, before 1914, the Imperial government had acquired, to meet its increasing needs for the armament programme, a share in the estate taxes and, in 1913, a special 'defence contribution' from the whole country.

The late date at which the great development of German industry took place enabled her manufacturers to profit by the experience, and mistakes, of their rivals in other countries. Veblen has pointed out that Germany was 'not committed to antiquated sites and routes for its industrial plant', and that 'having no obsolescent equipment and no out-of-date trade connections', her directors of industry 'were also free to take over the processes of the new industry at their best and highest efficiency, rather than content themselves with compromises between the best equipment known and what used to be the best a few years or a few decades ago'.

The immediate results of the victory over France in 1871 were not wholly favourable. Germany obtained an indemnity of £200,000,000 after the war, and, as she contemplated the adoption of the gold standard for her currency, she added to her reserves that part of the indemnity which was paid in gold. But the receipt of the indemnity accentuated a tendency to speculate which was to be expected in a people enthusiastic over their victories and newly-won unity. There was an unhealthy boom in 1873–4, particularly in railway construction and the heavy industries. When the crash came, 160 out of 857 recently founded companies failed, and agriculture and industry both remained depressed throughout the seventies. Then, assisted to some

extent by the higher tariff of 1879, German industries revived so that within a quarter of a century Germany had become the leading manufacturing state on the continent and competed successfully with Britain in various overseas markets.

## The Heavy Industries (Coal, Iron and Steel)

### *Coal Production*

The exploitation of Germany's coal resources was one of the foundations of the country's industrial strength. In 1871 production was less than 38 million tons of coal and lignite as against Britain's 118 million tons of coal. But in 1913 Germany produced 279 million tons of coal while Britain produced 292 million tons. The

*Coal mining in Germany and Britain*, 1871–1913

| | Germany | | Great Britain |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Output of coal and lignite (tons) | Number of miners | Output of coal (tons) |
| 1871 | 37,900,000 | 125,000 | 118,000,000 |
| 1880 | 59,100,000 | 179,000 | 149,000,000 |
| 1890 | 89,100,000 | 262,000 | 184,000,000 |
| 1900 | 149,800,000 | 414,000 | 228,800,000 |
| 1910 | 192,300,000 | 621,000 | 268,700,000 |
| 1913 | 279,000,000 | 689,000 | 292,000,000 |

Sources: Columns 1 and 3—Clapham, Sir J. H., *The Economic Development of France and Germany*, p. 281 (Cambridge, 1928). Column 2—Baumont, M., *La Grosse Industrie allemande et le Charbon*, p. 528 (Paris, 1928).

production came mainly from four coalfields: the Ruhr, the Saar, Lorraine and Upper Silesia. The Ruhr was the most important, its production rising from rather less than half of the total German production in 1860 to more than 60% in the present century. It supplied coal and coke to the iron and steel industries

*Coal Production of the four main German Coalfields in* 1910–13
(*metric tons*)

| | Ruhr | Upper Silesia | Saar* | Alsace-Lorraine |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1910 | 89,315,000 | 34,461,000 | 10,823,000 | 2,686,000 |
| 1911 | 93,800,000 | 36,623,000 | 11,459,000 | 3,033,000 |
| 1912 | 103,093,000 | 41,543,000 | 11,663,000 | 3,539,000 |
| 1913 | 114,487,000 | 43,801,000 | 12,223,000 | 3,796,000 |

* That part of the Saar in Prussia.

Source: Baumont, M., *La Grosse Industrie allemande et le Charbon*, p. 36 (Paris, 1928).

of Westphalia, the Rhineland, Lorraine, Belgium, Luxembourg and northern France. The coal handled at the river ports of Duisburg and Ruhrort increased from 1,640,000 tons in 1870 to 18,262,000 in 1913.

Since the great expansion of the German coal industry occurred so late in comparison with that of Britain, large units of production were established using up-to-date methods. As early as 1895 the average coal-mining concern employed no fewer than 500 men. In the early years of the present century Germany exported coal to France, Belgium, Holland and Switzerland, though she still imported it from Britain and Austria.

*The Ruhr—Iron and Steel*

The Ruhr was the chief centre not only of Germany's coal mining but also of her iron and steel industries. By 1900 half of her pig iron was produced in this area, 30% in Lorraine and Luxembourg and 15% in Silesia and the Saar. But the allied trades—the manufacture of tools, machines, engines and so forth—were more dispersed. The annexation of Lorraine gave Germany great deposits of *minette* iron ores, the extent of which was not at first fully known. The boom in the iron trades in the early seventies was followed by a collapse, and by 1876 nearly half of Germany's 435 blast furnaces were idle. But revival came with the introduction of the Thomas Gilchrist process for making steel from phosphoric ores, which were plentiful in Lorraine and Luxembourg, and the eighties saw a vast increase in Germany's iron and steel production. Between 1880 and 1890 her pig-iron and steel production increased from 2,729,000 to 4,658,500 tons, and her steel output rose from 1,548,000 to 3,164,000 tons. The German ironmasters and metal manufacturers learned much from their British rivals. They paid careful attention to the problem of the location of their plants, and they appreciated the importance of concentration in their industry. Collieries, furnaces and engineering works began to come under united control in the nineties, and great iron and steel works were established by the combination of small firms. By 1910 Germany had outdistanced Britain and her continental rivals with an output of 14,794,000 tons of pig iron and 13,149,000 tons of steel, and, despite the ore of Lorraine, did not produce all the iron ore that her industries needed: nearly 10 million tons were imported, of which one-third came from Sweden. The establishment of great shipbuilding industries at Hamburg, Bremen and Stettin was but one aspect of the remarkable progress of the iron and steel industries of which the manufacture of armaments

of all kinds was another not less important. In addition, a great variety of iron and steel goods were exported from Germany, their value in 1913 being over £100,000,000.

*Output of German Pig Iron and Steel*, 1880–1938 (*metric tons*)

| | Pig iron | Steel | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1880 | 2,729,000 | 1,548,000 | Including Luxembourg |
| 1890 | 4,658,500 | 3,164,000 | |
| 1900 | 8,521,000 | 7,372,000 | |
| 1910 | 14,794,000 | 13,149,000 | |
| 1929 | 13,190,000 | 15,990,000 | Frontiers of 1919 |
| 1933 | 5,180,000 | 7,440,000 | |
| 1938 | 18,497,000 | 23,219,000 | |

Sources : Clapham, Sir J. H., *The Economic Development of France and Germany*, p. 285 (Cambridge, 1928); Levy, H., *Industrial Germany*, p. 46 (Cambridge, 1935); *League of Nations Statistical Yearbook*, 1938–9, pp. 146–7 (Geneva, 1939).

N.B. 1880–1910 figures include Luxembourg (in German customs union); 1929–33 figures include territory of 1919 (excluding Saar); 1938 figures are for Greater Germany (including Saar and Austria, but not Sudetenland).

## Chemical and Electrical Industries

Two new groups of manufactures had an important place in Germany's economic structure—the chemical and electrical industries. As early as 1840 Dr John Bowring, in a report on the Zollverein, had observed that in Germany 'chemical knowledge in its various branches is further advanced than with us'. In the sixties the crude potassium salts of Stassfurt-Leopoldshall (south of Magdeburg) began to be systematically exploited. The basic (heavy) chemical industry produced chemicals in bulk partly for manufacturing purposes, including munitions, and partly for agriculture (artificial manures). Intensive scientific research—particularly into the utilization of coal by-products—paved the way for the development of the fine (light) chemical industry of which the two main branches were the preparation of dyes and pharmaceutical products. The products of the German dye industry achieved world-wide fame, and the value of the exports was nearly £10,000,000 in 1913. The manufactures of the pharmaceutical industry also had a high reputation. The chemical industries employed some 150,000 workpeople in 1903. The great chemical concerns co-operated even in the early stages of the industry. Two important 'communities of interest' were formed in 1904 and united in 1916, and subsequently the I.G. Farben (*Interessengemeinschaft Farbenindustrie Aktiengesellschaft*) cartel was established which dominated the whole industry.

The German electrical industry sprang up in the eighties and nineties. German experiments and inventions—particularly those of Werner von Siemens—helped to lay the foundations of the industry, but it was the practical application of electrical inventions in America that inspired German manufacturers to exploit the new form of light and energy. As in the chemical industries the establishment of large concerns was, almost from the first, a feature of the electrical industry. This was accentuated by the necessity for reviving the industry after the depression of 1900–2. On the eve of the war of 1914–18 two concerns—founded by Werner von Siemens and Emil Rathenau—were in a dominant position. They were Siemens and Halske (Berlin-Nuremberg) and the A.E.G. (*Allgemeine Elektrizitäts Gesellschaft*) which had developed from the German Edison Company. The installation of telegraphs and telephones was an important feature of the early phase of the industry. Next came cables, electric lighting and electric trams; then electric trains, power-generating stations and wireless. By the beginning of the twentieth century the two main branches of the industry had developed—'electrical engineering' (the manufacture of generators and other apparatus and the installation of electrical plant) and electricity (the electrification of railways, furnaces and machinery and the maintenance of power plants and power-transmission systems). In 1906–7 the industry employed 107,000 workpeople. A few years later (1913) half of the world's trade in electro-technical products was in German hands. 'Beyond question the creation of this industry was the greatest single industrial achievement of modern Germany'.

## Textile Industries

German textile industries also made considerable progress. With the rapid growth of population she became increasingly dependent on imported wool, despite some increase in home production after 1850. In 1880 home-produced wool supplied two-thirds of the wool used, but, by 1910, it represented a much smaller proportion. 'No great nation', it has been said, 'was so dependent on the outside world for the raw material of its warm clothing'.

Domestic workers in the textile industries declined rapidly, and by 1895 only 28,000 out of a total of 153,000 weavers were in this class, whilst four-fifths of the spinners were in large factories with an average of over 200 workers in each. The woollen industries were widely dispersed—in Saxony, Silesia, Thuringia, Alsace, Berlin,

Aachen—but the production units increased in size and declined in numbers.

*Number of Factories and Workers in the German Woollen Industry*, 1882–1925

| | Factories | Workers |
|---|---|---|
| 1882 | 48,200 | 206,400 |
| 1895 | 37,900 | 269,900 |
| 1907 | 17,300 | 227,700 |
| 1925* | 10,900 | 215,000 |

* Frontiers of 1919.

Source: *Deutsche Wirtschaft*, 1928, p. 154 (issued by the *Statistisches Reichsamt*, Berlin, 1930).

The linen and cotton industries displayed the same characteristics, dependence on imported raw material, the steady elimination of domestic workers and the creation of large modern factories. The competition of the cotton industry acquired by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine hastened the process. By 1895 there were 304 large cotton-spinning firms employing nearly 70,000 persons, whilst the consumption of raw cotton rose from 37,500 tons in 1878 to 370,000 tons in the early years of this century. The industry was concentrated mainly in the Rhineland, Westphalia, Saxony, Silesia and southern Germany, including Alsace.

## Growth of Industrial Organization

Two distinctive features of Germany's modern industrial development deserve notice—the growth of cartels and the unusually close connection between banks and industry.

Cartels are federations of businesses, 'the functions of which are to control the prices, the amounts produced and the methods of marketing of its various members; and in some cases to conduct their marketing for them'. Cartels may be either 'horizontal' or 'vertical'. The former is a federation of firms producing the same material or goods; the latter is an association of businesses engaged in different stages of the production from the raw material to the finished article. A union of firms operating steel works is a horizontal cartel; an association of firms owning collieries, iron and steel works, and machine-building plants is a vertical cartel.

Attempts to ascribe the development of cartels to uniform causes are unsatisfactory. Many factors promoted their establishment. Some combinations were formed when trade was bad, since a large

production unit might weather the storm more successfully than several small firms. Others developed under the protection of a tariff, for joint action might enable a number of firms to utilize to the full (in the home market) the advantages conferred by import duties. The possession of a natural monopoly—such as the production of potash—might also favour industrial combination. In foreign as well as home markets this situation could best be exploited by large firms. In the new electrical and chemical industries adequate capital to meet the heavy initial expenditure on experimental research could be raised more easily by big concerns than by small firms.

*Growth of Cartels after* 1873

There were some early industrial combinations in the Zollverein era, but it was after the crisis of 1873 that important cartels began to be established. Their development was fostered by the protective duties of 1879, and the Cartel Commission of 1905 enumerated 352 industrial combinations whilst, twenty years later, it was estimated that there were 3,000 German cartels.

What is significant is that in all the manufactures connected with the extractive industries and trades depending upon mineral production a few great cartels achieved a dominant position. Among the monopolist combines were the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, the Steel Union, the *I.G. Farben Industrie* and the *A.E.G.* In Germany cartels received legal protection, their agreements being treated by the law in the same way as other private contracts. Elsewhere monopolistic industrial combinations were often viewed with strong suspicion. In Britain agreements 'in restraint of trade' were not legally enforceable, and in the United States anti-trust laws were passed.

*The Banks and Industry*

The growth of the size of units of industrial production and the formation of cartels accentuated that unusually close relation between banking and industry which had already been a feature of Germany's economic development in the days of the Zollverein. By the early years of the twentieth century there were some twenty-five important business (non-issuing) banks. The four great 'D Banks'—the *Darmstädter Bank* (1853), *Diskontogesellschaft* (1856), *Deutsche Bank* (1870) and *Dresden Bank* (1872)—gradually absorbed many of their rivals. The joint-stock banks lent money on personal security and goods. Above all, they helped to float companies and gave such long credits

that they were generally partners in the firms concerned. They had representatives on companies' boards of directors and so helped to mould industrial policy, and they encouraged the formation of cartels so as to protect from competition firms to which they had given credit.

German banks also played an important part in fostering foreign trade. Branches of subsidiary banks were set up in important centres all over the world. The banks were also pioneers in promoting German economic expansion in backward areas—particularly in the Near East, South America and the Far East, and in all these activities were in close touch with the government. The financial side of Germany's *Drang nach Osten* was, in no small measure, in the hands of the *Deutsche Orientbank*, which had branches in Turkey, Egypt and Morocco. The *Deutsch-Asiatische Bank* (1889) promoted German interests in Shantung and elsewhere in China. The *Deutsche Übersee Bank* and the *Deutsch-Südamerikanische Bank* were active in Latin America. But it proved to be difficult to secure financial support from German banks for enterprises in Germany's own colonies.

## Foreign Trade

The vast development of Germany's industries was accompanied by a great increase in her foreign trade. Between 1872 and 1914 the value of her imports rose from £173,250,000 to £538,515,000 and of her exports from £124,600,000 to £504,825,000. She imported foodstuffs (e.g. meat, dairy produce, coffee) and raw materials (e.g. wool, cotton) and exported a great variety of manufactured goods. Three important changes in Germany's foreign trade in the years 1871–1914 deserve notice. First the export of finished industrial products held an increasingly important place in her foreign commerce.

*Value of Germany's Foreign Trade*, 1860–1913 (£)
(*excluding re-exports and the precious metals*)

| | Exports | Imports |
|---|---|---|
| 1860 | 70,000,000 | 54,750,000 |
| 1872 | 124,600,000 | 173,250,000 |
| 1880 | 148,850,000 | 142,200,000 |
| 1890 | 170,500,000 | 213,650,000 |
| 1900 | 237,650,000 | 302,150,000 |
| 1910 | 373,735,000 | 446,705,000 |
| 1913 | 504,825,000 | 538,515,000 |

Sources: The figures for 1860 are taken from Dawson, W. H., *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, p. 64 (London, 1911); the figures for 1872–1913 are from Stolper, G., *German Economy* 1870–1940, p. 52 (London, 1940).

Between 1873 and 1913 they rose from 38 to 63% of Germany's total exports. Secondly, Germany's trade outside Europe became increasingly important. In 1889 her trade with European countries accounted for nearly 80% of her exports and over 77% of her imports. In 1912 trade with European countries still claimed nearly three-quarters of Germany's total exports, but her imports from Europe amounted to only 56·2% of her total imports. Thirdly, the balance of payments of Germany's foreign trade became increasingly passive. At the beginning of the twentieth century the value of her exports was £60,000,000 a year less than her imports. This deficit was covered by payments received from foreigners for German shipping services and by interest paid on German investments abroad which amounted to between £1,000,000,000 and £1,250,000,000 in 1914. Germany's foreign investments, however, amounted to only one-tenth of her total investments in 1906–10, whereas Britain's foreign investments in those years were three-quarters of her total investments.

### Communications and Mercantile Marine

The great expansion of Germany's internal and external trade owed much to the development of communications. Bismarck failed in his effort to transfer the German railways to the Reich, but he gradually brought many private lines under the control of the Prussian state. Some of them—such as the *Ludwigsbahn* in Hesse–Darmstadt—lay outside Prussia. In 1910 there were 35,000 miles of railways in Germany, of which 23,350 miles belonged to Prussia and 10,625 to Bavaria and other large states. The railways were effectively run at a profit. The Imperial Railway Office, established in 1873, unified railway rates throughout the country. It was a simple matter for the Weimar Republic to nationalize the whole railway system.

Between a fifth and a quarter of Germany's goods traffic was carried by the inland waterways. Among the more important commodities transported by water were grain and timber in eastern Germany and coal and iron in Westphalia and the Rhineland. Two important new canals were constructed—the Kiel Canal, completed and opened by June 1895, and the Dortmund-Ems Canal (which gave the Ruhr industrial region access by water to the North Sea without crossing Dutch territory). These inland waterways were run at a loss and were subsidized by the state. In 1905 work was begun on the Mittelland Canal which was to join the Dortmund-Ems Canal to the River Elbe.

*Growth of Shipping*

After 1871 an increasing proportion of Germany's overseas trade was carried in her own ships. When the Empire was founded Germany had 4,519 merchant vessels (982,355 tons), nearly all of which were sailing ships. The growth of the German mercantile marine was particularly marked after Hamburg and Bremen joined the Imperial customs system in the eighties. The steamships of Hamburg increased from 99,000 tons in 1880 to 746,000 in 1900, and those of Bremen from 59,000 to 375,000. By 1914 Germany, with 3,000,000 tons of shipping (four-fifths of which belonged to Hamburg and Bremen lines), had a larger mercantile marine than any other Power except Britain (11,700,000 tons). The three biggest shipping companies were the Hamburg-America Line, the North German Lloyd and the Hansa. In 1913 the Hamburg-America Line had a fleet of 172 steamships (1,028,762 tons), and a further nineteen steamships (268,766 tons) were being built. Profits in the years

*Mercantile Marines of Germany, Britain and the United States*

| | | 1870 | 1900 | 1910–12 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Germany | *t* | 982,000 | 1,942,000 | 3,000,000 |
| | *s* | 82,000 | 1,348,000 | 2,500,000 |
| Britain | *t* | 5,601,000 | 9,304,000 | 11,700,000 |
| | *s* | 1,113,000 | 7,208,000 | 10,700,000 |
| United States | *t* | 1,517,000 | 827,000 | 928,000 |
| | *s* | 193,000 | 341,000 | 618,000 |

*t*=total tonnage; *s*=steam tonnage.

Sources: Clapham, Sir J. H., *The Economic Development of France and Germany*, p. 356 (Cambridge, 1928), which cites for the German figures the parliamentary return Cd 329 of 1902; and the *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, 1913, p. 46 (Berlin, 1914), which gives the figures for 1913.

1886–1913 had amounted to over £26,000,000, and the average dividend had been 7% per annum. Two companies which were actively engaged in trade with the colonies were the Woermann Line and the German East Africa Company (both of Hamburg). Other important shipping lines were the German-Australia Steamship Company, the German Levant Line and the German-American Petroleum Company. A great shipbuilding industry developed in Germany, the Vulkan yard of Stettin and that of Blohm and Voss of Hamburg being of special significance.

## The German Colonial Empire

The expansion of her manufactures, overseas commerce and shipping made it natural that Germany, like other great industrial states, should endeavour to consolidate her position as a World Power by establishing a colonial Empire. But she was late in entering the field, and Bismarck's acquisitions (see p. 200) remained the core of her colonial Empire until she lost it in 1918. In 1914, Germany's colonies were rather more than a million square miles in area and had an estimated population of between twelve and fourteen millions.

*Colonial Empires in* 1913

| | Area (sq. km.) | Population |
|---|---|---|
| Germany | 2,950,000 | 12,000,000 |
| Britain | 33,000,000* | 400,000,000 |
| France | 11,500,000 | 56,000,000 |
| Holland | 2,000,000 | 38,000,000 |
| Belgium | 2,400,000 | 15,500,000 |
| Portugal | 2,100,000 | 7,000,000 |
| Japan | 300,000† | 17,000,000 |
| U.S.A. | 324,000 | 10,000,000 |
| Italy | 1,500,000 | 1,600,000 |
| Spain | 250,000 | 700,000 |

* Including Egypt and Sudan. † Including Korea.

Source: Leutwein, P., *Dreissig Jahre deutsche Kolonial-politik*, p. 399 (Berlin, 1922).

### *Colonial Ambitions*

Germany held her colonies for only thirty years and so had hardly sufficient time to develop them successfully. The economic resources of the overseas territories and the purchasing power of their native inhabitants proved to be inconsiderable. The rubber of the Cameroons, the sisal-hemp of East Africa, the diamonds of South-West Africa, the phosphates of Nauru and the copra of Samoa were no adequate return for the cost of conquering and maintaining the Empire. Attempts to encourage the large-scale production of cotton, cocoa and tobacco in the African colonies achieved only a very modest measure of success. None of the principal African colonies balanced its budget, and up to 1913 colonial budget deficits cost the German taxpayer about £50,000,000. Germany's colonial trade on the eve of the war of 1914–18 amounted to a mere half of 1% of her total commerce. In 1914 there were less than 24,000 Germans in the colonies, and most of them were officials, soldiers and police and

not permanent settlers. Yet the limited extent and relative poverty of the German colonial empire only increased the desire of many Germans for its extension, for a larger 'place in the sun'. Looking at Great Britain and France, with their great colonial empires, Germans felt that their country had been cheated in the race. The Colonial League, the Navy League, the Pan-Germans were all determined to make good the failures of the past. They had ambitions in the Near East and in Africa, and there is no doubt that a section of the most active propagandists for a great navy looked to the dissolution of the British and French empires after defeat in war as the means to provide satisfaction for German colonial ambitions.

These desires were fed both by the sense of dependence on other countries for raw materials as a result of the industrial developments already described and also by the increasing pressure of population on subsistence and the fear that, unable to provide work, Germany might be faced either with internal disorder from the rising Socialist and trade union movement, or with the necessity of resuming the export of men by emigration, which Caprivi described in 1891 as the only alternative to the export of goods.

### *The Germany of William II*

Thus the Germany which William II had to rule was one in which sweeping changes resulting from the mechanization of industry were taking place. A group of great industrial magnates, controllers of the cartels which governed industry, was emerging and allying itself politically and through social intercourse with the older Junker-agrarian group. The Krupps, Stumms, Thyssens, and the rest sought to be as absolutely masters in their own industries as were the Prussian landed magnates on their estates. Despite the rapid growth of trade unionism the Central Union of German Industrialists were still refusing in 1905 to enter into a system of collective bargaining,

*Growth of Free (Socialist) Trade Unions in Germany* (1891–1928)

| | Membership |
|---|---|
| 1891 | 277,600 |
| 1902 | 733,206 |
| 1906 | 1,689,709 |
| 1912 | 2,553,000 |
| 1928 | 4,841,000 |

Sources: Figures from 1891 and 1912 are from Bruck, W. F., *Social and Economic History of Germany from Wilhelm II to Hitler*, p. 130 (Cardiff, 1938); figures for 1902 and 1906 are from Dawson, W. H., *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, p. 110 (London, 1911); the figure for 1928 is from *Deutsche Wirtschaft*, 1928, p. 291 (issued by the *Statistisches Reichsamt*, Berlin, 1930).

and it was only on the eve of the war of 1914–18 that they were being forced to revise their attitude. Meanwhile the bulk of the middle class, unable to accept the Marxian doctrines of the Social-Democrats intellectually, and contemptuous of its members socially, accepted the ideas and followed the leadership of the Prussian aristocrats and entrepreneurs. The post-Bismarckian society, over which William II ruled, and to which he contributed his quota of braggadocio and restless ambition, was a society expanding with great rapidity both in wealth, numbers and productive capacity. It had many of the less pleasant characteristics of the 'nouveau riche'. It was ambitious, increasingly materialist, and it worshipped power and success. The rapid changes and the movements of population incidental to modern industrialism were breaking down its old local loyalties and traditions. Yet the monarchical-feudal tradition of its people, and the autocratic structure of the state, made the Kaiser the centre of loyalty and imposed upon him the heavy responsibility of guiding the desires of his people for expansion into channels of wisdom and moderation.

## THE REIGN OF WILLIAM II

### The 'New Course'

The first four years of William II's reign showed few signs in public policy of the new expansionist tendencies in German life. On the contrary, like the first years of the reigns of Frederick William IV, of William I, and of Bismarck's rule after 1871, they gave promise of a more liberal regime, only to disappoint the hopes aroused.

*Caprivi as Chancellor*

In General Caprivi, William II chose, as Bismarck's successor, a man of moderation and honesty of purpose, who had already shown administrative capacity of a high order and who was in sympathy with the programme of internal and external conciliation which the young Kaiser wished to pursue. Between 1890 and 1894, when Caprivi fell, the anti-Socialist law was allowed to lapse, the repressive character of the regime, both in Poland, where a Pole was made archbishop of Posen, and in Alsace-Lorraine, was considerably lightened and, after a reduction of the tariffs on foreign goods had been passed by the Reichstag, a series of commercial treaties with surrounding countries was negotiated (1892–4) which committed

Germany to a policy of low protection for the next ten years. A very mild reduction of the powers of the Junkers in local government in the eastern provinces was also passed, in a much mutilated form, by the Prussian Landtag ; laws creating courts of industrial arbitration and limiting the hours of labour of women and children in industry were enacted by the Reichstag, and the new Army Law of 1893 reduced the term of service in the infantry from three years to two. In foreign policy the decision was taken, in 1890, not to renew the secret Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, on the grounds that it could not be reconciled with the terms of the Triple Alliance, but the young Kaiser, who still trusted to the influence of dynastic relationships in foreign affairs, made every effort to keep on friendly terms with Russia, more especially when his admiring cousin Nicholas II succeeded to the throne in 1893. Yet the exchange of visits between the Russian and French fleets in 1891 and 1893, which preceded the formal conclusion of the Dual Alliance between the two Powers, was a warning that a price might have to be paid for honesty.

*Opposition to the Kaiser's Policy*

The effects of the Kaiser's 'new course' in internal affairs soon showed themselves to be unpleasant. The Prussian Junkers went into opposition; the *Kreuzzeitung*, their organ, wrote of the policy of lower tariffs that 'the German farmer will now be inclined to regard the Emperor as his political enemy'; in 1892 the Landowners' Union (*Bund der Landwirte*) was formed to represent their agrarian demands and, in 1893, the Eastern Marches Association (*Ostmarkenverein*) was organized to protest against the Kaiser's pro-Polish policy. The Kaiser's social legislation entirely failed to wean the workers from the Social Democratic Party, now released from its legal fetters, and, at the elections of 1893, the party gained over a third of a million votes and, with forty-four seats, became the fourth strongest party in the Reichstag.

At first the Kaiser met the opposition which his policy aroused in Conservative circles with brave words. 'To those, who increasingly express dissatisfaction with the new course, I reply quietly but with determination, "My course is right and I shall continue to follow it."' But, by the end of 1893, his own natural conservatism, combined with the ill-success of his measures, had conquered his superficial liberalism. The influence of the military circles in which he moved, the attractions of a more active foreign policy, which would satisfy his own desires for fame and those of his people for expansion,

overcame his earlier wishes for social reconciliation. In October 1894 Caprivi, long since aware that he had lost his master's support, resigned and the 'new course' was at an end.

## Conservatism and Expansionism

The years which followed Caprivi's fall were, in home policy, years of reaction. Under the next two Chancellors (Prince Hohenlohe 1894–1900, Prince Bülow 1900–9) there were a few extensions of the social insurance laws and, in 1899, an act permitting the federation of associations throughout Germany made possible a great development of trade union organizations. But German historians have not unjustly called these years 'the Stumm era', after Baron von Stumm-Halberg, autocrat of the Saar heavy industry, who refused to permit not only Social Democrat but even Christian Social agitation within his area. And the Kaiser's change of attitude is clearly marked by his withdrawal in 1894 of the instructions to Lutheran pastors, given in 1890, to concern themselves with social questions. He now directed that they should confine themselves to the spiritual welfare of their flocks.

### *Reaction in Power*

Whilst, therefore, the Social Democratic Party and press, and the trade union movement made great headway so that, in 1912, the Social Democrats polled 4,250,000 votes and became, with 110 members, the largest party in the Reichstag, the policy of the state made no concessions to this growth of radicalism. On the contrary, plans for a conservative 'revolution', such as Bismarck had suggested in 1890, were openly discussed in conservative circles in 1895, and the repressive action of the police was supplemented by a long series of prosecutions for *lèse-majesté*. And, in 1902, before the Caprivi commercial treaties expired, Bülow introduced a tariff law greatly increasing the duties on imported corn and granting further protection to German manufacturers against foreign manufactured goods. The Landowners' Union and the Central Union of German Industrialists triumphed at the expense of the working class. Imperial policy towards the national minorities in the Polish provinces and in Alsace-Lorraine also hardened. Bismarck's policy of internal colonization in the Polish areas was taken up again, administrative decrees virtually banished the Polish language from the schools and, just before his fall in 1909, Bülow passed a law through the Prussian

Landtag empowering the government to expropriate Polish landowners compulsorily. The effect of his measures was, as might have been expected, to increase the agitation of the Poles for their national aims.

*Propaganda Leagues and Expansionism*

The tone of German policy was largely set, and its aims defined, by the propaganda leagues which flourished after 1890. The Eastern Marches Association, the Colonial League, the Navy League, the Pan-German League, all conducted propaganda campaigns of an ultra-patriotic character. Their membership interlocked and their presidents and committees were drawn from the great landowners and industrialists who also supplied them with funds. The Navy League (*Deutsche Flottenverein*) was backed by the head of the shipping firm of Woermann, and by the great iron, steel and coal magnates, Krupp and Stumm, who contributed 800,000 marks between them to its funds, and put two newspapers at its disposal. In return they both made large profits out of the naval armament programme between 1898 and 1914. Similarly, the Pan-German League, the most violently expansionist of these propaganda leagues, received its financial backing from the leaders of heavy industry—Kirdorf, Stinnes, Borsig and Röchling. Amongst its foundation members was Alfred Hugenberg who became a director of Krupps and, after 1918, head of the Ufa-film combine and the greatest press magnate of Weimar Germany. In 1928 he became leader of the Conservative (*Deutsch-Nationale*) Party, and his alliance with Hitler was largely responsible for bringing the Nazi Party to power (see p. 258). Moreover, the Pan-Germans in the German Empire were stimulated by the movement in Austria where, in the nineties, a violent group of anti-Semitic Pan-Germans, led by Schönerer, exhibited both in the Austrian Parliament, and outside it, the character and temper of the later Nazis. Though these propaganda leagues varied in the closeness of their relation to the government, and were sometimes regarded as a nuisance both by the Kaiser and by Bülow himself, they represented and stimulated the expansionist, imperialist aggressiveness of large sections of the German military, bureaucratic, agrarian and industrialist upper and middle classes.

## The Isolation of Germany

The foreign policy of Germany during the fifteen years after Caprivi's fall (1894–1909) corresponded to the expansionist tendency arising

from Germany's rapid industrial growth expressed by the propaganda leagues. But it was so fitfully conducted, and the general situation was so unfavourable in itself, that, whilst Germany gained little territory, she acquired the suspicion and hostility of the Powers and fell into dependence on her one remaining ally, Austria.

*The Kaiser's Foreign Policy*

The lack of consistency in German foreign policy was due to the governmental system itself. The Kaiser sought to direct policy, but his ideas were incoherent and his intervention intermittent. His determination to build a great navy (see Chapter V) involved the alienation of Great Britain, yet he had no real desire to fight this—or indeed any other—country. He relied on his personal friendship with the Czar ('Nikki' in his letters to him), and he played with the idea of a great continental league. But the days when the foreign policy of states was decided by dynastic sympathies were over. The Russian rivalry with Austria in the Balkans and her alliance with France made a united continent impossible.

Moreover, the Kaiser's policy was crossed by that of Marschall (secretary for Foreign Affairs till 1897), of Bülow (Foreign Secretary 1897–1900, Chancellor 1900–9) and of Holstein, the permanent Counsellor of the Foreign Office. Of these men Holstein was perhaps the most dangerous, for he exerted, from behind the scenes, a most powerful and almost uniformly short-sighted influence until his dismissal in 1906. Though all were agreed that Germany must pursue a *Weltpolitik* and that she should, by diplomacy and veiled threats of force, acquire whatever territory might be obtainable in any part of the globe, the general effect of this policy of 'compensations' and of the lack of consistency with which it was conducted was to make all other Powers regard Germany as a dangerous potential enemy and an unreliable friend.

*Anglo-German Relations*

An agreement was reached between Germany and England in 1890, by which the frontiers of German East Africa (Tanganyika) were defined in a sense favourable to Germany, and Heligoland was transferred to German sovereignty, whilst British predominance in Zanzibar and her sovereignty in Uganda were recognized. Relations between the two countries remained cordial for some time, but the agreement of 1890 was bitterly attacked by the Colonial League and the Pan-Germans and, even before Caprivi's fall, Marschall had

concluded a frontier agreement (1894) with France in the Cameroons, which opened a path for the French to the Nile, had joined with the United States (1893) in thwarting Rhodes's ambition to gain control of the railway from Pretoria to Lourenço Marques, and had sent German warships to Delagoa Bay (1894) when England was seeking permission from Portugal to land troops there. The Kaiser's telegram to Kruger, the Boer President, at the time of the Jameson Raid (1896) congratulating him on having preserved 'the independence of his country against attacks from outside', was, it is now known, a milder alternative to far more serious steps proposed by the Kaiser himself. It aroused intense hostility in England, and, since it could do no good to the Boers, was an act of tactless folly from the German point of view. It led, too, to an English approach to France, whose claims to Madagascar were recognized, and to Russia, over the question of Afghanistan; whilst the Triple Alliance itself was weakened when Salisbury, in 1897, refused to renew the Mediterranean agreement to maintain the *status quo*, which played a large part in making the alliance palatable to Italy.

Yet the Kaiser and his advisers remained obstinately convinced that the differences between England and the Dual Alliance went so deep that no permanent agreement between them was possible. Marschall's patronage of the *Deutsche Bank's* economic penetration of Turkey and of the Berlin-Baghdad railway was continued, and its possible threat to both British and Russian interests in Persia and India appeared clearly in Pan-German articles advocating German control of the Near East and the Persian Gulf. The Kaiser, whilst on a visit to Palestine in 1898, only two years after the Armenian massacres, toasted Abdul Hamid ('Abdul the damned') with the words, 'May the Sultan and the 300 million Mussulmans scattered over the earth be assured that the German Emperor will always be their friend'. And Chamberlain's offer of an alliance in 1898 met no serious response in Berlin.

Yet, from 1898 to 1902, Anglo-German relations improved. In 1898, an Anglo-German convention was reached on the future of the Portuguese colonies, if that country found itself forced to sell them and, in 1899, the Samoan question was solved by the recognition of German sovereignty in the islands of Upolu and Sawai in return for compensations to England elsewhere. Throughout the South African War, too, German policy towards England was correct, and the Kaiser refused Kruger's request for diplomatic intervention, although German public opinion was violently hostile to England.

*England and the Dual Alliance*

But the naval policy of the Kaiser and Tirpitz after 1901 began to alarm English statesmen (see pp. 295-310), and Bülow and Holstein received with cool indifference the renewed overtures made by England for an alliance in that year. Bülow remarked that the English threat to make terms with the Dual Alliance was 'a hideous spectre invented to terrify us'. His folly was promptly exposed by the opening of negotiations between England and France, which led to a formal treaty in 1904 settling all the outstanding colonial differences between the two Powers. Since Italy, in 1902, had also made an agreement with France by which she gave France freedom of action in Morocco in return for the same freedom for herself in Tripoli, the Triple Alliance had been much weakened, and the phase of German-Austrian isolation had begun.

Towards Russia, good relations with which Bismarck had always regarded as fundamentally important, the Kaiser and his advisers were equally unskilful. In 1897, after the murder of two German missionaries, Kiao-Chau was occupied by Germany although Russia had already negotiated for control of it with China. Germany's gain of an eastern base was neutralized by the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and the British lease of Wei-hai-wei. On the eve of the Russo-Japanese war (1904–5) the Kaiser vehemently urged 'Nikki' to undertake a crusade against the Japanese, but he offered no military assistance, and the severe Russian defeat at the hands of Japan was used by anti-German influences at the Russian court to throw doubt on the Kaiser's disinterestedness in advising so disastrous a course. The Treaty of Björkö (July 1905), arranged between the Kaiser and the Czar at a private meeting in Finland, represented the Kaiser's last effort to build a continental league, which would bring the Triple and Dual Alliances together. But it was repudiated by the Foreign Ministers of both Germany and Russia and was, in fact, incompatible with the existing engagements of both Powers. The increasing German influence at Constantinople, the rapid extension of the German economic penetration of Turkey, together with the wide concessions granted by the Turkish government in 1903 to the promoters of the Berlin-Baghdad railway, with its proposed network of lines to the Persian frontier and the Persian Gulf, were even more objectionable to the Russian than to the British government. For, after her defeat in the Far East, Russia turned her eyes back to the Balkans, to Constantinople, to Asia Minor and Persia, and was there confronted with the designs of Austria in the Balkans, and of Germany in Turkey.

*Effects of Isolation*

'By the end of the year 1905', writes Erich Brandenburg, 'Germany was almost completely isolated'. Such was the result of the joint policy of the Kaiser, Bülow and Holstein since 1897. The effects of this fact were quick to show themselves. In Morocco the French, once the Anglo-French treaty was signed, at once began to increase their control and at first Germany made no resistance. But in March 1905, Bülow persuaded the Kaiser to land at Tangier, and the Moroccan question took on a new significance. Under German pressure a conference was held at Algeciras (1906), at which, apart from 'doubtful and reluctant' support from Austria, Germany found herself alone. The agreement finally reached formally recognized the Sultan's independence and the principle of the 'open door' for the trade of all nations. But the German demonstration at Tangier had proved a failure, and France now brought about a reconciliation between Russia and England, which led to a series of treaties in 1907, by which not only were all outstanding questions between Russia and England settled, but also Russia and France agreed with Japan to support the *status quo* in the Far East, whilst Spain was drawn into a similar agreement for the Mediterranean. Germany was now alone, except for Austria and the doubtful support of Italy and Roumania. Bülow, who was so largely responsible for this situation, now began to speak of Germany's 'encirclement', whilst the Pan-Germans were furious that the Kaiser and Bülow had made no effort to secure territorial gains in Morocco, where they coveted the Atlantic seaboard to provide the German navy with bases.

## German Dependence on Austria

Germany was now thrown back on the Triple Alliance as her only support and, therefore, on Austria, since Italy could not be relied on. Austria's relations with Russia, however, were rapidly deteriorating because she felt the integrity of her Empire threatened by the growth of a Pan-Serb movement in Serbia which received vigorous support from the Pan-Slav party in Russia. When, therefore, the Near Eastern question was reopened by the 'Young Turk' revolution of 1908, Aerenthal, the Austrian foreign minister, seized the opportunity of Russia's unreadiness for war to present her, and Europe, with a *fait accompli* by declaring Bosnia-Herzegovina annexed to the Austrian Empire (5 October 1908), whilst, at the same time,

Ferdinand of Bulgaria, in concert with Aerenthal, declared the independence of Bulgaria from Turkish sovereignty. A violent reaction occurred in Serbia, and Russia was faced with the unpleasant alternatives either of forcing the Serbs to withdraw their claims for compensation, or of going to war with Austria.

In the end Russia chose the first alternative and war was averted. But, during the crisis, German policy showed clearly her new dependence on Austria and, as clearly, foreshadowed the outbreak of war in 1914. Bülow, for fear of losing his last ally, gave Austria his unreserved support in the Serbian question and wrote to Aerenthal, 'I shall...regard the decision to which you may ultimately come as that demanded by circumstances', thereby offering, as Brandenburg says, 'an unlimited blank cheque for the future'. Though the retreat of Russia in face of the threat of war gave Germany and Austria a resounding diplomatic success, it led to an immediate intensification of preparation for war both in Russia and France, and to an increased determination not to let such an event recur. During the crisis, too, Italy had been ignored by her allies and England's neutrality relied upon. In any repetition of the situation no reliance could be placed on the willingness of either Power to accept these silent roles, and, if they did not, war must result.

The dangers of the situation, in which Germany and Europe might be involved by the irresponsible controllers of Germany's foreign policy, were ludicrously illustrated by the publication, whilst the Bosnian crisis was at its height, in the *Daily Telegraph* (28 October 1908) of an interview with the Kaiser. William had intended it as an olive branch to English opinion, but, in the course of it, contrived to exhibit his own vanity and incomprehension, to convince the English of the hostility felt in Germany to this country, and to threaten Japan, Russia and the United States by representing the German fleet as intended to act with the British in settling the great questions of the Pacific. The interview caused an immense sensation both at home and abroad. It even led the Conservative Party in Germany to protest. But, though Bülow induced the Kaiser to promise greater circumspection in future, the futility of the parties in the Reichstag was shown by their total failure to secure, or attempt to secure, any advance towards responsible government. After a period of nervous breakdown the Kaiser recovered his composure and, having dismissed Bülow (1909), resumed his habits of oratory. The essential German system remained intact.

*Bethmann-Hollweg as Chancellor*

The legacy to which Bethmann-Hollweg succeeded was a grievous one, and he was ill fitted to deal with it, for, though a man of excellent intentions, he possessed little force of character and no experience of foreign politics. As a result the influence of Tirpitz on the Kaiser became even more powerful and dangerous, particularly since Kiderlen-Wächter, who became Foreign Secretary in 1910, was disliked by the Kaiser, who only reluctantly admitted him to office.

The division of Europe into two camps, arming strenuously against each other, for a while imposed the greatest caution upon all concerned, and, after the Bosnian crisis, efforts at appeasement were made on all hands. But, in 1911, they were rudely interrupted by the Italian attack on Tripoli and by the second Moroccan crisis of the same year. Italy's action again revealed the inherent weakness of the Triple Alliance, for she acted with as little consultation or consideration for her allies as Austria had shown in 1908. The second crisis was provoked by the extension of French authority in Morocco, but was handled by Kiderlen in so *gauche* a fashion as to put Germany largely in the wrong. His despatch of the German gunboat *Panther* to Agadir was in line with his encouragement of the Pan-German agitation for the annexation of western Morocco, and was intended to force France to face war if she would not agree to large compensations to Germany—the whole of the French Congo was proposed—in return for German acceptance of French control in Morocco. The event created a European sensation and drew his first belligerent speech from Mr Lloyd George, an event in itself. But the Kaiser, as Kiderlen well knew, was firmly determined not to go to war over Morocco, and, in the event, to the great disgust of the Pan-Germans and the Colonial and Navy Leagues, Germany was forced to assent to French predominance in the last available portion of Africa, in return for three strips of territory in the French Congo. Throughout the crisis England stood firmly by France, whilst once again the isolation of Germany was brought home to her and, with it, a sense of increased dependence on Austria.

Hardly was the Morocco crisis over before the Balkan League began its attack on Turkey (1912) with unexpectedly successful results, until quarrels over the spoil led to the second Balkan War. During these wars the influence of Germany and England was exercised, on the whole consistently, to persuade Austria and Russia to moderation, and their joint efforts in the Balkan crisis, together with the imminent probability of the recurrence of the danger of

war, led Sir Edward Grey to make further efforts for peace. But although, in 1913–14, colonial questions and the Baghdad railway dispute were in a fair way to settlement, the stubborn adherence of the Kaiser and Tirpitz to their naval programme prevented the development of any real understanding between the two countries. If, in Morocco, Kiderlen and Bethmann-Hollweg had both been belligerent and the Kaiser pacific, on the naval issue the Kaiser and Tirpitz were adamant and must bear the major responsibility for rendering impossible that understanding with England which alone might have prevented war in 1914. The underlying hypothesis, or gamble, on which the German government, and the Kaiser himself, were relying was expressed by Jagow in a letter to the German ambassador in London, Lichnowsky, on 26 February 1914: 'I think you are inclined to look on the dark side of things, as when you express the view that no matter what happens, in the event of war, England will be on the side of France, against us. After all, we have not built our fleet in vain....' The calculation is as revealing of the German incapacity to understand this country as it proved false in the event.

### Sarajevo and the Outbreak of War, 1914

The final crisis came in the summer of 1914. Austria was already alarmed by the results of the Balkan Wars. Russian influence in the Balkans had increased, most of all in Serbia, which had gained largely in population and territory. The Pan-Serb movement grew in intensity and threatened Austria's multi-national system not only in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of which the population was mainly Serb, but also amongst the large number of Serbs in southern Hungary and in Croatia and Dalmatia. The aged emperor, who had ascended his throne in 1848, was past control of events, and Conrad von Hoetzendorff, the Chief of the General Staff, was convinced that military action must be taken rapidly against Serbia before the forces of disruption became too strong in Austria, and before Russia was ready to fight. This view he pressed tirelessly and when, on 28 June 1914, the Crown Prince, Francis Ferdinand, was assassinated by a Bosnian Serb at Sarajevo, the Foreign Minister, Berchtold, at once accepted Conrad's point of view that Serbia must now, or never, be chastised and reduced in power and extent at whatever risk.

To that policy the Kaiser and Bethmann gave their assent. As in the crisis in 1908 they gave Austria a free hand in her dealings with Serbia, coupled with the assurance of their full support. They did this with the full knowledge that Russia would very probably

take part in an Austro-Serbian war and that Germany's participation would certainly involve France and might involve England. Although, in the later stages of the negotiations, under pressure from Sir Edward Grey, they sought to moderate Austrian policy, they only did so when it was too late. The result of Germany's restless *Weltpolitik*, of the Kaiser's blind determination to build his Grand Fleet, and of his obstinate refusal to face the effects of that policy on England, had been Germany's isolation and her dependence on Austria. And, at the moment when the last reliable ally determined to adopt a warlike solution of the insoluble problem of her conflicting nationalities, the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg honoured the 'blank cheque' already given by Bülow in 1908. They were not bound to do this under the terms of the Triple Alliance and, in doing so, they made a general European war, probable enough in any event, an imminent certainty. That is the measure of their personal responsibility.

## The Political Situation in Germany in 1914

The outbreak of war found the German home front in a condition of strain. The growth of the Social Democratic Party and of the trade unions had been accompanied by the growth of a left-wing section of the Centre, representing the Christian (Catholic) trade unions, so that the possibility of a majority in the Reichstag for the principle of Parliamentary government resting on the joint action of the Centre, the Left Liberals and the Social Democrats had emerged. This situation is clearly revealed in the election returns for 1912 as compared with those for the previous elections of the Kaiser's reign.

*Strength of Parties in the Reichstag during William II's reign*

| Date of General Election ... | 1890 | 1893 | 1898 | 1903 | 1907 | 1912 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservatives and Free Conservatives | 93 | 100 | 79 | 75 | 84 | 57 |
| National Liberals | 42 | 53 | 46 | 51 | 54 | 45 |
| Left Liberals | 76 | 48 | 49 | 39 | 49 | 42 |
| Centre | 106 | 96 | 102 | 100 | 105 | 91 |
| Social Democrats | 35 | 44 | 56 | 81 | 43 | 110 |
| Poles, Danes, Alsace-Lorrainers and Hanoverians | 38 | 35 | 34 | 32 | 29 | 33 |
| Anti-Semites | 5 | 16 | 13 | 11 | 21 | 13 |

Table adapted from *Die deutschen Parteiprogramme*, vol. II, edited by W. Mommsen and G. Franz (Leipzig and Berlin, 1932).

It will be seen that a coalition of Left Liberals, Centre and Social Democrats could command a clear majority in the Reichstag of 1912, which continued in existence throughout the war and until the

Revolution of 1918. The possibility of such a coalition was shown in the debates over the Zabern (Saverne in Alsace) affair in 1913, when the insolent behaviour of a young officer was followed by the illegal declaration of martial law by his commanding officer and by bayonet charges on the crowds who protested against the conduct of the officers. A vote of no confidence in the Chancellor was moved in the Reichstag and passed by 293 votes to 54—only the Conservatives voting in the minority. Yet, as in the case of the *Daily Telegraph* interview, the opposition parties did not press forward in a united effort to secure the responsibility of the government to the Reichstag. The vote of censure made no difference to Bethmann-Hollweg's position, and the officer in command of the Zabern garrison was decorated by the Kaiser soon afterwards. Indeed, so little had the Prussian ruling class changed its attitude towards democratic government that, on the eve of the war of 1914–18, a timid effort of the government to modify slightly the Three-Class system of voting was so mutilated by the Prussian Landtag that it had to be withdrawn. The classes in possession would yield none of their privileges, and the Pan-Germans and the supporters of the Navy and Colonial Leagues were ready to welcome a war in which they expected to realize their aims of German expansion. Their political opponents—Left Liberals, Centre and Social Democrats—were too divided amongst themselves to pursue a consistent policy, even for the attainment of the basic principle of democracy, the responsibility of the government to the elected chamber. And, when war came, the German politicians of the Left Centre and the Left showed that their patriotism was stronger than their desires for political reform. They joined with the Right in the political truce (*Burgfrieden*) for the duration of the war and in voting the necessary war credits. Poles, Alsatians and Danes might regard the war as their one chance of escape from the German Empire. But, so long as the Imperial autocracy could offer the prospect of swift success, the German political system would support it. And, even when hope deferred had begun to turn into dull despair, when the Left Centre and Left had become convinced that further obedience to their Kaiser and the High Command spelt disaster for the German state, the latent tension in the Prusso-German system of Bismarck's creation did not spontaneously turn into open conflict for the supersession of the old governing forces. The actual solvent of defeat itself was necessary to produce even the semblance of revolution in the disciplined society of Germany.

# THE WAR OF 1914–18

## The War on Land

The mobilization of the German army in 1914 proceeded smoothly and swiftly, and the application of the Schlieffen plan, which involved the violation of Belgian neutrality, was decided on. The military advantages of a swift decision, to be secured by rolling up the French left wing, were regarded as great enough to outweigh the disadvantages, even though these should include British participation in the war. For the German decision to invade Belgium Bethmann-Hollweg presented an embarrassed apology to the Reichstag and the world, based on the grounds of military necessity.





Fig. 44. The German attack, 1914

The arrows show the general direction followed by the seven invading armies. Land over 200m. is shaded.

The great wheeling movement of seven German armies (Fig. 44) was brought to a halt only at the Marne (8–9 September) and might well have accomplished its purpose if Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, had not been far from the front, in Luxembourg, and had not sent

two Army Corps to the eastern front at the critical moment. They arrived in East Prussia to find that Hindenburg and Ludendorff had already beaten the invading Russians decisively at Tannenberg and that the province was rapidly being cleared of enemy forces. In the west, after September 1914, the fighting settled down into trenches and, for four years, the *guerre d'usure* went on with fluctuating fortunes, immense losses in human life and material but, until August 1918, with no decisive result (Fig. 45). The first and second





Fig. 45. The Western Front to 21 March 1918

The territory of France is shaded.

battles of Ypres (Oct.–April 1914–15), the Franco-British offensives in September 1915 in Champagne and at Loos, the great German assault on Verdun (February 1916), the battle of the Somme (July 1916), which ultimately forced the Germans to retreat to the Hindenburg line (March 1917), were all alike indecisive, except as contributing to the exhaustion of the combatants. The costly failure of Nivelle's attack on the Chemin des Dames in April 1917, followed by serious mutinies in the French army, suggested that it might well

be France which would first lay down its arms. Already (August 1916) the famous pair of Generals, Hindenburg and Ludendorff, had taken over control of the High Command from Falkenhayn, who had replaced Moltke after the battle of the Marne. It was certain that what could be done by ruthless determination and superb organization they would do.

Moreover, despite early Austrian reverses in Serbia in 1914, that country was overrun in November 1915, and Bulgaria (October 1915) joined the Central Powers to counterbalance the loss of Italy, which had declared war on Austria in May 1915. In 1916, although a successful Russian offensive was made by Brussilov in Galicia and Roumania joined the Allies, the German-Austrian forces more than held their own in the east and, indeed, had conquered Roumania before the year was out.

By the beginning of 1917 both sides were desperate, for the German successes in the east were counterbalanced by their severe losses in the Somme and Ancre battles, and at one moment in the autumn of 1916 they had only five divisions in reserve on the western front. The failure of President Wilson's peace note, in December 1916, to arouse any response in the Entente countries determined Hindenburg and Ludendorff to press for the unrestricted submarine campaign, which the German Admiralty also desired but which, in February 1916, Bethmann-Hollweg had firmly refused to adopt.

*America Enters the War*

The decision was made to open the U-boat campaign on 1 February 1917, and was based on a German Admiralty memorandum, which implied that victory would result within the year. But, although the new submarine attack brought England dangerously near starvation, it also brought the United States into the war and thus provided a vast reserve of first-rate fighting men, when once trained, and a great supply of munitions and shipping for the Allied side. Moreover, it greatly strengthened the confidence of the Allied peoples, especially the French, in victory, and as greatly depressed the Germans, already suffering severely from the British blockade. Not even the disorganization of Russia by the revolutions of March and October 1917, in the second of which the Bolsheviks, determined on immediate peace, seized power, could compensate Germany for the aid given by America to the Allied cause.

Yet, in 1917, American land forces were not yet ready to take a serious part in the struggle and the long-drawn-out misery and loss

of the third battle of Ypres (Passchendaele) was only very partially compensated for the British by the limited success won at Cambrai (November 1917) when tanks were used on a large scale for the first time. The rout of the Italians at Caporetto (October 1917) compelled the Allies to send Franco-British troops to her support, and a further blow to Allied hopes came in December 1917, when the new Bolshevik government in Russia accepted an armistice with the Central Powers.

At the beginning of 1918 the German High Command, freed from any threat on the Russian front, had the choice of using their favourable military position to negotiate peace or of making one last supreme effort to defeat the Allies in the west before American reinforcements could arrive in sufficient strength to make any German attempt at a decision hopeless. Despite the Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 1917 (see p. 239), Hindenburg and Ludendorff chose the latter course. They, therefore, imposed a harsh treaty on the Bolsheviks at Brest-Litovsk (March 1918) and prepared for a final and, as they hoped, decisive blow against the Allied western front. The blow fell in March 1918, on the front from Arras down to Rheims. The Allied line was pushed far back. Amiens was threatened, Montdidier captured and, though Rheims held, a great German salient was thrust down to the Marne at Château-Thierry. Yet, once again, no decision was reached, and a secondary attack in Flanders similarly gained ground, at heavy expense, but did not achieve the break-through, which alone could bring victory. Ludendorff had expended the last German reserves in vain. The crisis had at last overcome inter-allied jealousies, and, in Foch, supplied the supreme commander so long lacking. American reinforcements were beginning to pour in. The submarine menace was being rapidly overcome. As a Swiss military critic said at this time the German situation was 'brilliant but hopeless'. Ludendorff made one last large-scale attack on the Marne near Château-Thierry (15–17 July) but, when that failed, the initiative had finally passed to the Allies.

On 8 August 1918, the Allied counter-offensive began near Amiens, and was taken up on the other sectors of the front. It was successful from the outset and went on continuously in one sector or another until the armistice (Fig. 46). Meanwhile the Austrian Empire was breaking up, and the door into Hungary was opened to the Allies by the collapse of Bulgaria in September. By 29 September even Ludendorff had become convinced that the war was lost and that an armistice must be asked for. He was equally convinced that, to obtain the best terms for Germany, responsible Parliamentary

government must be introduced, and the liberal-minded Prince Max of Baden was made Chancellor to carry through the change. Before the armistice negotiations were completed revolution had broken out in Germany, the Kaiser had abdicated, and it was a Republic, under the saddler's son, Ebert, as Chancellor which accepted the armistice terms on 11 November 1918.





Fig. 46. The Western Front, 21 March to 11 November 1918
The territory of France is shaded.

## The Naval War and the Blockade

It was in the German navy that the revolution of 1918 began with mutinies (29–30 October) in the ships at Kiel, and the disaffection in the navy owed much of its force to the inaction to which the German fleet had been condemned ever since the outbreak of war. From the first the Kaiser and Pohl, the Chief of Staff, ignored Tirpitz and pursued a policy of conserving their main battle fleet. But their forces outside the North Sea remained to be dealt with by the British navy.

In August 1914 the first task facing the Anglo-French forces in the Mediterranean was to destroy or put out of action the German

battle-cruiser *Goeben* and the light cruiser *Breslau*. By a series of mischances or misjudgments they were allowed to escape from Italian waters and they entered the Dardanelles on 10 August 1914, by permission of Enver, leader of the war party amongst the Young Turks. Their guns, dominating Constantinople, strengthened Enver's arguments for joining the Central Powers, and the Turkish declaration of war on the Allies followed in November 1914.

At that moment Admiral Cradock, commanding the South American station, attacked Admiral von Spee's much stronger China squadron off Coronel (1 November 1914), with the result that Cradock's flagship, *Good Hope*, and the cruiser *Monmouth* were both sunk. But the position in these waters was restored by Admiral Sturdee's victory at the Falkland Islands (8 December 1914) when the *Gneisenau*, von Spee's flagship, the *Scharnhorst*, *Leipzig*, and *Nürnberg* were all destroyed and only the *Dresden* escaped. Though she survived 'by persistent disregard of the neutrality of remote Chilean possessions' until March 1915 she did little damage, and the most dangerous commerce raider, *Emden*, met her end at the Cocos Islands on 9 November 1914. From that time onwards the high seas were dominated by the British and French navies, and the expeditions which successfully captured the German colonies in Africa and the Pacific were the fruits of that fact.

Though the Allied fleets failed to force the Dardanelles in March 1915, the campaign which followed (March 1915–January 1916) depended wholly on Allied sea power, as did the Allied armies based on Salonica and those which operated in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Syria. Not only were the supply routes to and from India kept intact but, after initial failures, Allied armies were able to conquer Baghdad (March 1917), to overrun Palestine and enter Jerusalem (December 1917) and, in 1918, to deliver a heavy and successful attack on Bulgaria, which resulted in her surrender (10 September). The fact that, with the German submarine menace at its worst, the Allied navies were able to maintain these widely separated fronts was a vitally important factor in the ultimate victory.

Still more important for the issue of the war was the enforcement of the blockade on Germany, which became much more stringent after the first German submarine campaign opened in February 1915. During the remainder of that year and throughout 1916 the Germans were restricted in their activities both by their limited number of submarines and by the determination of Bethmann not to strain American patience too far. The battle of Jutland

(31 May–1 June 1916) could not be regarded with much satisfaction by the British fleet, and, in particular, showed the German ships to be superior in construction, their range-finding more accurate, and their armour-piercing shells more effective than our own. Yet, within a month, Scheer, the German Commander-in-Chief, reported to the Kaiser that 'there can be no doubt that even the most successful result from a high sea battle will not compel England to make peace....A victorious end to the war at not too distant a date can only be looked for by the crushing of English economic life through U-boat action against English commerce'. Jutland had not been fought in vain, and the British superiority in battleships kept the German High Seas fleet in harbour for the rest of the war except for occasional sallies. This, and the withdrawal of many of the best officers and petty officers for the U-boats, lowered its general morale and, as early as June–July 1917, mutinies occurred which revealed not only discontent with living conditions but sympathy with the policy of a negotiated peace. Yet the unrestricted U-boat warfare in 1917 proved at first a deadly threat to Allied supplies. The German navy had constructed many more submarines, and in the quarter April–June 1917 over two million tons of Allied shipping were lost. But the adoption of the convoy system (April 1917), made still more effective later by the assistance of both American and Japanese destroyers, greatly lowered the rate of sinkings and the total for the year 1918 (January to November) was only 600,000 tons more than that for the April–June quarter of 1917. The submarine menace remained serious, but German hopes of victory founded upon it proved delusive, and the number of submarines sunk during the war, estimated at about 180 out of a total of 360, began to break the morale of their crews.

By 1918, therefore, the morale of the lower-deck in the German navy was very low, and the rumour that Admiral Scheer intended to take the whole fleet to sea in October to strike a desperate blow at the British, thus perhaps bringing the negotiations for an armistice to an end, resulted in mutinies which began in the *Thüringen* and *Helgoland* at Kiel (29–30 October) and rapidly spread through the fleet. At Hamburg the sailors were joined by the army reservists, and the movement for Soldiers', Sailors' and Workers' Councils spread rapidly through Germany. It is not without historic justice that the breakdown of German discipline should have begun in the service so painfully built up by the Kaiser and Tirpitz and for which they had forfeited English friendship with such light hearts.

## German Success and Failure

The German military effort during these four years of war had been one of the most remarkable in history. Aided by the revolutions of 1917 and by their superior equipment and supply services, they had secured the dissolution of the armies of Russia and, after Brest-Litovsk, were masters of the whole of her western borders. Finland,





Fig. 47. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
Based on Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., *Brest-Litovsk, the Forgotten Treaty* (London, 1938).

the Baltic provinces, Poland, the Ukraine to the gates of the Caucasus, were all, for the moment, under German control, and Turkey was their ally (Fig. 47). The Pan-German dream of a Greater Germany ruling over millions of dependent Slavs, but with *Lebensraum* for

the indefinite expansion of the German master race, had been realized. But, at the moment of its establishment, the deadly pressure of the blockade and the exhaustion both of the German people and of the German armies on the west, together with the break-up of the heterogeneous territories which composed the Austrian empire, shattered the fabric so painfully created. Germany had 'killed herself by victories' (*Wir siegen uns zum Tod*), but had also been killed by Allied sea power, which enforced the blockade, and brought the supplies to the land forces. These French and British forces, which had borne the brunt of the fighting during four years, were at last rewarded by being able to deal the final blow to German hopes. Germany, without Austria, had lost over 1,800,000 killed and 4,200,000 wounded. The deaths from disease amongst her civilian population are not accurately known, but must have been very heavy, and, in November 1918, she lay prostrate and helpless in defeat. Yet she had been within sight of a victory which, in the modern technical age, would have made her undisputed mistress of Europe. Supplied with the corn and mineral wealth of the Ukraine and the oil of the Caucasus, able to command both the Adriatic and the Aegean, her influence predominant in Turkey and penetrating to the Persian Gulf and to Suez; controlling the Baltic, with inexhaustible supplies of high-grade iron ore from Sweden, and with the heavy industry of Lorraine, the Saar, the Liége district, as well as that of Bohemia and Styria at her disposal, she would soon have been in a position to break the British naval stranglehold and to conquer Egypt and North Africa. The dream, so near realization in the first months of 1918, collapsed in defeat. But it remained in many German minds an ideal yet to be realized. And a glance at the map of Europe at the end of 1942 (Fig. 57, p. 471) shows how close the Nazi Pan-Germanists have once again come to its effective realization. The history of the German Republic is largely that of the failure of the German 'Left' to replace these dreams of conquest and exploitation by any satisfactory substitute.

## The Dictatorship of Ludendorff and the German Revolution

Although all the political parties in the Reichstag, including the Social Democrats, had accepted the *Burgfrieden* (political truce) in 1914, and although a strict censorship of the press and the prohibition of political meetings were imposed by the government, the

long-drawn-out war, the need to define German war aims, the shortage of food owing to the blockade, and the Russian revolutions of 1917, all contributed to assist the development of a demand for more responsible government as the war dragged on. The very basis of the Prusso-German empire, the power of the Kaiser as War Lord, disappeared as soon as war broke out for, as though distrustful of his own capacity to command, William II made little effort to control military policy and, as time went on, exercised less and less influence on the decisions of the High Command. Of this he was himself aware and wrote bitter marginal comments on the virtual extinction of his own authority.

When Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over the general staff in August 1916, they rapidly established a joint dictatorship in political as well as in military affairs. In this Ludendorff took the lead, and when he disagreed with Bethmann-Hollweg's policy, he refused to accept 'responsibility' for measures which he regarded as injurious to the conduct of the war and threatened resignation. By this form of blackmail, similar to that practised by Bismarck on William I, he obtained a complete ascendancy over the Kaiser and established a hitherto unparalleled control of political as well as military policy in the hands of the High Command, that is, of Hindenburg and himself.

From 1916 to 1918, then, Germany was ruled by a military dictatorship. In July 1917, Ludendorff secured the dismissal of Bethmann-Hollweg, who had opposed the unrestricted U-boat campaign and had been too inclined to listen to the Reichstag parties of the Centre and Left for Ludendorff's taste. Both Michaelis, who replaced Bethmann-Hollweg, and Hertling, who succeeded him in the autumn, were chosen with the approval of Ludendorff and both regarded it as their first duty to carry out Ludendorff's policy.

*Criticism of War Policy*

Yet there grew up amongst both the German working and middle classes an increasingly critical attitude towards the existing imperial system as the war went on. As early as December 1915 twenty members of the Social Democrat party voted against a war credit and, in 1916, formed the Independent Social Democratic Party (*Unabhängige Sozial-Demokratische Partei* or U.S.D.P.), whilst a still more radical group, the Spartacus League, was founded and led by the fiery Rosa Luxemburg. These two groups, though small in

numbers, represented the widespread longing for peace which was felt by the masses of the population, and which led in 1917 to the naval agitation already mentioned (see p. 235) and to a series of strikes in Berlin, Leipzig and other towns which had a definitely political programme. At Leipzig the workers demanded not only better rations but an immediate peace without annexations, restoration of full civil liberty, and 'the introduction of universal, equal, secret and direct suffrage in elections to all public bodies in the Empire, in the federal states, and in the municipalities'.

Under the influence of these manifestations of public opinion and of his own conviction that, the submarine campaign having failed to win the war, Germany's position was growing desperate, Erzberger, of the Centre Party, proposed in the Reichstag a resolution in favour of a 'peace without annexations' in July 1917. It was passed by the votes of a section of the National-Liberals, the Left Liberals, the Centre and the Social Democrats and was accepted by the new Chancellor, Michaelis, though with the significant qualification 'as I interpret it'. The democratic coalition, always possible in the Reichstag since 1912 (see p. 227), appeared at last to have come into being.

In fact, however, Ludendorff, the Conservatives and the Right-wing National-Liberals had no intention of basing their policy upon the Reichstag resolution. Conservatives and National-Liberals combined to form the Fatherland Party, Pan-Germanism under a new name, and sought to whip up patriotic feeling in the country. And although, on Michaelis's fall, the government seemed superficially to be widened when Payer, a Left Liberal, became Vice-Chancellor to Hertling, the Reichstag majority parties made no serious effort throughout the winter and spring of 1917–18 to gain effective control of the government or even to enforce their policy of peace without annexations. On the contrary when, after the Bolshevik revolution (October 1917), Russia sued for peace, and the tide of war appeared to set once again in Germany's favour, the Reichstag accepted the 'annexationist' terms of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, even the Social Democrats doing no more than to abstain from voting for it.

During the first nine months of 1918, indeed, Ludendorff pursued the policy of victory with annexations, endorsed by the Prussian Conservatives, agrarians and industrialists alike. He suppressed the strikes which broke out in Berlin in January by proclaiming martial law. He forced the Kaiser to dismiss the head of his civil cabinet.

With his approval the Prussian Landtag defeated the government's bill for equal suffrage by a majority of over 50 votes. If the temper of the people was growing more radical, it was a despairing radicalism, and they were too cowed to show it. Right up to the moment when military defeat had to be acknowledged by Ludendorff himself the old conservative Prusso-German structure was maintained intact—except that the dominating figure of Ludendorff dwarfed the Kaiser into insignificance.

*Passivity of Democratic Parties*

The extreme passivity of the more democratic Reichstag parties was exhibited most clearly in the hour of defeat. For it was Ludendorff who, on 2 October, sent one of his staff to Berlin to explain that the position of Germany was hopeless and that a new, more democratic, government responsible to the Reichstag must be formed in order to secure the best possible terms for Germany. It was the German High Command which, without any pressure from the political parties, admitted the failure of its policy and demanded that the imperial system should be turned into a parliamentary democracy.

Even at this stage the democratic parties made no effort to take over effective control of power. Prince Max of Baden became Chancellor and included as Ministers in his government not only Centre Party members (Erzberger, Trimborn) and Left Liberals (Payer, Haussmann), but also Social Democrats (Bauer, Scheidemann). Yet, after meeting on 5 October to approve in principle the change to a parliamentary system of government, the Reichstag meekly went into recess until 22 October, whilst the necessary bills were being prepared and, when they had been passed (26 October), again adjourned until 9 November. Even the sudden acceptance of the principle of equal suffrage in Prussia (15 October) was largely due to Ludendorff's influence. And, although Ludendorff himself resigned on 26 October, the first German revolution in 1918—the adoption of the Parliamentary system—was his handiwork.

*Character of the Second 'Revolution'*

The second German revolution of 1918 broke out with mutinies in the fleet from 29 October onwards, but it was a movement against the idea of a desperate sortie to attack the British fleet and for the redress of service grievances rather than for constitutional change.

How little revolutionary its character was is shown by the demand of the sailors that they should only be compelled to address their officers as 'Sir' once at the beginning of each interview. But, as the movement spread from the sailors at Kiel to the soldiers at Hamburg, it took on a more revolutionary form. Workers' and Soldiers' Councils on the Soviet model were set up, the abdication of the Kaiser and the Princes was demanded, and the Spartacus League urged a programme of full socialization. Yet, though the Majority Socialists responded to the revolutionary current sufficiently to secure the Kaiser's abdication, their leader, Ebert, only accepted the proclamation of the Republic because Scheidemann had forced his hand. Ebert's attitude to the extreme Left was shown by his words at this time: 'The social revolution, I hate it like sin'. His government, though representing the Berlin Soldiers' and Workers' Councils and formed of Social Democrats and members of the U.S.D.P., retained Erzberger and some Liberals in office and at once made clear its intention that no revolution on the Russian model would, if they could avert it, be permitted in Germany. The German 'revolution' of 1918—the second revolution of November—was, in fact, far more a collapse than a revolution. It was the result of defeat and of hunger rather than of any genuine revolutionary spirit in the broad masses of the German people. The lack of violence against the Princes of Germany, whose abdications followed on that of the Kaiser, was evidence of this. And the Majority Social Democrats under Ebert, deeply imbued with the German love of order, were certainly interpreting aright the wishes of most of their fellow-countrymen when they rejected social revolution, however little their actions corresponded to their radical party programme.

Yet for a few months after 9 November the threat of a more radical revolution, led by the Spartacus League and some of the Independent Socialists, existed. But, after the failure of his attempt to enlist a republican volunteer force, Noske, the Social Democrat Minister of War, used the counter-revolutionary bands of young reactionaries, the Free Corps, financed by the great industrialists and landowners, against the sympathizers with Russian Communism. In Berlin Rosa Luxemburg and Liebknecht, and many of their working-class followers, were killed. In Bavaria, Eisner, under whom a Left-wing Socialist regime was set up, was murdered and the Free Corps removed any danger of Bolshevism with ruthless brutality (1–2 May 1919) shooting, amongst others, twenty peaceable Catholic journeymen whom they mistook for Spartacists.

The anti-Communist activity of Ebert's Social Democratic government represented the docility and conservatism which had gradually made the party's programme largely meaningless. A great party bureaucracy, closely allied with the trade unions, had been built up and was ruled by a committee of elderly men, of mediocre ability, whose main idea was to keep their party machine intact and to score small tactical successes as occasion offered. Representing the skilled artisans, they were, in some respects, as deeply conservative as any class in Germany, and when a revolutionary situation arose, they desired to enforce order at whatever cost and by whatever means were available. In doing so they inevitably split the German working class into two irreconcilable groups and excluded the younger and more active men from their party. Their genuine devotion to the democratic principle was an inadequate substitute for the social revolution in the eyes of the younger generation.

## THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC

### The Democratic Constitution and the Versailles Treaty

As soon as power was in his hands, in November 1918, Ebert had announced that a National Assembly would be elected on the basis of universal suffrage to decide the political fate of Germany. The elections took place on 19 January 1919 and, before that date, the parties of the old Reichstag reconstituted, and in some cases renamed, themselves. The old Conservative and Free Conservative parties, with some National-Liberals, formed the German National People's Party (*Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei*), the remaining National-Liberals became the German People's Party (*Deutsche Volkspartei*), the earlier Left-Liberals (Progressives) now called themselves the German Democratic Party (*Deutsche Demokratische Partei*). The Centre and Social Democrats retained their party names, whilst the Independent Socialists formed a separate group to the left of the Social Democrats. The results of the elections to the National Assembly, which took place before such revolutionary fervour as there had been had died down, and before the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were known, deserve careful comparison with the returns

to the Reichstag of 1912 and with the figures of later elections during the Weimar Republic :

| | 1912 | 1919 | 1920 | Mar. 1924 | Dec. 1924 | 1928 | 1930 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Conservative and Free Conservative (*Deutsch-Nationale Volkspartei*)* | 57 | 44 | 71 | 95 | 103 | 78 | 41 |
| National Liberals (*Deutsche Volkspartei*) | 45 | 19 | 65 | 45 | 51 | 45 | 30 |
| Centre | 91 | 91 | 64 | 65 | 69 | 62 | 68 |
| Bavarian People's Party (*Bayrische Volkspartei, separated from Centre after* 1919) | — | — | 21 | 16 | 19 | 16 | 19 |
| Left Liberals (*Deutsche Demokratische Partei*) | 42 | 75 | 39 | 28 | 32 | 25 | 20 |
| Social Democrats | 110 | 165 | 102 | 100 | 131 | 153 | 143 |
| Independent Social Democrats | — | 22 | 84 | | | | |
| Communists | — | — | 4 | 62 | 45 | 54 | 77 |
| National-Socialists | — | — | — | 32 | 14 | 12 | 107 |

* *Titles in German are those adopted in* 1918-19.

*Sources :* Adapted from *Die deutschen Parteiprogramme*, 1918–30, edited by W. Mommsen and G. Franz, p. 139 (Leipzig and Berlin, 1931).

A glance at the results of 1919 shows that the Social Democrats, at the moment of their greatest expansion, had no hope of forming a homogeneous majority government, and that a Socialist Germany could not be created by democratic methods. From the first, therefore, the Social Democrats were dependent on their 'bourgeois' allies of the Centre and Democratic parties, and Germany as a whole was faced, under a parliamentary regime, with a series of coalition governments.

### *The Nature of the New Constitution*

The adoption of the Weimar constitution (see Chapter VI for further details) on 31 July 1919, turned the Prusso-German empire, formally at least, into a fully democratic, though still semi-federal, state. The President was to be elected by a plebiscite of the whole people. The Chancellor and the Ministers were responsible to the Reichstag, itself elected on the basis of universal suffrage. All the basic rights of other democratic countries—freedom of speech, the press and association, freedom from arbitrary arrest, even the right of the electorate to initiate and, in certain cases, to decide by referendum on legislation—were secured in the constitution. The old particularism of the states, now called 'Lands' (*Länder*), was greatly

reduced by the provision that Reich law was to override the law of a *Land*; and, in particular, the predominance of Prussia was carefully reduced by the remodelling of the old *Bundesrath* into a *Reichsrat*, with much reduced powers. In addition, though the principle of private property was recognized, powers were taken for nationalization with compensation, and for the creation of central and local economic councils so that some degree of state control over industry and the land seemed assured. The boast that Germany now had 'the most free constitution in the world' was not unjustified.

The test of every constitution is the way it works and the perfection of the Weimar constitution from the point of view of democratic theory had its dangers in a country sharply divided in political opinion and quite unaccustomed to the 'give-and-take' of democratic politics. The old unity provided by the person of the Kaiser and the personality and office of the chancellor, as Bismarck devised it, had worked badly enough under William II and Bülow. But now the German people were not only asked to transfer their allegiance from a royal figure standing above parties, they were asked to give it to a Social Democratic president or to a chancellor who might represent a *Weltanschauung*—a philosophy of life—with which they profoundly disagreed. Further, the democratization of the individual states (*Länder*) meant that, at the same time, a Social-Democratic-Centre coalition might be in power in Prussia, a mainly 'bourgeois' nationalist government in the Reich, a semi-Communist government in Saxony, and an extreme Right-reactionary government in Bavaria. Such a situation, which actually occurred in 1923, involved a serious threat to national unity. Finally, at a time when external pressure from the victorious Allied Powers called, above all, for strong and united government in Germany itself, the German people, long used to such government, had to suffer the spectacle, at each new crisis of their affairs, of long inter-party negotiations before a new government could be formed. This *Kuhhandel* ('cow-bargaining' or, as we might say, 'horse coping'), as the enemies of the democratic system called it, was enhanced by the lack of responsibility engendered in the various party leaders by the Bismarckian system (p. 196) and by the rigidity of outlook which is so deeply characteristic of the German people as a whole.

It was a still greater handicap to the new democratic republic that its constitution was adopted only a few weeks after Germany had been compelled (22 June 1919) to accept the Treaty of Versailles. One of the strongest reasons for accepting democratic institutions

with many patriotic Germans had been the hope of a 'good' peace based on President Wilson's Fourteen Points. This hope was illogical, since the Fourteen Points were issued on the sole authority of the President, whilst the armistice was not based upon them and the peace treaty had to be concluded with Great Britain and France, who had borne the brunt of the fighting, and with their other Allies, as well as with the United States. Yet the hope remained and, however illogically, many Germans felt that a moral obligation lay on the Allies to carry out President Wilson's programme.





Fig. 48. Germany in 1919

M.O.=Morava Ostrava (Mährische-Ostrau).

## *The Terms of the Versailles Treaty*

The territorial clauses of the treaty of Versailles (Fig. 48) were, on the whole, in consonance with the President's principles, though they went much further than Germans had hoped. The return of Alsace-Lorraine to France (Point 8); the creation of an independent Polish state with 'a free and secure access to the sea'; the restoration of Belgium, Roumania, Serbia (Points 7, 11); the recognition of a

Czechoslovak state (Point 10), could all be regarded as the logical outcome of the Fourteen Points, as could the decision to hold a plebiscite in North Schleswig (Fig. 49) to determine a new frontier




Fig. 49. The Schleswig plebiscite, 1920

Based on official sources.

between Denmark and the Reich. But the extent of the territories allotted to revived Poland, and especially the separation of Danzig and East Prussia from the body of the Reich (Fig. 50), aroused bitter German resentment, which was increased by the subsequent division of Upper Silesia after a plebiscite (November 1921) in which the majority of the inhabitants voted for Germany. And the clause explicitly forbidding the union of Germany and Austria appeared to many Germans to deny them the right of self-determination ruthlessly





Fig. 50. Linguistic map of the Polish Corridor (1918)

Based on G.S.G.S. 3703a, 1 : 1,500,000, *Poland : Ethnographical Map* (London, 1918).

Areas predominantly German-speaking are shaded. The boundaries are those of 1919.

applied by the Allies when it worked against Germany. Besides these grievances the cession of the Eupen and Malmédy districts to Belgium and the provision by which the Saar district was transferred to French control under a League of Nations Commission for fifteen years were comparatively small aggravations. But, as the direct result of the territorial provisions of the treaty, Germany lost 14·6% of her arable land, 74·5% of her iron ore, 68·1% of her zinc and 26% of her coal resources.

The Versailles treaty, however, contained much else that, as might have been expected, had found no place in President Wilson's liberal, and somewhat unrealistic, programme. Where the Fourteen Points spoke of 'a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims' (Point 5), the treaty provided for the detachment of her colonies from Germany and the creation of mandates for them, allotted to her enemies. The reduction of national armaments (Point 4) became a unilateral obligation imposed on Germany, by which her system of conscription was abolished and the great Prusso-German army was reduced to a force of 100,000 men, whose arms were to be controlled by a Disarmament Commission, whilst a large part of the German fleet was to be surrendered and in fact found a not ignoble end in Scapa Flow. By Article 231 of the treaty (the so-called 'War-Guilt' clause) 'the Allied Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage' which the Allies and their subjects had suffered 'as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies'. The obligation to pay reparations of enormous and unspecified amount was bad enough. The admission that the sole responsibility for the war rested on Germany and Austria was far worse. Finally, to enforce the treaty, Allied armies were to stand upon the Rhine for fifteen years and the Rhineland was to be permanently demilitarized (Fig. 51).

### *The Effects of the Treaty in Germany*

The terms of the treaty of Versailles came as a shattering blow to Germany as a whole and to the Republican parties in particular. Though the army leaders, including Hindenburg, advised that resistance was impossible, and though Hermann Müller, the Social Democrat, and Johannes Bell, the Centrist, deserved honour rather than obloquy for taking the responsibility of signature on their shoulders, the Right used the enforced acceptance of the treaty by the Social Democrats and Centre—the Democrats temporarily withdrew from the government rather than accept responsibility—utterly unscrupulously in the years that followed. The legend was assiduously developed that the army had been 'stabbed in the back', and that Germany's defeat had been ensured by the 'November Criminals' of the 'Black International'—the Catholic Centre—and the 'Red International'—the Social Democrats. Behind, or associated with, both was the 'Yellow International' of the Jews. The fact that Hugo Preuss, the





Fig. 51. Western Germany in 1919

Based on Bowman, I., *The New World*, p. 156 (fourth edition, New York, 1928). The areas on the left bank of the Rhine held by the various armies of occupation are indicated.

Democrat, who drafted the Weimar constitution, was a Jew was not forgotten, whilst Walter Rathenau, the Jewish director of A.E.G. (see p. 208), who had with Moellendorff organized German war industry, and did fine work as Minister of Reconstruction after the war, was assassinated (1922).

One reason, indeed, of the ultimate failure of the Weimar Republic was the impunity which the constitutional parties allowed to its enemies. They made no attempt to purge the bureaucracy or the judiciary, and were unable to protect their own supporters from reactionary judges, or to secure adequate punishment of the violent young nationalists who committed 'patriotic' crimes. This attitude of weakness was, in part, due to the strict adherence to legality which was part of the creed of the Centre, Social Democrats and Democrats alike. But it was also due to the deeply ingrained desire for order on the political left and to their reliance on 'national' elements, including the new army (*Reichswehr*), to suppress internal disorders, of which Noske's use of the *Freikorps* was the first example.

### *The Enemies of the Republic*

This situation was exploited to the full by the enemies of the Republic from the first. The landowners and industrialists had been left in possession of their estates and factories by the revolution, the Officers' Corps reconstituted itself and chose with meticulous care the N.C.O.s and men of the new army (the *Reichswehr*), and all alike regarded it as a patriotic duty to give tacit or open support to the militant young patriots of the Free Corps organizations. As early as 15 January 1919, the leaders of German heavy industry—Krupp, Kirdorf, Stinnes, Vögler, Röchling and others—formed an Anti-Bolshevik League, to which they subscribed many millions of marks. These funds were used to finance the Free Corps and other extreme nationalist and anti-republican groups. From the first the leaders of heavy industry were aware that their great plants, largely extended during the four years of war, could not be kept going profitably under a pacific regime. Through the German National People's Party they, and the Prussian landowning class, interested in securing posts as officers and bureaucrats for their sons, fought their old battle for political, as well as social, predominance in the Reichstag. And, since they needed wider popular support to give strength to their claims, they encouraged all the ultra-nationalist political movements which were stimulated by the terms of the Versailles treaty.

*Inflation and International Crises*

From 1919 to 1924 the history of the German Republic is that of a series of crises over the Allies' demands for the fulfilment of the treaty. At each crisis the German government offers what resistance it can, and then, faced by an ultimatum, resigns, is painfully reconstructed—and gives way. International conferences in Paris and London (1921), in Cannes and Genoa (1922), followed in swift succession. By 1922 the German mark (the normal rate of which was 4 marks = 1 dollar) was already losing value, and the failure of yet another conference in London (December 1922) was followed by the decision of the Reparations Commission that Germany was in default (28 December 1922) and by the French occupation of the Ruhr (January 1923). From that moment the inflation of the mark became catastrophic. Even by January 1922 a dollar could buy 191·8 marks; by January 1923 the dollar rate was 17,972·0, after which it raced towards infinity so that, in November 1923, it had become virtually worthless, since one dollar could then buy 4,200,000,000 marks.

Meanwhile the internal enemies of the Republic had been active. As early as March 1920, a Pan-German agrarian official, Kapp, had led a rising in Berlin with the support of Ehrhardt's Marine Brigade, a Free Corps organization, whose suppression was demanded by the Allies. The government moved first to Dresden and then to Stuttgart. The new Reichswehr stood neutral in the conflict, but the civil servants in the ministries refused to take Kapp's orders. When a general strike of the workers took place Kapp's position became impossible and his movement collapsed. But the events which followed showed clearly the weakness of the democratic Republic. For, whilst the 'red' workers of the Ruhr district, who had broken out in revolt against Kapp's supporters, were bloodily suppressed by the Reichswehr and by some of the Free Corps troops who had supported Kapp, Ehrhardt's brigade received no punishment. The trade unions, whose intervention had been decisive in saving the Republic, received promises of further democratization of the army, police and civil service, and of measures for socializing industry. But none of these promises were carried out, and the elections of 1920 (p. 243) showed that the credit of the republican parties had suffered severely and that the gainers from the Kapp *putsch* were the parties of the Right. One of the results of the affair was that Noske lost the office of Reichswehr Minister, and was relegated to be *Oberpräsident* of Hanover. But, since his place was taken by Gessler, a Democrat

politician, who gave the Reichswehr generals a very free hand and spared them inconvenient inquiries into their activities, the cause of the Republic was not strengthened.

The Kapp *putsch* showed, then, that radical republicans could expect little protection from the Republic, and that 'national' groups had little to fear. For the next two years these groups of militant young patriots, estimated to have numbered 300,000 men at one stage, based themselves on Bavaria, where a very reactionary government held office. A series of assassinations of republican leaders took place. That of Rathenau has already been mentioned (see p. 250), but Erzberger, the leader of the armistice delegation, was murdered in 1921, threats were made against Ebert's life and an attempt made on Scheidemann. And when, after Erzberger's murder, the government sought (September 1921) to take stronger powers against the perpetrators of these outrages, they were met by fierce opposition from the Right, and by threats of secession from Bavaria.

Throughout 1921–2, especially after the Allied decision to partition Upper Silesia, this internal tension continued and the occupation of the Ruhr (January 1923), followed by the hopeless inflation of the mark, brought the Republic to the verge of chaos. In the Rhineland the French were attempting to set up separatist states, in the Ruhr the workers carried on passive resistance against the occupying forces, in Saxony and Thuringia militant Socialist-Communist governments came into power, whilst in Bavaria, Kahr and General von Lossow played with the idea of nationalist counter-revolution at the moment of their country's greatest need for unity. The crisis was so profound that at length counsels of moderation gained a hearing in France, and, in Germany, Gustav Stresemann, of the German People's Party, showed the wisdom and courage which differentiate the statesman from the politician. On 13 August 1923, Stresemann took office and, having called off passive resistance and entered into negotiations with the Allies—themselves frightened by the results of their policy—prepared to deal with the extremists of Right and Left in Germany itself.

## The Stresemann Period, 1923–9

Stresemann's first task was to assert the authority of the central government. In October the Bavarian reactionary Prime Minister Kahr virtually declared war on the Reich by taking over the Reichswehr in Bavaria, with General von Lossow at its head, as 'trustee

for the German people'. At the same time this treasonable attitude was made worse by the concentration in and around Bavaria of racial-nationalist bands, with which Kahr was in touch, amongst them Hitler's group of National-Socialists, to which Ludendorff gave the authority of his great reputation.

*Hitler's Munich Putsch*

Possibly to make intervention against the Bavarian nationalists more palatable the Reichswehr was ordered by Stresemann to suppress the Socialist-Communist governments in Saxony and Thuringia (29 October)—an entirely unconstitutional action. It was still possible, however, that the Bavarian government and the extreme nationalist bands might attempt a coup against the Reich, and Hitler sought to secure this by bursting into a meeting addressed by Kahr in the Bürgerbräu Cellar at Munich on the evening of 8 November and forcing Kahr and Lossow at the pistol's point to declare for a march on Berlin. Once freed from compulsion, however, the Bavarian leaders withdrew their support and Hitler's demonstration on the morning of 9 November was met by the armed force of the Reichswehr and the police. A few volleys decided the issue. After a dozen of his followers had been killed Hitler fled for his life and the demonstration dispersed. Hitler's first bid for power had failed ignominiously. But, as in the case of the Kapp *putsch*, republican justice proved miserably weak against the counter-revolutionaries of the Right. Kahr and Lossow were not even charged with any crime, and Hitler's sentence of detention in a fortress, nominally for five years, reduced in fact to less than a year, was justly described by Heiden as 'virtually judicial praise' of his *putsch*.

Nevertheless, Stresemann had accomplished his purpose. Both Right and Left extremists were, for the moment, subdued, and he was able to turn to the task of stabilizing the mark, of treating with the Allies for a settlement of the reparations question, and of recovering for Germany her place among the Great Powers of Europe. His task was made possible by the fact that the United States, though still unwilling to join the League of Nations, was ready to take part in the economic rehabilitation of Germany, in order to find some outlet for her own excessive gold reserves, and markets in Europe for her industrial production. By April 1924 the Dawes Plan was published, the German government was promised an immediate loan of 800 million gold marks, and, though the final reparations total remained unsettled, annual payments of a size within Germany's

capacity to pay—so long as American support continued—were fixed. A price, it is true, had to be paid for this assistance. The German railways and the Reichsbank were removed from Reich control, and the Reparations Commission, under an American financier, Parker Gilbert, exercised a considerable degree of supervision over the finances of the Republic. But at least an air of financial stability was given to German economic life, and for the next five years (1924–9), the country enjoyed a somewhat spurious prosperity.

Yet the relatively peaceful years of Stresemann's rule owed their tranquillity largely to the exhaustion of the whole of German society after the inflation period, and to the fact that the great industrialists themselves moderated their hostility to the Republic whilst it was ruled by a nationalist leader. For, so long as American loans poured in, they were busy in exploiting the situation, and the continuance of the loans depended upon internal tranquillity in Germany.

*The Effects of the Inflation*

But the effects of the inflation did not quickly disappear. Whether it was in fact engineered by the great agrarians and industrialists for their own ends it is not possible to say certainly. But it is certain that they profited from it, whereas the middle and working classes suffered severely. The landowners and peasants could discharge their debts and mortgages in worthless marks, and the great cartels and banks did the same for the big industrial plants. But the small capitalist lost his savings, the trade unions their funds, and the wages of the working class never kept pace with the decline of the currency. The social effect of the inflation was catastrophic, especially in reducing the middle class to a 'proletarian' condition. And it lowered the tone of all German social and commercial life by creating a condition of affairs in which the clever speculator alone prospered. It also strengthened greatly the control of the highly concentrated heavy and chemical industries over the German economy. As early as December 1923, in a lecture before London University, Brig.-Gen. J. H. Morgan, who had served on the Disarmament Commission for four years, said of the inflation: 'It has destroyed the equipoise of society. It has ruined the middle classes and impoverished the workers....It has been a tremendous solvent of society. It is not merely that thrift...has disappeared....The thrifty themselves have gone under.' And he added that the inflation had 'undermined the political basis of the Republic and concentrated all real power in the hands of a few—namely, the great industrialists...in no country

in the world is capital so strong or politically so despotic. The economic form of society fails to correspond to the political theory: a republic in name, it is a capitalist despotism in fact.' Such a situation, especially where a people is politically inexperienced, provides the ideal opportunity for a demagogue lavish in promises and willing to arouse primitive emotions.

For the time being, however, the parties of the Right, among which the Bavarian People's Party and a section of the Centre Party must be counted in Reich politics after 1924, were content to rule by constitutional methods and even to make considerable concessions to the workers. If, in 1925, *I.G. Farbenindustrie* incorporated several rival dye corporations into itself, and in 1926, heavy industry concentrated its power still further by forming the *Vereinigte Stahlwerke*, a merger of four large steel concerns in western Germany, the level of workers' wages also rose steadily during these years, the trade unions revived and began to build up their funds and, in 1926, the Social Democratic Party was able to secure the passage of a law providing for unemployment insurance.*

*Stresemann's Policy*

In truth, nationalist though he was, Stresemann was far more liberal than most of his own party, to say nothing of the German Nationalists, and he sincerely desired to strengthen Germany internally by promoting co-operation between the classes, and between the parties which represented them in the Reichstag. For only a stable German government, in command of a firm majority in the Reichstag, could enable him to carry through his foreign policy.

That policy aimed at breaking the encirclement of Germany, which had resulted from her defeat, by securing the friendship of England and, if possible, of France, as the necessary preliminary to the evacuation of the Rhineland at the earliest possible date, and to a reasonable and final settlement of the reparations problem. Only when that had been done, and when Germany had resumed her place in the councils of Europe, could the problems of revision of the eastern (Polish) frontier be approached with hope of success. The pacts of Locarno (October 1925) by which England, France, Italy and Germany all guaranteed the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers represented the first part of his aims and were followed, though after an unfortunate delay due to rival claims, by

* A fuller account of economic developments in Germany during the years 1919-39 will appear in Volume III.

Germany's entry into the League with a permanent seat upon the Council (September 1926). The agreement at Locarno also brought with it a reduction in the number, and cost to Germany, of the occupation forces in the Rhineland and the evacuation of Cologne by the British (30 January 1926), and at the beginning of 1927 the Inter-Allied Commission of control of German armaments was withdrawn.

But, though these were successes of real importance for Germany, Stresemann was unable to follow them up. The French, prevented from gaining permanent control of the Rhine, and deeply conscious of their inferiority in population and productive capacity to the Germans, had only temporarily accepted the conciliatory policy cautiously expressed by Herriot at Geneva in 1924. To them the Locarno pacts, with their free acceptance of the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and the joint guarantee by England, Italy and Germany herself of the French eastern frontier, represented the minimum which France could justly be expected to claim and, if there were many in Germany who thought that Stresemann had conceded too much at Locarno, there were those in France who thought that Briand had claimed too little. In July 1926 Poincaré, who had been largely responsible for the occupation of the Ruhr, again became Prime Minister in France, and throughout 1927 German relations with both France and England became cooler, so that Locarno produced no further fruits. By the beginning of 1928 Stresemann was complaining bitterly of the failure of the Allies to provide the further concessions to which he felt that his policy of fulfilment entitled him, and, under the pressure of ill-health, his impatience for results led him, on 30 October, to send a demand for a new and final settlement of the reparations issue. In December the Allied Powers agreed, and a committee of experts was appointed which produced the Young Plan on 7 June 1929. In August, at the Hague Conference, Stresemann accepted the proposals and secured also the immediate evacuation of the Rhineland by the British and Belgian contingents, and the withdrawal of the French forces, 'if it is physically possible', by the end of June 1930. Desperately ill Stresemann forced himself to Geneva for the League Assembly in September, but on 2 October 1929 he died.

With the perspective we have acquired from later events it is reasonable to hold that Stresemann was 'happy in the hour of his death', for it is more than possible that not even his personality could have held in check the forces which, in the next four years,

overwhelmed the Republic. It is possible, also, that his policy of conditional fulfilment was fundamentally mistaken. It was based on a long-term view of a gradual and peaceful rehabilitation of Germany as a member of the European community, but there were few of his countrymen capable of a long-term view at the best of times, and almost none during the economic crisis into which the world was soon to be plunged. Yet there can be little doubt that Stresemann's death in 1929, and the loss of his great personal influence in international affairs, were a disaster not only for Germany but for Europe and the world.

## The Young Plan and its Opponents

Superficially, one of the more hopeful signs of greater stability in Germany during the Stresemann period was that, under the pressure of his personality, the German National People's Party had temporarily abandoned its purely anti-republican attitude and had formed part of a government coalition both in 1925 and in 1927. Both Hugenberg and Seldte, the leader of the semi-military *Stahlhelm*, had opposed this policy, however, and the party had withdrawn from the government rather than share in the responsibility of the Locarno pacts. But the mere fact of participating in a republican government appeared to show that even the extreme Right had come to the conclusion that the Republic had come to stay. The election of Hindenburg as President in succession to Ebert, who died in 1925, had assisted the Nationalists to take this decision, for, if the aged general found it compatible with his conscience to serve the Republic in serving Germany, it was somewhat ridiculous for other Nationalists to be *plus royaliste que le roi.*

The relative economic prosperity of Germany during these years was another vital factor in this apparent stability. Germany received loans from abroad between 1924 and 1929 to the tune of 25,000 million gold marks, whilst the total of her reparations payments under the Dawes Plan for the same period was under 8,000 million. With the surplus she was able to re-equip her industries, to indulge in large public works and municipal enterprises, to subsidize her agriculture, and to rebuild her export trade. In 1930 the value of her exports was a third greater than in 1914 and, despite her territorial losses, she produced considerably more pig iron and steel in 1929 than in 1913. Under these circumstances the great agrarians and the industrial magnates, rationalizing and re-equipping their

plants, had good reason to be satisfied with the Republic. They could not reasonably complain because their workpeople shared in this flow of gold from abroad through better wages, better municipal services, and the new unemployment insurance payments in times of slack trade, or because the trade union movement was also recuperating.

*Nationalist Opposition to the Young Plan*

Yet many of the Nationalists, and Hugenberg in particular, were dissatisfied. To them Stresemann's policy of fulfilment meant betrayal of the national cause. The Locarno guarantee of the western frontier sealed the loss of Alsace-Lorraine; membership of the League implied acceptance of the idea of an international order repugnant to their belief in militarist expansionism and, what was worse, it involved acceptance of the treaty of Versailles. So strong was their section that, before Stresemann's death, the division in the German Nationalist Party had enabled Hugenberg, now in command of a great press organization, to become the official leader of the party (1928), and the first use this irreconcilable old Pan-German extremist made of his victory was to link hands with Hitler in a campaign for a referendum against the Young Plan. The measure they put forward was entitled, 'Bill against the Young Plan and the War-Guilt Lie'. Its fourth clause denounced Stresemann and those who had negotiated the Young Plan as guilty of treason. And the campaign itself was conducted both by Hugenberg and by Hitler and his followers with an unscrupulous bitterness and violence against the dying Stresemann and all who had supported him, which promised ill for Germany and Europe if once the 'national alliance' obtained effective power. Less than six million voters supported the Hugenberg-Hitler referendum—hardly more than one-third of the votes necessary to pass it. Yet the alliance of the German Nationalists with the National-Socialists on this issue marks the turning point in Hitler's fortunes and the first stage in the final downfall of the German Republic.

## National-Socialism before 1929

The German Workers' Party, which later (1920) became the National Socialist German Workers' Party (*National-Sozialistische-Deutsche-Arbeiter-Partei*), known by its initials as N.S.D.A.P., was founded by an independent craftsman Anton Drexler (or Drechsler), whose political ideas were a mixture of naïve nationalism and a desire to protect the small man. But Drexler's little group would have had

no importance if it had not been captured by Hitler, for there were many similar small groups and, to be successful in the competition between them, a man of political genius was required.

*Hitler's Early Career*

Hitler was born on 20 April 1889, at Braunau on the Austrian-Bavarian frontier. His father, Alois Schicklgrüber, who assumed the surname Hitler in 1877, was illegitimate, so that inquiries into the Führer's paternal ancestry are fruitless. But it is not unimportant that Hitler's father, brought up as a shoemaker, managed to become a customs official under the Austrian government, or that Hitler was educated in Linz under a teacher of history, who, though Austrian, shared the Pan-German outlook of Schönerer and his party (see p. 219). Born into the lower-middle class, bred in ideas of extreme nationalism, the death of his parents left him, at the age of nineteen, faced with the problem of earning a living though, having been idle at school, without any qualifications for doing so.

For three years Hitler lived in Vienna as a proletarian in a 'men's hostel', or doss-house, earning a scanty living by odd jobs as a house-painter, but always, if his own account may be accepted, deeply concerned with politics. He learned to hate, but to understand, both the working class, whose trade unions he refused to join, and the Jews. And, from Lueger, the burgomaster of Vienna, he learnt most of the tactics and principles of politics which he was later to put into effect. In Lueger's Christian Social (*Christlich-Sozial*) party, 'Christlich' was synonymous with anti-semitic, and 'Sozial' with protection of the lower-middle class and peasantry against capitalists and proletarians alike. Thus, in Vienna, Hitler learnt to hate internationalism as represented by the hotch-potch of races in the old Austria, to despise the Hapsburgs, to adopt Pan-Germanism, and, above all, to hate the Jews with deep loathing and to regard them as the real force behind the Social-Democratic movement, and as, in his own words, 'the eternal fissure-fungus of humanity'.

In 1912, Hitler moved to Munich and managed to live a somewhat more tolerable life until war broke out in 1914, when, though an Austrian citizen, he was permitted to join a Bavarian regiment and served as orderly on its headquarters staff. He was made a lance-corporal, wounded once and gassed, and received the Iron Cross. In 1918–19 he was still in a reserve battalion of his regiment, and it was the Reichswehr which sent him to effect a political liaison

with the little German Workers' Party, and supported him financially as a propagandist of nationalist views amongst the working class. In July 1919, Drexler invited him to become a member of the party executive and he became No. 7 in that body.

The new member brought with him not only the fixed ideas of Pan-Germanism, anti-semitism and hatred of social democracy, but also an unlimited ambition, an intense propagandist energy, a hypnotic power of mass oratory, and a profound understanding of political tactics which was combined with a gambler's readiness to dare everything to attain his ends. What was equally important, he brought the backing of the Reichswehr, and later of the Bavarian reactionary government under Kahr, as well as subsidies from the Munich nationalists and from other sources such as the Anti-Bolshevik League. He was able to secure assistance from wealthy families like the Hanfstaengl's and from intellectuals and ex-officers like Dietrich Eckart, Hermann Esser and Captain Röhm, who moved in circles far more influential than any in which Drexler had influence, and, by his untiring energy as a propagandist and the ruthlessness of his methods, he became the indispensable leader of the group. By 1921 he had established his mastery and had become Führer, with Drexler relegated to an honorary presidency, and had already begun to knit connection with similar groups, and to establish branch organizations outside Bavaria.

From the first the N.S.D.A.P. under Hitler distinguished itself from the many similar groups by the ruthlessness of its methods. After a Munich Rabbi had appeared on Hitler's platform to protest against his grotesque slanders of the Jews the Nazi meetings displayed a notice 'Jews not admitted' and, from ejecting opponents forcibly from their own meetings, the party soon passed to breaking up forcibly the meetings of their rivals. The semi-military S.A., an organization of young men ready for any violence required, might begin as a *Schutz-Abteilung* (Protective Detachment), but soon earned the right to be regarded as a *Sturm-Abteilung* (Assault Detachment). In the hands of Captain Röhm it aspired to be more—the vanguard of a military organization, closely allied with the Reichswehr and the other Free Corps bodies, and aspiring to the role of the troops of the counter-revolution.

*After the Munich 'Putsch'*

The fiasco of 1923 (see p. 253) cured Hitler, though not Röhm, of this dream. Despite the countenance of Ludendorff he had failed.

But, as was his wont, he turned failure into success by his persistence and propagandist genius. He set to work, with the assistance of Hess, to formulate his political ideas in *Mein Kampf*, and he emerged from the Landsberg fortress more mature, more patient, but also more fundamentally ruthless and determined than before. The *putsch* had taught him that the time for open violence was not yet, and that the Reichswehr itself would not engage in open opposition to the legally established state. He would, therefore, accept the situation and the jeers of his less intelligent supporters against *Adolf Légalité*, but he was all the more determined to attain power in the end and to use it, in the hour of his triumph, with utter ruthlessness against all his opponents.

Yet, when Hitler was released in December 1924, his position was precarious. The 'unalterable programme' of February 1920, though it contained a *Gross-deutsch* demand for the unity of all Germans in one state, an anti-semitic clause promising exclusion of Jews from full citizenship, and a denunciation of the parliamentary party system of the Republic—all points with which the German Nationalist Party agreed—also contained a rather confused socialism which was borne out in practice by the fact that, within the S.S. and S.A., and in the party organization in general, the sharp social divisions, inherited from imperial Germany, were largely ignored. Moreover, the best organizer of the small party, Gregor Strasser, had already begun to build up in Berlin and north Germany a party machine and a following which took the socialist aspects of the party programme seriously.

Between 1925 and 1928 Hitler triumphed over these difficulties. He established himself as sole leader to whose decisions all members of the party were subordinate. He captured Goebbels, whom Strasser had put in charge of the Berlin movement, for himself. He got rid of Röhm temporarily, because he recognized that the Reichswehr would not, after 1923, tolerate a rival military organization. He created the S.S. (*Schutzstaffel*) as a special Body of Guards bound by an oath of loyalty to his person. By the end of 1926 the party organization was firmly in his hand.

Yet, though both the party and its organizations were growing, it was still a tiny minority in Germany. By 1928, Nazi Lawyers', Teachers' and Physicians' Associations had been created, and there was also a Hitler Youth organization. But the party membership in 1927 was a mere 40,000, and the difficulties of developing its hold by propagandist activities were increased by the reluctance both of

the Reichswehr and the great capitalists to disturb the peace of the Republic, upon which the flow of foreign loans and the conditions favourable to large profits depended. When, therefore, in 1929, Hugenberg offered him alliance and the support of his syndicated press for a campaign against the Young Plan, Hitler was at once ready to grasp the proffered hand. His Left-wing supporters, Gregor and Otto Strasser, and their following, might look askance at an alliance with a peculiarly ruthless capitalist and his associates. But, for Hitler, the socialist side of his movement meant nothing—except as a drug for the masses. His heart and soul were in the pursuit of power, in the creation of a Great Germany, in the ruthless elimination of all opponents, beginning with the Jews. The referendum against the Young Plan satisfied all his desires. He could denounce the Versailles *Diktat*; the 'November criminals', who had 'betrayed' Germany; the Weimar system, which enabled these 'betrayers' of Germany to exploit their country and to sacrifice its interests to the foreign capitalists—again, of course, mainly Jews—who sought to place the German people under permanent 'interest slavery' in the form of reparations. And, in all this, he could rely on Hugenberg's press to report his speeches and on the funds of Hugenberg and the heavy industrialists to pay his party's expenses. It is small wonder that he welcomed and accepted Hugenberg's proposal.

### Nazis, Nationalists and the Economic Crisis

The result of the Young Plan referendum was to convert the Nazi Party from a small group into a nation-wide organization of the first importance. This result was, in part, due to the support which Hugenberg's national press was bound to give to its allies during the campaign, in part to the new sources of financial assistance which that campaign brought with it. In 1928–9 Hitler had broken up Strasser's semi-socialist organization in the Ruhr district. He had got into touch with the great iron and steel magnate, Emil Kirdorf, through Dr Otto Dietrich, and, in 1929, Kirdorf attended the Nuremberg Congress of the party as a guest of honour. From that moment funds from heavy industry began to flow into Hitler's coffers, for the coal and iron magnates learnt to recognize that the socialism in the N.S.D.A.P. programme did not interest its leader, and that Hitler was, in fact, as 'pure' a patriot as themselves.

But it was not mainly the support of heavy industry which changed the position of the Nazi Party in Germany. It was the collapse of

the Stresemann system, owing to the economic crisis of 1929–30, which seemed to show that, in their contention that Germany could not pay the reparations provided for under the Young Plan, Hitler and Hugenberg were right and Stresemann and his supporters wrong. Even before the Young Plan was passed by the Reichstag the flow of foreign capital to Germany had begun to diminish. But, in the autumn of 1929, a world economic crisis of the most severe kind began to develop after a crash in values in Wall Street. Germany's import of foreign capital in 1928 was still over 5,000 million Rm., but in 1929 that sum was halved and, in 1930, reached only 700 million Rm. Not only did foreign investment in Germany fall away but many of the short-term American loans, which had been taken up and used with equal recklessness by industrialists and municipalities for long-term purposes, began to be called in. As a result a state of economic instability developed in Germany, so that unemployment rose sharply, confidence in the banks and the currency was shaken and, by the end of 1930, the whole German economic system seemed threatened with breakdown.

| | Percentage of trade union members | |
|---|---|---|
| | Wholly unemployed | On short time |
| 1929 | 14·6 | 9·4 |
| 1930 | 24·4 | 16·2 |
| 1931 | 37·0 | 21·7 |
| 1932 (first half) | 48·0 | 24·2 |

*Source :* Roll, Erich, *Spotlight on Germany*, p. 187 (London, 1933).

In this situation it was not surprising that fears of a second inflation should be widespread, nor that an over-simplified explanation, which cast all the blame on the bourgeois-socialist Republic, should have been accepted, particularly by the young and by those who had previously been indifferent to politics. Already aroused by the burning patriotic eloquence of Hitler and Goebbels against the Young Plan these elements poured into the ranks of the party and the S.A. in the winter of 1929–30. When the Centre Party Chancellor, Brüning, who had taken office without a majority to deal with the crisis and had already begun to rule by presidential decree under Article 48 of the Constitution, appealed to the country in September 1930, the Nazis who, in 1928, had secured only 12 seats in the Reichstag with 810,000 votes were now supported by over six million voters and became a party of 107 members, second only in size to the Social Democrats.

*Brüning and the Depression*

After the elections of 1930 it is doubtful if anything could have saved the German Republic, except a great economic revival, which did not come. In the Reichstag three parties, on principle opposed to parliamentary government, Hugenberg's Nationalists, the Nazis and the Communists, who had grown to 77 members, came near forming a majority of the whole body. Brüning, a noble if rigid character, without a shred of popular appeal, pursued a policy of stiff deflation, which involved the drastic reduction of all social services, including the cutting down of unemployment benefit at the time when it was most needed. The Social Democrats were without any policy at all, except that of supporting Brüning, lest worse should befall. The Communists, loudly revolutionary in speech, were, and their leaders knew it, too few, too ill-organized and too badly armed to have any chance of carrying through a revolution of their own. On the other side, as the economic crisis deepened, the old Nationalists were divided. The aged President and the Reichswehr generals feared the effects of Nazi radicalism in the army. One wing of the Nationalist Party, under Count Westarp, broke with Hugenberg, and many more feared the violence of Hitler and his followers. But others, some of the great landowners and many of the industrialists among them, saw in the rise of the Nazis the heaven-sent opportunity of overthrowing the Republic itself and of capturing for reaction a great party which could give the cause of Nationalism what it had always lacked—the support of the masses.

It was this division in the governing class, more than any other single factor, which at once facilitated and delayed Hitler's accession to power. From 1930 to 1932, Brüning continued to rule by decree and to cut down the expenses of the state in every direction, whilst unemployment grew with menacing rapidity from 4,500,000 at the end of 1931 to over six million at the beginning of 1933. At the same time Brüning supported German agriculture by high tariffs and by the *Osthilfe* (Eastern Help) Fund, which subsidized the agrarians of East Prussia, and which some of them shamelessly abused. Brüning also supported industrial concerns in difficulties by buying up their shares for the state at inflated prices or, as in the case of the Danat (*Darmstädter und National Bank*), by taking over their assets and merging them with other institutions.

*Hitler and the Crisis*

But though, during 1931–2, the reparations question was at last solving itself through the increasingly obvious inability of Germany to pay, and though the economic crisis was at least as severe in the United States as in Germany, Hitler continued a raging propaganda against the Versailles treaty and the Weimar system as the cause of all German miseries. The youth of Germany, unemployed, without hope of employment and without the parental savings, lost in the inflation, to fall back on, streamed into the S.A. which at least gave them a uniform, drilling, street fighting and processions as outlets for their energy, and a minimum of pay on which to live. But Hitler also gave them new hope. Out of the chaos of this defeated, economically broken Germany, he promised in tones of fierce confidence to lead them into a promised land, greater, more powerful than the Germany of their fathers. *Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer*—the defeat of all their enemies internal and external, the reunion of all Germans in one great state, the destruction of Jews, capitalists, Marxists, the enemies of the German folk. He set before them the picture of a great united society of all patriotic Germans working together in harmony for the glory and prosperity of the Fatherland. It was this ideal to which German youth responded and for which, in fanatical devotion to its Führer, it was prepared to sacrifice its very life.

Neither Brüning, nor the Social Democrats, nor the German Nationalists themselves, bound to the old system of military-economic dominance, could compete with this appeal. The membership of the Nazi Party rose rapidly (120,000, 1929; 200,000, 1930; 800,000, 1931), and its private army, which Röhm was recalled to command, consisting of fit and vigorous young men, numbered 600,000 by the beginning of 1932, and was an aggressive force as compared with the middle-aged, defensively minded, members of the Nationalist *Stahlhelm* or the Republican *Reichsbanner*. Street fights between young Nazis and Communists became a daily occurrence, and the tension inside Germany grew as the social misery deepened. Early in 1932 Hitler was given the opportunity of showing his strength to his opponents. Hindenburg's term of office was at an end and a new election had to be held. With some hesitation Hitler decided to oppose the old President, and the Communist leader Thälmann also stood. The final vote (10 April 1932) gave Hindenburg 19 million votes, Hitler 13 million and Thälmann less

than 4 million. Since Centre and Social Democrats as well as sections of the Right stood behind Hindenburg it was evident that many of the supporters of Hugenberg, as well as millions of those who had not voted before, and some who had voted Communist, must have voted for Hitler.

By this time Hitler was enjoying support from German heavy industry. In 1931, Kirdorf had secured for the Nazis a levy of 50 pfennig on every ton of coal sold by the German Coal Trust, and, in January 1932, a meeting of the Düsseldorf Industrial Club, at which Thyssen, Vögler, Röchling and other coal, iron and steel magnates were present, decided, after a masterly speech by Hitler, that they had common interests with the Nazis in rearmament, social reorganization (by which they meant the destruction of the trade unions) and economic imperialism. Such relations with big industry were not known to Hitler's rank and file or, if known, were regarded as evidence of his skill in duping the old bourgeoisie. And the size of his poll at the presidential election served only to whet his own followers' appetite for power.

## The 'Presidential' Experiment and the 'National Revolution'

Hindenburg's re-election as President, largely by Centre and Social Democrat votes, might have been expected to ensure his support for Brüning's government which he had himself called to office. But, in May 1932, he refused his assent to decrees prepared by Brüning which would have reduced the *Osthilfe* subsidies and have provided for state acquisition of bankrupt estates for small holdings. And when Brüning and his cabinet resigned, Hindenburg embarked on a new, dangerous and definitely unconstitutional experiment by appointing a non-party 'presidential' cabinet of nobles—at once dubbed the 'Barons'—which had no basis in the Reichstag at all, for it excluded even Hugenberg and the German Nationalist Party. The leader of this government, Papen, was a Catholic noble allied by marriage with the Ruhr heavy industry, a born intriguer, a dilettante politician, and a man of great personal charm. But Papen's hope that his presidential cabinet would be tolerated by the Reichstag was at once shattered by the vehement refusal of all the Reichstag parties, including his own—the Centre—to give him any support.

Papen reaped the benefit of Brüning's work by the final settlement of the reparations problem at the Lausanne Conference (10 July), and some slight signs of an industrial revival were given the assistance

of government credits for industry. Yet mass unemployment and the social tension it created did not materially diminish. On 20 July he ejected the Social Democrat-Centre Coalition government in Prussia and made himself *Reichskommissar* for Prussia by presidential decree, thus gaining control, by wholly unconstitutional means, of the machinery of government in three-fifths of Germany. The failure of the Social Democrats to resist Papen's attack revealed their weakness, and the alarm aroused in the southern states, especially in Bavaria, was allayed by Papen's assurances that no similar steps would be taken against states (*Länder*) with 'national' governments.

Papen's action against Prussia was a conservative revolution, and its roots may be found in the ideas current in 1895 (p. 218). Yet Papen and Hindenburg were not ready to overthrow the constitution by force, and therefore a general election was necessary to secure tolerance for the ministry and to provide it with a legal basis. On 31 July, 84% of the German electorate went to the polls. The main parties returned with the following strength:

| | |
|---|---|
| National-Socialists ... ... ... | 230 |
| Nationalists ... ... ... ... | 37 |
| Centre (including Bavarians) ... | 97 |
| Social Democrats ... ... ... | 133 |
| Communists ... ... ... ... | 89 |
| All other parties together ... ... | 22 |
| | 608 |

The Nazis had more than doubled their poll and their mandates, and had seduced many of Hugenberg's former supporters. The parties which were anti-democratic on principle (Nazis, Nationalists, Communists) together commanded more than half the votes of the Reichstag (356 out of 608), a fact which, in itself, showed the weakness of the democratic idea. But, though Papen's government could count on no support at all in the Reichstag, to which, under the constitution, it was responsible, the divisions between the parties made the formation of any other government commanding a majority impossible.

Under the practice of the constitution, which he rejected in principle, Hitler, as leader of the largest party, could claim to form a government. His Storm-troopers, engaged in daily, and often fatal, affrays with Communists and Social Democrats, were growing impatient for power and the spoils of office. Yet, when Hindenburg gave him an audience on 13 August, and Hitler demanded the position which Mussolini had received from Victor Emmanuel after

the march on Rome, he received a sharp reprimand and a curt dismissal from the old President. Neither Hindenburg, nor General Schleicher and the Reichswehr, nor Papen himself, whose taste for power was growing, were ready to hand over the control of Germany to Corporal Hitler and his party. They would tame him and his followers before granting them even a share in the government.

*Divisions in the Governing Class*

But the small group of the governing class had no clear plan for solving the constitutional dilemma and they were divided amongst themselves. Schleicher and the Reichswehr were opposed to an open military dictatorship, yet neither they nor Papen could find support for 'presidential' government. As soon as the new Reichstag met it had to be dissolved and the situation became still more strained. The Nazis went into violent opposition and the magnates of heavy industry withdrew their subsidies from them. In the second elections of this year (November 1932) the Nazis lost thirty-four seats, and the party was faced with financial bankruptcy. Its reply was to join with the Communists in a tramway strike in Berlin in order to increase the alarm of the ruling and middle classes lest it should go to the Left. The ostentatious alliance of the Nazis with the Communists was not wholly convincing, but it had its effect upon Schleicher, to whom Gregor Strasser persistently pointed out the danger of the Nazi S.A. getting out of hand.

In this situation the divisions amongst the governing group played a decisive role in saving the situation for Hitler. In November Schleicher forced Papen to resign and on 2 December reluctantly took over the Chancellorship himself. He aimed at forming an inter-party coalition by splitting the Nazis, and by bringing in the Centre, the trade unions, and the more moderate members of the Right. He proclaimed himself in broadcasts as a 'social general' and offered a programme of state aid to finance employment and of land settlement in the eastern provinces. This raised the very issue of *Osthilfe* which had led to Brüning's fall, and Hindenburg was soon roused by his advisers, Papen among them, against Schleicher's proposals. Moreover, Papen had an alternative plan. Hitler was now in a more humble mood. Had not the time come to make him Chancellor, but a Chancellor in chains? A Nazi-Nationalist cabinet, of which Hitler would be the figure-head, but the ministers mainly Nationalists, would have the advantage of popular appeal and the possibility, by gaining the tolerance of the Centre, of a Reichstag majority, whilst

still resting on the President's authority. For this plan Papen gained the support of the agrarians and industrialists, to whom Schleicher's social policy seemed 'Bolshevik', and he also secured Hitler's assent at a meeting with him at Cologne. Under pressure from his son, a friend of Papen; from Meissner, his trusted secretary; from most of his personal friends, Hindenburg at last overcame his repugnance to the Austrian corporal. On 30 January 1933 Hitler entered the President's palace in Berlin and accepted office as 'presidential' Chancellor of a government, every post in which had to receive Hindenburg's approval. In the list of Ministers there appeared the names of only two Nazis beside his own—Frick, Minister of the Interior for the Reich, and Göring, Minister without portfolio in the Reich, but also, under Papen, Minister of the Interior in Prussia. Papen became Vice-Chancellor and remained Reichskommissar for Prussia, Hugenberg was Minister of Economics, Seldte—the *Stahlhelm* leader—Minister of Labour, whilst five of Papen's 'Cabinet of Barons' figured in the list, with Neurath at the Foreign Office and General Blomberg as Reichswehr Minister. Hitler had at last attained power but, so the Nationalists thought, only as the servant of the Conservative forces which had created and sustained the Reich.

*The Beginning of the Nazi Terror*

The Nationalist illusion was swiftly shattered. The long columns of Nazi Storm-troopers bearing torches, who marched, cheering and singing, through the streets of Berlin and other German cities on the night of 30 January, were the heralds of a revolution. A mounting wave of terror began to spread over Germany and the Reichstag fire (28 February) let loose the flood. In command of the Prussian police Göring authorized them to shoot without fear of consequences and enlisted thousands of young Nazis as *Hilfspolizei* (assistant police) to take what action they pleased against Communists and Socialists. On 2 March, Frick instituted *Schutzhaft* (protective custody)—imprisonment without trial in concentration camps. In the 'Brown Houses' of the Nazi Party in Berlin and other great cities Jews, Communists, Social Democrats, were beaten with rubber truncheons, and political murders grew rapidly in number. The last elections under the Weimar Constitution were carried through under this terror, and without the protection of the vital clauses of the constitution, suspended by Hindenburg on the night of the Reichstag fire, which guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, of public meeting,

and freedom from arrest. Though the Social Democrats and Communists returned 201 members to the Reichstag between them, the Communist deputies were excluded from taking part in its proceedings. When, on 23 March 1933, the German Reichstag passed an 'Enabling Act', which gave the Cabinet power to legislate on its own authority and, in effect, suspended the Constitution, only the Social Democrat party voted against it. Amidst many weaknesses and failures, both in political courage and judgment, that vote stands as the final witness of a great party against the destruction of the basis of legality in the German state.

The Nationalists in the government thought to safeguard their position by the clause declaring that the Enabling Act would be 'considered as annulled if the present government is replaced by another'. Yet, by the end of June, the Nazis had suppressed all political parties but their own; on 27 June, Hugenberg resigned, and on 14 July a Cabinet decree-law declared 'there is only one political party in Germany, the National-Socialist German Workers' Party'. The one-party state on the Russian or Italian model was now fully established. The 'national revolution' was, in principle, complete.

### Why did the Republic Fail?

In view of the future of Germany the reasons for the failure of the democratic Republic present a problem of great importance, which, for reasons of space, can only be dealt with inadequately here. Yet a brief examination reveals certain results. There has never been a successful revolutionary movement in Germany based on the desire for political and social liberty. The revolution of 1848 (see pp. 138–49) cost few lives and failed for lack of unity of aim and strength of purpose. That of November 1918 was, it has already been said, largely the result of defeat and war weariness and, when it occurred, the republican parties were more concerned to secure internal order than to break the power of the ruling classes of imperial Germany. The sense of reverence for the army, as the one great instrument of national unity, transcending all their social, religious and political differences, of which the Germans were acutely aware, survived the revolution and carried with it the acceptance of a hierarchical society in which leadership was the function of an 'officer' class, whether in the army or the civil service, in agriculture or in industry.

Before 1918 this ordered society had always directed its personal loyalties to the established ruler—the emperor, the kings (of Bavaria,

etc.), the grand-dukes, the army leaders. Even for men of the Left the transference of their emotional loyalty to the drab politicians of a bourgeois Republic was not easy. For the men of the Right it was, in many cases, impossible. The unfamiliar process of parliamentary government by parties, which the Bismarck system (pp. 188–90) had perforce turned into interest groups, was repugnant to all those who, under a strictly organized and largely military regime, had been accustomed to strong and decisive government and had been content to have their minds made up for them, in political matters, by their 'natural' leaders. They did not desire political responsibility for themselves and profoundly doubted the capacity of their new parliamentary leaders to exercise it for the nation.

The parliamentary system, too, intensified and brought to the surface the disunity of the German people. The religious cleavage between Protestants and Catholics, the historical tribal cleavages between Prussian, Bavarian and Saxon, the deep social cleavages between the classes, most fatal of all from the republican point of view, the political cleavage between Social Democrats, Minority Socialists and Communists in the working class, were all brought to the surface by the nature of a free political system. Under the regime of proportional representation (p. 318) adopted at Weimar the existing parties, which represented these internal differences, were guaranteed fair representation, but, for that very reason, no homogeneous government was at all likely to emerge from the Reichstag. As a result all parties alike lived in a condition of frustration. The Protestant-Nationalist-Monarchists of the Right could no more hope for the realization of their ideals than could the Social Democrats or Communists of theirs. The Centre Catholics became the hinge of the parliamentary machine, and the differences in social outlook between the various sections of their party rendered any clear policy, apart from the defence of Catholic interests—the very principle which made them obnoxious to the rest of the nation—impossible for them. Thus, within the Weimar system, there developed that condition of *stasis*, of party strife, which ruined the democracies of so many Greek states.

Hence, all the great political parties organized their private armies—German Nationalists had the *Stahlhelm*, the Social Democrats the *Reichsbanner*, the Nazis the S.S. and S.A., the Communists the *Rotkampfer* (Red Fighters). As a result the 'non-political' Reichswehr, deeply conservative in character, especially in the higher ranks, stood out as the one armed force which represented the state

above the parties, and was relied on by many, even among the members of the parties themselves, as the only safeguard against civil war.

Meanwhile, for both economic and political reasons, Germany needed that strong and decisive government which could only proceed from national unity. On the economic side the Versailles settlement by the limitation of German armaments, and by the 'Balkanization' of Europe, deprived the essentially expansionist German industry (see pp. 203–16) of many outlets and stimulated the desire for treaty revision. And, after the period of sham prosperity between 1924 and 1929 based on foreign loans, the sharp antagonism between the interests of the industrialists and the working class in Germany became more evident than ever. The owners desired state subsidies, an expansionist policy of rearmament, the reduction of wages and the destruction of trade unionism. The workers clung to the concessions won under the Republic. But the Republic itself could satisfy neither. Brüning's policy of financial orthodoxy, combined with limited bribes to the agrarians and big industry, as well as drastic cuts in the social services, neither gave the owners the opportunity of profits nor saved the unemployed workers from bitter distress and semi-starvation.

Nor, on the political side, could the Republic provide satisfaction in the all-important field of foreign affairs. The pressure applied by the Allies to secure reparations after 1918 was natural enough, but was fatal to the hope that the German Republic would strike roots deep among the people, for it was followed by the inflation which the masses could not fail to attribute to it. But the territorial settlement, and the 'war-guilt' clause (see p. 248), were also profound sources of weakness to the Republic. Even if the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France could be accepted, the separation of East Prussia from the Reich, the division of Upper Silesia, the prohibition of union with Austria, the loss of the fleet and the colonies, the one-sided disarmament provisions and other clauses of the treaty were difficult for any patriotic German to accept. And the attribution of the whole responsibility for the war of 1914–18 to Germany and her Allies was an invitation and opportunity unlikely to be missed by German nationalist propaganda. In so far as the Republic stood for the policy of fulfilment it stood condemned from the first in the minds of large sections of the German people.

Thus, lack of training and aptitude for responsible government; traditional adherence to an authoritarian system; the sense of internal

disunity enhanced by the party system in the Reich and in the states; economic difficulties and social distress; a sense of injustice at the treatment of 'democratic' Germany—all these things contributed to the downfall of the Republic and to the growing popularity of Hitler and his movement. And it was amongst the younger generation, who could not be accused of any responsibility for the war of 1914–18 but had to suffer its consequences, and to whom patriotic propaganda to throw off the yoke of the victors of 1918 had its strongest appeal, that the Nazi movement made its most rapid progress. Some idea of the relation of the parties to youth can be obtained from the following table. But only those who saw those energetic young S.A. and S.S. men in the thirties, burning for

*Distribution of members of the Reichstag in* 1930 *by age-groups*

| | Social Democrats | Centre | Nationalists | Communists | Nazis |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Over 70 | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 | — |
| 50–70 | 73 | 36 | 27 | 1 | 12 |
| 40–50 | 49 | 22 | 10 | 20 | 21 |
| 30–40 | 20 | 7 | 2 | 47 | 63 |
| Under 30 | — | — | 1 | 8 | 9 |

Source : Neumann, S., *Die deutschen Parteien* (Berlin, 1932).

action to restore the glories of Germany, and convinced beyond reason that the 'system' of Weimar in its weakness and division was responsible for all their country's woes, can fully understand the dynamic force which converted Hitler's nomination to the Chancellorship from a mere change of government into the German national revolution with all its dangerous implications for the world.

## NATIONAL-SOCIALIST GERMANY

### The Meaning of Hitlerism

The deepest significance of the National-Socialist movement, then, is that it aimed at securing at long last the complete unification of the German people—in outward institutions and in inner spiritual belief. For that very reason it insisted increasingly that it, and it alone, was a great movement of the mind and soul of the German people (*Volksbewegung*) and not merely a new political party amongst

many rival parties. It sought to transcend all the deep divisions of tribe and class, of religious and political creeds, amongst Germans, and to unite them in fanatical trust both in the mission and future of their country and in the God-given infallible personality of the leader, Hitler.

Since the movement aimed at action based on emotional faith it was essentially anti-intellectual, for reasoning involved divisions of opinion fatal to unity. Since its purpose was German greatness in the sense of military and economic power, it was indifferent to objective truth and would only admit as 'true' such facts, or ideas, as assisted its aim. Moreover, the useful lie, which, as Hitler explained in *Mein Kampf*, is usually the Great Lie, was justified, as were all other means—brutal cruelty, breach of faith, bribery or blackmail or terror—which would assist in attaining the supreme political aim.

Since, too, this aim necessarily involved the disruption of the European order imposed by the Versailles *Diktat* and, therefore, one or more wars, and since these wars, themselves the inevitable product of the underlying law of struggle (*Kampf*) from which only the weak amongst mankind seek to escape, would certainly be 'total' wars, the German *Volk* and all its resources must be organized as a single vast politico-military army. In every sphere the 'fundamental principle that, in its day, made the Prussian army the most wonderful instrument of the German people...must become the basis of our whole conception of the state: Authority of every leader over those below him. Responsibility to those above him' (*Mein Kampf*).

It is in the light of these principles that Nazi doctrine and practice become intelligible. The doctrine of purity of race (see pp. 1–17) served as a stimulus to national pride (the *Herrenrasse*—race of Masters), to physical fitness, and to the desire for children to replenish the chosen stock. The anti-Jewish campaign represented the obverse of this—hatred of mixed marriage—but, not only did it serve as a measure to preserve German 'racial' purity, it also provided a divided people with that great aid to unity—a common object of hate, a scapegoat, upon whom the responsibility for all the woes of Germany could be heaped. The religious question (see pp. 51–62) presented greater difficulties to national unity, which Hitler has never been able to solve satisfactorily, but in education (see pp. 405–21) the process of capturing the mind of the younger generation for the Nazi faith has been pursued with the greatest energy.

## The Policy of Co-ordination

In the wide field of political, economic and social policy and institutions, the creation of national unity and the organization of the centralized politico-military state were carried through, between 1933 and 1939, with ruthless vigour and a high degree of completeness. The process was described as *Gleichschaltung* (co-ordination) and the sanction behind it was terror. The Gestapo (*Geheime Staatspolizei*) created by Göring (April–November 1933) was organized with German thoroughness (see Chapter VI, pp. 344–9), and no one who dared to oppose the regime even on grounds of religion or conscience could rely on immunity.

With the aid of the great outburst of genuine national patriotism that accompanied his accession to power, combined with the terror that threatened all opponents, Hitler was able to master the old Nationalists, who had thought to use him as their servant, and to carry through, in a few months, measures for the unification of Germany such as Bismarck, in face of the loyalties existing in his day to the local dynasties, and the constitution-makers of Weimar, with their liberal principles, had neither desired nor dared to attempt.

The abolition of all political parties has already been mentioned (see p. 270). In addition, the states (*Länder*), without being formally abolished, were 'co-ordinated' with the Reich by the appointment of governors (*Reichsstatthalter*), and the elective system was abolished throughout the whole of state, provincial and municipal government (see pp. 328–42). In place of the traditionally 'federal' Germany, with its many competing sovereignties, which Bismarck had preserved from reasons of conservative inclination and policy, Hitler had, by 1935, created a single, centralized German state after the model of Napoleonic France. In itself this political centralization of Germany was a profound revolution, fully in accordance with the needs of modern capitalist organization, and unlikely to be willingly undone by any future German government.

The trade union movement, which presented another possible focus of resistance and danger to unity, was at once broken up (2 May 1933), its offices occupied, its funds confiscated, its leaders portrayed by Goebbels's propaganda machine as embezzlers of the workers' payments. In its place was set an all-embracing German Labour Front (Law for Organization of National Labour, 20 January 1934), with which was later associated the 'Strength through Joy'

organization of the workers' leisure to provide them with 'circuses' as well as 'bread'. Within two years of the *Machtübernahme* ('taking over of power') in 1933, the whole life of the German people, with the most important exception of religion, had been *gleichgeschaltet*—co-ordinated—under Nazi control. Agriculture and industry, the 'free' professions—lawyers and doctors—were organized on Nazi lines. All makers of public opinion were under official control. Professors in the universities, who had been used to pride themselves on 'academic freedom' and 'objectivity'; teachers in schools; journalists, authors, musicians and artists—these last under Goebbels's Reich Chamber of Culture—had been forced, or induced, or had, in many cases gladly, volunteered to join in unison to sing the praises of the Third Reich and of its leader, Adolf Hitler. The Propaganda Ministry controlled the press and radio, issued directives to the newspapers and moulded public opinion through broadcasting. In the hands of Goebbels it was a powerful and flexible instrument for securing the acceptance of the Nazi views on all subjects of importance.

*Hitler's Tactics*

Yet it must not be supposed that this co-ordination was either complete or accomplished without difficulty, and Hitler's tactics and method internally deserve study, for they were used with the greatest effect also in foreign policy. They were based on a completely opportunist combination of persuasion, deception (in an organized form for the masses) and terror. And, however rigidly fanatical in his ultimate aims, he was ready to make any necessary temporary compromise to gain his end.

At home his purpose was to gain as large a volume of support in all classes as possible. Even in the elections of March 1933, held under the terror, Nazis and Nationalists combined had only just gained an absolute majority of the votes polled (52·3 %, of which the Nazis obtained 44·1 %). To secure the maximum of support it was necessary to provide jobs for as many of the unemployed as possible and at the same time to provide profits for industrialists and agrarians. It was equally necessary to avoid at all costs another currency inflation which, if it came, would rob the regime of popularity overnight.

By strict control of foreign exchange, and by Dr Schacht's skilful manipulation of it, this last danger was avoided. At the same time the erection of a vast party bureaucracy, side by side with that of

the state; a purge of anti-Nazis in the civil service; the expulsion and imprisonment of Jews; the organization of labour service; the subsequent reintroduction of conscription (1935) and, finally, the initiation of a vast rearmament programme, combined with road-making, land drainage and other schemes of public works, reduced the figures of unemployment rapidly. From a total of over 6 million unemployed in January 1933 the figure dropped to less than 2 million in July 1935 and, at the outbreak of war in 1939, Germany was already suffering from a shortage of labour. As a result of this policy the working class, though the skilled artisan in the trade unions had lost his privileged position and received lower wages for longer hours, had received from Hitler what the sad processions of Social Democrat and Communist unemployed demanded on their banners in 1932, *Arbeit und Brot* (work and bread). And, at the same time, the powerful body of great industrialists not only received back at a low figure the shares they had sold to the state in the bad times, but, unhampered by trade union restrictions, were called into position of leadership in their factories, were given vast orders at profitable rates, and provided by law with further powers of concentrating and cartellizing their industries (Act for the Formation of Compulsory Cartels, July 1933). Any fears they may have had of socialization soon passed, and, though they were compelled to accept the competition of Nazi Party enterprises (the Hermann Göring Works, German Bank of Labour, many party newspapers, etc.), the very existence of these was further evidence of the community of interest between the party and big business. Their subventions to the Nazi funds had secured a highly expansionist regime with the congenial prospect of satisfying their interest and patriotism alike in a future war for Germany's *Lebensraum*, and they were well content with their bargain.

To the agrarian nobility of Prussia, the regime was, perhaps, less wholly acceptable. Their rigid sense of caste was offended by the presence of upstarts of lowly origin exercising high authority in the state. Yet the agricultural policy of the Nazi government brought them great advantages, since the prices of their products were fixed high above costs and they received credit from the state on easy terms; and, though the controlling machinery of the Reich Food Organization (*Reichsnährstand*) worked clumsily, they were soon relieved from fears of expropriation. Whilst land settlement continued to figure during 1933–4 in some Nazi speeches (e.g. those of Koch, the Gauleiter of East Prussia), the actual figures of settlement

declined from 9,000 new farms and 225,000 acres in 1932 to approximately 5,000 farms and 155,000 acres in each of the two following years. At the same time Hitler not only recognized the principle of entail (*Fideikommisse*) for the greater estates, but introduced an analogous system by the Hereditary Farm Act (*Erbhofgesetz*) for the larger peasant holdings.

Even more than their increased sense of security and their greater profits it was the satisfaction of their desire for a strong foreign policy, for which a great army officered by their sons would be necessary, which reconciled the landowning nobility to the Nazi regime. And Hitler's supreme skill in handling the Reichswehr was the greatest factor in establishing his regime on a firm basis.

### Hitler and the Reichswehr

The special prestige enjoyed by the Reichswehr in Weimar Germany was not merely due to its position above, or apart from, the contending political parties. It had inherited the respect paid to the Prussian army in the German Empire, earned by the victories of Frederick the Great, of Blücher and of Moltke. Under the Empire the Minister of War was always a Prussian General and, with the fall of Gessler (1927) and with a Prussian Field Marshal as President, the practice was resumed. General Groener and General Schleicher were succeeded at the Reichswehr Ministry, when Hitler took office, by General Blomberg. Upon his ability to handle the army Hitler's regime depended.

He was wise enough to proceed cautiously. The influence of Nazi ideas was, he knew, bound to increase amongst both officers and men, more especially as the members of the Hitler Youth came forward to do their military service. In Blomberg he found a collaborator increasingly sympathetic to Nazi ideas. And his determination to break through the restrictions imposed at Versailles and to recreate the German army at its full strength was, in itself, sufficient to win him the sympathy of the Officers' Corps. Had he not written in *Mein Kampf*, 'the recovery of lost provinces is not achieved by solemn invocations of the Beloved Lord or through pious hopes in a League of Nations, but only through armed violence'—a striking echo of Bismarck's famous words (see p. 152)? With such views all German officers were in agreement, and, even without any effort at direct propaganda for Nazi ideas in the Reichswehr, Hitler could be sure of a gradual increase of Nazi influence.

To this policy, Röhm, head of the S.A., was opposed. Instead of gradual infiltration he wanted organic incorporation of his S.A. formations in the Reichswehr—a Nazi army under his command to stand beside the regular army. Whether there were also serious plans in Röhm's circle in 1934 for a second, social, revolution is not definitely known, but the massacre of 30 June 1934 was Hitler's answer to all Röhm's plans, to the discontent of his followers—and to other discontents.

*The Meaning of 30 June 1934*

On that day, by Hitler's orders, the S.A. leaders, Röhm, Ernst, Heines and many of the most prominent Nazis of the 'old Guard' were put to death without trial in Munich and the neighbourhood, whilst Göring conducted an even more extensive massacre in Prussia. But, at the same time, a large number of others, who had at one time or another opposed Hitler, suffered the same fate. General Schleicher and his wife; Kahr, the Bavarian ex-Minister, now 72, who had failed or 'betrayed' Hitler in 1923; Colonel Bredow, formerly ministerial chief under Schleicher; Klausener, one of the political leaders of Rhineland Catholicism; Bose and Jung, Papen's secretaries—killed at their work in the Vice-Chancellor's office—and very many others, some of them, indeed, by mistake but most of them by careful selection.

The massacre of 30 June 1934 is of deep interest as an illustration of Hitler's methods and of great importance in the establishment of his system. It satisfied the Reichswehr in that it ended the threat from Röhm's S.A., but the murder of Schleicher and Bredow was a warning from Hitler that not even the German Officer Corps was beyond his reach. The names of many of the other highly respected Nationalists and Centrists were equally a warning to all opponents, however far to the Right or highly placed in society, that he would brook no opposition, that his memory was long, and his vengeance deadly. At the same time he improved the occasion by telling the Reichstag 'at that hour I was responsible for the fate of the German nation and supreme judge of the German people'. By adding their approval in a law of 3 July, which described the murders as 'legitimate self-defence by the state', the Nationalists in the Cabinet made themselves accessories after the fact. And, when Hindenburg died within a month, Adolf Hitler became both Reich President and Chancellor, and 38 million Germans voted their approval, or were declared officially to have done so, at a plebiscite. The Reichswehr

took the oath of allegiance to the Führer and the fullness of power was now concentrated in Hitler's hands. The German *Rechtstaat*, with its not unworthy record of impartial justice, disappeared. The old ruling class—officers, nobles, bureaucrats, agrarians and industrialists alike—had accepted the dictatorship, with its methods of terror, and the consequent abolition of the rule of law. In doing so they placed themselves and the fate of the German people in the hands of a political adventurer of genius—but of a genius diseased. Any resistance of a political kind became impossible, and, within a few years, a general (Fritzsch) or an industrialist (Thyssen) was little more safe from Himmler's Gestapo than the meanest communist. Yet Hitler's immense successes in foreign policy provided them with compensation and, so long as those successes lasted, they were intoxicated by their Führer's apparently infallible powers of judgment.

## Hitler's Foreign Policy

Hitler's aims in foreign affairs were drastically clear, to himself and his inner circle, from the outset, and as carefully masked from the outside world by a series of speeches, pathetic, patriotic and pacific by turns, carefully calculated to enlist all possible sympathy for Germany abroad and to exploit the differences between the foreign states which might interfere with his designs.

The first main objective was to create the great German Reich which should bring within its fold all the provinces of the Prusso-German empire lost at Versailles, with their German minorities and, in addition, should incorporate German Austria and the German minorities of the old Austrian empire in Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia or elsewhere. The Pan-German dream, rendered more fluid and dynamic by the conception of *Lebensraum* (living space), was to be realized at the earliest possible moment. That, once realized, the strong arm of the new Great Germany would stretch out to cover *Auslandsdeutschtum* (Germans living abroad), wherever they found themselves; that it would seek to recover the lost colonies and insist on a share of Africa corresponding to its needs; that it would challenge and overthrow the 'Jewish-Bolshevik tyranny' of Russia and recreate the situation embodied in the terms of Brest-Litovsk were later stages of the dream. First the treaty of Versailles must be torn to shreds, the rearmament of Germany completed, the Rhineland and the Saar recovered, Austria brought within the Reich and then, with or without war, the rest would follow.

In six years (1933–8) Hitler carried through his minimum programme. Before he came to power the League of Nations had revealed its weakness by the failure to check Japanese aggression in Manchukuo (1932–3), and the Japanese withdrawal from the League and from the Disarmament Conference (March 1933) was followed by that of Germany (October 1933). That action Hitler had already foreshadowed in an article in the *Völkische Beobachter* a year earlier. He covered it now by a barrage of pacific words and by his Ten-Year Pact with Poland (January 1934), interpreted not only by the Poles, but in England and France, as evidence of his good intentions, rather than as a temporary measure to safeguard his rear whilst he faced the Western Powers. 'Our boundless love for and loyalty to our own national traditions', he said in a great speech (17 May 1933), 'make us respect the national claims of others.... The mentality of the past century which made people believe that they could make Germans out of Poles and Frenchmen is completely foreign to us.' It is easy to understand the welcome given to such words by the statesmen of all Germany's neighbours, still staggering under the great economic depression, half-disarmed, deeply affected by the pacific ideals embodied in the League, and incredulous that any German government, however fierce in its treatment of its own nationals, could have the 'folly' to repeat the mistakes of Bülow and Wilhelm II, of Berchtold and Francis Joseph.

Of all these factors favourable to his policy Hitler was fully aware, as he was also of the distrust felt in England of French policy and political instability, of the hostility in powerful circles in both England and France towards Soviet Russia, and of the ambitions of Mussolini, which were to bring him into conflict with the Western Powers. And he took every chance of deepening and exploiting the cleavages between his opponents.

The premature Nazi *putsch* (July 1934), in which the Austrian Chancellor, Dollfuss, was brutally murdered, was at once disavowed by Hitler, but it was a setback to his policy, for it brought Italian troops to the Brenner and was followed by the Stresa Conference, at which France, Italy and Great Britain recognized the necessity of defending Austrian independence; whilst the entry of Soviet Russia into the League of Nations seemed to promise a new guarantee against German aggressiveness. Yet, with the Saar safely in his hands after a plebiscite conducted under heavy Nazi pressure (January 1935), Hitler felt strong enough in March openly to defy the treaty of Versailles by reintroducing conscription and announcing the

creation of an air force. And, so strongly was the feeling of the British government in favour of giving Germany 'fair play' that he was able, in June 1935, to secure the signature of an Anglo-German Naval Agreement, which, as an eminent writer on international affairs has said, 'was made, without the concurrence of the French and other governments, and was open to the accusation that it amounted to a violation of the Versailles Treaty by two of the parties without general assent'.

*The Beginnings of the Axis*

After the Anglo-German Naval Agreement common action by Britain and France against further German violations of the treaty of Versailles was clearly impossible for a long time. Moreover, it encouraged Mussolini to proceed with his attack on Abyssinia and when, after the repudiation by British opinion of the Hoare-Laval pact, the League applied half-hearted sanctions against Italy, Hitler was able to take advantage of the break-up of the Stresa front to reoccupy and remilitarize the Rhineland (March 1936) and to begin his courtship of Mussolini. In order to forward friendship with Italy, Hitler, on 11 July 1936, recognized 'the full sovereignty of the Federal State in Austria', and undertook not to exert influence either direct or indirect on her affairs. The revolt of Franco against the Spanish Republic opened the path to active German collaboration with Italy. Hitler worked in close concert with Mussolini throughout the struggle and, by the bombing of Guernica, showed that his interpretation of non-intervention coincided with that of his fellow-Dictator, whose 'volunteers' were fighting in Franco's army. In October 1936, Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, visited Berlin. In May–June 1937 Neurath and Blomberg returned the visit, and in September 1937 Mussolini paid his first visit to Hitler and was received with extravagant and flattering attentions. All down Unter den Linden white columns of painted wood, surmounted by gold-painted wooden eagles, were erected in honour of the occasion and, before parting, both Dictators declared to the world the importance of their meeting. Hitler, who had already concluded the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1936, said, 'the most profound significance of this demonstration of two peoples is the honest wish to guarantee for our countries...peace'. Mussolini said: 'To the whole world, which is asking what the result of this meeting will be, war or peace, the Führer and I can answer with a

loud voice, Peace.' Both men lied and knew that they were lying. The tragedy of Europe lay in the fact that politicians and peoples in France and England, in Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in many other lands, still hoped and half believed that they were speaking truth. In fact, the Axis had been born, Italy had become a potential German vassal without realizing it, and the path was clear for Hitler's next aggressions.

Events moved swiftly. In November, through the Fascist Party, Mussolini let loose the cry for 'Tunis, Corsica, Nice'—a defiance of France based on German backing. His reward was the swift absorption of Austria by Hitler (11–12 March 1938), accompanied by a letter from the Führer saying: 'In this action one must see nothing save an act of legitimate national defence. Whatever may be the consequences of recent events I have marked a clear German frontier towards France and now I trace another, equally clear, towards Italy. It is the Brenner.' Mussolini might have replied that God and history had forestalled the Führer.

But neither Mussolini nor the Western Powers were in any position to resist. The death of the League as an instrument for controlling aggression was recognized by Mr Neville Chamberlain's statement that 'the government was under no commitment to take action in Austria'—despite the Covenant of the League, of which both Austria and Britain were members. Even since Mussolini's aggression in 1935 times had changed and the practice of international violence had forced a painfully ill-armed Britain into a public repudiation of her engagements.

No sooner had Austria been swallowed, and whilst her Jews were being beaten by lusty young Nazis and forced to remove garbage from the streets of Vienna with their hands, Hitler set in motion a violent campaign amongst the Germans of Czechoslovakia ('Sudetenland'), which increased in intensity during the summer and was accompanied by speeches of bitter malignity directed against Dr Benes and the Czechoslovak state. Whatever its faults, that state had provided more fairly and adequately for the free exercise of political and social rights by its German minority than had any other of the Austrian 'Succession' states, and incomparably more mild conditions than Germany was to allow even to Nordics within her future annexations (Fig. 52).

By September 1938 Hitler was threatening war. But at the Munich meeting between Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain and Daladier, the Führer was persuaded to accept a settlement, which gave the Reich

far more than its ethnical share of the Czechoslovak state, and reduced the remainder to a condition of complete military impotence. The respite secured by the sacrifice of a small but staunch democracy was short. Six months later (March 1939) Hitler occupied the remainder of Czechoslovakia, turned it into the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, and added the great Skoda armament works and the other valuable industries of the country to his formidable war machine.





Fig. 52. The Sudetenland

Based on G.S.G.S. 4508a, 1 : 1,000,000, *Czechoslovakia* (London, 1938). The percentages in the key are of the German speaking population.

The belated guarantees offered by Great Britain to Poland and Roumania, to neither of which she had direct access, did not frighten Hitler from his course. The technique of furious slander was turned upon Poland. Once again, as in Czechoslovakia, it was suddenly discovered that Germans were being mercilessly persecuted, though no evidence was ever produced to back the assertions of the German press and radio. After he had made all necessary military preparations, Hitler was persuaded to state his claims on Poland but did

so in ultimative form and set his troops in motion without giving the Poles, whom he had lulled for years into security, any time to reply. The invasion began, without any declaration of war, in the early hours of 1 September 1939. The Reichstag met at 10.30 to hear from the Führer that he had been 'forced to take up arms for the defence of the Reich'. The judgment on that statement of the British ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, who at least cannot be reproached for any lack of goodwill towards the Nazi regime, was: 'It was a deliberate travesty of the facts, and never can there have been, or ever be, a case of more premeditated and carefully planned aggression.' After mutual discussion Britain and France decided to honour their pledges to Poland and entered the war on 3 September. The Austrian corporal at last had his war before he was 50, and the great German gamble, *Weltmacht oder Niedergang* (World-Power or Destruction), had begun.

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# Chapter V

# ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL RELATIONS SINCE 1894

Origins of German Policy: British Opinion and the Two-Power Standard: German Navy Bills and the Risk Theory: Britain and the Dual Alliance: The Hague Conference and After: Anglo-German Conversations: The Haldane Mission: After Versailles: Bibliographical Note

## Origins of German Policy

Though Anglo-German rivalry may, broadly speaking, be said to have begun in 1894, when the German High Command issued a memorandum, written mainly by Captain von Tirpitz, on the importance of sea power to Germany, the conception of a German maritime power had already existed for at least a generation. As early as 1865 German eyes were looking outwards, beyond the boundaries of the realm as it then was; the lesser countries on its borders and their territories overseas were coveted as future German possessions. Lord Morley records that the Low Countries were then in trepidation at Bismarck's policy, as evinced the year before by the attack on Denmark. 'The Dutch Minister told the British Ambassador at Vienna that in 1865 Bismarck had given him to understand that without colonies Prussia could never become a great maritime nation; he coveted Holland less for its own sake than for its wealthy colonies.' As to Belgium, when reminded that it was guaranteed by the European Powers, the Chancellor replied that 'a guarantee in these days was of little value'. In a similar vein von Bülow in his *Reminiscences* quotes a letter from General von Schoen: 'General von Plessen...added that it was a matter of the highest interest for us to have not only Denmark in our hands but also Holland and her colonies if it were for nothing more than the urgent need of coaling stations.' The expression of the desire for this element of sea power bases recurs constantly in Bülow's volumes: it will again be found both during and after the war of 1914–18 in the writings of German sea officers. Thus Bülow says: 'I had seen, in the document I had studied at Lemmering, that the naval authorities were thinking of a number of bases on the potentially rich coasts of the Pacific. We would just have to wait for the right moment and take possession of

them. The Far East on the one hand, and Asia Minor on the other, were lands from which we could not allow ourselves to be excluded. But we must walk warily.'

Thus the seed of the desire for maritime expansion had already been sown in Germany when Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History* appeared in 1890. The book was at once translated into German by order of the Emperor and widely circulated in order to stimulate the movement for a powerful fleet, and, if it was not the cause of that movement, it was a strong and far-reaching instrument whereby the German people were indoctrinated with the idea of sea power.

The Memorandum of 1894 was a long one. It called for a navy the duties of which would not be confined to those limits which, until then, had governed its purpose—coastal defence and attack upon enemy commerce. These had been the objects at which the military staff, under which the navy had worked until 1888, had aimed. They were limits which Tirpitz says he had unceasingly opposed. 'Throughout the whole of my career', he wrote, 'I have always had to oppose two ideas, especially beloved of the lay mind—the idea of a special coastal defence and that of a cruiser fleet for foreign service.... As a thorough-going cruiser war on the high seas against England and other states is altogether excluded by our lack of foreign bases and by Germany's geographical situation...what we want is a battle fleet which can be stationed between Heligoland and the Thames.' Consistent with this conception of disputing the command of the sea in battle was the German policy regarding the torpedo flotillas. 'Some wanted small coastal torpedo boats. I demanded sea-going vessels which would fight in the North Sea.' So the German flotilla, from the beginning, had an offensive role in the High Sea Fleet. The attention which the German training authorities paid to all branches of under-water warfare, both mines and mobile torpedoes, has been marked from the earliest days of the navy. Captain Cyprian Bridge, writing in 1878, remarked upon this, observing that the German torpedo school was the most highly developed in Europe.

An element in the policy of a sea-going battle fleet was its 'alliance value'. To this Tirpitz attached great importance, and, in order to build up alliances, he urged that Germany's foreign policy should be so conducted as to lead to the acquisition of an ally or allies. Until the fleet had been brought up to the required strength all friction in foreign policy should be avoided.

The argument in the Memorandum of 1894 was summed up thus:

'A state which has oceanic, or—an equivalent term—world interests, must be able to uphold them and make its power felt beyond its own territorial waters. National world commerce, world industry, and to a certain extent fishing on the high seas, world intercourse and colonies, are impossible without a fleet capable of taking the offensive. The conflicts of interests between nations, and the lack of confidence felt by capital and the business world, will either destroy these expressions of the vitality of a state, or prevent them from taking form, if they are not supported by national power on the seas and therefore beyond our waters. Herein lies by far the most important purpose of the fleet.'

The arguments convinced the Emperor; but the German people had still to be persuaded that the need existed or that their commerce and colonies were in reality in any danger. Tirpitz might din in their ears that 'without sea power to protect our industry we should cease to be a great European Power': but with the knowledge that the Austrian and Russian empires, as well as Prussia herself, had been great European Powers without sea power or a powerful battle fleet in the North Sea, the people were not quickly converted to new ideas.

## British Opinion and the Two-Power Standard

In England, these developments did not at first perturb public opinion. Six years previously—in 1888—the policy of the 'Two-Power Standard' had been adopted and proclaimed, and the general feeling was that, so long as that standard was maintained, there was no need for anxiety. Unfortunately, however, there was no precise interpretation of the expression, and its meaning, in quantitative terms, was differently understood by different statesmen. Thus, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord George Hamilton, said that it meant that 'the British Fleet should be *equal in strength* to the combined naval forces of any two other countries'. The Second Sea Lord thought a 'sufficient superiority' over any two nations combined was necessary, but that tonnage alone was a misleading comparison. Between 'equality of strength' and 'a sufficient superiority' there is, obviously, a wide difference. Lord Charles Beresford protested that 'nothing could be more misleading, nothing more ridiculous, than comparing the numbers or tonnage of the Fleet of England with those of France or any other Power. What should be compared is the work the respective fleets have to do'. The British fleet 'should be more than a match for the combined fleets of any two European

Powers* which are likely to be foes...and its strength would be sufficient for defending our coasts and our trade and our commerce and securing the delivery of our food supply'. Sir Charles Dilke was not satisfied with the calculations based on mere numerical equality, as assumed by the First Lord. There was, he said, no scientific authority for it. 'All naval experts who have been consulted on the subject have always laid it down that for safety you must have a supremacy of five to three in battleships.' Mr Chamberlain took the same view, preferring to the bald equalitarian and mathematical interpretation of our battleship needs the building of five to every three built by any naval combination against this country. Mr Goschen pointed out one of the dangers of a standard based on a bare equality. If Britain should be at war with one great Power, and two others were to seize the opportunity to raise, say, the question of Egypt, 'we might be in a position of great danger'. At a later date (1898), however, he supported the interpretation in terms of equality with two Powers on the ground that the fleet of a single nation possesses an intrinsic superiority in organization, signalling and confidence, over a combination of ships of foreign nations. Dilke differed. A safe margin of strength against two Powers was, in his view, one which would give Great Britain a bare superiority over three—that is to say, sufficient power to make three Powers pause before they combined against us. Sir John Colomb agreed, speaking of the 'fallacy of a rule of thumb standard of abstract equality of one fleet to two...you cannot base comparisons of naval strength simply on the abstract numbers of ships...you allow no margin for a combination against us of more than two Powers. And you allow no margin for the result of errors of judgment in a commander.' Geographical considerations, too, affected the problem. The farther the enemy ports are from this island the greater must be the numerical preponderance which we require to produce equality. The need for a 'margin' was also strongly insisted on by Admiral Sir Frederick Richards for other reasons. He pointed out, in 1898, that the programme for the coming year made no allowance for the waste of war which, for the British fleet, must be 'out of all proportion to that of the enemy who may choose to remain in port and try to wear out our fleet by constant harassment and torpedo-boat attack'—as the Germans hoped to do by their 'attrition' policy in the war of 1914-18. Goschen, too, at this

* The word 'European' is to be noted. So Sir Edward Grey expressly excluded the United States. 'I never regarded the Two-Power Standard as applying to them.' Gooch, *Studies in Diplomacy and Statecraft*, p. 104.

time recognized the need for a margin. 'In short', he said, 'it seems indispensable to have a margin; otherwise we might be fatally crippled by one single great disaster.' In February 1898, when the new German Navy Bill had been announced—it was not passed till March—and while relations with France and Russia were still bad, Richards reminded Goschen that he considered the margin insufficient. 'The margin which England allows herself for securing her dominion is decidedly small': and now the German programme made it obvious that Germany's fleet would become a serious consideration before 1904. The Sea Lords wished to build up a more satisfactory margin by then. 'The question of real concern for this country', wrote Richards, 'is the new German programme which cannot be ignored', and he repeatedly pressed for a reserve beyond the needs of meeting France and Russia. 'At every turn we feel the inconvenience of the policy of being content with equality in battleships with France and Russia...we should have to trust to the forbearance of Germany, perhaps the greediest and most determined of our commercial rivals, not to take us at a disadvantage when so circumstanced (i.e. in a war with the two Powers). This is not a satisfactory position for the Power which lives by the sea....The only true policy lies in unquestioned superiority, but we aim at no more than a neck and neck race with two Powers.'

While there were these differences as to how the expression 'Two-Power Standard' was to be interpreted, there was an unanimous agreement that the standard had no reference to cruisers, either in numbers or tonnage. Goschen, in March 1896, said categorically that the cruiser programme was based 'not on a comparison of cruisers other nations have, because their conditions are wholly different from ours, but upon the question what we have to defend, what services have to be performed, in what direction our food supplies will have to be protected, and what resources we have'. Chamberlain was equally clear. In 1893 he had advocated laying down two cruisers for every one built by the foreign combination. Pretyman, First Lord in 1903, said that 'in cruisers there can be no question of equality; the standard of strength was not a comparative one—it was a question relating to the magnitude of the interests to be protected'. In 1904, Lord Selborne reasserted the exclusion of cruisers from the Two-Power Standard of strength: it never had been applied, he said, to cruisers and torpedo craft. In the same debate Pretyman again laid down that the test of strength in cruisers was not numerical comparison but 'regard to the work they had to do'.

This, then, was the accepted view regarding the policy governing naval strength at the time when the German threat, or challenge, was beginning. Though there were these differences as to the exact manner in which the Two-Power Standard was to be interpreted, there was complete agreement that it applied to battleships only, that the United States did not enter into the calculation, that the number of those ships must be enough to enable us to fight two European Powers with success, and that the numbers of the cruiser and flotilla forces were governed by the duties they were required to perform and not by comparison with those of other Powers.

The movement initiated by Tirpitz in 1894 had come to nothing at that time. Tirpitz had found himself at variance with his Admiralty, which moved too slowly in the direction of maritime expansion to suit him, and he had resigned in 1895. In the early days of 1896 the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger, congratulating him on the repulse of the Jameson raid 'without appealing to the aid of friendly Powers', and its enthusiastic reception in Germany, opened the eyes of many in England to the unfriendly sentiments in that country. It served also the purpose of the navy party in Germany. The expression of indignation which swept through Britain at the telegram was at once interpreted as an indication of her enmity to Germany. Until then, according to Tirpitz, she had been regarded as a possible neutral in a war between Germany and the Dual Alliance, *now* she must be regarded as a possible enemy; and hence the need for a stronger German navy. At the same time the Emperor gave voice to the view that Germany needed oversea bases as an important element in her sea power. If Lourenco Marquez should ever change hands, he wrote to Dr Leyds on 6 January 1896, 'it could only come into German or Boer hands'. In saying this he showed a failure to appreciate, or a deliberate disregard of, the high importance attached to Delagoa Bay by Great Britain, owing to its relation to the route to India. Two years earlier Lord Kimberley, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, had said, according to the Austrian ambassador, that the territory south of the Zambezi was vital to Britain, for if Delagoa Bay were to pass into other hands, Cape Colony would secede from the Empire: and the Cape was essential for the security of the route to the East—it was, in his view, even more important than Gibraltar or Malta which might be cut off any day. Thus the possibility that the Mediterranean route might be barred in war, as it has been in the present war and was for a time in the war of 1914-18, was present to the minds of the British statesmen at that time.

Von Tirpitz, on leaving the Admiralty, was appointed to the command of the East Asiatic Fleet. He took out with him orders to find a place on the coast of China for a German naval base: Amoy, Samsan Bay and the Chusan Islands were the places suggested; Kiao-Chau had been rejected as lying too far to the north and away from the trade route. He, however, gave his preference to Kiao-Chau and recommended that it should be acquired. Returning to Germany in June 1897 to take the post of Secretary to the *Reichsmarineamt* he at once began the preparation for the First Navy Bill; and the alleged murder of two German missionaries served as an excuse for the seizure of that harbour. Kiao-Chau was at once occupied and the building up of the naval stronghold was begun. Of this seizure and its sequel Lord Sanderson wrote in 1907: 'The Emperor William, having obtained from the Emperor of Russia a promise that he would not oppose the acquisition by Germany of a Chinese port, suddenly and much to the disgust of the Russian Government, seized Kiao-Chau in November 1897, and there seems little doubt, notwithstanding the assurances which were given us on that occasion, that she succeeded, as part of the arrangement made with China, in extracting from the Chinese Government certain preferential and possibly exclusive rights in the province of Shantung....Within a few months the Russian Government demanded and obtained the lease of Port Arthur. As a countermove, and more or less at the suggestion of the Chinese Government, we obtained a similar lease of Wei Hai Wei.'

## German Navy Bills and the Risk Theory

The First Navy Bill was launched in November 1897 and passed in March 1898. It provided for a five years' programme which would add seven battleships and two cruisers to the existing fleet. This would bring the total force up to 19 battleships, 12 large and 30 small cruisers, and 8 armoured coast-defence ships, besides a considerable flotilla of torpedo craft. No stone was left unturned to persuade the German people of the necessity for this increase in their naval strength. An intensive propaganda was organized throughout the whole of the country. 'We organized meetings and lectures and made special efforts to get into touch with the press on a large scale. We instituted tours to the coast and exhibited the ships and the wharves; we turned our attention to the schools and we called upon authors to write for us; stacks of novels and pamphlets were the result. Prizes were to be given by the Ministry of Education to the schools.'

The South African War provided an occasion for a fresh agitation for further increase in the navy. It could be pointed out that the desired intervention by Germany in favour of the South African Republics was impossible without a navy. A telegram from the representative of the Transvaal Republic, Dr Leyds, to his Government made this clear. 'Minister of Foreign Affairs Germany says Germany still friend of South African Republic but cannot assist in war because England master at sea....' The Emperor at the same time told Bülow that he must remain neutral until he had a fleet. 'In twenty years time, when the fleet is ready, I can use another language.' Till then, silence and work were necessary: now, the need was to hasten the building. A new Navy Bill was therefore brought forward in January 1900 in the preamble to which it was explained that its need arose from the necessity to deal with England. It provided for a battle fleet of two flagships and four squadrons of eight ships each, eight large and twenty-four small cruisers, a foreign-service force of three large and ten small cruisers, and a fleet reserve of four battleships, three large and three small cruisers. Though the Reichstag cut down the programme by six large and seven small cruisers the doubling of the battle fleet was passed.

The principle upon which the expansion of the German navy was initially based was that of what was called 'the Risk theory'. This theory, first outlined by Tirpitz in 1896, was subsequently developed at length in the preamble to the Navy Law of 1900. Colonies and trade, so it said, could only be effectively protected by a battle fleet, and the strength of that fleet must be such that even the strongest naval Power could not attack it without risking its position in the world. It was not necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of Great Britain, since she, with her interests scattered all over the world, could never keep her whole fleet concentrated in the North Sea. Even so, however, a German fleet might still be inferior; but inferiority in numbers could be compensated for by training. On this great stress was laid. 'As the German navy will still be more or less inferior to that of other individual Powers, our endeavours must be directed towards compensating for the inferiority by the individual training of the crews and by tactical training by practice in large bodies.'* Against a highly trained fleet even a

* Cf. von Kluck. 'Every achievement within human possibility is practicable in war provided that subordinate commanders keep one object in view—efficiency over superior numbers.' From the early beginnings the German tactical training of the navy envisaged the use of the torpedo flotillas with the fleet in an offensive capacity, and they were highly practised in manœuvres with the fleet.

superior British fleet would only accomplish victory at the cost of losses so heavy that it would then be in no condition to meet another naval coalition: the Two-Power Standard would be destroyed. Faced with so grave a risk, Great Britain would not venture to attack Germany—as it was pretended she was preparing to do—while, on the other hand, Germany could make use of the bargaining power thus conferred upon her to exert diplomatic pressure upon, and extract concessions from Britain when she was in difficulties. This was the very danger to which both Goschen and Richards had seen that Britain exposed herself by a narrow, equalitarian and marginless interpretation of the Two-Power Standard.

Tirpitz's demands for a greatly strengthened navy were supported by von der Goltz with additional arguments of other kinds. The growth of German trade had led to an increase of the German population, and this, in turn, to a need for importing corn. Germany was no longer self-sufficient in her food supply. A war might last a long time, and it was therefore essential that she should be immune from the effects of blockade. The control of the Baltic was necessary against the Dual Alliance, but it was also necessary to be prepared for a war against England who was represented as being deeply hostile to Germany in consequence of her commercial growth and rivalry, and favourable to the idea of seizing any opportune occasion for crushing her. 'We must not overlook the fact', he wrote, 'that the opinion of large sections of the British public is favourable to a war of annihilation.' Von der Goltz did not confine his vision to matters of defence against the imagined British attack. He, like Tirpitz, foreshadowed the situation in which Britain would be involved in a war in which, as she could not leave her outer dominions and trade routes without defence, she must scatter her forces for their protection. This would be the opportunity to attack her. 'Careful preparation and quick mobilization can give a weaker enemy actual superiority for a considerable time. . . . There are places enough where England's greatness is mortal.' India, Canada, Australia if once lost would be lost for ever. The British Empire would be dissolved.

## Britain and the Dual Alliance

The situation in which Tirpitz and von der Goltz made these their calculations was that in which the relations between Britain and the Dual Alliance were bad. For over a score of years there had been a series of disputes, some of them acute, in Siam, Egypt, Madagascar,

Morocco, the Persian Gulf, Newfoundland, the New Hebrides, Persia, Afghanistan, Constantinople. What was not considered was the possibility that the German threat might draw the three countries together, making them think of sinking their differences and of turning their eyes towards the rising power of Germany. If those differences should be adjusted, the need for the existing great dispersion of the British navy would be substantially reduced and a stronger concentration in the North Sea would at once become possible. Moreover, even though there were these political differences, their existence did not imply that either of the two continental Powers would be desirous of crushing Britain to the ultimate advantage of Germany. Alsace and Lorraine were still thorns in the flesh of France, and Germany's diplomatic incursions into the Near East, and those of her ally Austria into the Balkans, had brought the two Germanic Powers dangerously close to regions in which Russian interests lay.

The crude assumption that Britain, for reasons of commercial interests, would make an unprovoked attack on Germany, was strangely inconsistent with the offer made by Chamberlain in March 1898 for an Anglo-German Alliance—an offer rejected by Germany on the score that England was not to be trusted to come to the help of Germany but would back out of her obligations—an assumption that came with a somewhat bad grace from the successors of Frederick the Great and Frederick William the Third. As it was, the new Navy Law of 1900 provoked little serious comment in England where it was widely recognized that colonies and trade demanded sea power for their security. 'We not unnaturally regard the growing naval ambition of Germany with a certain feeling of sympathy, which is nevertheless not unalloyed with concern', wrote *The Times*. Even the blustering telegram sent by the Emperor to the North German Lloyd—'Forward with the work...then we shall be able to impose peace on the water as on the land'—was dismissed with the comment that extraordinary importance need not be attached to an exchange of telegrams 'couched in the peculiar patriotic idiom of Germany'. Nor was much notice taken of a speech of the Emperor in June 1901 in which he said: 'Although we do not yet possess the navy we ought to possess, we have nevertheless fought for our place in the sun and won it. Our future is on the water....' It was still, in the early part of that year, the strength of the navies of France and Russia to which British naval policy was directed. Towards the end of the year, however, there were indications of a rising uneasiness in consequence of

the restless and aggressive character of German diplomacy which was accentuated in the spring of 1902, when the German Socialist paper *Vorwärts* disclosed the existence of a confidential document of the German Admiralty forecasting a still further extension of the naval programme in the budget for 1904–5. There were now, said *The Times*, 'new aspects' of the question of naval defence. As the year progressed this note of uneasiness became more pronounced. In August *The Times* wrote: 'Some of our rivals have worked with feverish activity and they are steadily increasing their efforts. We cannot allow them to gain upon us without imperilling our all.'

The building of the new naval base at Rosyth, announced in March 1903, although related to the growth of the German fleet was not due solely to it. A committee had been appointed by Goschen in 1900 to consider the general question of harbours and dockyards, the fleet having outgrown the accommodation of the existing bases. But the choice of the Forth was certainly connected with the German threat and, naturally, it did not escape comment in that country.

The assumptions on which the 'Risk theory' was based were largely invalidated by two events, the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 and the Anglo-French agreement of 1904. The former eased the Russian threat in the Far East and the latter eliminated the long-present danger of a Franco-Russian combination against Britain. The need for the existing dispersion of the British navy, particularly in the Eastern Seas and in the Mediterranean, was thus reduced, and a consequent increase of concentration in the North Sea rendered possible. A further factor in favour of Great Britain was an improvement in Italo-French relations. These had been bad since the French seizure of Tunis in 1881 which had contributed to the entrance of Italy into the Triple Alliance. Germany could now no longer flatter herself with the expectation of Italian help in a war with France and England, nor of such a dispersion of the British navy as would offer reasonable chances for German success in a struggle in the North Sea.

The Russo-Japanese War (1904–6) seriously weakened Russia at sea, to the benefit of Germany, but, on the other hand, Germany's Moroccan policy in 1905–6 aroused a general distrust in Europe of German aims and policy and, in this country, led to a greater interest being displayed about the strength of the navy. Sir John Fisher had become First Sea Lord in October 1904, and among the other changes introduced by him was the *Dreadnought* type of battleship. This was followed in Germany by the announcement, in November 1905, of a new Navy Bill which was to provide, in 1906, three of the

cruisers which had been cancelled by the Reichstag in 1900 and for an increase in the tonnage of the battleships of the existing programme in order to meet the *Dreadnought* ships, together with a widening of the Kiel Canal* and an appropriation of £250,000 for submarine experimental work. Tirpitz expressed the view that the introduction of the heavier type of battleship 'automatically doubled the fighting force of our Navy . . . . I reckoned that from about 1916 onwards an English attack would no longer be probable from a naval point of view.'

Following close upon the heels of the announcement of these measures the Admiralty issued a statement of policy (the 'Cawdor Memorandum') to explain the situation and its needs. It described the new organization for a rapid mobilization of the reserve, and stated that the Board was satisfied for the present with an output of four large armoured ships a year, but that, if there were an increase of foreign naval shipbuilding, there would be no difficulty whatever in increasing that output to meet the needs. In essence, this was a plain intimation to Germany that her programmes would be met by British programmes.

## The Hague Conference and After

At the end of 1905 the Conservative Government fell. Its Liberal successor came into office with a desire to effect a permanent improvement in Anglo-German relations and a belief that this was possible, together with a general reduction of armaments. Reduction, however, made no appeal to Germany. Her people had now been fully indoctrinated with the belief in a need for a powerful navy and had become accustomed to bearing the necessary burden: as they were later to accept the corresponding policy of 'guns before butter'. They resented, too, the expressed intention of the British to preserve their own supremacy at sea: they took umbrage at what was looked upon as interference with German policy in the suggestion that the Navy Bills could be altered in a downward direction. Those laws, it was categorically stated, were immutable—except in an upward direction. The Second Hague Conference sat in 1907. It was heralded by demonstrations in Britain of a desire to ease the burden of armaments. This, coming from Britain, was regarded, not

* The Kaiser Wilhelm Canal, begun in 1887 and completed in 1895, had a breadth of 213 ft. at the water line and 72 ft. at the bottom, and a depth of 29 ft. 6 in. The bottom was now to be doubled in width and depth increased to 36 ft. to meet the needs of the larger ships of the future.

in Germany alone but also in France, as an attempt by Britain to preserve her position at sea 'on the cheap'. At the Conference it proved impossible to proceed with disarmament beyond a platonic resolution to the effect that the question was 'more urgent than ever', and that it was desirable that Governments should resume its study. Foremost in opposition to the British proposals was the German representative, Baron Marschall, who openly derided the British attitude and prided himself that he and his Austrian colleague had succeeded in preventing the attempt to bring about any reductions. Eyre Crowe, of the Foreign Office, describing the Conference in a letter in October 1907, said that the Triple Alliance and their satellites, including Greece, Roumania and Belgium, succeeded completely in wrecking everything; that Russia and the United States went with Germany and against Britain most markedly in all naval questions and often obviously in a sense quite opposed to their own interests. 'Many of the smaller Powers—notably Sweden, Norway and Denmark—clearly intimated that even where their interests seemed to demand their going with us, they dare not do anything that might expose them to the ill-will of Germany.' Alone, Portugal, Spain and Japan were with Britain.

The Conference therefore failed. The military competition continued. But the same year (1907) witnessed an agreement between Britain and Russia which still further made waste paper of the 'Risk theory'. Germany had now to recognize the possibility that, in place of Britain having to face the fleets of France, Russia and Germany, it was Germany who might have to face the fleets of Britain, France and Russia. Nevertheless, her naval policy was not only not abandoned, it was intensified. By a decree of March 1907 the life of the German battleships was reduced from 25 to 20 years, a measure which made increased building programmes necessary in order to fulfil the terms of the previous Acts. Between 1908 and 1911 twelve battleships, instead of eight, would now have to be laid down; and even that might have to be increased. This had its natural repercussion in Great Britain, in spite of the Government's desire for economy. In February 1908, in reply to a proposal of Mr MacDonald's for still further reductions, the Prime Minister asserted the intention of maintaining the Two-Power Standard. 'An unassailable supremacy', he said, must be assured.

The issue had now passed out of the original form. It was no longer whether Germany should have a colonial Empire as her colonial school of politicians had pressed she should have, in opposition

to Bismarck who, in 1887, had spoken of her as a 'satisfied Power'. There was, as Eyre Crowe remarked, a deep-seated opposition between the aims of the two countries. British policy was based fundamentally, he said, on two principles—the Balance of Power and maritime supremacy. An island kingdom's existence depended on the maintenance of sea communications, and these depended on sea power. Unlike continental nations, which could not be isolated from the sources of their needs by the closing of the sea to their national shipping, island nations would be overthrown if an opponent commanded the sea. To oppose the hegemony of an aggresive Power was a necessity; and England was the natural enemy of an aggressor threatening the independence of other Powers. Hence the Balance of Power. As for the German navy, it was not for Great Britain to oppose Germany's building as large a navy as she wished, but an ocular demonstration of a firm intention to lay down two ships for every one laid down by Germany would be the surest way of convincing her that her attempts to achieve sea supremacy would fail. Concessions would only encourage. To build would be the surest way of winning the respect of Germany. It is only necessary to read the *Memoirs* of Tirpitz and the contemporary diplomatic correspondence to appreciate the wisdom and insight of this view.

The confidence, expressed in 1903, that there would be no difficulty in meeting a foreign challenge of shipbuilding was shaken in 1906 by information of a great increase in Germany's shipbuilding capacity. Mr Balfour then expressed doubt whether 'we can count upon building faster than they can'. The Prime Minister, however, remained confident in our power and, in the following year, the Civil Lord did the same. But as evidence continued to be received that Germany's shipbuilding potentialities had grown and were still growing, the warning could not be disregarded. Whereas it had been assumed that a German battleship could not be built in less than three years, Krupps had now said that they could build one in 24–30 months; and, as to capacity, they had seven slipways and could lay down two battleships a year. Howaldt of Kiel could promise delivery in the same time at a rate of one ship a year, the Vulkan works of Stettin two ships of 18,000 tons and two large cruisers, Blohm and Voss could lay down two large ships a year, Schichau four, the Weser Yard two. Thus the long-established British warship-building industry was being definitely challenged, and its ability to maintain a lead, or to recover lost ground, was diminished. If Germany chose to force the pace it was within her power to do so.

The German challenge had its reactions in the outer Empire. At the Colonial Conference in 1907 the First Lord of the Admiralty asserted the intention of maintaining the navy on a scale that would ensure the command of the sea in any reasonably probable contingency. Whether the Colonies contributed or not, the Admiralty would do its best to secure them from oversea attack. The German penetration into New Guinea had aroused anxiety in Australia, and Mr Deakin referred to it in a tone of criticism, accusing the Imperial Government of lack of attention to affairs in the Pacific. Australia, he said, had been assured by Lord Derby that Germany had no intention of annexing any part of that island, and it had been in faith of that assurance that the British flag, hoisted by the Governor of Queensland, had been hauled down. Now, Germany had appropriated half of the very territory that Australia had been assured would not be touched. A German naval base was in course of being established in the approaches to Australia. To ensure that such encroachments should be prevented in the future the Commonwealth put forward the following Resolution:

'That it is desirable that the Colonies should be represented on the Imperial Council of Defence.

'That the Colonies should be authorized to refer to that Council for advice on any local question in regard to which expert assistance is deemed advisable.'

Three fundamental principles of Imperial defence were thus summed up at the end of the Conference:

(1) The obligation imposed on each self-governing community of providing as far as possible for their own local security.

(2) The duty of arranging for mutual assistance on some definite lines in case of war.

(3) The necessity for maintenance of that sea supremacy which alone can ensure any military co-operation at all.

Thus the German naval policy of a fleet and a world-wide system of bases was having its effect in the Australasian colonies. At home the hopes of disarmament and of an ending to the naval competition with Germany were fading away. While the inadequacy of the British naval programmes was severely criticized by the Opposition, Ministers endeavoured to convince the Emperor, through the medium of the ambassador, Count von Wolf Metternich, that Great Britain was fully resolved to maintain her supremacy in capital ships, and

therefore that all increases in German building would be met by British building. Metternich tried to bring this matter home to the Emperor, impressing upon him his conviction that the British neither could nor would be indifferent to the strength of the German navy. Associated as its growth was with the cries of the German Navy League and the violent Anglophobia in a large body of the German press it was regarded as a menace to Britain's security and existence. While a defeat in the North Sea meant the end of the British Empire, a lost battle on the Continent was a long way from the end of Germany—a theme which recurred many times in the speeches of Ministers and the writings of Eyre Crowe. But Metternich's warnings were ridiculed by the Emperor. 'The English', he wrote, 'must get used to the German fleet. And from time to time we must assure them that the fleet is not built against them. Let the English get rid of their fears by making an entente with Germany.'

## Anglo-German Conversations

All the representations made by the British Ministers, Grey and Lloyd George, to the effect that Anglo-German relations centred on the naval problem and could not improve while the competition continued, were without avail; they served only to produce violent indignation from the Emperor that his ambassador should have even listened to what he called 'the shameless suggestion that English friendship depended on the curtailment of German sea power'. In further conversations Lloyd George suggested that the needs of the Two-Power Standard would be met if the British fleet were as strong as the combined navies of Germany and any one other Power, and that there should be a permanent ratio of 3 : 2 between the British and German fleets; this to be accompanied by a reduction in the 'tempo' of German shipbuilding. This, however, found no more acceptance than the previous attempts at an arrangement.

King Edward VII visited the Emperor in August 1908. He took with him a memorandum, prepared in the Foreign Office, as a guide to any conversations. In this the simple fact, which accounted for the British attitude, was expressed in a couple of sentences. 'If the German navy ever becomes superior to ours, the German army can conquer this country. There is no corresponding risk of this kind to Germany: for, however superior our fleet was, no naval victory could bring us nearer to Berlin.' The paper was not, however, shown to the Emperor, and though Sir Charles Hardinge, who accompanied

the King, had a direct conversation with him, no advance proved possible. Wilhelm II 'failed to see any reason for nervousness in England or for any increase in the British fleet on account of the German programme'. He 'would not tolerate any discussion and would rather go to war than accept any dictation'. The German Foreign Office saw, in the evident desire of the British Government for an understanding, an opportunity for obtaining some concessions—in other words, for blackmail. 'Our naval policy', wrote von Stumm, 'gives us a valuable trump card in relation to England'. Compensation might be got in some other spheres, particularly in the abandonment by Britain of her entente with France and Russia. The most should be made of British embarrassments, and the British taxpayer should be made to see how costly was an 'unfriendly' attitude towards Germany. British Ministers, however, declined to accept the view that Germany would be making a 'concession' if she accepted the existence of British naval supremacy at sea, a supremacy which, whatever Germany might do, would be maintained. 'It is desired', wrote Sir Charles Hardinge, 'that the recognition of the supremacy of the British navy should be regarded as a great concession, meriting counter-concessions on our side....Such a recognition would be of no value unless the British navy were really supreme, and as long as our navy is supreme it does not matter whether it is so recognized in Germany or not.'

The general deterioration in Anglo-German relations consequent on the intransigent attitude of the Emperor and von Tirpitz at length began to create anxiety in some German circles. The Chancellor, von Bülow, saw that British opinion, even in those sections which had not been antagonistic to the German naval policy, was hardening against Germany; the Socialists in Germany recognized that the naval policy was a direct cause of her isolation; others saw that the competition was not only financially ruinous but also fruitless, and proposed abandonment of the capital ship policy and a return to one of coast defence and commerce warfare. The fact that Britain did not intend to be diverted from her maintenance of supremacy at sea was now plain to at least a section of the German people; it was given expression in simple terms by Grey when, at the end of 1908, he told the ambassador that a number of additional *Dreadnoughts* might have to be laid down in 1909 to meet the German programme. The British plans, he said, depended upon the pace at which the German programme was carried out. It was clear that there had been an acceleration in German shipbuilding, and that the margin of British

superiority had been narrowed so much that it even appeared possible that Germany might, for a time at least, possess as many, or more, *Dreadnought* ships as Britain. Information received during the winter of 1908–9 gave strong reason to believe that Germany had anticipated her programme, and such replies as were given to questions concerning the rate and nature of her construction were definitely misleading. The situation was so plainly dangerous in the spring of 1909 that the Government decided to lay down four ships at once and to ask Parliament's consent to laying down four more if it should prove necessary for the preservation of the superiority of the British battle fleet.

A strong measure of opposition was offered to the increased programme, for there was still a body of opinion which believed in the possibility of an understanding, which favoured a reduction of naval armaments, and, even after the publication of the German estimates for 1909, refused to recognize that any danger existed. Grey took a firm stand. 'There is no half-way house, as far as we are concerned, in naval affairs between complete safety and absolute ruin.' The proposals received approval.

While Germany's programmes were thus proceeding, her ally Austria was also preparing to build three capital ships of the latest type and Italy one more. The presence of these ships in the Mediterranean would alter the balance of power in that sea and this would react upon the position in the North Sea: for though there was the understanding with France, and the responsibility for the general defence at sea in the Mediterranean rested, in a measure, with her, the French navy had fallen seriously into arrears in its first-line ships. An Admiralty forecast in the spring of 1909, based on the result of laying down four ships during that year, showed Britain with sixteen modern capital ships to thirteen of Germany in November 1911: a margin dangerously narrow for an Empire whose existence rests upon sea power. It was through the vastly increased productive power of German shipbuilding that this situation had become possible. Two years earlier Germany had had only two yards which could build a *Dreadnought*; now she had fourteen and three more were under construction.

As a result of this combination of events and calculations the British naval estimates for 1909–10, announced in July, provided for the four 'contingent' ships. In 1910 the rate at which German shipbuilding was progressing was still uncertain, and the British programme for that year (1910–11) provided for five capital ships. The First Lord (Mr McKenna) told the House that, though he could not

say for certain that Germany would have seventeen capital ships in commission in 1912, what was certain was that it was in her power to have them. The British programme would give this country twenty-five *Dreadnoughts* in the spring of 1913 when Germany would have no fewer than twenty-one. Adding to these the ships under construction by Germany's allies in the Mediterranean this allowed no margin, for, though Australia and New Zealand had each offered a capital ship, both Italy and Austria might lay down others also. The programme did not pass without opposition. The Government was accused of building against 'mythical armadas', of laying down *Dreadnoughts* against nightmares, and of sacrificing social reform to naval armaments. The Prime Minister fully admitted that every new ship postponed some work of social reform: but, he added, national security was the first condition of social reform. The programme passed the House.

Various exchanges of view took place between the two Governments during the winter of 1910–11 but without any solution of the difficulties. The German Chancellor continued to persist in asserting that Britain was unnecessarily nervous of the German shipbuilding, that Germany had no aggressive intentions, that German programmes could not be reduced, and that Britain could, without injury to her relations with France and Russia, promise to maintain unconditional neutrality in a Triple Alliance–Dual Alliance war. None of these assumptions could be accepted by the British Government. The situation was not made easier for the Government by a motion, in the spring of 1911, by the 'reduction of armaments' group in the Commons, who accused the Admiralty of overestimating the German rate of construction. The First Lord had no difficulty in refuting the charge and in showing that it was a fact that the German programmes had been accelerated and that the British programme was not a 'panic' programme but was based upon reasonable inferences from ascertained facts. The Foreign Secretary deplored the necessity and expressed a desire for understanding between the two countries. His speech was at once interpreted in Berlin as a sign of weakening. The German naval attaché in London who, throughout these years, persistently misrepresented British views and fanned the flame of competition, expressed great gratification, saying that 'Grey's surrender is due to the Naval Law alone and the unshakable resolution of the German people not to allow any diminution of their important instrument': a statement which may properly be set beside that of the British ambassador in Berlin (Goschen) to the effect that 'the

best means of convincing Germany that competition was useless would be a steady rate of increase in 1911–12 and a determination to continue on that basis annually'. The activity in the German dockyards, he observed, had a tendency to increase or decrease in inverse ratio to that of Britain. The writings of von Tirpitz and the marginal comments of the German Emperor lend strong confirmation to this view.

The British programme for 1911–12 provided for five capital ships. During that year events reached a critical stage owing to the despatch by Germany of a cruiser to Agadir: an attempt to create a breach in the Anglo-French entente. It failed. The two countries showed a united front, and the result was, in Tirpitz's words, 'the first diplomatic defeat since Bismarck...', a rebuff which could not be pocketed and must be salved, as he told the Chancellor, by a Supplementary Naval Bill. Thus the incident was made use of to obtain a further increase in the fighting strength of the navy. The new Bill, in his words, 'did not aim at an actual increase in the fleet but at improving our readiness for war' by putting a reserve squadron into permanent commission. Three, in place of two battleship squadrons were now to be in commission, together with certain other additional measures, to be mentioned hereafter.

The Italian war with Turkey afforded another opportunity for proclaiming the need of increases in the German navy, which must now, so it was asserted, be of such a strength as to give 'a reasonable chance against England'. Matters had thus passed a long way beyond the 'Risk theory' on which the foundations of the navy had been based. The German ambassador in London expressed his fear that what amounted to a blunt offer to England of the alternative 'either you remain neutral or we increase our fleet' would only result in a closer drawing together for mutual security of France and Britain, and would effectively prevent any hope of better relations; but his warning fell upon deaf ears. At the same time German financial circles had become anxious, for the cost would be great and it might be that the army would have to be starved to meet the needs of the navy. So a hard struggle developed between, on the one side the Chancellor, the ambassador and the financial authorities, and on the other the navy party represented by the Emperor, von Tirpitz and the Navy League. Victory for the navy party resulted; but not complete victory. Three battleships and three large cruisers had been asked for. The cruisers were refused. A side issue was raised at the same time concerning the colonies. The conception of a German

African Empire stretching across the continent from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean was put into circulation, a conception which embraced the demands of the navy party for oversea bases.

Sir Edward Grey took the opportunity of this crisis and of the presence of the representatives of the Dominions in London to explain the situation, and why Britain could not be indifferent to events on the Continent. 'What really determines the policy of this country', he said, 'is the question of sea power'. If one Power, or group of Powers, should first separate the remainder and either crush them in detail or force them into the orbit of the group, the naval situation which would result would be that in order to keep the command of the sea we should have to calculate on a possible combination against us of the fleets not of two Powers but of five Powers. It was this which made it impossible for Great Britain to pledge herself to the unconditional neutrality demanded by Germany.

## The Haldane Mission

Though matters had reached the very edge of war in 1911, the situation had been tided over; but the increased tension was plain. A proposal was made from Berlin that direct conversations between British and German statesmen might have some result. As a preliminary Sir Ernest Cassel was sent to Berlin. He carried with him a memorandum, setting out in three clauses the principal elements in the British standpoint. The first demanded that British naval superiority should be recognized, and that the present German naval programme should not be increased but if possible retarded and reduced. The second expressed England's sincere desire not to interfere with German colonial expansion and her readiness to discuss Germany's aspirations in that sphere. The third proposed reciprocal assurances that neither Power would join in aggressive designs or combinations directed against the other. These were accepted as a basis for conversations and Lord Haldane went to Berlin. The hopes of a settlement faded away during the conversations, for the German acceptance contained the proviso that present programmes should include the new Supplementary Law, and it quickly appeared that the desired retardation would not be conceded; while what was demanded in relation to the third clause was a definite and unconditional promise of British neutrality without any reference to the word 'aggression'.

Haldane had not seen the particulars of the Naval Law while in Berlin. On his return to London it was received and examined. It

constituted a formidable increase of German striking power, for besides the addition already mentioned of a third squadron in permanent commission it provided for a great expansion of the personnel, full crews for nearly all the destroyer flotillas, and an additional fifty or sixty submarines. In the colonial sphere England was also asked to agree to extensive concessions of territory, not all of it her own, in Angola, in the Belgian Congo, Zanzibar and Pemba. In return for this she was to benefit by a slight slowing down of the rate of German building, a concession in Timor, and some considerations regarding the Baghdad railway. None of this would render practicable any reduction of the British expenditure, and was wholly insufficient, and Haldane informed the ambassador that immediately the new Naval Bill was passed a supplementary British estimate would be introduced, and the strength of the fleet in the North Sea would be increased by the withdrawal of heavy ships from the Mediterranean, an intimation which drew from the Emperor an angry statement that Germany would consider such action as a *casus belli* and would answer with a still stronger supplementary law and eventual mobilization.

The German naval estimates for 1912–13 confirmed the Supplementary Bill. They would provide, in 1920, for a fleet at home of forty-one battleships and a foreign-service force of eight large and eighteen smaller cruisers together with a reserve fleet of the older battleships and cruisers. The Chancellor, though he had not agreed very willingly to the Bill, defended the naval policy in the Reichstag on the score that it was an absolute necessity for a 'really great Power' with a seaboard to have a strong fleet: the fleet was, in fact, not for the purpose of defending commerce but for the general purpose of 'greatness'. The more extreme German writers went further. Equality with England on the open sea was demanded by Admiral Ahlefeld, and, while this was being urged in the naval sphere, General Bernhardi was preaching, in his *Germany and the Next War*, the theme that war is a biological necessity, that it was inevitable, and that when it came the main task would be to defeat Britain at sea: for it was she who stood in the way of German expansion.

The attempts at arriving at an understanding foundered mainly upon the rock of the demand for a declaration on the part of Britain to observe an unconditional and absolute neutrality in a continental war. In April 1912 the Chancellor asserted that 'the refusal of the English Government to offer us a satisfactory agreement about neutrality means that we can no longer hope to meet English wishes

by modifying our supplementary naval law', though he expressed his readiness to continue discussion of the colonial and territorial questions. The Naval Bill therefore must pass. Pass it did, and in reply the British estimates for 1912–13 provided for four battleships, eight light cruisers and twenty destroyers—destroyers, it is to be observed, now entered more prominently into the problem since they constituted an essential element in the battle fleets. At the same time a new formula took the place of the Two-Power Standard. Though that standard, it was said, had been applicable to the earlier situation when a hostile Franco-Russian combination was to be expected, it was no longer adapted to the situation created by Germany and her allies. In substitution a 60% superiority over the German battle fleet was to be the immediate aim, though it was recognized that the time might come when it would be necessary to lay down two keels to every one laid down by Germany. In the hope that the competition might still be brought to an end, or at least suspended, the First Lord, Mr Churchill, made a proposal in March 1912 for a year's 'naval holiday' from building. It received no welcome in Germany.

As a result of the passing of the Supplementary Bill and of the Austrian building plans an increase in the British programme was announced in July 1912; and in September the French fleet in the Mediterranean was strengthened by the transfer of six of the most modern battleships from Brest to Toulon. This left the northern French coasts without defence at sea, and imposed what was felt to be a moral obligation upon Britain to assume responsibility for their security. At the same time the seriousness of the naval situation was recognized in the Dominions and Colonies. The Federated Malay States offered a battleship and Mr Borden proposed a gift of three battleships from Canada. His proposal passed the Lower House but was rejected by the Senate, and this rejection made it necessary to announce, in June, that the construction of three ships of the existing programme would be advanced.

In the meantime, an exchange of proposals for fixing a definite comparative strength in battleships had taken place, and a proportion of 16 : 10 between Britain and Germany was agreed to. It was interpreted by Tirpitz in terms of squadrons—eight British of eight ships each to five German of the same number. Thus measured it would be less easy for Britain to add ships. But the Government did not intend that the Dominion and Colonial ships should be counted in this proportional arrangement; moreover, Britain would lay down two ships for any additional ship laid down in a Supplementary Law.

Though the First Lord returned more than once to his proposal for a naval holiday it met with no more success than before in Germany, where it was regarded as an attempt 'to make a breach in the Naval Law': nor indeed was it regarded with much favour in this country.

The British estimates for 1914–15 showed no relaxation. They included four battleships and for a strengthening of the Mediterranean fleet which would bring it up to eight modern ships by the end of 1915. Though this brought from the Emperor a proposal to introduce another Supplementary Law which would increase the cruiser fleet and add another battleship, even Tirpitz himself did not favour the course, saying that it would be 'a great political blunder' to do so. It may be said that the fact was beginning to dawn upon Germany that the expectations upon which the naval policy had been based were not being fulfilled. The 'Risk theory' had long ago proved false; the possession of a strong fleet had not given Germany the 'alliance value' attributed to it, but had effectually caused her isolation. The navy, which had cost the country some £200 millions between 1900 and 1914, was still insufficient to protect Germany's trade and colonies or to wrest the command of the North Sea from Britain when war broke out in 1914. Nevertheless, while the German conquests in Europe and the successes of the submarines at sea continued, and a final victory of the Central Powers appeared probable, the future of German sea power was confidently predicted and its scope defined. The colonies would be returned, and in them there would be all the necessary bases for the cruiser and submarine forces, the lack of which had so greatly contributed to the failure of the *guerre de course* by those vessels. With strongly defended bases the routes in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans could be dominated. The aims of German sea power, in the eyes of the more extreme bodies, now went far beyond those which had governed its inception. 'German policy is forced to secure for itself, by all conceivable means, domination of the world sea. The sea is free to us only if we dominate it. If we do not dominate it, it may one day be closed against us,' wrote a Pan-German author in 1917.

## After Versailles

A new phase began after the war of 1914–18. By the terms of the treaty of Versailles the German navy disappeared. Germany was therein limited to six armoured ships of not more than 10,000 tons, a small cruiser force of ships of not more than 6,000 tons, and a restricted flotilla: she was forbidden the possession of submarines and

aircraft. She was deprived of the colonies which were to have served the purposes of providing the bases for her cruiser warfare.

German thought after the war turned to her future policy at sea. Her thinkers rejected the Tirpitz theories of a battle fleet and a struggle for the command of the sea. In place of the 'indirect' method of first obtaining command by the use of massed forces and, by virtue of that command, cutting the sea communications of her principal enemies, Britain and France, they advocated the 'direct' attack on the shipping by an intensive *guerre de course*. The submarine campaign had come near enough to success to give reason to believe that if all the efforts of which the navy was capable were directed against shipping full success in crippling the sea communications was obtainable. The limited number of comparatively lightly armed cruisers to which the Washington and London treaties had committed this country would not be sufficient to provide defence for the numerous convoys needed to maintain the commerce of the country in war. Heavy armed and armoured cruisers would overwhelm the 'escort' vessels of the Sea Powers, and the armoured ships ('pocket battleships') which Germany had built within the terms of the treaty of Versailles were suited to this form of commerce attack. Another theme which was the subject of the strategists of Germany was the handicap under which the naval forces lay by being confined to the corner of the North Sea. Great advantages, they pointed out, would accrue from the occupation of ports in Norway. In these views the intensive and unrestricted forms of commerce warfare and the seizure of Norway were foreshadowed.

The restrictions of the treaty of Versailles were fundamentally modified by the Anglo-German treaty of 1935, by the terms of which Germany was again allowed to build battleships and cruisers of the same size as those of the other Powers and to possess submarines. In the surface types her strength was limited to 35% of that of Britain, in submarines to 45%, and this latter figure was subsequently extended to 100%. She proceeded without delay to implement this agreement. The two battle cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* and the battleships *Bismarck* and *Tirpitz* were laid down ; the construction of submarines and light craft went forward. Though none of these measures would give her the use of the sea and guard her against the danger of want of food from which she had suffered in the war of 1914–18, they would, combined with other measures, enable her to effect the aim of cutting the sea communications of a maritime enemy; and the danger of famine would be averted by the

conquest of the grain-growing territory of the Ukraine. Maritime blockade, with a Germany so situated, would lose its terrors. The one difficulty which would then face her would lie in her supplies of oil. Lack of this essential and imported material would be overcome by building up large stocks, by hydrogenation, by such supplies as Roumania could furnish, and by a short and decisive war for which these resources would suffice.

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# Chapter VI

# GOVERNMENT, ADMINISTRATION AND LAW

*From the Second to the Third Reich :* The Empire of 1871–1918 : The German Republic of 1918–33 : Effects of Party Divisions under the Republic : Powers of the President under the Republic : The Republic and the States : Local Government under the Republic : Town Government under the Republic : Conclusions.

*The National-Socialist State :* Fundamental Principles : The Construction of the National-Socialist State : The Reich Government : The Führer's Control of the Cabinet : The Führer and the People's Will : The Reich and the States : Local Government : Government of the Communes : The Civil Service : The Armed Forces : The Police and the S.S. : Fusion of Police and S.S.

*The Nazi Party Organization :* The Central Party Organization : The Party Functional Organizations : The Party Territorial Organizations.

*The German Legal System :* German Law before 1933 : Law in the Nazi State : Relation of the Courts to the State : Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts : Special Courts for Political Offences : Labour Courts and other Special Courts : Administrative Law and Tribunals : Procedure : Members of the Courts and the Legal Profession.

*Bibliographical Note*

## FROM THE SECOND TO THE THIRD REICH

In Nazi phraseology the National Revolution of January 1933, when Hitler and the National Socialist Party took over the government of Germany, ushered in the Third Reich, which was to last a thousand years (*Das Tausendjährige Reich*). The First Reich, founded at the coronation of Charlemagne in A.D. 800, and known later as the Holy Roman Empire, had come to an end in 1806. The Second Reich, founded by Bismarck in 1871, had collapsed in defeat in 1918. To the Nazis, the German Republic of the years between 1918 and 1933 was a mere transitory phase, whose democratic system contradicted the nature and needs of the German people. Yet, since the Nazis have never formally abolished the republican constitution and, particularly in local government, have used much of the structure, which served not only the Republic but the Empire before it, some knowledge of the institutions of Germany before 1933 is necessary for an understanding of the National-Socialist Reich.

### The Empire of 1871–1918

The German Empire had been built on the agreement, brought about by the power of Prussia, between the rulers of twenty-five

sovereign States* to create a perpetual confederation, 'for the protection of the territory of the Confederation (*Bund*) . . . and for the care (*Pflege*) of the German people'. It was, thus, authoritarian, for in none of the component States (with the possible exception of the Free Cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck) did responsible representative government prevail, though in Baden and Württemberg it had nearly been won before 1914. It was also federal and not unitary, since the States retained many rights of sovereignty (*Hoheitsrechte*) in their own hands. But its federal character was of a peculiar kind, for the great size of Prussia compared with any of the other States and the military victories of its army, which had made German unity possible, made Prussian predominance in the federation inevitable.†

Both the authoritarian principle and the hegemony of Prussia were fully protected in the constitution of 1871, drafted, in the main, by Bismarck himself. The King of Prussia became Emperor (Kaiser) of the Reich, War-Lord of all German armed forces‡ and, acting through the Chancellor of the Reich, whom he appointed and dismissed, executive head of the new imperial government and civil service. The Chancellor, who also by custom almost invariably combined the offices of Minister-President of Prussia and Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs, presided over the *Bundesrath* (Federal Council), of which the members were plenipotentiaries of the governments of the States. Chancellor and *Bundesrath* together formed the deliberative centre of the imperial government and the *Bundesrath* had more than equal power in legislation with the popularly elected chamber, the Reichstag, as well as other powers (e.g. in relation to foreign policy, and settlement of inter-State disputes) which that body did not possess. Since the *Bundesrath*

* The term used in German constitutional documents for a State is *Land* (plural: *Länder*). The English word 'land' does not convey the sense of territorial sovereignty. Throughout this chapter the word State with a capital S, will be used to refer to a *Land*. The central government will be referred to as the Reich.

† Prussia comprised two-thirds of the area and three-fifths of the population of the Empire, and was nearly four times as large and more than five times as populous as Bavaria, the next largest State. The smallest State, Schaumburg-Lippe, with a population of about 40,000 and an area of 131 square miles was, as compared with Prussia, much less important than Rutland compared with England.

‡ Prussian control of the army was most important. The Prussian King-Kaiser personally controlled all the appointments to the General Staff and the chief commands, and the Prussian Minister of War also acted as Minister of War for the Reich. No separate Reich Ministry of War was set up.

represented the combined sovereignties of all the monarchical rulers of Germany it could be relied on to support the Prussian King and Kaiser in resisting demands from the Reichstag for the adoption of responsible parliamentary government.* Moreover, by restricting the legislative competence of the imperial government to the minimum number of subjects necessary for national unity† Bismarck left to the conservatively organized States, including Prussia, the control of most of the usual spheres of government. The administration of justice, police, local government, education, religion, internal trade, agriculture, all remained in the hands of the States. Since the Prussian king ruled as well as reigned, and the governmental institutions of Prussia secured to the conservative forces complete control of policy and legislation, the authoritarian principle was safe in the major part of the Empire, and, with Prussian example and support, it was hardly less so in the lesser monarchical States. The Chancellor's power, as Bismarck organized it, was itself a striking example of the authoritarian principle. For there were at first no other imperial Ministers and, when pressure of work involved subdivision of the imperial Chancellery into departments, the Vice-Chancellor and the Secretaries of State appointed to relieve the Chancellor were definitely his subordinates.

Against the array of authority represented by the King-Emperor, Chancellor-Minister-President, and the Federal Council, themselves supported by and controlling the governments of the States, the Reichstag, though elected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage, and thus the sole representative body of the German people as a whole, could do little. It could not change the government by an adverse vote. It had no means of enforcing the Chancellor's responsibility. Even its control of the budget was limited, though it could be used, on occasion, to change the government's proposals. But it was also, from the first, deeply divided into parties which found it difficult to work together.

* Apart from this anti-democratic community of interest amongst the rulers, Prussia's position was safeguarded by possessing 17 of 58 votes in the Bundesrath. Fourteen negative votes were sufficient to prevent the passage of constitutional amendments.

† These subjects of Reich legislation were: (1) Conditions of citizenship. (2) Customs commercial regulation and Reich taxation. (3) Coinage, weights and measures. (4) Banking. (5) Patents. (6) Copyright. (7) Foreign trade and shipping. (8 and 9) Railways, canals, roads, tolls. (10) Posts and telegraphs. (11) General legislation on civil and criminal law. (12) Army and Navy. (13) Public health. (14) General regulations for press and associations.

Though during the reign of William II, and particularly after the general elections of 1912 (see Table on p. 227), the growth of the Social Democrat Party and of a left-wing in the Centre (Catholic) Party threatened the authoritarian system both in the Empire and in Prussia, it maintained itself down to the first revolution of October 1918 (see p. 240). With the abdication of all the royal rulers of Germany—Hohenzollerns, Wittelsbachs, and the rest—the government of Germany, in the Empire and the States alike, lost its essential principle. The personal sovereignties of kings and grand-dukes, exercised individually in their several States, and collectively under Prussian leadership in the Empire, disappeared overnight. For the first time in its history the German people was called upon to rule itself.

### The German Republic of 1918–33

The first task of the National Assembly, elected on the basis of universal, equal and secret suffrage, which sat at Weimar* from January to July 1919, was to draw up a new constitution. Its work was completed, and the constitution finally passed, on 31 July 1919. The keynote of the whole construction is struck in the first clause, 'The German Reich is a Republic. All power proceeds from the people.' In accordance with this principle of popular sovereignty, the President was to be elected by the whole electorate. The Chancellor and Ministers of the Reich (corresponding to our Prime Minister and Cabinet), though appointed by the President, required the confidence of the Reichstag. This was elected 'by the universal equal, direct and secret suffrage of all men and women above the age of twenty, upon the principles of proportional representation'. Each State, too, must have a republican constitution and a government responsible to a legislature elected on the same universal suffrage as in the Reich. Popular sovereignty was further expressed in provisions for the reference of laws to the whole electorate and for the initiation of legislation by the electorate itself. The constitution also contained a chapter on 'Fundamental Rights and Duties of Germans' which guaranteed all the liberties of the subject, political and civil, normal in a democratic regime.

Not only was popular sovereignty substituted for that of the kings and princes, but the special links, which had secured the dominance of Prussia in the empire, were broken. The alliance

* Hence the expressions 'the Weimar Republic' and 'the Weimar constitution' are commonly applied to the German Republic and constitution.

of the princes with the Prussian King-Emperor for the maintenance of royal authority had already gone, and the President, the Chancellor and the Ministers of the Republic had now no direct connection with the government of Prussia at all. Foreign Affairs and the Army ceased to be under Prussia and became wholly Reich ministries (the *Auswartige Amt* and the *Reichswehrministerium*). And in republican Prussia, with universal suffrage replacing the three-class system, the control of government passed from the Junkers and the industrialists to the Centre and Social Democratic parties.

At the same time the legislative and administrative competence of the Reich compared with the States was greatly strengthened. The tendency towards centralization, common to all highly industrialized states, had been powerfully felt in Germany before 1914, though Reich social legislation was still administered by the States. The war of 1914–18 had made Reich control of economic life necessary and the reparations demands of the allied victors after 1918 created a similar need in time of peace. The republican constitution, therefore, reaffirmed the principle that Reich law overrides (*bricht*) State law and gave the Reich not only sole power to legislate on a restricted list of subjects but also power to legislate, and by doing so to oust the States from legislating, on a further list of twenty subjects covering a very wide field. These new powers were, however, exercised sparingly by the Republic. Reparations demands and inflation forced the Reich to extend its direct taxes to sources hitherto mainly reserved to the States and to set up, in 1920, local taxation offices (*Landesfinanzämter* and *Finanzämter*) for their collection throughout the country. The whole railway system also came under Reich control since its surplus revenue was pledged for reparations payments. But the list of Reich Ministries under the Republic—Foreign Office, Defence, Interior, Finance, Justice, Posts, Communications, Agriculture, Economics, Labour—tends to exaggerate the powers of the central government as compared with those of the States, for some of these Ministries (e.g. Justice, Economics) had little or no administrative substructure.

The States as such were still represented at the centre by the *Reichsrat* (Reich Council) which replaced the *Bundesrath*. Its powers, on paper, were considerable* but, once the Reich govern-

* Its consent was required for all legislation and the Reich Ministers were bound to consult it before introducing their bills to the Reichstag. A bill rejected by the Reichsrat could only become law if passed by a two-thirds majority of the Reichstag and, if the Reichsrat protested against a bill passed by the Reichstag, the measure required reaffirmation by a two-thirds majority or approval by a majority of the electorate at a referendum.

ment had become responsible to and dependent on the confidence of the Reichstag, it could not compare in authority or power with the body which it replaced. For the governments which it represented were themselves democratically elected, and were localized versions, at a lower level of authority, of the Reich government itself.

The breakdown of this republican system was at root due to the deep-seated social, religious and economic divisions in the German people, reflected in their political parties, which rendered the working of a democratic system almost impossible. It was also due to the use made by President Hindenburg and his last three Chancellors before Hitler (Brüning, Papen and Schleicher) of the emergency powers granted to the President under Article 48 of the constitution.

### Effects of Party Divisions under the Republic

The reconstitution of the major parties after the revolution of 1918 has already been described (see p. 242). The adoption of proportional representation increased the number of small groups and rendered parliamentary government still more difficult. The provision of the republican constitution that ' the deputies are representatives of the whole nation . . . subject to their conscience only and are bound by no mandates ', was never more than a pious aspiration. In fact, the members of the Reichstag were under the rigid discipline of their party committees. The effects of these party divisions, combined with the control of the party committees, were as follows :—

(1) Every German government under the Republic had to be a coalition of at least three parties to secure the necessary majority of the Reichstag.

(2) Every change of government involved a process of bargaining between the parties on the allotment of ministerial posts, which severely limited the Chancellor's choice of colleagues.

(3) Even at times of crisis there were long delays before a new government could be formed. For example, after Stresemann's death in 1929 and at the height of the controversy over the Young Plan, it took the Social-Democrat Chancellor, Müller, over a month before he could reconstruct the government.

(4) Even when he had formed a government, a Chancellor's control of general policy and of his colleagues was restricted by the control of the party committees over their members in the government. ' Team work ' and joint cabinet responsibility did not exist

and could not come into existence under such conditions. Every government was weak, for lack of internal unity.

(5) The process of legislation was difficult and slow, since every party claimed a share of representation on the Reichstag committees which considered the government's measures.

With the development of great popular parties opposed to the very principle of parliamentary government (notably National-Socialists and Communists) the German Reichstag, intended by the constitution to be the 'power-house' of the Republic, was unable to provide any government with a reliable basis of support. The constitution of the Reichstag after the general elections of November 1932, sufficiently illustrates the position :—

| | | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| National-Socialists .. .. | 196 | Christian Social Party .. | 5 |
| German Nationalists .. | 51 | German Peasant Party .. | 2 |
| Württemberg *Landbund* .. | 2 | Bavarian People's Party .. | 19 |
| German People's Party .. | 11 | Centre (Catholic) Party .. | 70 |
| Economic Party .. .. | 2 | State Party (former Democrats) | 2 |
| Hanoverian Party .. .. | 1 | Communists .. .. .. | 100 |
| Social Democrats .. .. | 121 | | |

The disruptive influence of party divisions also affected the internal unity of the Reich through the parliamentary system in the States. From 1925 to 1932 Prussia was ruled by a coalition of the Centre, Democrat and Social Democrat parties, whilst Bavaria was under a strongly right-wing government and the governments of the Reich itself tended to rely increasingly on conservative support. The governmental unity provided under the Empire by the conservative alliance of the Prussian with the other monarchical State governments was lacking in the republican system. As a result of these facts the democratic system worked far from smoothly in republican Germany and, as a condition of parliamentary deadlock developed, the powers of the President became of decisive importance.

### Powers of the President under the Republic

Apart from his emergency powers under Article 48 the framers of the republican constitution endowed the President with wide powers. Directly elected by the people, his tenure of office was for seven years, as against the Reichstag's four-year term. He represented the Republic in foreign relations, accredited and received ambassadors, was supreme commander of the armed forces, whose officers—as well as those of the civil service—he appointed and dismissed, subject to the laws governing their status. He appointed and dismissed the Chancellor and, on his recommendation, the Reich

Ministers. Even though it was provided that all the President's ' orders and decrees ' (*Anordnungen und Verfügungen*) required the counter-signature of the Chancellor or of the competent Reich Minister for their validity, it was clear that his special relationship to the German army and civil service, and his freedom to select the Chancellor in a multi-party system, gave the President very real power. But, in addition, under Article 48 of the constitution, the President could : (*a*) enforce upon a recalcitrant State by use of the armed forces the fulfilment of its duties under the Reich constitution or laws ; and (*b*) take the necessary steps for the restoration of ' public security and order ' wherever it was threatened, both by using armed forces and by suspending the guarantees of personal and political liberty provided by the constitution. It is true that presidential decrees issued under Article 48 had to be submitted to the Reichstag for its approval with as little delay as possible, and to be withdrawn if the Reichstag so demanded. But, when the Reichstag was itself hopelessly divided, it was open to the President and Chancellor, acting together, to exercise virtual dictatorship.

During the critical years of the Ruhr occupation and the inflation (1923–4), President Ebert issued many decrees under Article 48, some of which, of an economic character, could only with difficulty be construed as necessary for ' public security and order '. When the economic depression of 1929 struck Germany, Field-Marshal Hindenburg had become President, with all the special authority over the army, civil service, and people alike provided by his military prestige and long service. For two years (1930–32), with Brüning as Chancellor, he dealt with the economic and political crisis by a series of presidential decrees, duly confirmed by the Reichstag. But by the spring of 1932 the aged President, although just re-elected by republican votes and pledged by oath to preserve the constitution, was ready to extend the authoritarian principle further. The appointment of Papen and his ' cabinet of barons ', who had no hope of obtaining a Reichstag majority, represented the adoption of a ' Presidial ' form of government, which could not be reconciled with the spirit, and only by a strained interpretation with the letter, of the constitution. The suppression of the Prussian coalition government and the substitution of Papen as Reich Commissar for Prussia by decree under Article 48 marked the reassertion of the authoritarian principle in German politics. The ' Hüter der Verfassung '* (guardian of the constitution) revealed himself as

* The title of a book by a Professor of Political Science, Carl Schmitt.

the enemy of the democratic system and prepared the way for the advent of the new form of authoritarian government embodied in the National-Socialist state.

## The Republic and the States

The number of the States was reduced, after 1918, from twenty-five to seventeen, mainly by the fusion of a number of small Thuringian States into one. The surviving States were: Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, Württemberg, Baden, Thuringia, Hesse-Darmstadt, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Oldenburg, Brunswick, Anhalt, Lippe-Detmold, Schaumburg-Lippe, Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck.

The extended competence of the Reich government under the Republic made surprisingly little difference to the political life of the individual States. The Prussian government, from 1919 to 1932, comprised a Minister-President and seven Ministers, who exercised an authority over three-fifths of the Reich more extensive and, in certain respects, more immediately important to the ordinary citizen than that of the Reich itself. The spheres of competence of the Prussian Ministries illustrate this, as follows:—

(1) *Ministry of the Interior:* supervision of State administration and local government; control of all police.

(2) *Ministry of Justice:* supervision of courts and appointment of their personnel; prison administration.

(3) *Ministry of Finance:* Budget and control of taxation and tax officials; administration of State quarries, mines and electricity undertakings; administration of public buildings (*Hochbauverwaltung*).

(4) *Ministry of Science, Art, and Popular Culture:* All educational establishments from universities to elementary schools, museums, academies of art and music; ecclesiastical questions.

(5) *Ministry of Commerce:* Regulation of industry and commerce; mines and metal works; electricity undertakings; motor and air travel; representation of Prussian interests at the Reich Ministry of Communications.

(6) *Ministry of Agriculture, Domains and Forests:* Administration of State domains and forests; agricultural education; animal breeding, veterinary services.

(7) *Ministry of People's Welfare (Volkswohlfahrt):* Medical services; unemployment relief and social insurance; housing; poor relief.

## Local Government under the Republic

The local government institutions varied considerably from State to State. Prussia was divided geographically into twelve provinces,* each with an *Oberpräsident* at its head (Fig. 53); each province was divided into two or more *Regierungsbezirke* (government districts) presided over by a *Regierungspräsident*; next came the *Landkreis* (rural circle)† whose chief officer was the *Landrat* and, on the same plane, the *Stadtkreis* (urban circle)† with an *Oberbürgermeister* at its head; finally the *Gemeinde* (commune), varying in size from a village to a small town formed the base of the structure.




Fig. 53. Provinces and *Regierungsbezirke* of Prussia after 1919

Based on Diercke, *Schulatlas*, pp. 153–4 (Braunschweig and Hamburg, 1924). B = Brunswick.

In Prussia the tasks of local government proper were sharply divided from those which were regarded as concerning the State as a whole. The elected local government bodies and officials were concerned with the first. The *Oberpräsident* both supervised the activities of the local government bodies and, as an official of the State, controlled the secondary education and ordinary police of

* Berlin formed an independent unit of its own.

† The *Landkreis* corresponds roughly to our county, though it is usually smaller in size, and the *Stadtkreis* to our county borough. A Prussian town had to have 40,000 inhabitants (or 30,000 in Westphalia and 25,000 in the Rhineland) before it attained the status of a *Stadtkreis*. There were 422 Prussian *Landkreise* in 1922, and their population varied from 18,000 to 230,000.

the province. The *Regierungspräsident* was not responsible to the *Oberpräsident* but directly to the Prussian Minister of the Interior, and the *Regierungsbezirk* was an area of administration but not of self-government.

Beginning with Stein's famous municipal statute of 1808, elective self-government bodies were slowly built up not only for the towns but also for the communes, the *Landkreise* and the provinces. From 1853 until 1918, the basis of election remained the Three-Class system of voting but, under the Republic, universal suffrage took its place.

In the rural districts the larger villages elected a village council (*Gemeindevertretung*) which, in turn, chose a committee and a chairman (*Gemeindevorsteher*). Up to 1928, however, there still existed, mainly in the provinces of Prussia east of the Elbe, 12,000 feudal manors (*Gutsbezirke*) in which the owners (*Rittergutsbesitzer*) personally exercised certain powers of administration and jurisdiction without popular control. Both the *Kreis* and the province also had elected representative bodies—the *Kreistag* (county council) and the *Provinziallandtag* (provincial council) which appointed standing committees (*Kreisausschuss*,* *Provinzialausschuss*) to assist in the work of local administration. In the *Kreis* the *Landrat*, who was appointed by the Prussian Minister of the Interior, represented and supervised both the self-government and the State spheres of administration. But, in the province, the sphere of self-government was directed by a *Landeshauptmann* chosen by the provincial council. His activities fell under the supervision of the *Oberpräsident*, but he represented an independent source of authority—the people of the province as opposed to the State government.†

## Town Government under the Republic

Both the large and small towns of Germany possessed before 1933 elective self-governing institutions and had a notable record of municipal enterprise. There were two forms of constitution usual in Prussia. One was that created under Stein's municipal statute,

* Members of the *Kreisausschuss*, with the *Landrat* formed the administrative court of the *Kreis*, see p. 366.

† These local government areas, officers and institutions of Prussia did not appear in other States. Bavaria was divided into eight *Kreisregierungen* which, in contrast to the *Regierungsbezirke* in Prussia, all had their own elected self-government bodies, and thus, despite their name and size, more nearly resembled a Prussian province than a *Regierungsbezirke*.

which provided a town council, elected by the whole body of citizens and in turn electing an executive council (*Magistrat*) of both professional and voluntary councillors, with a *Bürgermeister* (burgomaster or mayor) as their president and chief executive officer.

The other form was that acquired by the municipalities of the Rhineland and Westphalia under Napoleon's rule in which the burgomaster, elected by the town council for six or twelve years, exercised the executive authority in his own right through paid officials, who were his subordinates. This second form, known as the *Bürgermeisterverfassung* (burgomaster constitution) was adopted in Baden, Thuringia and Saxony, and in 1930 proposals were made in Prussia for its adoption throughout the State and by the German Towns' Association for its adoption throughout the Reich.

Few countries have more reason than Germany to be proud of their achievements in local government. Not only were municipal services in the English sense—trams, buses, lighting, water, sanitation—highly developed and efficiently run, but public health and welfare services and municipal encouragement of art, music and the theatre exceeded that in most other countries. This was largely due to the 'universality rule', under which, in contrast to an English local authority, the presumption in law was that a municipality might develop any enterprise it regarded as desirable for the community. The local government civil servants in the higher grades were trained on the same lines as those of the State, and the office of burgomaster of a great city was both highly paid and highly esteemed.

Even before 1933, however, the financial difficulties of both the German States and local authorities had reduced their independence considerably. The extension of the Reich's taxing powers in 1920 and the effects of the inflation, resulted in a system (*Finanzausgleich*) by which the Reich made annual allotments to the States, who in turn remitted their shares to the local authorities. These last were also strictly limited in the sources of revenue which they could tap. At the same time the State increasingly imposed 'commissioned tasks' (*Auftragsangelegenheiten*) on the local authorities, of which the relief of those who did not enjoy, or had exhausted, unemployment insurance benefits was the most important after 1929. So heavy did this burden become that it has been calculated that between 80–90% of the revenue in rural communes and up to 97% in some large towns was thus earmarked.

As the crisis deepened the local authorities, some of whom had borrowed too freely during the years of easy money (1924–9), fell more and more under the control of the State. Emergency decrees of the Prussian government in 1930–31 fixed wages and salaries of local officials, forced the abandonment of many local cultural, welfare and building schemes, and took full control of the credit policy of the local authorities. There was also an increasing tendency for the State in Prussia to enforce the incorporation of rural areas with great cities, as in the creation of 'Greater Frankfurt' in 1928 or the reorganization of the Ruhr districts in 1929, which resulted in the abolition of 107 administrative districts.

### Conclusions

It cannot be denied, therefore, that in the Reich, in the States and in the local government areas, the democratic system of the Republic had failed to give satisfactory results in important aspects of government, both central and local. All these weaknesses were exaggerated by the opponents of democratic institutions in their political propaganda. It was, however, impossible to restore the traditional monarchical-dynastic basis of authoritarian rule in Germany, for the mass of the population had no faith in the dynastic principle. The most obvious solution, that of improving the democratic system itself, was too rational for a time of acute crisis. Having failed to govern itself satisfactorily the German people became the subjects of the new authoritarianism embodied in the National-Socialist Third Reich.

## THE NATIONAL-SOCIALIST STATE

### Fundamental Principles

Though the Weimar constitution has never been formally abolished by the Nazis, there can be no doubt that they are right in claiming that their assumption of power (*Machtübernahme*) in 1933 was 'no mere change of government, but was a fundamental revolution, the triumph of a *Weltanschauung* (philosophy of life) which was bound to refashion the whole state according to its own principles'.* The basic ideas of the Nazi *Weltanschauung* have been discussed

* *Hitler's Speeches*, translated by Professor N. H. Baynes, vol. 1, p. 413. Professor Baynes's discussion of the constitution of the National-Socialist state (*op. cit.*, pp. 413–418) is most valuable and has largely been used in what follows.

on pp. 273–4. Politically they issue in a fanatical belief in the supreme need of the German Folk-community for unity, and in its duty to obey and follow the leader, who ' is no (mere) representative to whom the people has given a mandate ; he is the incarnation of the spirit of the people '. As such he is its *Führer* (leader), entitled to claim blind obedience both from the people as a whole and from every subordinate leader, whether in the state or party, all of whom derive their authority from him. The Führer is supreme in every sphere of political life. ' His is an inalienable and illimitable supreme authority which is manifested with especial clearness in moments of actual political danger. The entire power of the state, internal and external alike, is united in the hand of the Führer, and as the holder of this power he is sovereign '. The constitutional theory of National Socialism has been summed up by Frank* in the phrase ' Our constitution is the will of the Führer ! '

The primary agency of the Führer for giving concrete expression to his will, and for instructing the Folk in their duty, is the National-Socialist party, which represents that *élite* of the Folk which first responded to the Führer's call. ' So far as concerns the National-Socialist idea, together with the general principles determining the character of the government, it stands above the state '. Goebbels has said, ' Every member of the party who holds an office in the state must regard himself first of all as a National Socialist, must mould his actions on the principles of the party, and co-operate closely with the party officials '. To secure these ends the party before, and still more completely since, 1933, organized itself as a state within the state. It has its own *Reichsleitung* (Reich group of leaders) corresponding to the Reich government, its own regional and local organization, its own police, army, courts and schools ; and a series of functional organizations covering almost every field of human activity (see pp. 349–55).

In 1935, at the Nuremberg party rally, Hitler defined the relations of state and party. The state was to carry on the administration ' within the framework and by means of the laws '. The party was to build up its own internal organization, educate the entire people in the National-Socialist idea, and to introduce those trained

* Hans Frank, formerly Reich Commissar for Co-ordination of the States and Reich Commissar for Justice, Governor of the Government General (i.e. Polish territory not incorporated into the Reich) since 1939.

into the state to serve either as leaders or followers. In practice, however, the party has steadily extended its direct control over the state. This has been done in part by the combination of state and party offices in the same hand (*Personalunion*) and in part by the intrusion of party organizations, such as the Hitler Youth, into what were formerly regarded as state spheres of activity. Above all, the inner *élite* of the party, organized in the S.S. guards under Himmler, have become so powerful as almost to dominate party and state alike (see pp. 344–9).

This relationship of party to state, and the National-Socialist creed itself, demanded the abandonment of 'objectivity' in administration and in justice. The good of the people, as interpreted by the Führer and the party, supplanted the rule of law. Above all the suppression of opponents of the Führer by every available means became the duty of the state. Further, the *Führerprinzip* involved the abolition of every form of discussion (since discussion might promote disunity), and therefore of the whole democratic system. Finally the unity of the Folk community in the person and will of the Führer called for the suppression of all possible foci of division. The States, the other political parties, the Churches and their social organizations, must all be co-ordinated (*gleichgeschaltet*) as completely as possible or suppressed.

Hitler was wise enough not to attempt complete centralization of German life at one blow. As abroad, so at home, he ate his artichoke leaf by leaf. But, by a supremely skilful combination of terror and legality, he converted Germany by a series of steps taken between 1933 and 1938, from a highly decentralized State into a closely centralized form of one-party dictatorship. The combined use of terror and legality must be insisted on as a fundamental part of Nazi technique both at home and abroad. Terror itself has been, so far as that is possible, legalized and permanently organized in the Nazi State (see p. 345). The adherence to formal legality, whether in national or international affairs, has had the advantage of dividing opponents and of conciliating hostile opinion. It is essential for an understanding of the system to realize that, for Hitler and his followers, all opponents of National Socialism, whether domestic or foreign, are without rights of any kind. It is equally essential to realize that Hitler and his followers believe profoundly in the use of physical force, and in their unqualified right to use it without limitation in what they conceive to be the interests of the German Folk.

## The Construction of the National-Socialist State

The application of the *Führerprinzip* to the decentralized, democratically organized, political institutions of Germany was the task to which Hitler and his party colleagues set their hand during the first years of the regime. It involved the capture and centralization under the Führer himself of the whole machinery of government. The task was begun under the influence of the terror let loose by Göring after the Reichstag fire, which took place on the night of 27–28 February 1933, and was completed under the renewed terrorist effect created by the Röhm purge (see pp. 279–80) of 30 June 1934. It involved the suppression or 'Nazification' of all organized bodies which might challenge the Führer's authority, or their reduction to a condition of impotence. The process was termed *Gleichschaltung* (co-ordination) and, under this name, the new government of the National Revolution, dominated by the Nazi leaders, rapidly effected a radical centralization of all German life and eliminated all possible rival groups. Within three years of the *Machtübernahme* (assumption of power) the Führer had established his authority over all the machinery of power and over all the agencies for creating and controlling opinion in Germany, with the one exception of the Churches (see pp. 51-62). Central, regional and local government, the rival political parties, the police (always of the first importance in Germany), the civil service, the armed forces, the educational system, the press and broadcasting had all been brought under the control of the Führer's will. In the process the influence of the German Nationalists, whose alliance had made the legal establishment of the new regime possible, was practically eliminated. Power was concentrated in the hands of the Nazi party leaders, and the party itself built up a vast organization, parallel with that of the state.

## The Reich Government

The law for removing distress from Folk and Reich (*Reichsgesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich*) passed with the necessary majorities for a constitutional amendment by both the Reichstag and the Reichsrat on 24 March 1933, may be described as the fundamental law of the Nazi state. It provided that:

1. Laws could be made by the Reich government (i.e. the Chancellor and Ministers) without the procedure laid down in the

constitution (i.e. without the concurrence of the Reichstag and Reichsrat). This power extended to the budget and to loans.

2. The laws enacted by the Reich government could depart from the constitution so long as they did not affect the essential form (*Einrichtung*) of the Reichstag and Reichsrat. The rights of the Reich President were to remain unaffected.

3. The laws decided by the Reich government were exempted from the operation of Articles 68–77 of the constitution (i.e. the section dealing with the process of legislation).

4. Treaties with foreign states no longer required the consent of the legislative bodies.

5. This law was to come into force on the day of its proclamation. It would cease to have effect on 1 April 1937, or if the present Reich government were succeeded (*abgelöst*) by another. It has been thrice renewed, on 30 January 1937, on 30 January 1939 by unanimous vote of the Reichstag, and on 10 May 1943 by a proclamation issued by Hitler.

This 'Enabling Act', as it is often called, was passed by a majority of 441 to 94, the minority being composed of Social Democrats. The number of deputies present and the majority obtained were large enough to satisfy the provision of the constitution that a constitutional amendment required the presence of two-thirds of the total membership of the Reichstag (432) and a two-thirds majority of the votes cast. Even if the eighty-one Communist deputies, who were excluded from the session and were, for the most part, in concentration camps or in hiding, had been present, and if the Social Democrats had been able to muster their full strength (120), the two parties combined would have been unable to prevent the passage of the bill.* The major responsibility for its passage with the necessary majority must be held to fall upon the Centre and the Bavarian People's parties, whose combined votes (92) if cast against the measure, instead of for it, would have increased the minority to 186, or eleven more than was required to prevent a constitutional amendment from becoming law. How far the decision of the Centre and the Bavarian People's parties to support the law was due to the terror unloosed by Göring after the Reichstag fire it is impossible to say, though there is reason to suppose that this consideration played its part.

* Under the conditions supposed the total number of deputies present would have risen to 637, and a minority of 213 would have been required to prevent the passage of the law. The Social Democrats and Communists together would have numbered only 201.

The effect of the Enabling Law was to combine legislative and executive authority in the same hands. The small group of men who formed the Reich 'Cabinet', Hitler and the Ministers, were endowed with almost unlimited power. For not even the Supreme Court of Appeal (*Reichsgericht*) could challenge any executive action clothed by the Reich government in the form of a law and, even if the executive had failed to legalize an action beforehand, it could put itself right by a decree *ex post facto*. At one stroke all the safeguards provided by the republican constitution against authoritarian government were swept away and the constitution itself, though unrepealed, became meaningless.

Even this concentration of power in the hands of the Reich government did not, however, satisfy the *Führerprinzip*. It was almost certainly intended by the Nationalist Ministers, who formed a majority of Hitler's original Cabinet, that the powers granted by the Enabling Act should be exercised by the Cabinet as a whole, acting as a collegiate body. The danger of Nazi absolutism was also, they thought, counteracted by the fact that the Reich President, Hindenburg, retained his powers.

But the Nationalists had underestimated the dynamic force of the Nazi movement. Although, after the suppression of all other parties (see p. 333) and the election of a one-party Nazi Reichstag in November 1933, the law for the reconstruction of the Reich (*Gesetz über den Neuaufbau des Reiches*) of 30 January 1934 gave the Reich government power to 'enact new constitutional law', this extension of the Cabinet's powers was to accrue primarily to the Führer himself. For when, after the massacre of 30 June 1934, the Reich Ministers made themselves 'accessories after the fact' by giving their consent to a Reich law approving Hitler's actions, they were in no position to resist the full application of the *Führerprinzip* to the Reich Cabinet itself. On 2 August 1934 Hindenburg died, and on the same day there appeared a Reich law, dated 1 August, uniting the offices of President and Chancellor in Hitler's person. It was accompanied by a decree (*Erlass*) issued by Hitler himself in which he declared that, since Hindenburg had given a unique meaning to the title of President, he did not wish to use it but wished to be known as *Führer und Reichskanzler* (Leader and Reich Chancellor).

Like all similar pronouncements by the Führer this was no mere verbal quibble. The title 'President' possessed an uncomfortably republican flavour. Hitler intended to assume all the legal powers

granted by the constitution to the President of the Reich (see pp. 319–20), above all the supreme command of the armed forces, but he wished to combine them with his mystical powers as Führer and to establish this principle at the highest level of authority. When, in the autumn of 1934, the Reich Ministers took an oath of personal allegiance to Hitler the concentration of power at the centre of government was complete. No legal limitation on Hitler's power remained, and only such political limitations as arose from considerations of prudence. The Reich Cabinet could not hope in future to override the views of the Führer. They became an advisory body without the ultimate power of decision, a function exercised by Hitler himself. Though, like all despots, subject to pressures from various directions, and able to play them off one against another, Hitler, since the autumn of 1934, has been the final source of all law and of all executive action in Germany.

The exercise of this authority has shown itself in Hitler's issue of ordinances on his own authority without any counter-signature whatever. Of these the most striking is the *Führerverordnung* (Leader ordinance) of 18 October 1936, empowering Göring to carry out the four-year plan of economic development. For, in addition to giving Göring very wide executive authority, it also endowed him with power to issue ordinances, necessary to the execution of the plan, having the force of law.

This decree was promulgated from Berchtesgaden without counter-signature by a Minister. No Reich law can be found giving Hitler authority to legislate in this way. But if he can delegate to a nominee both executive and legislative powers over the economic life of the German nation there would appear to be little or nothing which he cannot do.

### The Führer's Control of the Cabinet

Hitler's control of his colleagues has been increased by the addition to the cabinet of his chief party subordinates. Except for Alfred Hugenberg and, later, Papen the Nationalist members were not driven out—indeed, in the early years of the regime they were somewhat anxiously kept in—but new Ministries have been created and the rank of *Reichminister* granted to party leaders. Thus the ten Ministries which existed in January 1933 (Foreign Office, Defence, Interior, Finance, Justice, Posts, Communications, Agriculture, Economics and Labour), of which seven were then held by Nationalists, had been increased to fourteen before the war. In

1933, the Air Ministry (Göring), and the Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment (Goebbels) were added; in 1934, the Ministry of Science and Education (Rust); in 1935, the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs (Kerrl*).

All the new Ministers have been Nazis of long standing, and the replacement of Neurath† at the Foreign Office by Ribbentrop still further increased the party strength in the governing group. But, in addition, the Führer's Deputy (Hess); Röhm, Chief of Staff of the S.A. until his murder in 1934; Frank, Commissioner of Justice for the reform of the legal system in the spirit of National Socialism; Lammers, head of the Reich Chancery; Schacht, even after he resigned from the Economic Ministry; and Seyss-Inquart, the betrayer of Schuschnigg, also held 'Cabinet rank'. Other prominent Nazi leaders like Himmler, as Reich leader of the S.S. and Chief of the German Police, and Ley, as leader of the German Labour Front, were given the right to attend meetings of the Cabinet when affairs concerned with their departments were discussed. Finally, by 1937, the Nationalist Ministers had themselves become party members and were rewarded for their services by being presented with gold badges of honour by Hitler himself.

This consolidation of party control, under the Führer, over the Cabinet, has been accompanied by a decline of the Cabinet's importance as a body. Even before the war it met infrequently and since the creation of the small 'war cabinet', the Council for the Defence of the Realm (*Ministerrat für die Reichsverteidigung*)‡, on 30 August 1939, the legislative functions of the Reich Cabinet have largely passed to that body (see Appendix, p. 482). The other Ministers have become departmental chiefs executing the orders of the Führer and of the Council of Defence.

The new departments created in the central government, particularly those for Propaganda, Education and Religion, represent not only the reduction of the authority of the States (see pp. 335–7) but an organized effort of the party, working through the organs of the Reich, to impose the Nazi *Weltanschauung* (philosophy of life) upon Germans of all ages. The effects in religion and education are discussed elsewhere (see Chapter I, pp. 51–63, and Chapter VII *passim*). But the importance of Goebbels's activities in the Propa-

* Died 1942, no new Minister yet appointed.

† Neurath was replaced by Ribbentrop in February 1938. He retained however the rank of Reich Minister.

‡ It is of interest that Hitler himself is not a member of the Defence Council.

ganda Ministry can hardly be overestimated. Press, radio, film, drama, and, so far as possible, art, have been organized by the Propaganda Ministry, with great skill and a lavish expenditure of money, not in the interests of truth or beauty but in those of the one-party state. Criticism has been completely stifled, for all authors and artists must be members of one of the chambers of music, art and literature established by Goebbels if their work is to be produced, and, in this sphere, as in all others, the threat of the concentration camp hangs over the critic's head. Moreover, day and night, with the utmost ingenuity, Goebbels and his collaborators have determined what information the German people should be given and have adjusted its content and moulded its form to suit both the permanent and temporary needs of the party policy. Of all the instruments of government grasped by the Nazi leaders the control of opinion, combined with the suppression of criticism, has been perhaps the most ingeniously organized and exploited and has proved itself one of the mainstays of the regime.

## The Führer and the People's Will

The *Führerprinzip* places the Folk in the position of followers (*Gefolgschaft*), whose will is discovered for them by the intuitions of the Führer himself. No process of discussion or debate upon political issues is therefore necessary. Conflicting political parties are regarded as noxious, for they lead to divisions in the Folk and national weakness, whilst representative bodies and the process of voting are only required to give public endorsement to the decisions already taken by the Führer himself.

As a logical result of this position the Communist and Social Democrat parties were officially suppressed in May and June 1933 under the ordinances of 28 February for the protection of Folk and State* and, under severe pressure from the Nazi party, all the other political parties were induced to dissolve themselves between 28 June and 7 July 1933. On 14 July 1933, a law was passed declaring the National-Socialist party the only political party in Germany and imposing severe penalties on anyone who should seek to organize any other. In November 1933, a one-party general election was held and a unanimous Nazi Reichstag and Reichsrat were returned. The Nazi state and the Nazi party were now face to face, and the

* Issued by President Hindenburg on the day after the Reichstag fire under the authority of Article 48. They suspended all the constitutional guarantees of the political and civil liberty of the subject, which have never been restored.

relations between the two were regulated by a law of 1 December 1933 ' to ensure the unity of party and state '. This asserted that the Nazi party, since the victorious revolution, was ' the bearer of the German idea of the state (*Staatgedankens*) and was indissolubly united with the state '. The party was made a corporation of public law, which gave it legal powers to tax its members, to issue ordinances, and to exercise coercive discipline over its officials. At the same time the Führer's deputy in the party leadership (at that time Rudolf Hess) and the Chief of Staff of the S.A. organization (Röhm) were made members of the Reich government.

The internal jurisdiction of the party courts over party members was also given legal recognition and Reich officials and offices were to assist the party officials in carrying out their duties.

Since then the Reichstag has ceased to have any real meaning and has been aptly described as ' the most highly paid male chorus in the world '. It is composed of carefully selected old party comrades (*Parteigenossen*) in the ratio of one to 60,000 voters. Its President is still Göring, and it was summoned before the war once or twice a year to hear a speech from Hitler and sometimes to endorse, without discussion, a law already drawn up. Its importance in the Nazi state can be judged from the following list of its meetings between 1934 and 1937 :

30 January 1934. Speech by Hitler—Law for Reconstruction of the Reich.

13 July 1934. Speech by Hitler—Justification of the massacre of 30 June 1934.

6 August 1934. Session of Mourning for President Hindenburg.

21 May 1935. Speech by Hitler—German Peace policy.

15 September 1935 (at Nuremberg). Speech by Hitler—Racial laws and law on Reich flags.

7 March 1936. Speech by Hitler—Denouncing the Locarno Pact and justifying the reoccupation of the Rhineland.

30 January 1937. Speech by Hitler—Prolongation of the ' Enabling Act ' of 24 March 1933.

The political voice of the German people is now confined to the function of saying ' yes ' or ' no ' to questions put to it by the National-Socialist government. Three plebiscites of the whole German people have been taken to provide endorsement for the actions of the Führer. The occasions were carefully chosen and the whole of the party and Reich propaganda machinery was set to work

to secure a satisfactory result. It is impossible to determine whether, or how far, intimidation or falsification of the results was used. But the published figures have shown a unanimity surprising even in a closely regimented country. The last of the three, held on 10 April 1938, in both Germany and Austria, to endorse the absorption of Austria into the Reich, returned a percentage of 99·57 affirmative votes. Even on a subject on which a high degree of unanimity might be expected the percentage of disagreement (0·43) is low.

## The Reich and the States

The historically separate German States, in which local loyalty still persisted, seemed to present a more serious obstacle than even the political parties to the Nazi process of *Gleichschaltung*. But, though Hitler felt bound, for tactical reasons, to assure the Reichstag, on 23 March 1933, that ' the continued existence (*Bestand*) of the States (*Länder*) will not be interfered with ', they were within two years stripped of all vestiges of independent sovereignty and converted into local government areas of the centralized Nazi state.

The process was masked by retaining the names and areas of the States intact, whilst abolishing all their rights of self-government. Of the seventeen States in existence in January 1933 fifteen still remain, the only changes having been the union of Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Mecklenburg-Strelitz in 1933, and the incorporation of Lübeck in Prussia in 1937. But, by a series of laws* passed between 1933–5, the German Reich lost its federal character and was converted into a centralized state.

The effect of these laws was to place a Reich governor (*Statthalter*) in charge of each of the States and at the head of its government. They are appointed, and can at any time be dismissed, by Hitler himself and are ultimately responsible to him for the administration of their State. But they were, in the first instance, subject to the instructions of the Reich Minister of the Interior and, since 1935, must carry out the instructions of every Reich Minister in matters concerning his department. Though clothed with a high-sounding title the *Reichsstatthalter* is, so far as administrative independence goes, on much the same level as a Prussian

* These laws were (1) 31 March and 7 April 1933, two laws for co-ordinating (*Gleichschaltung*) the States (*Länder*) with the Reich, the second of which created the office of *Reichsstatthalter* (Reich governor); (2) the law of 30 January 1934 for the Reconstitution (*Neuaufbau*) of the Reich; (3) the *Reichsstatthalter* law of 30 January 1935; (4) the law of 14 February 1934.

*Oberpräsident* and, since many of the surviving States are very small, the governors of these are, in fact, less important. In part the survival of the smaller States as separate administrative areas may be explained by Hitler's desire to provide some of his associates with high-sounding offices of not very serious political moment.

The State governments having been 'co-ordinated' in 1933, their representative assemblies have also been abolished. This further application of the *Führerprinzip* reached its logical conclusion in the law of 14 February 1934 which abolished the Reichsrat (see p. 317). The States, as a body, have now no separate representation at the centre of government. Each can only approach the seat of final authority through its governor, himself a nominee of the central government. Like the Reich government, the State governments, whose members are appointed and dismissed by the Führer on the proposal of the *Statthalter*, exercise the legislative powers of the State. But such legislation requires the approval of the Reich Minister to whose department the subject belongs, and all Reich legislation is valid in the States. The Reich government may also pass legislation applicable to only one State. Since the Reich has created Ministries for every aspect of government and the State civil services have also been largely taken over by the Reich, there is little left for the State governments to do but to apply Reich legislation within their areas.

Prussia, by reason of its size and historic importance, differs somewhat in the organization of its State government from the other States. Hitler himself is *Reichsstatthalter*. But he delegates his power to Göring, who is Minister-President. All the Prussian Ministries, except Finance, were absorbed into the corresponding Reich Ministries during 1933, and though Göring has appointed a *Staatsrat* (State Council) of his own nominees, it has only once met. The local government of Prussia is, therefore, conducted by the pre-Nazi administrative machinery (see p. 315 and pp. 321–5). In the other States the number of Ministers and Ministries retained seems to have been decided largely by local and personal considerations. In some (Hesse, Anhalt) there are no Ministers, in none more than four, though some of these conduct two or more Ministries.

Since 1935, therefore, Nazi Germany has become a highly centralized unitary state, after the Napoleonic model. The old dualism between Prussia and the Reich has been solved by their complete fusion. The other States have been brought completely

under the control of the central government and the rigid application of the *Führerprinzip* has deprived them of all representative organs and of all power of effective independent action. The structure of government throughout the Reich has been reduced to a simple pattern, though the retention of the boundaries of the States differentiates them from Prussia. The reorganization of all local government areas on uniform lines is, however, foreshadowed, and the treatment of Austria, after its absorption in the Reich, might have been applied to the whole of Germany, if the present war were won.

In April 1939, Burckel was appointed Reich Commissioner for the co-ordination of Austria and the country was divided into seven *Reichsgaue**, each with a *Statthalter* at its head. The latter is purely an agent of the central government and his orders and decrees may be cancelled by the competent Reich Ministers. But he has very wide administrative powers and is the chief police authority of his area. Under him are a *Regierungspräsident* and a *Gauhauptmann* for the fields of State administration and 'local self-government' respectively. Though this distinction has been taken over from Prussia, it has no more meaning in the new *Reichsgaue* than it has retained in Prussia. For the *Gau* has no self-governing institutions of its own, save the nominated councils of the towns within it.

## Local Government

The fundamental difference made by the Nazis in local, as in central, government has been the complete suppression at every stage of all elected representative bodies. The *Provinziallandtag* and the *Kreistag* have both disappeared and the organs of municipal government are now all nominated, subject to the approval of the central government and of the local party leader. Apart from this great change the only important difference in the names and functions of the areas and their officials has been the extension of the name *Kreis* (district) to the local units of administration in Saxony, Württemberg and Baden, whilst the office of *Landrat*, originally Prussian, has been extended throughout the Reich since 1 January 1939. Despite their destruction of the institutions of self-government the Nazis have been anxious to avoid the odium of destroying

* The word *Gau*, adopted by the Nazi party for its own larger local units (see p. 354), is derived from the Latin *pagus*. For Germans it has a romantic smack of pre-Christian Teutonism. The seven *Reichsgaue* of Austria are Vienna, Carinthia, Styria, Lower Danube, Upper Danube, Salzburg, and Tyrol-Vorarlberg.

self-government itself, and have preserved in Prussia both the former division between subjects of self-government and subjects of State administration and the title and office of the *Landeshauptmann*, who was formerly the independent representative of the provincial self-governing assemblies. He is now an administrative subordinate of the *Oberpräsident* for the subjects of ' self-government '. In place of the former provincial committee, elected by the provincial assembly, there is now a nominated advisory provincial council, of which the *Landeshauptmann* and the *Regierungspräsidenten* of the province are members, the remaining members being appointed by the Prussian Minister-President. The former arrangement by which the *Oberpräsident* could not give instructions to his *Regierungspräsidenten*, who communicate directly with the Ministries of the Reich (as formerly with those of the State), was also retained in Prussia, though it has been abandoned in the new *Reichsgaue*, Sudetenland, Danzig-West Prussia, and Wartheland, formed in 1939.

The departments in the office of an *Oberpräsident* before 1939 were as follows :

1. General department.
2. Secondary schools.
3. Agriculture and development of a new peasantry.
4. Inspector of order police (*Ordnungspolizei*).
5. Weights and measures.
6. Town and country planning.

In addition, through the *Landeshauptmann*, the *Oberpräsident* deals with the following subjects of ' self-government ' :—(1) care of culture and community (*Kultur- und Gemeinschaftspflege*) ; (2) health, including prevention of tuberculosis and cancer, and midwifery ; (3) public welfare ; (4) youth welfare ; and (5) care of disabled soldiers of the war of 1914–18. The *Regierungspräsident's* office has departments for (1) general administration ; (2) schools, other than secondary ; and (3) agriculture, including administration of State domains. But he is also the *Landespolizeibehörde* (State police authority) and his sphere of authority covers (1) building ; (2) expropriation and requisition ; (3) factory and shop inspection ; (4) financial supervision of the communes ; (5) general supervision of the *Stadt-* and *Landkreise* and of the communes (*Gemeinde*) within each *Landkreis* ; (6) the land service* and land survey ; (7) police administration ; (8) preservation of the countryside ; (9) price control ; (10) public health and welfare ; (11) transport ;

* i.e. questions arising out of the compulsory service on the land which is done before the period of military conscription.

and (12) water supplies. In addition, the leader of the district secret state police (*Gestapo*) office supplies the *Regierungspräsident* with political information about his district.

The *Landrat*, who administers a *Kreis* (county), is now appointed by the Führer on the proposal of the Minister of the Interior. Within his narrower area his competence is extremely wide, for he is the police authority of the *Kreis*, responsible for order and security, health, fire prevention, A.R.P., inspection of buildings, factories and shops, control of foreigners and permits for residence, and for the different branches of the police who deal with these questions. But the *Landrat* also deals, within his own area, with almost all the subjects covered by the offices of the *Oberpräsident* and the *Regierungspräsident*, and is equally in charge of the State administration proper and of the ' self government ' tasks of his *Kreis*, which include finance, welfare, public health, cultural institutions, housing, among others. He is also responsible for general supervision of the communes within his *Kreis*. In his multifarious duties he co-operates with the party *Kreisleiter* (see p. 354) and can use all the party organizations to assist him.

The functions of the *Landrat* were considerably extended in 1933 when the elected *Kreisausschüsse* (Kreis committees) were abolished as administrative bodies. Göring, as Minister-President of Prussia, seems to have been anxious to preserve the authority of the *Landrat* as against that of the party *Kreisleiter*, who was forbidden to interfere with the tasks of State administration. But the offices of *Landrat* and *Kreisleiter* are often in the same building, and the pressure of total mobilization has, in some instances, united the two offices in one hand. In any case, the great majority of the higher officials of the State administrative system had, by March 1937, come to be party men, often holding important party as well as State offices. This personal union of State and party offices, and the dominance of party members, is shown in the following table, relating to Prussia in March 1937:

| | |
|---|---|
| 12 *Oberpräsidenten* .. .. | All replaced by party members between 1933–37; eleven of the twelve had been members before 1933; nine of the twelve were also *Gauleiters* of the party *Gau** most nearly corresponding to their province. |
| 34 *Regierungspräsidenten* .. | Thirty-one replaced by party members; nineteen of these pre-1933. |
| 361 *Landräte* .. .. | 344 are party members; 171 of these pre-1933. |

* See above, p. 337, and Fig. 61.

## Government of the Communes

The process of co-ordinating local government and of applying the *Führerprinzip* to it did not end with the States, provinces and 'counties' (*Kreise*). On 30 January 1935, the process was completed by the issue of the *Deutsche Gemeindeordnung* (German communal constitution), which swept away from the towns and villages what was left of the democratic process in local government and imposed a uniform constitution on every commune (*Gemeinde*) in the Reich. It applied equally to urban (*Stadtgemeinden*) and to rural communes (*Landgemeinden*); it swept away all local variations in constitutional type; and, with the necessary variations to correspond to their size, it applied to the largest cities of Germany as much as to the smallest village. Though it purported, in its preamble, to further self-government 'in the true spirit of (its creator) Freiherr vom Stein', its content was directly contrary to the principles of Stein's great municipal ordinance (*Städteordnung*) of 1808.

Henceforward the burgomaster* of each town was a nominated officer, in whose appointment the local Nazi party representative (*Beauftragte*) had an important share, though the final appointment had to be made by the *Regierungspräsident* (in the case of communes within a *Kreis*); by the *Statthalter* in the case of *Stadtkreise*; or by the Reich Minister of the Interior in the case of towns with over 100,000 inhabitants. The members of the council (*Gemeinderäte* or, in large towns, *Ratsherren*) might vary from twelve to thirty-six according to the size of the commune. But they, too, are nominated by the party representative, in consultation with the burgomaster, and the decisions of the council are all taken by the burgomaster himself. There is no voting and the function of the council is purely advisory. The burgomaster must ask for their advice on important questions but is under no obligation to follow it. Since the council meetings are usually held behind closed doors and the community has so little power over its own affairs it is not surprising that interest in local government has undergone a sharp decline since 1935. Even Frick, when Minister of the Interior, deplored this tendency, though without taking any steps to remove its cause. But, if real self-government has been suppressed and the municipal officers have been made agents of the state and the party, they have not been

* *Bürgermeister* in towns with a population of less than 20,000, which are not *Stadtkreise*, i.e. administratively separate from the adjacent *Landkreis*. *Oberbürgermeister* in all *Stadtkreise*.

relieved of any of their former administrative tasks and have had many new ones imposed upon them. The normal town usually administers the following municipal offices: Finance, accounts, local taxation, registry, survey, insurance, labour, health, youth, housing, public welfare, parks and cemeteries. Since the war, or in some cases just before it began, a number of others have been added, e.g. war compensation, food rationing, economic (rationing of articles other than food, etc.), price control. The conflicting authority of the party organizations, such as the Hitler Youth and the National-Socialist people's welfare organization*, and the immense flow of government decrees, have added to the complexity and to the burdens of local administration. In 1942, an official publication complained that the Munich food office had had to carry out a total of 1,783 new decrees issued by higher authorities during 1941.

## The Civil Service

Hitler and the Nazi party leaders were not satisfied with 'co-ordinating' the external machine of government. They recognized that the great body of civil servants, both in the Reich and in the States, if left to itself, might present a serious obstacle to the execution of their plans. They were determined not to make the mistake of their republican predecessors who, out of respect for legality and for vested rights, had left many of their most dangerous enemies holding high office in Reich and State departments. These men were the natural allies of the new national government and it is typical of them that Dr Meissner, chief of the Reich President's chancery, has served with equanimity under Ebert, Hindenburg and Hitler, and is now a Reich Minister.

But, during the Republic, a number of democrats had been appointed, and promoted, to important positions in the civil service. One of the first acts of the new regime, therefore, was to pass a law with the more than usually misleading title of 'the law for the re-establishment of the professional civil service' (7 April 1933). By this measure the Reich government conferred upon itself power to dismiss or to retire all non-Aryan officials, all those admitted between 1918 and 1933 without the prescribed training, and all those who had not given proof of 'political reliability'—a flexible phrase covering all opponents of the Nazis. An immediate and sweeping

* *National Sozialistische Volkswohlfahrt*, known for brevity as N.S.V. See below, p. 429.

purge of the civil service, both in the Reich and the States, followed, and a close control has since been exercised over new entries. The aspirant for the higher ranks of the civil service and of the judiciary and legal profession must be 'rooted in the people', must have performed his labour and military service, must give proof of Aryan descent and political reliability, and must swear an oath of allegiance to Hitler himself. As a result of these provisions 99% of the 293 new appointments to the post of *Verwaltungsreferendar* (the first step in the higher civil service) between 1933 and 1936 were party members, 66% having joined before 1933. This steady 'Nazification' of the civil service from below, following on the purge of 1933, permitted some concessions to the older system of established rights in the civil service law of January 1937. But the Reich government retained wide powers of dismissal and transfer, and every civil servant was required by the law 'to be guided in his whole conduct by the fact that the party, in indissoluble union with the people, is the bearer of the German idea of the state'. In effect the independence and impartiality of the German civil service has gone. Appointments to all the higher civil service posts now require Hitler's approval, and to the lower ones that of the *Gauleiter* of the area concerned. Promotion depends upon being, or seeming to be, a good Nazi, and the party wields an effective control over the vast administrative machine.

## The Armed Forces

In many respects the most vital instrument of power which Hitler and his party required to control in order to sustain their regime and to fulfil their expansionist aims in Europe was the army. The task of securing control of the army was the more important for Hitler because it had behind it, even after 1918, the prestige of Prussian victories and a highly coherent group in the German officers' corps. Without its support, or against its resistance, the national revolution, backed only by the numerous but ill-equipped S.A. and the numerically small S.S. of 1933, could have done little. Hitler's political alliance with the German nationalists and the ceremonial thanksgiving for the new Reich held at Potsdam in March 1933 symbolized the marriage of the old and the new nationalism. But, while Hindenburg, president and supreme commander of the armed forces, appeared in the uniform of a field marshal, Hitler made an unimpressive figure in the civilian's lugubrious frock-coat and top hat. The army had not yet accepted the new Führer, except as

political head of the civilian government. The *Reichswehr* (defence) Ministry remained in the hands of a general (von Blomberg), as in the imperial period and during the later years of the Republic.

Hitler was prepared to bide his time and to pay a price to secure ultimate control. In 1933 he restored the system of military courts, dear to the hearts of the officer class, but which the Republic had abolished. As has been seen, the Röhm massacre (see pp. 279, 330) was closely followed by Hindenburg's death and the combination of the President's powers with those of the Chancellor in Hitler's hands. From 1 August 1934 Hitler became supreme commander of all German armed forces and at once enforced on all ranks an oath of loyalty to his person, in marked contrast to the oath of loyalty to the constitution, which had been demanded by the Republic. ' I swear by God this holy oath that I will give unlimited obedience to the Führer of the German Reich, Adolf Hitler, supreme commander of the armed forces, and that, as a brave soldier I will be ready at any time to stake my life for this oath '. The acceptance of this formula by the officers' corps of the German army was one of the decisive events in the establishment of the Nazi state.

In March 1935, conscription was introduced into Germany and on 21 May 1935 a defence law (*Wehrgesetz*) provided for one year's service* for all Aryan Germans, but at the same time forbade members of the Nazi party to engage in political activity during their term of service. Formally the army was to retain its non-political or *überparteilich* (' above party ') position. In April 1936, the general officers commanding both the army and the navy, General von Fritsch and Admiral Raeder, were given the rank of Reich ministers and might, thereafter, be summoned to Cabinet meetings. They were, however, explicitly stated to remain under the authority both of Hitler himself and of the Reich war minister (General von Blomberg), and this apparent increase in the influence of the older officers was short-lived. On 4 February 1938, after von Blomberg's dismissal, a further ordinance appeared, signed by Hitler and the head of the Reich chancery, Lammers, in which Hitler announced that, from that time onward, he intended to exercise personally and directly the command of all the armed forces and that the office of the high command of the armed forces (*Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*†) in the war ministry was to act as

* Raised to two years on 24 August 1936.

† Usually referred to, for brevity, as OKW.

his military staff. The head of this office, General Keitel, was to act as War Minister with a seat in the Cabinet and to take his instructions directly from Hitler.

Once again a great concentration of power in the Führer's hands had taken place. Ludendorff's ideal of the wholly unified direction of the armed forces had come to pass. A single mind, advised by the technical experts of the OKW, was to control and decide military as well as political strategy. The generals in the field were confined to tactical decisions.

Inside Germany, before 1939, the army, like the Reich and the party, had its own administrative areas. The country was divided into fifteen *Wehrkreise** (defence districts or corps areas) (Fig. 63) and the administration, recruitment and training of the troops within the area were centralized at a corps headquarters situated in one of the larger towns. These army administrative areas did not correspond either with the civil areas of administration (Prussian provinces or the States), or with the Nazi party political areas, the *Gaue* (Fig. 61 and see p. 354). The relations between the three types of area—army, Reich and party—since the war are discussed below (see Appendix, pp. 485–90).

## The Police and the S.S.

Ever since the eighteenth century, Prussia has been to a much larger extent than is easily understood by an Englishman or an American, a 'police' State. Jerome K. Jerome in 'Three Men on the Bummel' and Mark Twain in 'Innocents Abroad', were exposing a deep-seated characteristic of Prussian, and even German, government, when they mocked at the docility with which the Germans accepted the countless interferences with their freedom typified by the word *Verboten*. For the police in Prussia, in addition to being entrusted with functions exercised in England by the licensing authorities, the film censor, the Lord Chamberlain, the Home Office, food inspectors and others, also enjoyed general powers 'to take the necessary measures according to their discretion, but subject to the existing laws, to avert such dangers to the community or to an individual as threaten public security or order'. These powers affected a very wide range of human activity, though they were restricted under the Republic by the guarantees of the liberty of the subject provided in

* They were numbered from 1 to 18, but 14, 15 and 16 did not exist as administrative areas. It has been suggested that they were the numbers of corps possibly organized as a general reserve.

the Weimar constitution. But, on the day after the Reichstag fire (28 February 1933), these clauses were suspended and have never been restored. As a result the already wide police power was freed from almost all legal restriction, and the individual had little protection against arbitrary action.

Before 1933 the police power had been in the hands of the States. With the Nazi assumption of power, therefore, Göring, as Minister-President and Prussian Minister of the Interior, at once seized control of the police machine in Prussia (i.e. three-fifths of the Reich) and sought to convert it into an instrument of personal power. By a decree of 2 March 1933, he widened the scope of *Schutzhaft* (protective custody) so that anyone could henceforward be arrested and detained in a concentration camp without trial, or even after acquittal. Under the law for the ' restoration of the civil service ' (7 April 1933) he rigorously purged the Prussian police of all genuinely republican elements* and he detached the special (political) branch of the Prussian police and converted it into the secret state police (*Geheime Staatspolizei*, or *Gestapo*), at the same time increasing its personnel and activities, and making it directly responsible to himself. His chief agent was Daluege, the S.S. chief for Berlin and North Germany, who became chief of the Prussian State police in May 1933.

Meanwhile, what Göring was doing for Prussia, Himmler was doing in the other German States, becoming in all of them leader of the political police. In April 1934, Himmler became head of the Prussian Gestapo also and, in May 1935, the Prussian administrative court decided that the Gestapo's activities were not subject to judicial control. This principle was embodied in a Prussian law of 10 February 1936, and has since been treated as valid for the whole Reich. Through the appointment of Himmler, already Reich leader of the S.S., as chief of police in the Reich Ministry of the Interior on 17 June 1936, the ' nationalization ' of the German police and its intimate connection with the S.S. organization were confirmed. Since that date the authority of the States and local government authorities has been reduced in police matters, and the fusion of the police and the S.S. has steadily proceeded.

Himmler's first act (26 June 1936) was to divide the entire police force into two branches, both subordinate to himself. These were

* It is significant that, despite the long period of Social Democrat rule in Prussia, very few of the rank and file of the police failed to accept the new regime or were affected by the purge.

the *Ordnungspolizei* (order police) under Daluege, and the *Sicherheitspolizei* (security police) under Heydrich. The first comprised all the uniformed police engaged in the general task of maintaining public order, i.e. the police forces of the States and the communes, the *Schutzpolizei* (protection police), the rural *Gendarmerie* and the *Gemeindepolizei* (communal police). The office of the order police also controlled the police fire service, the water police, and the *Technische Nothilfe* (technical emergency assistance), a specialized body used in emergencies for constructional work, repairs and demolition. During the war, the A.R.P. police have come under its control also.

The security police, as organized by Heydrich, includes the criminal police and the Gestapo, or political police. The distinction between ' ordinary ' and ' political ' criminals has not been clearly maintained, but the two branches have been so closely dovetailed together that no serious difficulties seem to have arisen.

The process of ' nationalization ' was carried further in March 1937, when all regular members of the Gestapo, the criminal police, the *Schutzpolizei* and the *Gendarmerie* were made Reich officials, and was completed by the German police law (*Deutsches Polizeibeamtengesetz*) of June 1937 which gave to the Minister of the Interior (or in practice, to Himmler acting for him) the power to issue regulations governing the appointment, promotion and conditions of service for all executive police officers, including those of the communes, throughout the Reich. With the appointment of direct representatives of Himmler to the State and provincial offices of the local police authorities,* and with the law of November 1938, which gave the Reich Minister of the Interior, and with his approval other Reich ministers, power to issue police regulations for the whole Reich or for any part of it, the independent police powers of the States and other local authorities were reduced almost to extinction.

## Fusion of Police and S.S.

Before war broke out in 1939, Himmler had gained control of the internal armed force of the Reich in all its branches. In the Gestapo he had an agency of permanent terror against all opponents, with eighteen concentration camps in Germany and two in Austria (September 1939), some of them (e.g. Sachsenhausen) said to be

* i.e. the *Statthalter* or, in Prussia, the *Oberpräsidenten* and *Regierungspräsidenten*; and the *Oberbürgermeister* and *Landräte*.

capable of holding 12,000 prisoners. In addition, he had not only the specially armed and trained security police but also the armed formations of the barracked protection police and the motorized units of the *Gendarmerie*. Throughout Germany a highly organized and disciplined 'army' for internal use had been concentrated under the control of Himmler and his leading subordinates. These men were also the leaders of the Nazi S.S., the carefully chosen and toughened inner circle of *Hitlertreue* (' loyal to Hitler ') young men, the ' pretorian guard ' of the regime. Of that body Himmler was Reich leader, Daluege and Heydrich high-ranking officers,* and increasingly the whole body of police had come to consist of S.S. members. In 1938 Himmler issued a decree for the admission into the S.S. at once of those members of the uniformed order police who had been members of the party or of one of its formations before 1933, and of others later. And, in 1939, Gunter d'Alquen, in an officially approved booklet ' *Die S.S.*' said that ' by slow and selective evolution the police has, through National-Socialist recruitment and National-Socialist leadership by the S.S., itself become a part of the proud formations of the movement '. There are still policemen who are not S.S. members, but the German police force is dominated by the S.S. organization.

It must not, however, be supposed that the influence of the S.S. is confined to the police ; indeed, the full significance of its control of that weapon of internal order cannot be understood except by some further account of the other activities of the S.S. itself.

In addition to control of the Reich police, Himmler, as Reich leader of the S.S., has a party security service (*Sicherheitsdienst des Reichsführers*), which has branches throughout the Reich and is functionally the intelligence service of the party. Its head is also chief of the security police, but its central and local offices are separate and, in addition to permanent officials, reliable S.S. members act as honorary collaborators, reporting any movement of opinion favourable or unfavourable to the party. Even the Gestapo as well as the local party officials, are kept under the surveillance of this separate organization.

Further, in the years before the war, Himmler steadily built up an armed force, the *Waffen* (weapon) S.S., separate from the regular army organization. Until the outbreak of war it was a small force numerically, but since then has been very greatly expanded, though

* *Oberstgruppenführer*, or highest group leaders. The rank is roughly equivalent to that of an army general.

its use upon the eastern front must have thinned its ranks. Behind it, again, stands the general (*Allgemeine*) S.S. spread throughout the Reich, whose numbers were stated by Gunter d'Alquen to be 240,000 in 1939.

The ultimate significance of the S.S. organization is that it comprises the inner order of Nazi fanatics schooled to dedicate their whole lives to the Führer's purposes. It has its own press, and its weekly journal *Das Schwarze Korps* (The Black Corps), with a circulation of over 500,000 in 1939, exerts great influence on general policy. But, as one writer has said, ' the S.S. touches all phases of its members' lives. Before the S.S. child is born his father and mother have complied with S.S. racial and eugenic standards. He is born in an S.S. mothers' house. He is delivered by an S.S. physician. His parents give him a pure Germanic name. (His) home is often a new S.S. apartment house in a suburban S.S. settlement '. He will have a better chance than others of being admitted to a *Napola* (see pp. 416–17). He will do his military service with an S.S. unit. He may receive higher training at an S.S. Junker school or, if he goes to the university, he will find an S.S. house. If disabled or killed in the war, his pension, or those of his dependants, will be administered by a separate S.S. organization.

This S.S. political ' Order ' has its own property and an elaborate organization at headquarters covering every branch of its activities, including its own courts for dealing with any breaches of discipline committed by its members. It is throughout filled with the military-racial ideas of Hitler himself and its members have been the most active and merciless agents of persecution in the concentration camps, in the expulsion and murder of Jews, in the ' mercy-killings ' of the insane and of incurables.

Finally, the influence of the S.S. has become increasingly important in the Nazi regime as a whole. In foreign policy both Ribbentrop and Bohle, head of the foreign organization of the party, hold S.S. rank. Sauckel, Commissioner-General for Labour ; Darré, the Minister for Agriculture, and Backe, his present substitute ; Bormann, head of the party chancery, successor to Hess as Hitler's deputy ; Buch, the head of the supreme party court ; Dietrich, the Reich press chief, and Amann, who holds a similar post in the party ; Alfred Rosenberg, director of Nazi ideology, and many other prominent Nazi officials and *Gauleiter* are members. But the S.S. influence has also spread to industry and banking, and it is said that some of the younger members of the old aristocratic families have

themselves become members and that inter-marriage between the historic and the newly-risen *élites* is becoming common. Some of these new 'recruits' (e.g. the Cologne banker Schröder, who brought Hitler and Papen together) may merely have received honorary titles which they dared not refuse. It is, however, probable that they felt little reluctance in accepting them so long as things went well, however much of late they may have regretted their incorporation.

The close fusion of the police with the S.S. contradicts the principle of differentiation of function between party and Reich, laid down by Hitler himself. But it is of the essence of the Nazi system to subordinate principles to practical necessity, and the union of these two agencies under one hand is a basic factor in Nazi control of the Reich. That control, however, is reinforced by the other organizations of the party, political, economic and social, which cover the activities of the mass of the German community almost as completely, though not so intensively, as those of the S.S. man are covered by his own organization.

## THE NAZI PARTY ORGANIZATION

In the one-party state the organization of the party, specially privileged in law as compared with other corporations, becomes so nearly part of the state machine that the government of the state cannot be understood in abstraction from it. This is even more true in Nazi Germany than it was in Fascist Italy, where both the monarchy and the Catholic church, as well as the general lack of political fanaticism amongst the people, imposed limitations on the Fascist party's attempted totalitarianism. The Nazis have shown characteristic German thoroughness, and addiction to organizing for its own sake, in the construction, side by side with the machinery of state government, of a vast and complex party organization through which to ensure their control of the minds and lives of the German people and of the state itself.

This party organization may be considered in relation to (1) the central committee of party leaders, under Hitler, known as the *Reichsleitung*, which corresponds to the Reich Cabinet, and the chancery, which corresponds to the Reich chancery; (2) the functional organizations of the party, with central and local offices; (3) the territorial organization of the party spread over the Reich.

## The Central Party Organization

The Nazi *Reichsleitung* has varied in composition to some degree, but comprises the Reich leaders of all the main functional organizations of the party, as well as chief officials of the central party office. Thus, in 1942, it included Bormann, head of the party chancery; Bouhler, head of the (party) chancery of the *Führer*; Buch, head of the supreme party court; Schwarz, the Reich treasurer; Himmler, head of the S.S.; Goebbels, Reich propaganda leader; Ley, Reich organization leader; Rosenberg, leader of the party's foreign policy office and the *Führer's* delegate for the spiritual and philosophical training of the party; Baldur von Schirach, leader of youth training (*Jugenderziehung*)*; Hierl, Reich labour leader; Amann, Reich press leader, and Dietrich, the party chief for the press; Lutze, chief of staff of the S.A.; Hühnlein, leader of the National-Socialist Motor Corps (*N.S. Kraftfahrkorps*, usually abbreviated to N.S.K.K.); and the chiefs of the offices for colonial policy (General von Epp), for communal policy (Fiehler), for law (Hans Frank), as well as Frick, in his capacity of head of the Reichstag delegation. Darré, who went on indefinite leave in May 1942, was previously a member.

Of the members of the party *Reichsleitung*, Bormann, Goebbels, Rosenberg, Frick, Dietrich, Frank and Darré also held, in 1942, the rank of Reich Minister, whilst in addition Himmler, Ley and Hierl had access to the Reich Cabinet for the affairs of the Reich departments, of which they were in charge.

There is, therefore, a considerable degree of common membership between the Reich Cabinet and the party *Reichsleitung*, several of whom conduct both Reich and party departments (e.g. Goebbels for propaganda), whilst others hold high appointments in the Reich as well as in the party.† The most notable exceptions to this duplication of party and Reich office are Göring and Ribbentrop. But the personal connection between the two bodies is very close.

There is no evidence that the party *Reichsleitung* now meets with any regularity or can be regarded as the place where party policy is thrashed out before it is imposed upon the state. It would appear to be rather a collection of the chiefs of the party's own 'departments' with, perhaps, the function in reserve of being called in to endorse the Führer's policy if times became critical.

* Schirach was replaced as leader of the Hitler Jugend by Axmann in 1940, but retained his place on the *Reichsleitung* under a new title.

† Thus Ley has been made Reich Commissioner for Housing; von Epp is *Statthalter* of Bavaria; Himmler was Chief of the German Police till he succeeded Frick as Reich Minister of the Interior.





Fig. 54. The Nazi Party Organization

The party's chief administrative officers, Bormann and Schwarz, are very important figures in the Nazi state. After Hess's departure on his ' mission ' to this country, Bormann succeeded to the position of the Führer's deputy, though Göring was nominated to be next in succession. Schwarz, as controller of the party's purse strings, and the channel to the various party organizations of the subventions received from the Reich, must obviously exercise a powerful influence.

## The Party Functional Organizations

The impact of the Nazi party upon the life of the people and its importance in relation to the government and administration of Germany comes most directly from the many functional organizations which the party has developed, and from the local party administration with which they are connected. The complexity and variety of these organizations is shown in Fig. 54. It will be seen that, within the whole group of associations, there is an inner group of seven (surrounded by a dotted line in Fig. 54). These occupy a closer relationship to the party than the rest, and are described as *Gliederungen* (formations) as opposed to the other two types, the affiliated associations (*Angeschlossene Verbände*) and the supervised associations (*Betreute Organisationen*). The last two types, however, have legal personality and the right to own property but, except the Labour Service and the Flying Corps, all are alike under the supervision of the party treasurer. The Labour Service and the Flying Corps illustrate the close connection of party and Reich, for both appear in the party handbook, whilst the Labour Service also appears as a department of the Ministry of the Interior and the Flying Corps under the organization of the Ministry for Air.

The seven formations owe their position largely to their priority of foundation in the early days of the movement. But they represent fundamental characteristics of the Nazi political scheme of things. The S.S. and the S.A. are frankly military—the party's private army. The Motor Corps is almost as completely military in organization and aim.* The Hitler Youth, with its uniforms and drill, is equally so. If the lecturers and students' associations and the women's association seem at first sight purely ' civil ', the character of the physical and mental training which they provide turns them into agencies and breeding grounds of militarized citizens.

* Its leader, Hühnlein, has expressed its purpose in the sentence ' The more advanced the stage of motorization, the greater the defence strength of the nation '.

The S.A. (*Sturm Abteilungen*, storm troopers) has lost much of its earlier importance since the massacre of Röhm and other leaders in 1934. It has to see all the most likely youths recruited into the S.S., whose privileged position its members have resented. The S.A. now gives preliminary military training to young men about to enter the army and a kind of home guard training to men who missed their military training when (1919–35) conscription had been abolished and to reservists after their period of service. It still has, however, a number of training schools, including the oldest training school of the party—the *Reichsführerschule der S.A.* at Munich, and it performs, as it always has, a multitude of duties of an auxiliary character for party and Reich. But it is reported that, of its 1,400,000 members before the war, 70% are serving in the forces and the influence of the S.A., as a separate organization, must have been very greatly reduced by this fact.

Of the other Nazi organizations, apart from the Hitler Youth (see pp. 410–411), the two which have exercised the widest influence are probably the Labour Service and the Labour Front. They are quite separate from each other and serve different purposes. The Labour Service, developed out of voluntary beginnings under the Republic, was, in 1935, made compulsory for all Germans of both sexes between 18 and 25, although, in practice, the compulsion was not enforced on girls until September 1939. But, for young men, a great organization was built up with its own schools of leadership and administration and the half-year's term of service was used intensively both to harden the young men for their period of military training, which immediately followed, and also to indoctrinate them further with Nazi ideas. The organization, under an ardent Nazi, Konstantin Hierl, thus served a treble purpose. It carried out useful public works (land drainage and forestry, as well as fortifications); it increased the military effectiveness of the young recruits; and it 'pre-conditioned' them in Nazi ideas, which they carried with them into the army.

The Labour Front is an 'omnibus' organization of a different kind. It is the authoritarian successor of all the freely organized trade unions and friendly societies, 'co-ordinated', i.e. suppressed, in 1933. It has taken over their funds, their properties and their social welfare institutions (hospitals, convalescent homes, etc.), and exercised their functions, so far as these are allowed to continue in the Nazi State. But it includes employers and their associations, as well as employed, and is a huge all-

embracing organization of all engaged in industry, supported by compulsory contributions from employers and employees alike, with some thirty million corporate or individual members. It has directed its energies largely to the prevention of any pressure for improved wages or conditions by the working class on their employers, to the education of the workers in Nazi ideas and to the provision of recreation through its ' strength through joy ' (*Kraft durch Freude*) organization. Its task of regimenting the workers has been made easier because, since 1936, unemployment has been almost non-existent as a result of the intensive rearmament programme, and the Labour Front's huge financial resources have therefore had little charge upon them for unemployment relief. Its administrative costs are said to be extravagantly high, largely owing to its elaborate organization. Its central office has some two dozen functional sections dealing with such matters as relations with the forces, women workers, propaganda, etc. ; seventeen specialized sections for different trades, which act as central offices for the Reich factory committees ; a ' strength through joy ' office with six sections, dealing with sports, travel, leisure, etc. ; and a central office for finance with nine sections. But it has built up a very considerable economic power of its own. It owns the third largest bank in Germany, the Bank of German Labour, with a capital of 25 million marks ; life insurance companies with a combined capital of 28 million marks ; housing estates and building construction companies ; a shipbuilding works at Stettin and a motor works (*Volkswagen*, people's car) now turned over to munitions ; it has absorbed the property of the co-operative societies, and it has its own printing and publishing concerns. Thus its leader, Robert Ley, who is also Reich organization leader of the party and now Reich commissioner for housing, has a very considerable economic ' empire ' under his personal control.

But Ley, and the Labour Front, do not stand alone. The party itself has valuable properties in real estate (offices, training-schools, etc.) all over Germany, in addition to its newspapers, periodicals and publishing houses.

The precise relation to the party of the vast series of Hermann Göring combines built up in the munitions industry is difficult to define, but it is a grandiose structure with a holding company, the *Aktiengesellschaft Herman Göring*, whose capital has been raised to 250 million marks, and it provides a further basis of economic power for the party.

## The Party Territorial Organization

The whole Reich is divided into party administrative areas in which the local activities of the Nazi party are organized. The largest party administrative area is the *Gau* (see note, p. 337). The party *Gau* was based on the republican electoral divisions (*Wahlkreise*) of Germany and varies considerably in size, the western *Gaue* being smaller than the eastern, some of which are coterminous with the provinces. Before the war there were thirty-nine party *Gaue* within the Reich. Each *Gau* is in charge of a *Gauleiter*, of course appointed by and responsible to Hitler himself. Below the *Gau* is the *Kreis* (district), each with its *Kreisleiter*. It is in most cases smaller than the State administrative area and there were 822 party *Kreise* in 1939. Below the *Kreis* comes the *Ortsgruppe* (local group) under the *Ortsgruppenleiter*; it may comprise a section of a city, a small town or a country district. There were 27,989 of these in 1939. Below these again are cells (*Zellen*, 92,696 in 1939) and, at the base of the whole structure the block of houses, each with a block warden (*Blockwart*, 481,875 in 1939), who acts as party agent and spy on the occupants of the block.

Most of these subordinates are voluntary workers for the party. But the *Gauleiter* and the *Kreisleiter* both have central offices for their districts with permanent staffs and a considerable organization, for the functional associations have their local offices at the central offices of the party in the *Gau* and *Kreis*. The *Gauleiter's* organization in Württemberg may be taken as an illustration.

It comprised, in addition to the *Gauleiter*, the following *Gau* officials: a deputy *Gauleiter*, a *Gau* staff office leader, an organization leader, a school leader, a propaganda leader, a leader of the *Gau* press office, a *Gau* treasurer, a judge (of the *Gau* party court), and a *Gau* inspector. There were *Gau* offices of the Labour Front; of the N.S.V.; of the associations for women, doctors, civil servants, teachers, students, the guardians of the law, technology, war victims, rural population; as well as of the S.A., S.S., Motor Corps, Flying Corps, Labour Service and Hitler Youth. There were also a *Gau* film leader, *Gau* propaganda speakers, and the offices of the thirty or more papers and periodicals published in the *Gau*.

Some of these offices would again appear in the organization of the *Kreisleiter* and, when the lower groups are taken into account, it is evident that the party control of the national life extended from the highest to the lowest level. Apart from the definitely political

functions of control of appointments to local government offices (see p. 340) granted to the *Gauleiter* and *Kreisleiter*, it is impossible for any child (Hitler Youth), youth (Labour Service), or grown man (Labour Front) to escape from the party net. Though it may not be ' state ' administration in the strict sense, the Nazi party organization has been a most powerful agency in governing the actions of the German people, of the state officials, and, so far as it can be separated ' in idea ' from the party, of the state itself.

It should not, however, be supposed that all the Germans included in the vast range of the Nazi organizations are themselves members of the party, or even that they accept its *Weltanschauung* and approve its actions. This is far from being true. Of the many millions of the working class included in the Labour Front, only a small minority belong to the party itself ; in the Nazi professional associations many of those included are not party members and, it may be surmised, a large number have little genuine sympathy at any rate with the more extreme aspects of party policy. Moreover it has been Hitler's policy to keep the party as an *élite* amongst the population, just as he has created the S.S. as an *élite* within the party itself. The precise number of party members is not published but it has been estimated, by reliable sources, to have been about 2,500,000 in 1935. In May 1937 a four-year ban on new members was lifted, and in 1941 the total membership was estimated at about 4 million. But in addition to the full party members, there are also a large number of collaborators, many of them minor officials of the Labour Front and other party associations. In April 1937, an official party organ gave their total as 1,565,000, and some 840,000 more were sworn in during that month, making a total of over 2,400,000. To these must now be added the Nazis and Nazi sympathizers of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Danzig, Poland and Memel, to say nothing of the similar groups in other occupied countries. Taking together party members, collaborators, and that large body of Germans of all classes who in affairs of state are always ready to accept the *fait accompli* (*die vollendeten Tatsachen*) and the powers that be, it is evident that at least as long as things were going well the Nazi state was actively supported by a very considerable proportion of the German people.

# THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM

## German Law before 1933

Unlike England, where the early development of a strong monarchy created a uniform system of native law administered by a centralized judiciary, the political divisions of Germany gave rise to a large number of different local systems of law. The development of the study of Roman law, and the increase in the number of men trained in it at the Italian and German universities, led to its adoption both by the emperors and by many of the princes. In 1495, the newly constituted supreme court of the empire (*Reichskammergericht*) was instructed to apply Roman law, and it influenced deeply the many codes enacted by the German States, principalities, and towns during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. The Prussian code of 1794 (*Allgemeines Landrecht*), the Austrian code of 1811, and the codes adopted, under the influence of the French civil code, in the Rhineland and in Baden (*Badisches Landrecht*, 1809) were all based on the principles of Roman law.

The movement for German unity was accompanied by a desire for uniform codes of law, and the North German Confederation set in hand the preparation of a criminal code, which was adopted by the German Empire in 1871. This was followed by the creation of a uniform civil code (*Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*), combining both Roman and Germanic elements, which came into force for the whole empire on 1 January 1900. Before that date, laws* had been passed creating a common procedure in the courts of all German States, and a supreme court of the Reich (*Reichsgericht*), sitting at Leipzig, acted as a court of final appeal in both civil and criminal suits. The actual administration of justice still lay in the hands of the States (Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony, etc.), which had their own ministries of justice, and appointed their own judges, prosecutors and other officials. But the substance of the law administered, and the procedure followed, were common to the whole of Germany.

Under the Republic (1919–33) the chief changes made in the legal system were the creation of a system of new courts for the decision of industrial disputes by the Labour Courts Act (*Arbeitsgerichtsgesetz*) of 1926, the substitution of fines for imprisonment in certain cases,

* They are known usually as the *Reichsjustizgesetze* and comprised a Judicature Act (*Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz*), a Code of Civil Procedure (*Zivilprozessordnung*), a Code of Criminal Procedure (*Strafprozessordnung*) and a Code dealing with bankruptcy (*Konkursordnung*).

and the introduction of the Youth Welfare Act (1922) and the Juvenile Courts Act (1923). The political and economic crises of 1923–4 and of 1929 onwards led to emergency decrees* abolishing the use of juries and substituting lay assessors for them, restricting rights of appeal, and strengthening the position of the court at the expense of the parties. Finally Papen's government introduced special courts (*Sondergerichte*) to try certain political crimes. These courts were composed solely of professional judges and were allowed to disregard a number of statutory safeguards created to protect the accused. No appeal could be brought against their sentence.

## Law in the Nazi State

The Nazis still claim that theirs is a *Rechtsstaat*—one in which the rule of law obtains—like the Republic and the Empire before them. But the concentration of legislative power in the hands of the executive (see p. 330), the assumption by Hitler of the position of supreme judge (see p. 279), the exemption of the Gestapo from judicial control (see p. 345), and the power given to the courts to interpret the law according to the interests of the state or 'the sound instinct of the people' (*Gesundes Volksempfinden*) have converted German law from an instrument of impartial justice into a means to a political end. This change is much more apparent in matters of criminal than of civil justice, where political considerations enter much less frequently and the existing rules of law are normally applied. But, even in this sphere, the political character of the parties has become a relevant consideration for the court and the special position enjoyed by the party and its members has had the effect of depriving citizens of legal remedies.

The chief changes introduced by the Nazis into the substance of German civil law have been those arising out of their theories of leadership and of 'blood and soil' (*Blut und Boden*). A great body of racial and anti-semitic legislation has been passed depriving Jews of civil rights (see pp. 490–1) and imposing new measures to preserve racial purity (see pp. 14–17, 450–1). The *Reichserbhofgesetz* made a large proportion of peasant holdings inalienable both *inter vivos* and by will, and subjected them to the jurisdiction of special courts (*Anerbengerichte*, see p. 365). A new company law (*Aktiengesetz*) introduced the leadership principle into the realm of

* The emergency decrees of 10 October 1931 and 14 June 1932 are particularly notable.

commercial undertakings and restricted the power both of shareholders and of boards of directors. Labour law was also radically transformed. The trades unions having been absorbed into the Labour Front, the principle of collective bargaining was abolished and labour trustees (*Treuhänder der Arbeit*), themselves state officials, now decide the terms and conditions of employment. In the field of criminal law fundamental changes have taken place, of which the creation of the Gestapo (see p. 345) is the greatest. But the definition of treason has also been very greatly widened, and the death penalty introduced for a number of crimes of violence, as well as for treason and espionage. The establishment of special courts (*Sondergerichte*), and of the so-called people's court (*Volksgerichtshof*) in 1934, was followed, in 1935, by the virtual abolition of the rule *nulla poena sine lege*, which forms the basis of all civilized legal systems. Courts were given power to punish by analogous application of the existing laws if the ' sound instinct of the people ' required it and if punishment would be in accordance with the underlying principles of a provision of the code. It is now impossible to foretell, in some instances, whether an act is punishable or not. At the same time the safeguards previously provided for the accused were curtailed, and the width of discretion given to the courts amounted to a charter of arbitrary action for the judges.

### Relation of the Courts to the State

The Judicature Act of 1877 and the Weimar constitution provided that the judges were independent and subject only to the law. Naturally, the judges were not completely unfettered. In purely administrative matters they were subject to direction by the Minister of Justice. Wilful violation of the law by a judge, or the wilful abuse of judicial discretion were criminal offences. On reaching the age limit, judges had to retire. But they could not be removed or transferred to another position except in accordance with the sentence of a court of discipline composed of judges and on grounds specified by law. In Prussia, this function was exercised by the *Disziplinarhof für richterliche Beamte.*

The advent of the Nazis has affected the position of the courts profoundly, although less in law than in fact. According to the Weimar constitution, the independence of the judges, being a fundamental principle, could only be abrogated by the procedure required for a change of the constitution. But by the enabling act of 24 March 1933, the executive obtained the power to legislate and to change

the constitution. The government was now in a position to abolish the independence of the courts. But there was no need to do so directly, for, now that the government was itself both the executive and the legislature, it was only necessary to couch an executive order in the form of a legislative measure to secure its acceptance by the courts. The independence of the courts was formally respected but the government could, in fact, enforce in the courts any measure which it deemed necessary.

In principle, judges are still irremovable except in virtue of a decision of a court of discipline, while the supreme court itself exercises this jurisdiction in respect of its members. But the independence of the courts of discipline has been undermined and, in addition, the civil service law (*Beamtengesetz*) of 1937 provides that judges, like all other officials, may be retired for political reasons. Further, a judge who does not conform to instructions is unlikely to be promoted, and the courts were purged of 'leftists' and non-Aryan members. The remaining judges, and those appointed since, are unlikely to show a lively spirit of independence, although recent developments have shown that even their ways of legal thinking have not found the approval of the party.

Formerly, too, the courts could examine whether decrees and ordinances were *ultra vires* and whether a law enacted by a member State was contrary to the federal constitution. Even laws of the Reich could be disallowed by the courts on the ground that they were contrary to the Weimar constitution. In Nazi Germany this right has been lost, and the courts can no longer declare any law to be unconstitutional or any decree to be *ultra vires*.

## Organization and Jurisdiction of the Courts

The administration of justice is organized in a strictly hierarchical order. The Ministry of Justice of the Reich supervises the organization of the courts and their personnel, prepares legislation, controls the prisons and directs the professional training. Before 1935, these functions were concentrated in the hands of the Ministers of Justice of the States (*Länder*). The highest courts under the Ministry of Justice are the supreme court (*Reichsgericht*) at Leipzig, the supreme court for patent cases (*Reichspatentamt*) at Berlin, the court of appeal for inalienable peasant holdings (*Landeserbhofgericht*) at Celle in Hanover, and the people's court (*Volksgerichtshof*) at Berlin.

Under the supreme court thirty-four courts of appeal (*Oberlandesgerichte*) operate in Greater Germany. As a rule, one court of

appeal is established in each State and in each Prussian province, but some small States (Lippe, Schaumburg-Lippe, Anhalt, Bremen) fall under the jurisdiction of a neighbouring court of appeal, while some Prussian provinces are served by two (Rhineland, Hessen-Nassau) and one State (Bavaria) by several courts of appeal. Recent additions are four Austrian, one Czech and one Sudeten-German court of appeal, as well as one each at Danzig, Poznan and Katowice.

Under these, 183 district courts (*Landgerichte*) and 2,052 town courts (*Amtsgerichte*) act as courts of first instance.

It is evident that the English doctrine of the binding force of precedents cannot operate in a country where the number of courts of first instance is 2,235 and where the courts of appeal amount to thirty-four, most of them further subdivided. It could only operate in respect of decisions given by the supreme court. But in Germany even the authority of a decision of the supreme court is restricted to the case in question. Nevertheless, if a division of the supreme court wished to deviate from a rule laid down by another division, a cumbersome procedure had to be followed, until it was modified in 1935 by the introduction of great senates especially charged with the task of overruling previous decisions. At the same time, the supreme court was invited to exercise its power to overrule its previous decisions more freely, if National-Socialist considerations required it. With two exceptions, decisions of the supreme court are not binding upon the courts below. Nevertheless, the lower courts are inclined to follow a well-established practice of the supreme court. Not to do so would give the supreme court an opportunity to reverse the decision and saddle the parties with unnecessary costs.

### *The* Amtsgericht

The number of 2,235 courts of first instance may seem excessive. But it must be noted that the *Amtsgericht* fulfils a variety of functions which in England have been reserved for the magistrates, justices of the peace, registrars in bankruptcy, commissioners in lunacy, district probate registries and land registries. In recent times, it has been entrusted with wide powers to adjust the obligations of debtors who are affected by the economic crisis or by the war.

Primarily, the *Amtsgericht* is competent in both civil and criminal matters. As a rule, the *Amtsgericht* exercises jurisdiction over an area inhabited by approximately 35,000 people. Small *Amtsgerichte*, staffed by four judges or less, are generally found in rural districts. In big cities, the jurisdiction may extend over several hundred

thousand inhabitants (*Grosses Amtsgericht*), or several *Amtsgerichte* may even be set up. In this case, the various functions of the court are divided among a great number of judges, each of whom sits alone. In criminal matters, only big *Amtsgerichte* sit with lay assessors (*Schöffengerichte*) and all relevant cases arising in neighbouring small *Amtsgerichte* must be transferred to a big *Amtsgericht*. At the outbreak of the war, the *Schöffengerichte* were abolished. The internal organization is in the hands of a senior judge (*aufsichtsführender Richter*), who is sometimes given the title of *Oberamtsrichter* or *Amtsgerichtsdirektor* or *Amtsgerichtspräsident* in big cities.

### *The* Landgericht

The *Landgericht*, which exercises jurisdiction over an area inhabited by 390,000 people on the average, is also a court of first instance in civil and criminal matters. As a civil court it sits in divisions (*Zivilkammer*), composed of three professional judges, or in commercial divisions (*Kammer für Handelssachen*), consisting of a professional judge assisted by two expert lay assessors. As a war measure, the division of three judges was superseded by a single professional judge.

As a criminal court, the *Landgericht* sat until 1924 in divisions consisting of five professional judges (*Strafkammer*) or as a court of assize (*Schwurgericht*) composed of three professional judges and twelve jurymen. In 1924, the *Landgericht* lost its criminal jurisdiction of first instance, except in respect of the court of assize, which was converted into a court of nine, composed of three professional judges and six lay assessors. In 1932, the *Strafkammer* was reconstituted as a court of first instance consisting of three professional judges and two lay assessors to try more serious offences and cases requiring a lengthy hearing. At the outbreak of the war, the lay element was completely eliminated and the court of assize abolished. The presiding judge of a division has the title *Landgerichtsdirektor*. The head of the court is called *Landgerichtspräsident*.

### *The* Landgericht *as a Court of Appeal*

As a court of appeal, the *Landgericht* used to hear civil and criminal appeals from the *Amtsgericht*, both on questions of fact and law (*Berufung*). Civil cases went before the civil division, criminal appeals from a judge sitting alone went to a small criminal division (*Kleine Strafkammer*), consisting of one judge and two lay assessors ;

those from the *Schöffengericht* were heard by the great criminal division (*Grosse Strafkammer*), consisting of three judges and two lay assessors.

As a war measure, the competence of the *Landgericht* to hear civil appeals was abolished. These appeals now go to the next higher court, the court of appeal (*Oberlandesgericht*). Criminal appeals are now heard by the only remaining criminal court of the *Landgericht*, the *Strafkammer*, now consisting of three professional judges.

*The Court of Appeal* (Oberlandesgericht)

Courts of appeal (*Oberlandesgericht*) are composed of divisions (*Senate*), each of which is made up of three judges. A presiding judge is called *Senatspräsident*. The head of the court carries the title *Oberlandesgerichtspräsident*. He is the administrative head of all the courts in his district and is directly responsible to the Minister of Justice. The court of appeal of Berlin, which occupies a predominant position, retains its ancient name of *Kammergericht*.

Before the war, courts of appeal exercised a twofold function. They heard second appeals on questions of law only (*Revision*) against decisions of the *Amtsgericht* in civil and criminal matters. Since the jurisdiction of the *Landgericht* to hear civil appeals has ceased with the outbreak of the war, first appeals in civil matters from decisions of the *Amtsgericht* must now be lodged directly with the *Oberlandesgericht*. In criminal matters, the second appeal to the *Oberlandesgericht* was abolished altogether. The *Oberlandesgericht* also hears a first appeal on questions of fact and law (*Berufung*) from the civil side of the *Landgericht* as a court of first instance.

*The Supreme Court*

The supreme court at Leipzig (*Reichsgericht*) is composed of divisions (*Senate*) for civil and for criminal matters. A senate consists of five members. Great senates, which are charged with the supervision of the uniform application of the law by all divisions of the court, consist of seven members. The *Reichsgericht* hears appeals on questions of law only (*Revision*) and only in respect of cases which were begun in the *Landgericht*. In civil cases, the value of the claim must exceed 6,000 Rm. Before the establishment of the people's court, the supreme court, acting as a court of first and last instance, tried cases of treason against the external or internal security of the Reich (*Hoch-* and *Landesverrat*). It is now possible to give a diagram (see p. 363) of the organization of the courts.

## *The Courts before* 1939

| | Civil Courts | | Criminal Courts | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Amtsgericht | | Landgericht | |
| First instance | Amtsgericht (1 judge) | Landgericht (3 judges), Civil Div. Comm. Div. | 1 judge | Schöffengericht (1 judge and 2 lay assessors) | Strafkammer (3 judges and 2 lay assessors) | Schwurgericht (3 judges and 6 lay assessors) |
| Second instance (*Berufung*) | Landgericht (Civ. Div.) (3 judges) | Oberlandesgericht (Civil Senate, 3 judges) | Landgericht (Kleine Strafkammer) (1 judge and 2 lay assessors) | Landgericht (Grosse Strafkammer) (3 judges, 2 lay assessors) | | |
| Third instance (*Revision*) | Oberlandesgericht (Civil Senate, 3 judges) | Reichsgericht (Civil Senate, 5 judges) | Oberlandesgericht (Criminal Senate, 3 judges) | Oberlandesgericht (Criminal Senate, 3 judges) | Reichsgericht (Criminal Senate, 5 judges) | Reichsgericht (Criminal Senate, 5 judges) |

## *The Courts after* 1939

| | Civil Courts | | Criminal Courts | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| First instance | Amtsgericht (1 judge) | Landgericht (1 judge) | Amtsgericht (1 judge) | Landgericht (Strafkammer) (3 judges) |
| Second instance | Oberlandesgericht (Civil Senate, 3 judges) | Oberlandesgericht (Civil Senate, 3 judges) | Landgericht (Strafkammer) (3 judges) | — |
| Third instance | — | Reichsgericht (Civil Senate, 5 judges) | — | Reichsgericht (Criminal Senate, 5 judges) |

## Special Courts for Political Offences (*Sondergerichte*)

The Weimar constitution and the Judicature Act provided that ' nobody shall be deprived of his competent judge '. All cases were to be tried by courts established according to law. The competence to hear a particular case was not to be determined *ad hoc*, but beforehand. Irregular tribunals were prohibited. These safeguards have lost their value as the Nazi government is in a position to establish any kind of court by the simple device of making a law.

Special courts have increased under Hitler, but they existed before. Courts of discipline for officials and attorneys and military courts are of long standing, though the latter had been suppressed under the Republic and were revived in 1933. Other special courts (*Sondergerichte*), at first attached to the courts of appeal, and, since 1938, to each *Landgericht* to deal with political offences, were also created. These courts, which consist of professional judges only, unfettered by the ordinary rules of criminal procedure and not subject to review by any higher courts, are all the more important since the public prosecutor may refer to them any case from the *Amtsgericht* or the *Landgericht*. When these courts were set up in 1933, they were regarded as exceptional. But in 1943, all German criminal courts are composed solely of professional judges and all appeals are severely curtailed. There is not much difference, at present, between an ordinary criminal court and a *Sondergericht*, except that the latter acts with greater speed and is less bound by the code of criminal procedure.

The people's court (*Volksgerichtshof*), established in 1934 and extended in 1936, has taken the place of the supreme court as a court of first and last instance for the trial of political offences, of treason, espionage and similar crimes. The court is divided into senates consisting of two professional judges and three lay assessors. The people's court is a political court. The general abolition of lay assessors during wartime has not affected it.

### *Labour Courts and other Special Courts*

Labour courts, introduced in 1926, heard disputes between employers on the one side and workers and employees on the other, if the disputes arose either under a collective contract of employment concluded between the federations of employers and workers or out of individual contracts of labour. The jurisdiction in respect of collective contracts has become obsolete with the creation, in 1934,

of labour trustees. Instead, all disputes between employees arising out of their employment have been transferred to the labour courts.

As courts of first instance (*Arbeitsgericht*) and as courts of appeal (*Landesarbeitsgericht*) they sit with one judge and two lay assessors. A second appeal on questions of law (*Revision*) may be brought to the *Reichsarbeitsgericht* composed of a judge of the supreme court and two lay assessors.

In virtue of the law of 1933 concerning hereditary peasant holdings new courts were set up to deal with questions arising under the act, such as applications for permission to alienate or encumber an estate, to leave it by will to persons other than the statutory heirs, to deprive the peasant of his estate or to levy execution against it. The court of first instance (*Anerbengericht*), composed of one judge and two peasant assessors, is attached to the *Amtsgericht*. Appeals lie to the *Erbhofgericht* composed of three judges and two peasant assessors. One *Erbhofgericht*, attached to a court of appeal, was to be established in each member State, but the States were given the liberty to establish a common *Erbhofgericht*. The *Erbhofgericht* for Prussia is attached to the court of appeal of Celle (Hanover) under the title of *Landeserbhofgericht*. A second appeal lies to the *Reichserbhofgericht* established at the seat of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food of the Reich in Berlin.

Decisions whether sterilization in accordance with the law for the prevention of hereditary diseases of 1933 shall take place are entrusted to courts sitting with one judge and two medical practitioners as assessors. The *Erbgesundheitsgericht*, attached to the *Amtsgericht*, acts as a court of first instance. Appeals go to the *Erbgesundheitsobergericht*, one of which is set up at every court of appeal.

## Administrative Law and Tribunals

As in France, and other continental countries, the actions of the executive, and its officials, are regarded as acts of State which cannot be challenged by the citizen in the ordinary courts of law. A system of administrative courts was, therefore, created both in the Reich and in all the German States which was concerned with three principal topics: (1) the law relating to officials; (2) the law relating to taxes, rates and other public obligations of the citizen; and (3) the law relating to the maintenance of public order and security.

Before 1933, the competence of the Reich was limited to federal poor law, public insurance, monopolies and trade combines, the bulk of direct taxation (June 1919), and the acts of Reich officials, as opposed to those of the States. Since 1933, and more especially since two laws of 1937, the civil services of the States have come under the control of the Reich. But though the Reich in 1941 established a supreme administrative tribunal, embodying the Prussian supreme administrative tribunal, the members of which must have qualified as high civil servants or judges, the administrative courts of the States continue to function and are for the ordinary citizen the normal machinery for seeking redress against acts of the State or its officials which are *ultra vires*.

The composition of these courts varied from State to State. Some were staffed by professional judges ; some by a mixture of judges, civil servants and lay assessors ; some by civil servants alone. In Prussia the court of first instance (*Kreisausschuss*, or *Kreisgericht* since 1933 ; *Stadtausschuss*, or *Stadtgericht* since 1933), was a mixed body of officials and lay assessors, as was the *Bezirksausschuss* (*Bezirksgericht* since 1933), the court of second instance. The appeal court, however, consisted of professional judges, as it did in most of the larger States. Since the present war began, all the administrative courts of first instance have been abolished and cases must now be begun in the next higher court, i.e. for Prussia in the court of the *Regierungsbezirk*. Further, formal actions can only be brought with the permission of the higher administrative authorities themselves. All administrative tribunals are now staffed by three judges, who must be either judges or high civil servants.

Compared with France, where the administrative courts became a real bulwark of the citizen's rights against the state, the German administrative courts, especially since 1933, offer the citizen much less protection against excessive official action. He has still the right to sue an official in the ordinary courts for tort, but such an action is of little use if no damage has ensued or where the complaint is that the administrative act is *ultra vires* or an abuse of administrative discretion.

The old authoritarian traditions of Germany, now reinforced by the *Führerprinzip*, largely nullify the protection which the administrative courts should provide. Though, in England, the state cannot be sued since ' the King can do no wrong ', the tradition of legality and the strong tendency of the courts to protect the rights of the individual offer a better safeguard in practice than the present

German system. In Germany, the state does not, in legal idea, enjoy the same protection as in England. But the body of administrative law is framed for the state's protection and is administered by state officials. The additional safeguard for the citizen provided by the right to sue the state is, therefore, largely nullified both by the nature of German administrative law and by the official character of those whose duty it is to apply it.

In the matter of individual liberty this is overwhelmingly true. For, since the suspension of the articles of the constitution which protected it, and the exemption of the Gestapo from judicial control (see pp. 344–5), the German citizen can no longer look to the courts to protect his letters or his home from violation, or himself from indefinite imprisonment accompanied by torture, where the Gestapo regards it as necessary. As the case of Pastor Niemöller reveals (see p. 57), not even acquittal by a court provides any safeguard.

## Procedure

### *Civil Jurisdiction*

Actions must be begun in the *Amtsgericht* or the *Landgericht*, according as the claim falls within the competence of the former or the latter. The procedure before the *Landgericht* differs in certain respects from that of the *Amtsgericht*, inasmuch as it is more informal before the latter owing to the fact that the parties may plead in person. At the same time the *Amtsgericht* is given wider powers to direct the parties and to secure a proper and speedy presentation of the case. Altogether, the influence exercised by the courts upon the conduct of the proceedings is greater in Germany than in England.

### *Criminal Jurisdiction*

The wide discretion granted to judges in criminal cases since 1933 has already been noticed (see p. 358). Recent legislation has introduced further differentiations in the administration of criminal justice. At times, the courts are now called upon to examine not only whether a particular offence has been perpetrated but also whether the perpetrator belongs to a special class of offenders specified by law, viz. whether he is a dangerous or habitual criminal or a 'saboteur', before they may convict. The courts have thus acquired a still wider power of discretion since no objective criteria exist for ascertaining whether a person is a 'saboteur' by nature. The accused can thus be punished not so much for what he has done, but for his personal qualities.

*The Prosecution*

The prosecution of offences is entrusted to the public prosecutor, who was originally under a statutory duty to act in respect of all criminal offences which came to his knowledge. In the course of time, this duty was considerably relaxed. With respect to a number of offences of little public concern, the public prosecutor was never bound to prosecute *ex officio*, but only upon formal application. In a few cases the parties themselves must prosecute.

Acting upon police reports or upon information given by individuals, the public prosecutor starts preliminary investigations with the assistance of the police. He may carry out arrests, search premises and seize objects either with a judicial warrant or without (subject to approval by the court). A law of 1926 provided that warrants of arrest must be reviewed periodically, but this safeguard was abolished in 1934. Release on bail is admissible.

The public prosecutor can initiate proceedings in one of two ways. He may submit to the court a formal statement of accusation, or he may apply for a judicial investigation preceding trial (*Voruntersuchung*), followed by a formal statement of accusation. Judicial investigation preceding trial may be compared with the preliminary examination by the justices in England. But it was to be held by a specially appointed judge (*Untersuchungsrichter*), and was compulsory in more serious cases only. Since 1935, the public prosecutor decides in his discretion whether a judicial investigation preceding trial shall take place.

*The Trial*

The trial is public and oral, but in certain circumstances cases may be heard *in camera*. The public prosecutor exercises the functions which in England are entrusted to counsel for the prosecution. The direction of the trial is in the hands of the presiding judge who interrogates the accused, the witnesses and the experts, and inspects the real evidence. Counsel for the defence has no right of cross-examination which, although formerly permitted, was not favoured and was abolished in 1942. But the presiding judge may allow the public prosecutor, the accused or his counsel, to put specific questions to witnesses and experts. If the court consists of a collegiate bench, a majority of two-thirds is required for a conviction. The conviction is coupled with the sentence and, since 1933, with an order for further detention, e.g. as an habitual criminal, if the case warrants such an order.

*The Law of Evidence*

In civil and in criminal proceedings, the court, acting upon the application of the parties or on its own initiative, orders the production of evidence. In criminal proceedings, the question whether a court may reject applications to hear evidence has been solved in different ways at various times. Witnesses, experts and parties are examined by the court. In civil proceedings, the examination may be entrusted to one member of the court, or, if more convenient, to another court (always an *Amtsgericht*). Hearsay is no substitute for the examination of a witness in court, but it may be used to supplement it. Circumstantial evidence is admissible. The courts are free to assess the value of evidence, except in respect of public documents which are unimpeachable evidence regarding the facts recorded by them. Evidence may be given by the following means : (1) By witnesses ; (2) by experts ; (3) by inspection by the court ; and (4) by documents. Since 1933, parties may be examined in the witness box in civil proceedings. Previously, they could put each other on oath as to the truth of some allegation. In criminal proceedings the accused is not heard as a witness and cannot take an oath.

*Appeals*

Appeals consist of appeals on questions of fact and law (*Berufung*) and appeals on questions of law only (*Revision*). Until 1939, two successive appeals could be brought in all civil proceedings. Now, only one appeal (to the *Oberlandesgericht*) lies from decisions of the *Amtsgericht*, while two appeals are still admissible against decisions of the *Landgericht*. In criminal proceedings, two appeals were available against decisions of the *Amtsgericht*, but this right was curtailed in 1924 and in 1932, and since the outbreak of the war only one appeal (*Berufung*) to the *Landgericht* is permitted. Against sentences of the *Landgericht* as a court of first instance only one appeal (*Revision*) to the supreme court is admissible. Formerly, criminal appeals lodged by the accused could never worsen his position, but this prohibition was removed in 1935.

In civil or criminal proceedings, when the time to appeal had lapsed, a judgment or sentence could hitherto only be assailed by an application for a new trial (*Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens*) upon grounds specified by law. But in respect of civil proceedings the chief public prosecutor of the Reich was given in 1941 a new and hitherto unknown remedy. He may now apply to a special civil

senate of the supreme court to set aside any judgment and to order a new trial ' if he entertains serious objections of a legal or factual nature against the correctness (*Richtigkeit*) of the judgment and if he deems a new trial necessary in the interest of the community '.

As regards criminal proceedings, the chief public prosecutor was given shortly after the outbreak of the war the power to bring an ' extraordinary objection ' (*ausserordentlicher Einspruch*) against any sentence having the force of *res judicata* and to demand a new trial before a specially constituted senate of the supreme court ' if he entertains serious objections against the correctness (*Richtigkeit*) of the sentence pronounced by the court below '. In 1940 this procedure was extended, inasmuch as the chief public prosecutor was allowed to bring before an ordinary senate of the supreme court ' a plaint of nullity ' (*Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde*) against the sentence of a court on the ground that ' the sentence is unjust owing to the wrong application of the law to the proven facts '. Plaints of nullity are now used in routine matters, while extraordinary objections are employed in important cases only.

*Juvenile Courts*

In 1923, juvenile courts (*Jugendgerichte*) were established to exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenders between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. But since the outbreak of the war juveniles may be prosecuted in the ordinary courts. In 1943, the jurisdiction of the juvenile courts was restored to a considerable extent.

The penalties and educational measures at the disposal of juvenile courts are more flexible than those available to the ordinary criminal courts. The range of measures was further increased during the war, when periods of informal detention to be served either during week-ends or for a continuous period, and indeterminate sentences followed by internment, were introduced.

*The Prison System*

Prisons were originally a concern of the member States. They consist of prisons for those convicted to penal servitude (*Zuchthaus*) and to imprisonment (*Strafgefängnis*), and of prisons attached to the courts for those awaiting trial (*Untersuchungsgefängnis*). No uniform law of prison administration was established. But in 1934, when the Reich took over the prisons, a comprehensive codification was initiated. The main emphasis is now laid upon the coercive and deterrent character of punishment rather than on social readjustment.

Preventive detention of convicted habitual criminals, introduced in 1933, is governed by the rules applicable to penal servitude with the exception that, while a conviction to penal servitude is restricted to a fixed period, preventive detention is indeterminate. Releases are now granted by the public prosecutor general of the district.

German criminal law contains no provisions regarding concentration camps. They are a creation of the secret police and those confined in them have no legal remedy for any ill-treatment suffered during their period of confinement.

### Members of the Courts and the Legal Profession

The organization of the courts and the training and selection of their members was the concern of the *Länder* until the Reich succeeded them in 1935. Since a considerable degree of uniformity existed before 1935 and seeing that the legal, as distinct from the factual, changes are not very great, it must suffice to give an account of the present position.

In 1933, the German courts were staffed by 65,000 officials, including some 10,000 judges. The number of attorneys was 19,500. As in other continental countries, judges are members of a profession with an education and a career of their own. The profession is open to those only who have acquired the ' qualification to serve as a judge ' by undergoing a special education and by passing the required examinations, which are also required of all those wishing to qualify as attorneys or for the higher civil service.

The training of a German lawyer falls into two parts. First, he must study at a university for at least three years. At the end of these studies, the candidate presents himself to one of the boards of examination attached to a number of courts of appeal.

The second stage of the training can now begin. A successful candidate applies to the president of a court of appeal for an appointment as *Gerichtsreferendar*. Until 1933, the authorities were bound to accept every successful candidate, who thus became a temporary unpaid civil servant. Since 1933, proof of Aryan descent, political reliability and an oath of allegiance to Hitler are required. The candidate must be ' rooted in the people ', must have performed manual labour, be proficient in sport and have proved his worth in the labour and military service. The *Referendar* is attached to the courts for a practical training lasting three years. At the end of it, he presents himself to the central examination office attached to the Ministry of Justice of the Reich (formerly to those of the member

States). The examination takes place before one of several examination boards which are set up in different parts of Germany.

Formerly a successful candidate was entitled to ask for an unsalaried post as *Gerichtsassessor* in the judicial service or in the office of the public prosecutor. Alternatively, he could establish himself as an attorney. This liberty has since been curtailed. In 1934, the admission of attorneys was restricted. If admitted as an attorney, the candidate must now serve for one year as a probationer and for two further years as *Anwaltsassessor* before he can become an attorney. Appointments as *Gerichtsassessor* are now only to be made if the candidate shows personality and is 'rooted in the people'. If accepted as a member of the judicial service, he must serve for one year as a probationer before he is permanently appointed. During the war, the professional requirements were relaxed owing to a shortage of judges. Thus all German judges, prosecutors and attorneys, as well as all civil servants, are selected, not as in England by a self-governing corporation like the Inns of Court, nor by open competitive examination as for our civil service, but by a body of officials bound to apply discrimination on political grounds against those who do not support the regime.

*The Judges*

Judges are civil servants who enjoy a special status. They are organized in a strictly hierarchical order under the supervision of superiors and, in the last resort, of the Minister of Justice. A permanently appointed judge has the title *Rat*. According to the type of court to which he is attached he is an *Amtsgerichtsrat*, *Landgerichtsrat*, *Oberlandesgerichtsrat* or *Reichsgerichtsrat*. Presiding judges, if permanently appointed, have the title *Landgerichtsdirektor*, *Senatspräsident am Oberlandesgericht* or *Senatspräsident am Reichsgericht*.

*The Public Prosecutor* (Staatsanwalt)

Public prosecutors must have qualified to act as judges. They are attached to the district courts (*Landgericht*), the courts of appeal (*Oberlandesgericht*), the supreme court (*Reichsgericht*) and to the people's court. Public prosecutors are civil servants organized as separate authorities (*Staatsanwaltschaft*) under the direction of a chief public prosecutor for each court, who has the title of *Oberstaatsanwalt* at the *Landgericht*, *Generalstaatsanwalt* at the *Oberlandesgericht* and *Oberreichsanwalt* at the supreme court. Other public prosecutors attached to the supreme court are called *Reichsanwälte*.

The *Generalstaatsanwalt* attached to each court of appeal controls all public prosecutors of his district and is directly responsible to the Minister of Justice. At the town courts (*Amtsgericht*) the function of the public prosecutor is entrusted to minor officials (*Amtsanwälte*), who act under instructions from the chief public prosecutor attached to the local *Landgericht*.

Public prosecutors fulfil many functions. They investigate criminal offences with the assistance of the police. They initiate criminal proceedings, prosecute in court, supervise the execution of sentences, and grant releases. The right of the public prosecutor to intervene in civil proceedings was originally restricted to divorce proceedings, but under the Nazis it has been considerably extended.

*The Attorney* (Rechtsanwalt)

The attorney combines the functions which in England are divided between the solicitor and the barrister. He advises the client, represents him before the administrative authorities, drafts documents, carries out negotiations, and appears in court. The admission, status and disciplinary supervision of attorneys is regulated by law. Originally, admission to the profession was free to all those who had qualified as judges, but overcrowding led to demands for restrictions. In 1935, the Minister of Justice, in conjunction with the leader of the Nazi organization of lawyers, was given the discretionary power to admit attorneys. Political reliability became a condition for admission.

Attorneys must attach themselves to a particular court. Usually they attach themselves to a *Landgericht* and to an *Amtsgericht* in the district of the *Landgericht*, or to a court of appeal. They may also appear before any German *Amtsgericht* or deputize for an attorney attached to another court. Special rules apply to labour courts of first instance, the supreme court and the people's court.

Parties must be represented by attorneys in all civil cases, except those pending before an *Amtsgericht*. Poor persons may be granted legal aid by the court. In criminal proceedings the accused must be represented by counsel in practically all cases except those tried by the *Amtsgericht*, and even then if preventive detention or castration is at stake, or if the accused is deaf or mute. Unless the accused chooses his own counsel, the court must—or may in other cases—assign counsel. The latter is generally an attorney, but officials of the court, other than judges, may also be appointed.

It is unusual for attorneys to become judges, but under the Nazi regime a number of attorneys who had proved staunch supporters of the party have been appointed to high judicial office.

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# Chapter VII

# EDUCATION

*Introduction.*

*The German Educational System before* 1933 : General Background : Elementary Education : Post-Elementary Education : Secondary Education : The Universities

*The National-Socialist Educational System :* Basic Principles : The Nazi Educational Organization : Nazi Changes in Types of Schools : Teachers' Training : Party Educational Institutions : Effects of the Nazi Educational System

*Bibliographical Note*

## INTRODUCTION

The totalitarian state, as its name implies, claims to control the whole personality and activity of all its citizens, in order to direct them towards the public good, as its rulers conceive it. Education in such a state takes on a character fundamentally different from that which it presents in ' liberal ' states. There, too, the aim of education may be the training of ' the whole man ', but it is conceived as a training towards free and independent activity and, after adult life is reached, further education is left to the individual himself. Even during his years of tutelage the pupil is encouraged, in the liberal state, to think for himself, and his instruction in certain fundamentally important spheres, especially religion, is left to the decision of his parents in the first instance and, when he comes to maturity, to his own conscience.

Both the German Empire (1870–1918) and the German Republic (1918–33) were, to a greater or less extent, liberal states in this sense. The Nazi revolution of 1933, therefore, imposed a fundamental change in educational principles and practice on Germany. Under the Nazi system, education was to control every individual, as Ley, the Reich leader of the Labour Front put it, ' from the cradle to the grave ', and the width of the party's interpretation of the educational process was expressed by Hitler himself in his speech on the fourth anniversary of his accession to power. ' Education does not begin or end at a certain age . . . instruction is never complete. We therefore cannot admit that any field or medium of education should be outside the scope of the community's obligations. Schools, Hitler Youth, Labour Service, Party, Armed Forces—all these are educational institutions. . . . Books, newspapers, theatres, films are all educational media '.

The Nazi state seeks to use all these media to mould the mind of every German and to secure the final aim of education set out in the Nazi edition of Brockhaus's Encyclopædia : ' The aim of all education is the creation of the political, National-Socialist, human being '. In this view education becomes propaganda for the dominant and exclusive political creed. The influence of the family, the Church, the voluntary society, and the free thought of the individual himself, all alike are suspect, to be suppressed and eliminated by the state and party as far as possible.

Yet, though the year 1933 marks a real revolution in German education, the Nazis took over a living system which they could not wholly transform at once and of which they were themselves products. It is, therefore, necessary to sketch the structure and nature of the educational system of Germany before 1933, and then to examine what changes of form, as well as of spirit, the Nazis have introduced into it.

## THE GERMAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM BEFORE 1933

### General Background

As in other European countries, education in Germany owed much, in its early history, to rulers, whether emperors or local princes, to the monasteries and to the towns, in which the rising middle class sought to provide for the needs and ambitions of its children. Before the Reformation universities*, monastic schools (*Klosterschulen*), cathedral schools (*Domschulen*), and town schools (*Stadtschulen*) and even the beginnings of elementary education in *Lese- und Schreibschulen* (reading and writing schools) had come into existence.

The leaders of the Reformation in Germany, Luther and Melanchthon, earnestly encouraged both the princes and the towns to enlarge their efforts, and the Jesuit order, during the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, built up, on the Catholic side, a great educational organization in the territories of the Catholic princes of Germany. In the same period there appeared the ' princely ' schools (*Fürstenschulen*) of Pforta, Meissen, and Grimma, boarding schools with a severely classical curriculum for training the

* The first in the territory of the Holy Roman Empire north of the Alps was founded by the Bohemian king, who became the Emperor Charles IV, at Prague in 1348. For the list of German universities see below, p. 391.

future higher officials of the states (*Länder*); and the *Ritter-Akadamien* ('knightly colleges'), in which well-born boys were given a more 'modern' type of education, to fit them for the great world, in foreign languages, history and geography, and even some science. Proficiency in manly exercises—e.g. riding, fencing—and in social accomplishments—e.g. dancing—was encouraged in these *Ritter-Akadamien*.

During the 'age of enlightenment', various experimental boarding schools appeared and in the later eighteenth century the ideas both of Rousseau and of Pestalozzi found a response in Germany. But these schools touched only a small minority of German society and the essential feature of German education in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was the development of state interest in, and the establishment of state control over, the educational system.

As early as 1559, Duke Christoph of Württemberg had instituted the *Deutsche Schule* (German school) in his domains to teach reading, writing, the catechism and singing, under the supervision of the local clergyman. In 1619, the principle of compulsory attendance at school was adopted in Weimar and, in 1642, by Duke Ernest the Pious in Gotha. In rescripts published in 1716–17, Frederick William I of Prussia also adopted it, and his measures were re-enacted and extended in the *General Landschul-Regiment* (General regulations for Prussian schools) issued by Frederick the Great in 1763. Henceforth Prussian children were to attend school from the age of five to thirteen or fourteen, and, as in Württemberg, a local clergyman was to act as inspector of schools.

The control of the Prussian state over its educational institutions was rapidly extended. In 1788, the school leaving examination (*Abitur* or *Reifeprüfung*) was established, and, in 1794, the Prussian code laid down that all schools are the concern of the state and may be conducted only with the state's approval. Henceforward all 'private' schools were subject to state inspection and were required to conform to standards laid down by the state.

State control of education in Prussia was carried still further by a law of 1812 which made the *Abitur* of a classical high school, of which there were ninety-one in Prussia in 1818, a necessary qualification for entry to a university. In 1817, a separate Ministry of Education and Public Worship (*Kultusministerium*) was instituted and, by the end of the long tenure (1817–58) of its first occupant, Baron von Altenstein, state control of education in Prussia, as well

as the main structure of the modern system, had been fully established. All teachers, from the university to the elementary school, were in process of becoming civil servants. The example of Prussia was followed in the other States of Germany. But it is important to notice that the educational system remained, both after the creation of the Empire in 1870 and under the Republic, in the hands of the individual States (*Länder*). Although a common standard for certain examinations (e.g., the *Abitur*) was mutually agreed on by the States, and although university students might spend parts of their training in the universities of different States, each State, down to 1934, retained its own educational system and no single national system came into being before the Nazi revolution.

The general character of German education, down to 1933, reflected both the religious and class divisions of German society, and also a permanent conflict between two rival ideals of education —that of preparation for the service of the state, which is rooted in Prussian tradition and was formulated by Fichte, and that of producing the cultured individual, which goes back to the 'Enlightenment' and found its classical exponent in Wilhelm von Humboldt.

Religious division was expressed, chiefly at the level of primary education, in the prevalence of the confessional school (*Bekenntnisschule*), in which the teachers were Catholics or Protestants. It was their acute differences on this subject which prevented the parties of the 'Weimar Coalition' during the Republic—Centre (Roman Catholics), Democrats and Social Democrats—from ever being able to formulate a national educational policy.

Class divisions were reflected in the structure of the school system —the free elementary school (*Volksschule*) for the masses; the fee-paying intermediate school (*Mittelschule*) for the lower middle-classes; and the secondary school (*Höhere Schule*), with fees double those of the *Mittelschule*, for the upper middle class. It was also shown by the relative infrequency of transfer from one type of school to another, and by the low proportion of university students (6% in 1930) from the 'lower class' (manual workers, shop assistants).

The tension between the two ideals of state service and general culture chiefly affected the higher levels of education in the secondary schools and in the universities. The elementary schools were dominated by the idea of preparing children to be useful servants of the state, the intermediate schools took on a sharply vocational character. But in the secondary schools and in the universities the

idea of general culture as the aim of education received more than lip service. German academic standards were among the highest in Europe, and, down to 1914 at least, both secondary schools (particularly the classical *Gymnasien*) and universities were inclined to an exaggerated intellectualism. Yet, even in the secondary schools, the other ideal—that of the Prussian spirit of service—had its effects. Discipline was rigid and often harsh, teaching was authoritarian and left little to the pupil's initiative. After 1900, and more radically, after 1918, the barrack-room atmosphere and the one-sided academicism of the schools were violently attacked by the leaders of the Youth movement. Under the Republic the principles of the experimental schools on freer lines, which had been started mainly for the children of the professional classes, were extended by some ' Left ' governments, notably in Hamburg, to the elementary schools. The aim of producing an all-round development of an independent personality and at the same time of bringing education into closer connection with life by relating it to the child's environment (*Heimatkunde*), to his German inheritance (*Deutschkunde*), and to his future functions as a citizen (*Bürgerkunde*), was widely held and officially adopted by the Prussian state. The relation of the Nazi system to these ideas will be discussed later (see pp. 405–14).

## Elementary Education

### *The Elementary School* (*Volksschule*)

Compulsory education of all children from the age of six to fourteen was reaffirmed by the constitution of 1918 (Art. 145), which also provided that such education should be free and that every child should continue its education to the age of eighteen, by attending either a continuation school (*Fortbildungsschule*), a vocational school (*Berufsschule*), an intermediate school (*Mittelschule*) or a secondary school (*Höhere Schule*).

Until 1870, the most numerous type of elementary school was the one class (*Einklassige Schule*), in which a single teacher might have to instruct as many as eighty pupils of all ages between six and fourteen at once. By 1901, this situation had disappeared in the towns and had become uncommon in the villages. But the elementary schools still remained understaffed, even as compared with England, and, in 1938, the ratio of children to teachers was 42 : 1 as against 30 : 1 in England.

Under the Republic the majority of the schools remained denominational (*Bekenntnischulen*), but in some States, especially in south-western Germany, interdenominational schools (*Simultanschulen*), later known as *Gemeinschaftsschulen*, were the rule. A third type, the secular school (*Weltliche Schule*), was introduced in a few centres (e.g. Berlin), where the Social Democrats were strong. The essence of the whole system was that children should be instructed in the religion of their parents.

The *Volksschule* was divided into a junior section (*Grundschule*) covering the first four years of school life (six to ten) and a senior section (*Gemeindeschule*). Transference from the elementary to an intermediate or secondary school took place usually at the age of ten. One of the most important changes made by the Republic was to abolish, by a law of 1920, the public and private *Vorschulen* which had served as preparatory schools for secondary education for the children of wealthier parents. As a result, the first four classes of the *Volksschule*, the *Grundschule*, now became formally the single basis of education (*Einheitsschule*) for all classes of citizens, though some of the private *Vorschulen* survived till the fall of the Republic.

The objects aimed at by the Republic in elementary education are clearly set out in the directives issued. The *Grundschule* ' has the task of awakening and developing all the intellectual and physical qualities of the child. Everything the child learns should not be superficially pumped into him, but must be experienced and independently acquired '. The close relation of the teaching to the child's experience is also insisted on for the senior school (*Gemeindeschule*). In addition, civics was introduced at this stage as a new subject and both it and history were so to be taught as to contribute to international understanding.

*Administration*

The mechanism of State supervision of the elementary schools remained unaltered under the Republic. In Prussia the *Regierungspräsident*,* under the Minister of Education, with a district school board of inspectors (*Regierungsschulräte*) and lawyers (*Regierungsräte*) appointed by the Minister, exercised general control. Reports were made to this school board by local inspectors, *Kreisschulräte* for the country districts and *Stadtschulräte* for the towns. The immediate support and administration of the elementary

* For the duties of this official and a map showing the areas of the *Regierungsbezirke* (government districts) see pp. 323, 338, and Fig. 53.

schools, however, was a matter for the local government bodies of the communes (see pp. 323–4), which elected education committees (*Schuldeputation*) including both town councillors, teachers and clergy, to carry out their duty. The teachers were appointed by a complicated method involving the agreement of the town council and of the school committee, and their appointment required confirmation by the *Regierungspräsident* himself.

A serious effort was made under the Republic to ' democratize ' the internal government of the schools. The headmaster was ' *primus inter pares* ', with a casting vote in the teachers' conference which took disciplinary and other decisions affecting internal school life. There were teachers' councils attached to the supervising authority, and parents' councils, elected by parents of the pupils of every school, which could make suggestions to the teachers' conference. Finally, the school community (*Gemeinschaft*), including teachers, parents and pupils, would assemble for special occasions.

*Training of Teachers*

Training for the elementary teachers' profession varied considerably in the different States before and after 1918, but, before 1918, had been everywhere unsatisfactory. It usually began at the age of twelve ; was conducted for three years in a teachers' training establishment (*Präparandenanstalt*) and was concluded with three further years (fifteen to seventeen) at a *Lehrerseminar* (teachers' seminary). Success in an examination of approximately school certificate standard (*Mittlere Reife*) enabled the intending teacher to fulfil his military obligations by one year's training (*Einjährig-freiwillige*) instead of two, and after a short period of practical training and a period of probation, he might hope for a permanent appointment.

The Republic sought to raise the whole status and level of training for elementary teachers. Under the Weimar constitution, all teachers became explicitly civil servants (Art. 143) and a unified system of training for the whole Reich ' according to standards pertaining to higher education ' was contemplated. But no Reich school law was ever passed, and it was left to the States to implement the good intentions of the framers of the constitution. Thuringia led the way (1922), Saxony followed (1924), and in 1925, Becker, the Prussian Minister of Education, carried through a far-reaching reform in Prussia. Though the ideal of university education for elementary teachers was not adopted by Becker, the Prussian law

of 1925 set up teachers' academies (*Pädagogische Akadamien*) on a level far higher than the old *Präparandenanstalten.* A two years' course of study, including pedagogy, history, philosophy, psychology, anthropology, school hygiene and social science was provided for the students. Above all, the level of the students was drastically raised by requiring the leaving certificate (*Abitur*) of a secondary school from all candidates for entry. The staffs of the new academies, of which Prussia had fifteen in 1932,* were carefully selected from experienced and progressively minded school teachers and university lecturers and were, for the most part, relatively young.

Both the atmosphere and methods of the elementary school and the training of teachers were thus in process of being ' liberalized ' under the Republic. In the eastern provinces of Prussia, at least in village schools with elderly masters and conservative landowners and clergy, and in nationalist-Catholic Bavaria, the process had hardly begun. But elsewhere it was beginning to bear some fruit, and at least until the depression of 1929 brought heavy salary-cuts, general doubt of the Republic's stability, and disappointment with its achievements, the attitude of the elementary schoolmaster and schoolmistress had changed considerably. The reforms of Becker, initiated only seven years before the Nazi revolution, came too late to have much effect, and it is possible that the low salaries paid to elementary teachers would have made a body consisting of these more highly trained products of secondary schools and pedagogic academies very dissatisfied, or have failed to produce sufficient candidates of this kind to staff the schools.

*Intermediate Schools*

The German intermediate schools (*Mittelschulen*) are properly considered under the heading of elementary education because they were administered under the elementary code. Yet they were maintained by the municipalities, charged fees, and aimed at providing a ' genteel ' education up to the age of sixteen for the children of lower middle class parents destined for trade and industry and for the lower clerical posts in business and the public services.

The teaching staffs were composed of selected elementary teachers and of university graduates, who had to pass a special

* The other German states, which developed similar institutions, were Saxony, which had two, Thuringia, Hesse, Mecklenburg, Hamburg, Oldenburg, Baden, Bremen and Brunswick, which had one each. Neither Bavaria nor Württemberg changed from the older methods of training elementary teachers.

examination and spend a five-year probationary period before receiving final appointment. The pupils passed into these schools at the age of ten and pursued a course of study parallel with that of a secondary school, but without Latin and at a lower intellectual pressure. Special emphasis was given to commercial subjects, to handicrafts and, for girls, to domestic economy. But the aim was not as severely vocational as that of the *Fachschulen* (technical schools). The number of pupils attending such schools had begun to decline in recent years. In 1938, they taught 272,000 children as against 318,000 in 1911 and 329,000 in 1921. It has indeed been argued that their existence corresponded not so much to any real educational need as to the obsolescent class structure of older German society. And in 1940 the Nazis announced a plan for their replacement by a new type of school (see p. 495).

## Post-Elementary Education

Under the Republic the child which left the elementary school at fourteen was under an obligation to continue part-time education for another four years, and employers were bound to allow the necessary time for this instruction. Three types of school were available, the continuation schools (*Fortbildungsschulen*), trade schools (*Berufsschulen*) and technical schools (*Fachschulen*). The financial responsibility for the provision of these continuation schools fell, however, on the communal authorities, which were often too poor to provide them, especially in rural areas. A large number of the age-group 14–18, therefore, still received no further consecutive education under the Republic after leaving the elementary school.

### *Continuation Schools* (*Fortbildungsschulen*)

These had developed out of the Sunday and evening schools, which had started at the end of the eighteenth century under the influence of Pestalozzi. Their purpose was both vocational, to improve the skill of apprentices, and also cultural, to improve the general education of their pupils. This second aim was given special emphasis in regulations issued by Prussia in 1923. Scholars had to attend these schools for at least four to six periods a week. In addition to vocational instruction (*Berufsskunde*), the subjects taught included German, essay writing, mathematics, and sometimes history, civics and music. The staffs of these schools consisted mainly of elementary school teachers. In 1927, 1,620,000 pupils attended the *Fortbildungsschulen*.

*Berufsschulen* (*Trade Schools*)

There were also part-time vocational schools, in which the instruction given was almost wholly technical. They were of various types —schools for arts and crafts (*Gewerbeschulen*), commerce (*Kaufmannsschulen*), farming (*Landbauschulen*), domestic science (*Haushaltungsschulen*), and schools for unskilled workers (*Schulen für ungelernte Arbeiter*). Their pupils, in 1927, numbered 988,000.

*Fachschulen* (*Technical Schools*)

In addition to the above types of part-time schools, there were also many full-time technical schools which, under the Republic, charged fees. They included not only schools giving technical instruction for particular industries, e.g. engineering, but also commercial schools (*Handelsschulen* and *Höhere Handelsschulen*), of which some 350 were run by the States and the municipalities and some as private centres. They did not, however, fall within the scheme of compulsory post-elementary education provided by the Republic.

## Secondary Education

*Secondary Education for Boys*

It has been seen that amongst German secondary schools (*Höhere Schulen*) down to 1871, the classical *Gymnasium*, with a nine-year course devoted primarily to the study of Latin and Greek, was given pride of place, since it was the only avenue to a university career. As the demand for more modern studies increased, Germany did not adopt the English system of having classical and modern ' sides ' in the same school, but set up new types of school to meet the new requirements. These were the *Realschulen* (modern schools), of which two types offered, like the *Gymnasien*, a full nine-year course of study. The *Realgymnasium* made modern languages its characteristic subjects, but retained Latin ; the *Oberrealschule* paid special attention to mathematics and science, in addition to modern languages, but taught no Latin at all.

The growth of these schools was encouraged by the fact that, after 1870, they were allowed to hold their own *Abitur* examination, successful candidates being able to proceed to the university for the study of modern subjects—mathematics, science and modern languages. The monopoly of the classical *Gymnasium* was thus broken. When William II came to the throne he threw his influence on the side of modern studies, declaring in 1890 that ' we wish to

educate our children to be young Germans and not young Greeks or Romans'. In 1900, the three types of higher secondary school were placed on an equal footing, so far as entrance to the university was concerned.

The Republic made no changes of importance in the three existing types of higher secondary school, but added two further types to them. In 1922, the *Deutsche Oberschule* (German high school), also with a nine-year course, was introduced, its basic subjects being German language, literature and history, combined with general history, geography, two foreign languages and philosophy. In 1925 the *Aufbauschule* (lit. 'building-up school') was instituted. It was intended to provide for gifted pupils, particularly from rural areas, who had completed their elementary school course, but had, for one reason or another, failed to obtain entrance to a secondary school at the normal age (ten). It therefore offered a six-year course similar in character to the last six years of the *Deutsche Oberschule*, and its leaving certificate was accepted for university entrance. When the Nazis took power in 1933 there existed, therefore, five main types of secondary school for boys, as follows:

1. The classical *Gymnasium* .. .. .. (288)
2. The *Realgymnasium* .. .. .. .. (379)
3. The *Oberrealschule* .. .. .. .. (207)
4. The *Deutsche Oberschule* } .. .. .. (86)
5. The *Aufbauschule* }

(The number of each type in 1932 is shown in brackets.)

In addition to these 'higher' or 'full' secondary schools, there were also types of secondary school, distinct from the *Mittelschulen*, which offered only a six-year course of study. They corresponded to the first three types of higher school and were called *Progymnasium*, *Realprogymnasium* and *Realschule*. Their leaving certificate, given on the examination for the *Obersekundareife*,* opened the way to the middle grades of the public services and had a corresponding value in the professions and in business.

*Administration.*—All these schools were administered in Prussia, alike under the Empire and the Republic, by the *Oberpräsident*† of each province, assisted by a *Provinzialschulkollegium* (provincial

* Until the advent of the Nazis, forms in German schools were numbered from the top downwards. Thus *Prima* (I) corresponded to the upper sixth of an English public school and *Obersekunda* roughly to our upper fifth.

† For the functions and sphere of authority of the *Oberpräsident* of a Prussian province see p. 322.

school board), with the Ministry of Education and Public Worship as the final authority. The provincial school board acted as a corporate body and consisted of not less than five members, of whom one had to have had legal training, the others being former secondary school headmasters or teachers. The members enjoyed the title *Oberschulrat*. They controlled the finance, buildings, appointments and curricula of the schools.

As in the elementary schools, the inner administration of the secondary schools was conducted under the Republic by a teachers' conference, of which the headmaster (*Oberstudiendirektor*) was the chairman with a casting vote. Parents' councils were also introduced and, at first, even pupils' councils. Though these last soon ceased to act, it was usual up to 1933 for each form to elect a representative (*Vertrauensmann*), who could present suggestions to the form master.

The republican Ministers of Education in Prussia, and in some of the other States, also sought to make secondary education more easily available to the 'lower orders'. The *Aufbauschule* was the institutional expression of this aim, but, in addition, the Weimar constitution itself laid down the principle that admission to secondary education should not depend upon the wealth and social position of a child's parents, but upon its suitability for higher studies. To this end some increase of free places in secondary schools (up to 20%), as well as the creation of the *Aufbauschulen*, contributed. But the lack of a really adequate scholarship system, accompanied by maintenance allowances, still shut out many gifted children and, even in 1931, the working-class population, constituting over 50% of the total population, supplied only some 7% of the pupils in secondary schools.

*The spirit of the secondary schools.*—For the secondary, as for the elementary schools, directives were issued under the Republic, which expressed the desire that the teaching in these schools should both encourage 'the joyful affirmation of the new (i.e. republican) state' and also contribute towards 'international reconciliation'. Such instructions were carried out by some secondary schoolmasters, but the old imperialist-nationalist traditions prevailed in the majority of these schools. The conclusion reached by a Carnegie enquiry in 1923 that 'from Cologne to Königsberg all the younger generation is being impelled towards *revanche*' may, perhaps, have been too sweeping. But it is supported by the verdict of another enquirer, J. F. Scott, in 1926, who said that, on the question of

responsibility for the war of 1914–18, ' the general tone of the majority of texts (i.e. school books) varies from blunt prejudice to bitter, blind, nationalism '.

Too late, one may add ' as usual ', the situation was recognized in an official Prussian publication at the end of the 'twenties. ' We cannot conclude the chapter on the secondary schools without touching one apparently sore spot—the political attitude of the teachers' councils. Whenever the people and the authorities celebrate the anniversary of the constitution complaints pour in about insufficient or undignified attention to that occasion. There are doubtless teachers who have still not recovered from the collapse of the old regime and who feel unable to adopt a positive attitude towards the Republic. There are even teachers who abuse their position as friends and leaders of our youth and deliberately inculcate hostility towards the people's State '.

In fact, the estimate of an American educationist in 1922 that 80% of Prussian secondary schoolmasters were monarchist at heart, and that 95% of their colleagues in Bavaria desired a Wittelsbach restoration, probably remained substantially true down to 1933. It was not without general significance that, on the day after Hitler's admission to the office of Chancellor, the headmaster of one of the largest secondary schools in the suburbs of Berlin, hoisted the old Prussian flag over his school. Like so many of his colleagues in the profession, and like so many other Germans, including the Nationalist leaders themselves, he was saluting the return of the ' good old days '. It is probable that by now he has learnt that the Swastika is as jealous to monopolize the old Prussian glory for its own as it is bitterly hostile to the republican symbol of liberty and to the cause of international amity.

The effort of the Republic to ' liberalize ' its secondary education was, therefore, a failure. The narrowly nationalist text-books of imperial Germany remained in use in the schools ; the older teachers remained true to their nationalist and monarchical beliefs, and many of their younger colleagues, who had abandoned or never felt loyalty to the German royal houses, brought to their work the new, more radical, more bitterly anti-liberal philosophy of the Nazis and their intellectual allies.

*Secondary Education for Girls*

As in other countries, the development of secondary education for girls in Germany lagged behind the provision for boys. It was

not until 1894, under pressure from the movement for the emancipation of women led by Helene Lange, that regulations were issued in Prussia for *Höhere Mädchenschulen* (girls' high schools), which were to provide a seven-years' course and to teach two foreign languages. The training and examination of women teachers was also regulated and the rank of *Oberlehrerin* created. In 1896, girls were for the first time admitted to the examination for the *Abitur*, but until 1903 they were still treated in Prussian universities as guests. Full equality in the treatment of education for girls with that for boys was not reached until 1918, but from that date until 1933 a closely similar system prevailed. The secondary schools available for girls bore different names from those for boys, but differed little in the curriculum followed from the corresponding type, except that the full rigour of the classical studies in a boys' *Gymnasium* was rarely provided. Thus the general scheme of girls' secondary schools may be compared with that for boys :

| *Girls* | | *Boys* |
|---|---|---|
| The *Oberlyzeum*<br>*Realgymnasiales Oberlyzeum*<br>or the *Studienanstalt*<br>(entered after three years at a *Lyzeum*) | Gave a nine years' course, corresponding to the | *Realgymnasium* or *Oberrealschule* |
| The *Lyzeum* gave a six years' course corresponding to the | | *Realprogymnasium*<br>*Realschule* |

In addition, in rural districts, girls as well as boys were able to attend both the *Deutsche Oberschulen* and the *Aufbauschulen.* There were also *Frauenschulen*, which offered vocational training after the six-year *Lyzeum* course for future teachers of physical culture, as well as training in domestic science, kindergarten, and welfare work.

*Training of Secondary Teachers*

Entry upon the career of a secondary school teacher was far from easy in Germany down to 1933. The profession was confined to graduates, and as early as 1810 a Prussian decree, later adopted by all the other States, made an *examen pro facultate docendi* obligatory. Since 1917 the would-be secondary schoolmaster had to fulfil the following requirements :

1. Four years at a university.
2. At the end of this time, success in a State examination for the office of teacher in a secondary school (*Prüfung für das Lehramt an Höheren Schulen*), in which two main, and one subsidiary subject would be offered.

3. One and a half to two years at a *Pädagogisches Seminar* (teachers' training college), where further theoretical instruction was combined with practice in teaching.
4. A second State examination conducted by a teachers' training board (*Pädagogisches Prüfungsamt*), presided over by an *Oberschulrat* (see p. 387). The successful candidate was then appointed as a *Studienreferendar*, but had to serve a probationary period, usually of two years, before becoming a *Studienassessor*.*

Appointment as a secondary schoolmaster in Germany, before 1933, involved, therefore, a course of nineteen years' study from entry into the *Grundschule* at six years old, and a further two years' probation, so that the candidate was twenty-seven years old before he was fully settled in his career.

Considered as a whole, the secondary schoolmasters both of the Empire and of the Republic were a highly competent and extremely conscientious body. Not a few were scholars of distinction, some of whom found time to produce works of learning in their own subjects. The rates of pay were low, ranging from under £200 a year as the minimum of a *Studienassessor* to some £550† a year as the maximum for the headmaster of a large school. Yet, up to 1933, there was a surplus of qualified teachers in Germany. The Nazi handling of education has, however, converted this into an acute shortage (see p. 420).

## The Universities

There is a striking contrast between Germany and England in the history of university education in the two countries. Whilst some six hundred years separate the foundation of Oxford and Cambridge from that of Durham, the next English‡ university to be founded, in Germany there was a continuous series of new foundations both before and after 1500. Of the existing twenty-three German universities, only six trace their history back beyond 1500, but it will be seen from the accompanying table that there have been new

* After 1918 the schoolmasters in German secondary schools ceased to use the title *Professor*, which had been usual before. As civil servants their titles were assimilated to those of the administrative grades : *Studien-Referendar* for a probationary period ; *Studien-Assessor* holding a temporary appointment ; *Studienrat*, as a permanent master. An *Oberstudienrat* was equivalent to the second master in an English school. Headmasters were called either *Studiendirektor* or, in large schools, *Oberstudiendirektor*.

† These figures are based on the law of salaries for 1943, and take the pound as equivalent to 20 Reichsmarks.

‡ The universities of Scotland have not been overlooked, but the comparison here drawn is between Germany and England, not Germany and Great Britain.

## *Table of German Universities*

| University | State | Year of foundation | Number of matriculated students | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Winter, 1930–31 | | Winter, 1936–37 | | Summer 1939 |
| | | | Total | Women | Total | Women | Total |
| Berlin .. | Prussia .. | 1810 | 14,687 | 3,087 | 6,717 | 999 | 6,100 |
| Bonn .. | Prussia .. | 1818 | 5,612 | 1,192 | 2,941 | 424 | 2,515 |
| Breslau .. | Prussia .. | 1702 | 4,481 | 871 | 2,932 | 450 | 2,179 |
| Erlangen | Bavaria .. | 1743 | 1,944 | 155 | 1,080 | 91 | 884 |
| Frankfurt-am-Main | Prussia .. | 1919 | 3,823 | 755 | 1,630 | 242 | 1,464 |
| Freiburg-Baden | Baden .. | 1457 | 3,397 | 754 | 2,599 | 530 | 2,176 |
| Giessen .. | Hesse .. | 1607 | 1,876 | 142 | 682 | 48 | 553 |
| Göttingen | Prussia .. | 1737 | 3,851 | 568 | 1,540 | 199 | 1,153 |
| Greifswald | Prussia .. | 1456 | 1,644 | 231 | 722 | 103 | 577 |
| Halle-Wittenberg | Prussia .. | 1694 | 2,492 | 274 | 1,065 | 172 | 739 |
| Hamburg | Hamburg .. | 1919 | 3,746 | 855 | 1,704 | 321 | 1,521 |
| Heidelberg | Baden .. | 1386 | 3,079 | 593 | 2,047 | 492 | 1,818 |
| Jena .. | Thuringia | 1558 | 2,879 | 512 | 1,478 | 317 | 1,101 |
| Kiel .. | Prussia .. | 1665 | 2,389 | 356 | 1,069 | 178 | 941 |
| Köln .. | Prussia .. | (1388)* 1919 | 5,616 | 1,057 | 2,696 | 397 | 2,428 |
| Königsberg | Prussia .. | 1544 | 3,208 | 625 | 1,481 | 298 | 1,407 |
| Leipzig .. | Saxony .. | 1409 | 6,938 | 938 | 2,488 | 270 | 1,895 |
| Marburg | Prussia .. | 1527 | 3,210 | 660 | 1,318 | 303 | 1,126 |
| Munich .. | Bavaria .. | 1472 | 8,895 | 1,711 | 5,034 | 926 | 4,382 |
| Münster .. | Prussia .. | (1780)* 1902 | 4,149 | 879 | 2,436 | 364 | 1,957 |
| Rostock .. | Mecklenburg | 1419 | 1,624 | 203 | 786 | 123 | 851 |
| Tübingen | Württemberg | 1477 | 2,960 | 371 | 1,792 | 230 | 1,447 |
| Würzburg | Bavaria .. | 1582 | 2,971 | 340 | 1,785 | 314 | 1,293 |
| Twenty-three universities | | — | 95,807 | 17,183 | 48,558 | 7,832 | 39,236 |

Based on official sources.

* These universities were originally founded in 1388 and 1780 respectively; they were refounded in 1919 and 1902 respectively.

## *Table of Colleges of University Status*

In addition to the twenty-three universities proper, there were a number of colleges o university status, as follows :—

### I. Technical Colleges (*Technische Hochschulen*)

| College | State | Year of foundation | Number of students | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1931–32 | | 1936–37 | | 1939 |
| | | | Total | Women | Total | Women | Total |
| Aachen | Prussia .. | 1870 | 994 | 43 | 665 | 11 | 789 |
| Berlin-Charlottenburg | Prussia .. | 1879 | 4,592 | 131 | 2,328 | 33 | 2,323 |
| Breslau | Prussia .. | 1910 | 678 | 11 | 444 | 4 | 542 |
| Brunswick | Brunswick.. | 1877 | 1,061 | 74 | 707 | 97 | 399 |
| Darmstadt | Hesse .. | 1877 | 2,243 | 41 | 1,134 | 14 | 1,143 |
| Dresden | Saxony .. | 1890 | 3,814 | 405 | 1,160 | 41 | 1,051 |
| Hanover | Prussia .. | 1879 | 1,783 | 47 | 1,016 | 25 | 911 |
| Karlsruhe | Baden .. | 1865 | 1,324 | 27 | 616 | 5 | 661 |
| Munich | Bavaria .. | 1877 | 4,049 | 96 | 1,865 | 66 | 1,692 |
| Stuttgart | Württemberg | 1862 | 2,002 | 73 | 993 | 29 | 797 |
| Ten colleges | | — | 22,540 | 1,948 | 10,928 | 325 | 10,307 |

### II. Colleges of Veterinary Medicine (*Medizinische und Tierärztliche Hochschulen*)

| College | State | Year of foundation | Number of students | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1931–32 | | 1936–37 | | 1937–38 | |
| | | | Total | Women | Total | Women | Total | Women |
| Berlin * | Prussia | 1790 | 440 | 10 | — | — | — | — |
| Düsseldorf | Prussia | 1907 | 455 | 80 | 542 | 101 | 454 | 82 |
| Hanover | Prussia | 1778 | 543 | 7 | 537 | 2 | 530 | 4 |
| Three colleges | | — | 1,438 | 97 | 1,079 | 103 | 984 | 86 |

* Incorporated into Berlin University in 1934.

### III. Colleges of Economics and Political Science (*Handelshochschulen*)

| College | State | Year of foundation | Number of students | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1931–32 | | 1936–37 | | 1939 |
| | | | Total | Women | Total | Women | Total |
| Berlin | Prussia .. | 1906 | 1,586 | 471 | 763 | 121 | 880 |
| Königsberg | Prussia .. | 1915 | 749 | 209 | 199 | 33 | 203 |
| Leipzig | Saxony .. | 1898 | 696 | 39 | 269 | 6 | 297 |
| Mannheim* | Baden .. | 1908 | 493 | 61 | — | — | — |
| Nuremberg | Bavaria .. | 1919 | 286 | 20 | 157 | 12 | 187 |
| Five colleges | | — | 3,810 | 800 | 1,388 | 172 | 1,567 |

* Incorporated into Heidelberg University in 1933.

## IV. Academies of Mining Technology (*Bergakademien*)

| College | State | Year of foundation | Number of students | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1931–32 | | 1936–37 | | 1939 |
| | | | Total | Women | Total | Women | Total |
| Clausthal | Prussia .. | 1775 | 212 | 1 | 109 | 1 | 78 |
| Freiberg | Saxony .. | 1765 | 188 | — | 93 | — | 98 |
| Two colleges | | — | 400 | 1 | 202 | 1 | 176 |

## V. Colleges of Forestry (*Forsthochschulen*)

| College | State | Year of foundation | Number of students | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1931–32 | | 1936–37 | | 1939 |
| | | | Total | Women | Total | Women | Total |
| Eberswalde | Prussia .. | 1830 | 56 | — | 39 | — | 93 |
| Hanover-Münden | Prussia .. | 1868 | 83 | — | 37 | — | 56 |
| Tharandt* | Saxony .. | 1816 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Two colleges* | | — | 139 | — | 76 | — | 149 |

* Incorporated into the *Technische Hochschule* at Dresden in 1929.

## VI. Colleges of Agriculture (*Landwirtschaftliche Hochschulen*)

| College | State | Year of foundation | Number of students | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | 1931–32 | | 1936–37 | | 1939 |
| | | | Total | Women | Total | Women | Total |
| Berlin* | Prussia .. | 1881 | 397 | 11 | — | — | — |
| Bonn-Poppelsdorf† | Prussia .. | 1847 | 588 | 2 | — | — | — |
| Hohenheim (near Stuttgart) | Württemberg | 1818 | 106 | 1 | 171 | 3 | 141 |
| Three colleges | | — | 1,091 | 14 | 171 | 3 | 141 |

* Incorporated into Berlin University in 1934. † Incorporated into Bonn University in 1934.

## VII. Roman Catholic Colleges (*Katholisch-Philosophisch-Theologische-Hochschulen*)

| College | State | Year of foundation | Number of students 1937–38 | College | State | Year of foundation | Number of students 1937–38 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Augsburg | Bavaria | 1834 | 16 | Fulda | Prussia | 1734 | 212 |
| Bamberg | Bavaria | 1647 | 165 | Mainz | Hesse | 1805 | 162 |
| Braunsberg | Prussia | 1567 | 105 | Paderborn | Prussia | 1614 | 439 |
| Dillingen | Bavaria | 1549 | 157 | Passau | Bavaria | 1612 | 317 |
| Eichstätt | Bavaria | 1843 | 283 | Regensburg | Bavaria | 1586 | 221 |
| Frankfurt-am-Main | Frankfurt | 1926 | 297 | Trier | Prussia | 1773 | 466 |
| Freising | Bavaria | 1834 | 216 | Thirteen colleges | | — | 2,955 |

These tables are based on official sources.

foundations in each succeeding century.* The difference between the development in the two countries may be attributed in part to the persistence of acute religious differences in Germany, which stimulated controversy and the desire on the part of both Protestants and Catholics to provide for higher education ; in part to the greater love of learning for its own sake in Germany than in England ; and not least to the many political divisions of Germany which made every ruler of a State of considerable size anxious to have at least one university in his domains.

*State Control*

The medieval university was a self-governing corporation, with the right to grant degrees and to exercise jurisdiction over its members. These privileges were granted to the new universities as they were founded, and survived until 1933. But since the reorganization of the universities in Prussia and in the other States, which accompanied and succeeded the Napoleonic wars, the States have exercised effective control over the universities through their Education Ministries. Though no central Education Minister for the whole of Germany existed until 1934, the custom of student migration from one university to another necessitated the maintenance of common educational standards and of a common faculty organization, and the frequent interchange of teachers also made for a unified system.

The control of each State over its universities was exercised chiefly over their finance and over the appointment to professorial chairs. The practice of endowing public and charitable institutions with lands and money, which has been so beneficially widespread in England and has contributed so largely to the independence of our schools and universities, never obtained in Germany. German universities, therefore, have had few resources under their own control from which to draw revenue and, since they charge low fees, they have been largely dependent on grants from the States. In addition the senior members of the teaching staff were civil servants, and appointments to professorships, though three names

* It should be noticed that, in addition to the universities proper, the term *Hochschule* (see the list printed on p. 392-3) includes ten *Technische Hochschulen*, primarily devoted to engineering, and a number of specialist colleges (*Fachhochschulen*) for advanced study in agriculture, forestry, commerce, mining and veterinary surgery. These institutions owed much to the favour of William II and acquired the status of universities and the right to grant doctorates to their students. They also have the right to train secondary teachers in science and mathematics. They have, however, never enjoyed the same social and intellectual prestige as the university proper.

were usually submitted by the faculty concerned, were made by the Education Ministry, which could go outside the list of those put forward. Between 1817 and 1895 26% of the professors appointed in Prussia were not faculty nominees. On appointment, the new professor in Prussia took the civil servant's oath of allegiance and was subject to disciplinary measures if by ' misconduct in or out of office he becomes unworthy of the respect, consideration or confidence which his calling demands '.

In addition to these controls, the Prussian system provided for the appointment by the State of a curator (*Kurator*) for each university. He was charged with the duty ' to exercise, on behalf of the State, a general superintendence over the institution and to watch over its welfare and efficiency in every way '. In practice this official was the normal channel for transacting business between the university and the Ministry of Education.

*Internal Organization*

Subject to this state control, the modern German university before 1933 enjoyed considerable powers of self-government. Its academic head, the *Rektor*, was elected by the full professors from their own ranks, but his appointment had to be confirmed by the Minister of Education of the State. The senate was usually composed of the *Rektor* and his deputy (*Prorektor*), the deans of the faculties, the university judge (*Universitätsrichter*) and a number of professors elected by the whole professoriate. The senate exercised both executive and disciplinary powers.

The routine government of each university was carried out by the full professors (*Ordinarii*) in their respective faculties. Here each *Ordinarius* was, until 1923, an autocrat and it has been said that ' a German university thus resembled a loosely knit federation of petty princedoms '. Although, in 1923, the remainder of the teaching staff received some right to make their views heard on the administration of their departments the situation was not radically altered.

Apart from the full professor, the other teachers consisted of professors ' extraordinary ' (*Extraordinarii* or *ausserordentlichen Professoren*), usually specialists in a particular subject within the general field of the *Ordinarius*, and also of lecturers (*Privatdozenten*), who were not civil servants (until 1938) but received a licence to teach (*venia legendi*) from their faculty after submitting a thesis (*Habilitationschrift*) and undergoing an oral discussion upon it. The

*Privatdozent* was as a rule unsalaried and, though he received lecture-fees, he usually required private means upon which to live until he was promoted to a professorship.

*The Faculties and the University Course*

Most German universities retained the old division into four faculties—theology, law, medicine and philosophy—until recent times. With the development of modern studies the faculty of philosophy came to include not only mathematics and the ' arts ' subjects other than theology and law (e.g. modern languages, history, politics, economics), but all the scientific subjects as well. It was, thus, rather a collection of faculties than a single faculty. In a number of universities faculties of natural science had been instituted in recent times.

The would-be university student in Germany had to produce his *Abitur* (or *Hochschulreife*) certificate in order to be matriculated. He shook hands with the *Rektor*, and was given an identity card (*Erkennungskarte*) which protected him from summary arrest. He then paid his fees at the accountant's office (*Quästur*) and obtained a course book (*Kollegienbuch*), which had to be signed at the beginning and end of the semester by the teacher of each course with which the student wished to be credited. The student was not tied to any particular combination of subjects, but might browse at will and in the first part of his career did not scruple to cut lectures (*schwänzen*). He could use his privilege of mobility (*Freizügigkeit*) to transfer to another university. In fact, under the former regimes he had complete ' *Lernfreiheit* ' (freedom of study).

To graduate as doctor the student must put in a minimum of six semesters, i.e. three years. When he felt sufficiently mature he sought admission to a research class (*Seminar*) held in one of the departmental libraries or institutes. He might be required to pass a special test or pass through a *Proseminar*. In the *Seminar* members of the class prepared papers (*Arbeiten*) and had them discussed. After consultation with the professor of his chosen subject, the candidate for the doctorate (*Doktorand*) worked at his inaugural-dissertation or degree thesis. If it was accepted he was given a date (*Termin*) for the oral examination in which he could offer one main subject (*Hauptfach*) and two subsidiaries (*Nebenfächer*). Should he be successful he received a diploma showing the class obtained (*Prädikat*) on the basis of thesis and oral together, e.g. *rite*, *cum laude*, *magna cum laude* (*valde laudabilis*), *summa cum laude*.

He must then arrange for the printing of at least part of his thesis and provide a number of obligatory copies (*Pflichtexemplare*) for circulation.

*Organization of Students*

Since all German universities were non-residential, the students had to organize their own social life through clubs or fraternities (*Verbindungen*) formed for this purpose. Only a minority of students belonged to these fraternities, but they expressed so clearly and naïvely some of the native characteristics of German youth, and set the social tone for so many who could not afford to belong to them, that they have a real significance in German life. During the later Middle Ages, the cosmopolitan student body at the universities began to organize itself into nationalities (*nationes*) on the territorial principle. Owing to the lack of political unity in Germany the student fraternities (*Landsmannschaften*) organized themselves on the basis of their local loyalties down to the beginning of the nineteenth century, when a new style of aristocratic fraternity, the Corps (*Korps*), superseded them, first at Heidelberg (1810) and later at most of the other universities. Under the influence of the liberal ideas of the French revolution and of the war of liberation, a different and more middle-class type of organization, the *Burschenschaft* (Union of *Burschen**, i.e. students), appeared, first at Jena, and was soon developed into an inter-university society, the *Allgemeine Deutsche Burschenschaft* (General German Students' Union), which played a political role on the side of liberalism and nationalism (see p. 131) in the years of reaction after 1815. Its colours of black, red and gold were adopted by the liberal movement of 1848, and as those of the national flag by the Weimar Republic of 1918.

Even before, and still more definitely after, the foundation of the Empire, however, the *Burschenschaft* abandoned their liberal ideas and assimilated themselves to the aristocratic Corps. Henceforward both types of fraternity wore distinctive colours (*Couleurs*) including special *Mützen* (peaked) or *Stürmer* (peakless) caps, both engaged in drinking and duelling contests, and both were violently nationalist and usually anti-semitic.

It is the social ideal represented by these drinking and duelling evenings which is particularly significant. They were regulated

* The word *Bursche* (student) is derived from the Latin *bursa* (purse). *Bursa* was used to describe a house kept for students by a *Magister* in the Middle Ages and, later, in its German form, came to be applied to the students themselves.

by an elaborate code of conduct, known as the *Comment*; drinking of great quantities of beer was compulsory (*Trinkzwang*), both in the weekly *Kneipe* or the more ceremonial *Kommers*. But their most remarkable feature was the duel fought either with a light sword (*Schläger*) as a friendly contest or as a prescribed club rite (*Bestimmungsmensur*), or in the duels on questions of 'honour' with the heavier sabre (*Säbel*). These duels were fought with greater or less degrees of body protection, but it was the positive ambition of most Corps students to acquire that passport to the higher walks of German society, the scar on the face (*Schmiss*) acquired in one of these combats*. For to be '*satisfaktionsfähig*', i.e. of such social standing as to be regarded as a worthy opponent of another gentleman in the duel, was to be a gentleman oneself.

It is the uncritical respect for physical toughness and physical courage, combined with a primitive sadism that took pleasure in blood-letting and in pain and its infliction, which renders the German students' duelling practices, developed without foreign example or interference, a significant index of important national characteristics. That these practices should not only have survived until 1918, but after it, and should have been the hall-mark of the 'best' members of student society, is as revealing as the fact that the students of German universities never developed the good-tempered contests of wit, occasional eloquence, and earnest political advocacy to be found in the 'Union' debates of British universities. A further importance of these student societies was that their old members (*alte Herren*) were organized into societies, of which the *Kösener-Senioren-Convents-Verband* (K.S.C.V.) was the most important, and that these exercised a considerable influence as patrons of their younger successors, both by assisting them to secure appointments to administrative posts in the higher civil service and in business, and in their subsequent careers. This was the more important in securing the hold of the older conservative forces over the higher civil service, because the appointments were not made, as in England, strictly in accordance with the results of a competitive examination. After the State examination for the civil service had been held, a selective process took place from among the successful candidates. It was here, as well as in subsequent promotions in the service, that the influence of the *alte Herren* could make itself felt.

* A vivid account of one of these duelling evenings will be found in Jerome K. Jerome's *Three Men on the Bummel*.

It should not be supposed that the majority of German students belonged to the corps or the *Burschenschaft* but, though they embraced only a minority of students, this minority consisted of the most socially influential individuals and tended to set both the social and political tone for the rest. In 1900, the unorganized ' wild ' students, or ' finches ', created the *Freie Deutsche Studentenschaft* (Free German Students' Association), which pursued cultural and social aims in deliberate opposition to the rigid etiquette, compulsory beer-drinking, and duelling of the older *Verbindungen*. Its members tended to the left in politics and from its ranks came many of the leaders and members of the German Youth movement which, before 1914 and after 1918, demanded a thorough reform of the German university system as a whole.

*The Crisis in University Life under the Republic*

The defeat and collapse of the German Empire in 1918, and the years of tension and recurring crises which followed, accompanied by the inflation which reached its climax in 1923 during the Ruhr occupation (see pp. 252–5), brought to the surface the latent conflicts and inherent defects of German university life.

The proud boast of German scholars had been their *Lehrfreiheit* (freedom in teaching), which included the right to pursue scientific truth in a purely objective spirit and to present their results, uninfluenced by social or political considerations, to their students and to the world. The limits of that freedom had been shown not only by the number of instances in which the State had refused to appoint to professorial chairs any of the nominees suggested by the Faculties, but also by the very small number of Jews appointed as full professors ; further, the Prussian law of 1899 laid down that ' the deliberate promotion of Social Democratic aims is inconsistent with holding a position in a royal university ', despite the fact that the Social Democrat party was a legal body and, in 1903, secured nearly one-third of all votes cast at the general election.

Yet, despite such limitations on academic freedom, the German universities could justly claim, before 1933, to have produced a volume of research in every branch of knowledge which compared favourably with that of any other country in the world. Nor could the objectivity or the devotion to the pursuit of scientific truth of many of their scholars be called in question.

But there was an increasing lack of coherence in the mind of the teaching body itself upon the aims of university education and an

increasing sense, especially among the students, of a gulf between university studies and the needs of social life. Among the teachers the idealist philosophy had broken down and with it that unifying *Weltanschauung* (philosophy of life) which had held the nineteenth century university together. As a result, the university was dissolving into a bundle of uncorrelated specialist institutions (*Fachschulen*), and the lecture rooms transmitted much highly technical and specialized scientific instruction (*Wissenschaft*) but, too often, general education or culture (*Bildung*) was no longer transmitted at all. The method of obtaining a degree by presenting a thesis on a necessarily narrow topic of research encouraged this tendency to specialization and, except amongst those few students who were by nature scholars, increased the sense of a gulf existing between university studies and the actualities of everyday life. Even the separation of the State examinations* for the civil service and the professions from the university courses may have contributed to the same result, however desirable it was from the point of view of preserving the independence of university studies.

The absence of a predominantly residential system in colleges, or of any general tradition of personal intercourse between teachers and students, still less of any responsibility resting on the teacher to interest himself in the personal lives of his students, also contributed to the lack of cohesion in the universities, as did the practice of student migration. For, with large classes whose composition frequently changed, the professor would have found it difficult, even if he had desired, to know his students individually. But, in turn, this lack of corporate life increased the individual student's sense of isolation and the power of the *Verbindungen* and other student societies over their members. Dissatisfaction with this situation had already led to demands for reform before 1914 and after 1918 these demands were greatly intensified. Reasoning as Frenchmen did in 1870 and in 1940, many Germans in 1918 took defeat as evidence of something wrong in German education. The ex-servicemen, in particular, returned to the universities full of projects for reconstruction. They demanded that the isolated specialisms should be brought into relation with each other and with the needs of society; that the university students and non-professorial teachers should be given a voice in university affairs. In addition,

* The State examinations (*Staatsexamina*) for civil servants, lawyers, doctors, clergy and secondary school teachers were conducted on syllabuses determined by the State, though professors were associated with State officials in conducting the examinations.

the parties of the Left asked for easier access to the universities; for adult education on a bold scale; for greater emphasis on the social sciences; and for an academic policy which would stress education for citizenship rather than the training of researchers.

These demands, strongly resisted by conservative professors and conservative ministerial officials, were very imperfectly met by the Weimar governments. A number of minor reforms were indeed introduced. New faculties, for science, economics and the social sciences, were created in certain universities, and the status of the *Technische Hochschulen* was improved; some new avenues to the university were opened, and some financial help provided for students, though there was still no adequate educational ladder accessible to the children of manual workers. Representation on Senate and 'inner faculties' was accorded to non-professorial teachers, and students were given some powers of self-government through an official national organization, the *Deutsche Studentenschaft*. The rapid expansion of secondary education for girls led to a great increase in the number of women students; and for the first time a few women were appointed to university teaching posts. But the opportunity of a thorough reconstruction on democratic lines was not taken. The ideal of 'the career open to the talents' (*Freie Bahn dem Tüchtigen*), acclaimed in theory, was very incompletely realized in practice; the rigorous qualitative selection which is its corollary was not applied at all; and there was no systematic attempt to adapt the methods and machinery inherited from the nineteenth century to the new tasks imposed by the twentieth. The effect of this, as of other Weimar compromises, was to alienate the reformers—many of whom became either Communists or National-Socialists—without conciliating the Conservatives. Meanwhile, the university continued to be, in Max Scheler's words, 'a *Fachschule* (technical school) with a bad conscience'.

This failure was closely associated with another, whose eventual consequences were to be even more disastrous. No attempt was made to remove, or even to curb, those elements in the universities which were openly anti-democratic. Like the great landowners, the great industrialists, and the administrative officials, the personnel of the universities was virtually unaffected by the *revolution manquée* (save that vacant chairs were now open to Jews and, in principle at least, to socialists). As a result, disloyalty to the regime was in many places not only tolerated but encouraged; for example, the Heidelberg physicist Lenard could in 1922 fly the Kaiser's

colours above his institute unrebuked, while a socialist student who removed them was given a year's imprisonment; and a Marburg professor could store illegal arms for Hitler's S.A. to the knowledge, and with the silent connivance, of most of the university; and the leading professor of German at Berlin university from 1920 onwards could open each lecture with the words 'We who are ruled by Jews and Social Democrats'. This attitude was not universal: such things could hardly have passed in the new municipal universities of Köln, Hamburg and Frankfurt, where the democratic forces were powerful, or at Bonn with its tradition of liberal Catholicism. But they were common enough elsewhere, especially in East Prussia and in places (as at Marburg) where the university was closely allied with the nobility and industrial magnates. And as time went on the general body of students, whose loyalty could perhaps have been won in 1918–20 for a bold and imaginative democratic policy, became increasingly indifferent or unfriendly to the Republic.

At the same time, economic causes were creating conditions of hardship and discontent in the universities. The inflation of 1921–3 wiped out the private means on which most of the *Privatdozenten* depended, and ruined the families of many students, who could henceforth maintain themselves only by taking paid work concurrently with their studies. The slump of 1928–33 was accompanied in Germany (as on a smaller scale elsewhere) by a quite abnormal influx of new students who in better times would have sought openings in business. Most of these new students belonged to the lower middle class; an official social analysis for 1930 assigns over 60% of all German students to this class; 32% are described as 'upper class' (this includes children of professional and business men); less than 6% as 'lower class' (children of manual workers, shop assistants, etc.). This meant that most students brought to the university little in the way of cultural tradition; they demanded far more personal guidance than their predecessors, and received, owing to their numbers, far less—even from that minority of professors who were interested in other things than the training of researchers. Despite the provision of cheap meals and of other forms of economic help, a large proportion—one estimate makes it 40% of all students—were living in acute poverty, and very many were without prospect of future employment. To such students the traditional university could offer 'neither an interpretation of life nor a directive for action—and even no longer bread and prestige'

(Adolf Löwe). They constituted, as Dibelius saw at the time, ' a dangerous mass of inflammable revolutionary material, heaping itself up in the old homes of German culture '.

*Political Strife among Students*

During the republican period (1918–33) the discontents of the students took on an increasingly open political character. As early as 1919 a violently nationalist-racialist organization was founded—the *Hochschulring deutscher Art*—which incorporated most of the *Verbindungen* and struggled with rival political organizations, such as the Socialist *Studentenschaft*, or the union of republican students, for control of the official body, the *Deutsche Studentenschaft*. These *Astawahlen* (' Asta ' elections), for the members of the students' committees (*Allgemeiner Studentenausschuss*) in each university, reflected the struggle of the political parties for power in the State, and increased party bitterness amongst the young by the violence with which they were conducted, especially by the right-wing student bodies. As early as 1925 the moderate Liberal newspaper, *Frankfurter Zeitung*, reported that the annual meeting of the students' conference was dominated by the *Hochschulring*. Instead of cultural aims or academic problems, the discussions turned on such questions as the admission of students of ' alien race ' (i.e. Jews) to what was, after all, the official republican organization for all students, and bitter attacks were made on the Prussian Minister of Education, Becker. As later in national politics, the divisions between the various centre and left wing groups of students reduced their influence to insignificance.

In the following year (1926), though the Nazi Party was at a low ebb in the country, the National-Socialist *Studentenbund* was founded by Baldur von Schirach, who had been expelled from the Munich corps *Palatia* for refusing to give ' satisfaction ' in a duel of ' honour '. It spread with great rapidity, and by 1931 the results of the *Astawahlen*, available for only nine universities and five *Technische Hochschulen*, show the Nazis in command of an absolute majority of those taking part in the *Studentenschaft* elections at these fourteen institutions. They were far from being a majority of the student body as a whole, and in Berlin, in 1932, they were estimated as only 500 to 1,000 out of 12,500 students. But the political indifference or lack of responsibility or cowardice of the majority allowed this active minority, already openly using violence against Communist and Socialist fellow-students in Berlin, Munich

and Giessen, and organizing riots against Jewish, Socialist and pacifist teachers at Heidelberg and elsewhere, to obtain complete control of the representative organs of student opinion. In this situation, the constituted state authorities, as well as the university officials, showed lamentable weakness in failing to enforce order and discipline, and the professoriate as a whole failed to make any serious attempt to protect the *Lehrfreiheit*, so much prized in word in the past, of their colleagues. Two cases showed how little reliance could be placed on the readiness of German professors to defend the principle of *Lehrfreiheit* on behalf of unpopular colleagues. In 1930, Günther Dehn was elected by the theological faculty of Heidelberg to a full professorship (*Ordinarius*). A violent campaign was started by nationalist students accusing him of having called the soldiers of 1914–18 ' murderers ' and, although an enquiry by the Church authorities proved the falsity of the accusation, the faculty yielded to student pressure, and cancelled the appointment. One voice only was raised against this sacrifice of principle. Professor Martin Dibelius declared that he could not accept ' the opposition of student groups, who are ignorant and uncritical ', to override ' the right of a future colleague to express his views and convictions within the limits of good taste '. In the case of the pacifist Professor Gumbel, whose lectures were made the occasion of violent demonstrations of hostility by Nazi and Nationalist students, the principle of *Lehrfreiheit* was again sacrificed. It was the professor, not the students, who was suspended from his functions.

Already then, before the Nazi accession to power, the universities of Germany were in a state of violent crisis. The deeper underlying causes of that crisis largely correspond to those of German society as a whole, of which the Nazi party was the product and not the author. But the Nazis, aiming at total domination of the German folk (*Volk*) and state, lost no opportunity of intensifying the inherent tension of the situation, and of presenting themselves and their programme to the world of education, the ultimate source of political power, as the only possible solution of the dangers and difficulties which they had done their worst to bring to explosion point.

# THE NATIONAL-SOCIALIST EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

## Basic Principles

It has been seen (see p. 376) that the Nazi leaders regard education as the means by which to produce good National-Socialists, that Hitler himself has insisted that the process must last throughout the individual's life, and that the formal machinery of public education in the school or university is thought of as an adjunct to the all-embracing party machine of propaganda.

Many important consequences flowed from this view of education. In the first place, the discovery and presentation of objective truth ceased to be the primary end of the educational process. 'We are not objective', said Hans Schemm, founder of the *National-Sozialistischer Lehrerbund* (National-Socialist teachers' association) and Bavarian Minister of Education from 1933 to his death in 1935, 'we are Germans. For us everything is false which is not advantageous to the German people. For us everything which is harmful to the German people is a crime, even if multitudes come and tell us that, from an objective point of view, it is the truth'. This subordination of truth to national expediency has had disastrous results on German education from the primary school to the university.

Secondly, the ultimate aim of Hitler and the National-Socialist movement is the creation of a greater Germany by warlike means, and the educational system has been adapted to that purpose. Nazi education is consciously anti-intellectualist, consciously lays primary emphasis on training the body and character in *Wehrhaftigkeit* (preparedness for war) and is consciously utilitarian in its emphasis on vocational rather than on general education. 'What we wish from our German youth', said Hitler at the Nuremberg rally in 1935, 'is different from what past generations asked. In our eyes the German youth of the future must be slim and slender, swift as the greyhound, tough as leather and hard as Krupp steel'. Qualities of mind are secondary to this aim, and the character aimed at is the antithesis both of that desired by the Christian and by the rationalist. Toughness; hardness; freedom from pity or scruple in dealing with enemies; unqualified, 'blind' obedience to orders; unquestioning acceptance of the Nazi and rejection of every other philosophy of life—these are the qualities at which Nazi education aims.

To attain this end the principles of organization, adopted to realize them in the political sphere, had to be applied to the German educational system. The *Führerprinzip* (leadership principle), with its corollary of centralized control from the top downwards, had to be rigorously enforced on the whole decentralized machinery of German education. Like every other sphere of German life, education, too, must be externally '*gleichgeschaltet*' (co-ordinated) as the first step to changing its internal character and content.

## The Nazi Educational Organization

Five days after Hitler's accession to power on 30 January 1933 Bernard Rust, who had joined the Nazi party as early as 1922, was made Prussian Minister of Education. A year later, on 30 April 1934, the States having been 'co-ordinated' in the meanwhile (see pp. 335–7), a decree was issued placing all forms of education under the Reich and creating a Reich Ministry of Education, with Rust as Reich Minister. The Ministries of Education in the various States were not abolished* but, as in all other spheres, the State Ministers, and the subordinate local government bodies, retained very little independent power. All alike were subject to the control of the Reich Minister and became, in effect, his local agents. The Reich Education Ministry contains, in addition to the Minister's immediate secretariat: (1) a department for higher education and research (*Wissenschaft*), which controls the universities, technical colleges, and research institutions; (2) a department for education proper (*Erziehung*), dealing with schools of all kinds and also with the training of teachers; (3) a department for popular culture (*Volksbildung*), which supervises adult education, libraries and museums; (4) a department for physical training (*Körperliche Erziehung*); (5) a department for the Land Year (*Abteilung Landjahr*), which deals with the children who, having completed their course at the elementary school, are conscripted for this service.

Many of the other Nazi educational organizations do not fall under Rust's control. The Propaganda Ministry, the Hitler Youth, the Labour Front, the Labour Service, all have their independent organizations, whilst Rust shares the control of the *Napolas* (*Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten*, National Political Educational Institutes, see p. 416) with the S.S. and has no control over

* In Prussia, however, the Prussian Ministry of Education was merged in that of the Reich, with Rust as head of both.

the Adolf Hitler Schools (see p. 417.) In addition Alfred Rosenberg and Baldur von Schirach are in charge of the ideological training of the party and the youth respectively. But the control of the normal machinery of state education rests in Rust's hands. The changes which he has introduced affect both the method and the content of education.

*The Purge of Teachers and Pupils*

From the university to the elementary school the elimination of 'politically unreliable' teachers was one of Rust's first tasks. Jews were the first victims but the majority of those dismissed were not Jews by religion, though many were part-Jews or were married to Jews. In 1932, only $2\frac{1}{2}\%$ of university lecturers of all ranks were Jews, but between 1933–8 about one-third of all official posts in the universities changed hands. By 1936 it was estimated that 1,377 teachers in universities or technical institutions of university rank had been dismissed.

Little has been heard of Rust's purge of Marxist, Liberal, democratic and pacifist teachers in the schools, since few of the dismissed schoolmasters had the means to escape abroad. Though no exact statistics are available the purge was undoubtedly severe in the urban elementary schools. The nationalist outlook of the secondary schoolmasters (see p. 388) confined the changes in these schools mainly to Jews and to the few progressive schools started under the influence of the youth movement.

Amongst the pupils the effects of the purge were mainly felt by Jews. A decree of 1933 limited the number of 'non-Aryan' university students to 1·5% of the whole and is said to have resulted in the expulsion of 7,000 students. Since then Jews have been virtually excluded from the universities for they are forbidden to take medical and other professional examinations, they may not join the *Studentenschaft*, and since 1937 no full Jew may take a doctorate and part-Jews only with ministerial permission. In the schools Jewish children were first separated from the remainder, and since 1938 may only attend the special schools for Jews, where these still exist.

*The Führerprinzip*

Rust has applied the leadership principle throughout the educational system. On the side of governmental supervision, the powers of the provincial and district school boards are now concentrated in

the hands of the *Oberpräsident* and *Regierungspräsident* respectively. Appointments to teaching posts in elementary schools are made by the *Regierungspräsidenten*, whilst since 1935 those to secondary schools have been dealt with by Hitler's own secretariat, an indication of the importance attached to them.

In the internal government of educational institutions the same principle prevails. In April 1935 Rust issued ' guiding principles for the simplification of university administration '. The *Rektor* is no longer elected, but appointed by the Minister, the Senate is an advisory committee, appointed by the Minister after consultation with the *Rektor* ; the Dean of each faculty is its ' leader ', with the professors as his advisors. The *Rektor's* powers are to some extent limited by two party officials representing the body of lecturers (*Dozentenschaft*) and of the students (*Studentenschaft*), both of whom are appointed by the Minister after consultation with the *Gau* (see p. 354) leaders of the National-Socialist lecturers' association (*Dozentenbund*) and students' association (*Studentenbund*). These lecturers' and students' leaders are responsible for the ideological co-ordination of their colleagues.

Professors are still in principle nominated by their Faculty, though the Dean, as Faculty leader, often draws up the short list and the Ministry not only goes outside it more frequently than before 1933, but has now the power to transfer professors or lecturers to other universities at will.

Just as the self government of the universities has given place to party and state control, so the school teachers' councils and the elected committees of parents have either disappeared or been converted into nominated bodies. The headmaster, whether of a secondary or an elementary school, is once again a virtual autocrat and the disciplinary system of the schools has become more strict. Corporal punishment, abolished under the Republic, has been reintroduced.

*Co-ordination of Teachers' Organizations*

Under the Republic there were a number of voluntarily organized teachers' associations both for men and women, four for elementary school teachers (two of them Catholic) with a total membership of 239,000 and two for secondary teachers (one for men and one for women) with 33,000 members. These associations exercised considerable influence on educational policy and were consulted by the various state authorities.

Before the accession of the Nazis to power, the *National-Sozialistischer Lehrerbund* or N.S.L.B. (National-Socialist teachers' association) had been founded by Hans Schemm in 1929, with headquarters at Bayreuth. Since 1933 the *N.S. Lehrerbund* has become an omnibus organization for teachers of all grades from the universities to the elementary schools, though the *N.S. Dozentenbund*, the lecturers' association for university teachers, has retained its separate organization. The task of the N.S.L.B. has been to see that all German teachers are fully instructed in Nazi ideology and disseminate it in their teaching. The text-books for school use come within its purview and these have been drastically changed to give expression to the Nazi creed. The organization is also closely in touch with the High Command, which has a Commissar in every *Wehrkreis* (see p. 344) to ensure education in a warlike spirit (*wehrgeistige Erziehung*).

The N.S.L.B. conducts a Reich School outside Bayreuth at which educational conferences are held, as well as training courses for selected teachers. It also conducts training camps for teachers throughout the country. Since 1933 it has become practically, if not theoretically, necessary for every teacher to belong to it and in 1942 it claimed 360,000 members or 98% of the whole teaching profession.

The N.S. *Dozentenbund* (lecturers' association) occupies a special position as one of the inner formations (*Gliederungen*) of the party (see p. 351), but its members are automatically members of the N.S.L.B. The lecturers' association has to take a decisive part in selecting university teachers, to train all lecturers in Nazi ideology and to work in close collaboration with the National-Socialist) German Students' Association (*National-Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund*, or N.S.D.St.B.).

*Organization of Pupils*

Not only are the teachers of every grade organized by the Nazi party, but their pupils also are embraced and controlled by special organizations of their own.

In the universities the older Corps and the *Burschenschaft* sought at first to maintain their separate existence, but in 1935 the *Burschenschaft* liquidated itself and this was followed by the self-dissolution of the Corps, the last of which to dissolve was the Coburg *Landmannschaft* in June 1936. The Catholic student associations, protected by the Concordat, survived until 1938, when they were dissolved by

Himmler's orders. The National-Socialist Students' Association took over the funds and properties of its older rivals, and became indirectly the only official representative of the whole student body, despite the fact that as late as 1938 its leader complained that only 20% of the students belonged to the party organizations. Nevertheless, since 1934 the N.S.D.St.B. has been entrusted by Hitler with the task of leading the German students' body, and all the offices in the official student body, the *Deutsche Studentenschaft*, have been filled by its members. It is, in fact, ' solely responsible for the whole politico-ideological education of the German students '.

The task performed by the N.S.D.St.B. in the universities is carried out in the schools for boys by the Hitler Youth (*Hitler Jugend* or H.J.) and for girls by the Union of German Girls (*Bund Deutscher Mädel* or B.D.M.). Both these organizations recruit their members for their junior branches at ten and pass them on into the organizations proper at fourteen. Boys remain in the Hitler youth until eighteen, the girls in the B.D.M. until seventeen, when they may join a voluntary organization called *Glaube und Schönheit* (Faith and Beauty) until they are twenty-one.

After 1933 all other youth organizations, except the Catholic ones protected by the Concordat, were rapidly suppressed or ' co-ordinated ', and even the Catholic organizations were dissolved in 1938.

The Hitler Youth is an elaborate and powerful organization with a head office, the *Reichsjugendführung* (Reich youth leadership, commonly known as R.J.F.), which has become virtually a Ministry and controls the training and appointment of the three grades of youth leaders—higher, middle and lower. The lower leaders are provided with week-end courses ; the middle leaders with more elaborate instruction in regional and national leader schools, and may be selected for the academy for youth leadership, which opens to them the career of a higher leader. The higher leaders are paid good salaries and all leaders may claim expenses on a generous scale, but at thirty-five the leader must pass on to other forms of party or national service. By 1939 membership of the H.J. embraced some seven out of twelve million German boys. They were given uniforms and elementary military training—route marches, grenade throwing, organized fighting. Wednesday and Saturday afternoons and most Sundays were thus employed and, in addition, there were holiday camps and frequent propaganda lectures. As war approached the military character of the H.J. became more marked.

In 1939 over a million boys were learning to shoot and smaller groups were receiving instruction in gliding, flying, or were being prepared in the motor H.J. and the marine H.J. for entry into the mechanized units and the navy. ' We have put the whole youth of Germany into uniform ', said Baldur von Schirach a week before war began, ' because we have found in the past what it leads to if you leave the young people to themselves. . . . Henceforth every generation of the German people shall be armed, from the cubs upwards '.

*Nazi Party Influence in Education*

It is only when this thoroughgoing organization of both teachers and taught is appreciated that the Nazi changes in educational curricula and methods can be seen in their proper perspective. From the university to the elementary school, the penetrating influence of the party organizations seeks to dominate the daily life and thought of professors, teachers and pupils alike. Not only are the leaders of the *Dozentenbund* and *Studentenschaft* given important direct powers in university government in association with the *Rektor*, but every professor or lecturer and every student is aware that his words and actions are under party supervision. Equally, in the elementary schools, not only does the H.J. control most of the out-of-school activities of the pupils but the local H.J. leader is represented on the nominated school committees of the local government bodies and on the school communities (*Schulgemeinden*) which have replaced the republican parents' council. And in all schools, secondary and elementary alike, the Nazi teachers' association can exert a decisive influence on the career of every teacher.

*Changes in School and University Curricula*

The spirit of the Nazi educational system can be most directly studied in the ' directives ' issued by Rust for the elementary and secondary schools, in the pronouncements of university *Rektors* and professors, and in the changes in the curricula both of schools and universities carried out under the regime. For the elementary schools, Rust set the aim of producing ' physically and intellectually strong German men and women . . . prepared to sacrifice themselves for the leader and the people ', and insisted that ' the elementary school has not the task of imparting a vast body of knowledge for the personal use of the individual '. Throughout, in fact, the pupil is regarded as a means to the service of party and State. Hence the ordinary subjects studied, which were left

formally unaltered, were given a new content. In German literature ' poetry of the first world war and the martial poetry of the Nazi movement deserve special consideration '. History is to fill the child with ' admiration of our great past and belief in the historic mission of our people '. It is almost wholly confined to German history and lays special emphasis on Hitler's career, and on the Nazi interpretation of the war of 1914–18 and of the Versailles treaty. In geography Germany is again the centre of study, attention being given to ' alien countries and spaces only in so far as they are of importance for our people '. Geographical teaching is to insist on the ' interconnection of people and space ', i.e. the *Lebensraum* theories, ' blood and soil ', and the special achievements of the Nordic race. Even mathematics is to be brought into connection with ' national-political ' ends.

In the directives for secondary schools these principles are given more detailed expression. German literature is to be studied under the headings of (1) the people as a community of blood; (2) the people as a community of fate and battle; (3) the people as a working community; and (4) the people as an ideological community. In the history syllabus no foreign history is mentioned and the higher classes are to study recent history (since 1871) with increasing intensity. The nature of the historical view to be impressed on the pupils is shown by the headings for teaching the collapse of 1918—' Moral disintegration of large sections of the home front; war profiteers; the black market; the part played by Marxism, political Catholicism, freemasonry, Jewry, pacifism '. The course ends with ' the tearing up of the Versailles dictate (*Diktat*), Germany's liberation and the pacification of Europe '. It is a faithful reproduction of Hitler's usual survey of recent German history in his speeches.

Like literature and history, the geography taught in the secondary schools is to serve ' national-political ' ends, ' to educate the youth . . . to be whole Germans and whole Nazis '. It is dominated by racial and *Lebensraum* theories, and special emphasis is laid, in dealing with Africa, on German colonization there. So, too, biology is to show the pupil ' the multiplicity of all forms of life ' and therefore ' the biological nonsense of the theory of equality '. The directives for biology are very detailed and set out in full the manner in which racial theory is to be taught, culminating in the racial regeneration, which is provided by the Nazi *Weltanschauung* and by the racial laws passed at Nuremberg in 1935 (see p. 451).

For girls the directives concentrate on their function in the family, as the cell of nation and state, and detailed instructions on the teaching of domestic science, including cooking, and on hygiene, including the care of babies, are provided.

In the higher range of university education directives from Rust cannot be called in evidence. It is rather the *obiter dicta* of Rust himself and of the leaders of the universities, and the changes in the university curricula, which show how the university, like the schools, was turned from the pursuit of objective truth into a machine for making good Nazis. ' The new science ', said Rust at Heidelberg in 1936, ' emphatically denies that its honour lies in the eternal nature of its search for truth '. The aim of the university, said Professor Kruger, Rector of Berlin University in 1933, is to ' eliminate the dregs of a past liberal age ' or, as the Rector of Kiel university said in 1937, to ' set its face against western liberalism, individualism and rationalism '. Perhaps the most drastic utterance of all is that of Professor Kahrstedt of Göttingen, in 1934 — ' We repudiate international science. We repudiate the international republic of learning. We repudiate research for its own sake. We teach and learn the abstract sciences, not to discover abstract laws, but to sharpen the wits of the German people in competition with other peoples '.

The Nazi spirit in university education is also shown by the decree of January 1935 which prescribed that all students, in their first two semesters, should acquaint themselves with the ' racial foundation of all science ' by attending courses on ' racial and tribal (*Stamm*) anthropology, pre-history and the development of the German people, especially in the last hundred years '. New professorships have been created in the field of racial science and pre-history, and a new science—*Wehrwissenschaft* (military science)—was devised, with which almost every other study could be connected. Berlin university was provided with a full professor for ' general military theory ' (*allgemeine Wehrlehre*) and another for military history, one lecturer for *Wehrpolitik* and *Wehrgeographie*, a professor of military psycho-pathology and lecturers on defence, army and air policy abroad. A complete faculty of military technics was also created at the *Technische Hochschule*. In addition, the teaching of geo-politics has been greatly extended.

This emphasis on racial and military studies has been further secured by including them as subjects in the State professional examinations (see p. 400), and the old *Lernfreiheit* of the students

has been much curtailed by the insistence, on the part of the Ministry of Education, on prescribed courses of study being adhered to by all candidates for these examinations.

Throughout the educational system, therefore, the Nazis have provided for the inculcation of their fundamental ideas of race and racial struggle. Only their view of the past is presented, and the emphasis of the whole educational process is upon the preparation of the individual for service, probably in war, to his nation and state.

## Nazi Changes in Types of Schools

Although the most radical changes in the different types of school have been made since war began and will be mentioned later (see p. 495) some important changes had been made before 1939.

### *Elementary Education*

The Nazis left the structure of these schools unaltered, but they have increased the instruction in physical training at the expense of other subjects, and they have profoundly altered the character of the schools by converting them from confessional (*Bekenntnis-*) schools into undenominational (*Gemeinschaftsschulen*) throughout the country (see p. 60). The type of religion taught by Nazi teachers is, for the most part, a German religion wholly unsatisfactory either to Catholics or Protestants. In addition school prayers were abolished in elementary schools in 1939.

### *Post-primary Education*

The middle schools were encouraged by Rust, on account of their vocational character, but the *Fortbildungsschulen* were abolished and the period of compulsory part-time attendance at classes by ex-elementary scholars was, in 1938, reduced to ' three years in general, two years for agricultural vocations '. After leaving the elementary school the German child received, therefore, since 1938, no further general education, but was given a shortened vocational training either at a trade or an agricultural school. But Rust has made a serious effort to make this part-time vocational education more universal and to enforce attendance more strictly.

### *Secondary Education*

Here Rust made more fundamental changes. By a decree of March 1937 the secondary schools were limited to three types—the *Oberschule*, reorganized internally so as to offer variations in the

curriculum and thus retain the characteristics of both the *Oberrealschule* and the *Realgymnasium* in one building ; the *Aufbauschule* in its existing form ; and the *Gymnasium*, reduced from its old primacy to being merely a permitted special type (*Sonderform*) in areas already provided with an *Oberschule*. As a result the number of *Gymnasien* was reduced from 418 to 168 between 1935 and 1940.

At the same time Rust made a further very important change by shortening the secondary school course from nine years to eight, and by bringing the *Aufbauschule* into line by preserving its six years' course but providing that its scholars should enter at twelve instead of thirteen. The reason for this step was, no doubt, primarily to provide for the periods of labour and military service to which the young German, under the Nazi system, was liable.

The same decree also provided that admission to a secondary school was to depend upon the results of an examination, written, oral and physical, and on reports on mental progress and character. Children whose conduct was such as to ' harm the national community ' could be expelled from a secondary school.

## Teachers' Training, 1933–39

So far as the training of elementary teachers was concerned Rust made no outward change of importance before 1939. The republican teachers' academies were renamed teachers' training colleges (*Hochschulen für Lehrerbildung*) ; a number of those situated in the great towns were closed and twelve new ones founded in rural districts ; and the character of the instruction given was brought into line with Nazi ideas. Sport, largely of a military character, and training in Nazi political ideas were given a prominent place.

The system of training secondary teachers was also left intact in the main. But it was shortened by requiring three instead of four years at a university, and only one year instead of two at a training college. Taken in conjunction with the shortening by one year of the secondary school course, the total period of education—at *Grundschule*, secondary school, university and training college—was thus reduced from nineteen under the Republic to sixteen under the Nazi system. But the three years thus ' saved ' were pre-empted for other purposes, since the candidates had usually to complete six months Labour Service, six months at a special candidates' camp (*Referendarlager*) for intensive political instruction, and two years' military service.

## Party Educational Institutions

In addition to the ' educational ' work of the N.S.D.St.B. and of the H.J. in the political field, the Nazis have created special educational institutions of their own on the secondary level. These are the national-political educational institutes (*Nationalpolitische Erziehungsanstalten*) usually known as *Napolas*, and the Adolf Hitler schools. In addition the Langemarck scholarship system (*Langemarck-Studium*), with schools of its own, prepares specially selected students for the universities.

### *Napolas*

The Republic had endeavoured, without much success, to convert the old cadet schools into model boarding schools. In 1933 the Nazis took them over, appointed reliable Nazi staffs, and reopened them as special schools for training a political élite for the service of the party and the state. Other schools have since been added, including (in 1935) the old *Fürstenschule* of Pforta and, by 1940, twenty-three *Napolas* in all, of which two were for women, had been opened. They contained 4,933 pupils (150 girls) and 586 teachers (twenty women). The schools are formally under Rust as Minister of Education, but their Inspector-General, Heissmeyer, and his deputy, Calliebe, are both high S.S. officials and the connection of the schools with the S.S. (see p. 348) is very close. Some of the headmasters and members of the staffs are S.S. officers and men, the latter often chosen from the S.S. houses (*Mannschaftshaüser*) at the universities or from the S.S. Reich Academy or from the Reich Academy for physical training.

Choice of the pupils is made, in the first instance, by local school inspectors advised by the Hitler Youth Leader. They must be of Aryan descent for three generations and, after a first test, are sent to a selection camp for a week or ten days where ' they have to prove their gifts, their courage and their powers of decision '. Even after this, a further rigorous test, including war games and a searching enquiry into their ' abilities and inclinations of body, spirit and character ' is carried out at one of the *Napolas* by S.S. officials before they are finally accepted. The *Napolas* are boarding schools giving a full eight years' course to those admitted at ten. Contributions are expected towards expenses from parents according to their capacity to pay, but there are free places for those who cannot afford fees. The life of the schools is organized on strictly military lines. The pupils all wear uniforms ; each form is called a platoon (*Zug*)

and has its platoon leader (*Zugführer*). Sport, mainly military sport (*Wehrsport*), plays a prominent part in the curriculum and, on the intellectual side, great emphasis is laid on racial and political instruction. The watchword of these schools is 'order and discipline' and the slogan for the boys is 'Believe, obey, fight'. Those boys and girls who cannot stand the strain of the training are expelled.

The choice of profession made by this specially trained élite is of interest. In 1940, of the 614 students who passed out, 379 chose the career of an officer, 130 (including six girls) chose to go to a university, and the remaining 105 chose to become leaders in the S.S. or other party organizations.

*Adolf Hitler Schools*

A still more selective set of schools for the party élite are the Adolf Hitler schools, which date from a decree of Hitler's, in July 1937, authorizing Baldur von Schirach and Ley, leader of the Labour Front, to organize them. They are administered and financed entirely by the party under a special office in the central party organization.

More definitely even than the *Napolas*, these schools were designed to produce the future leaders of the party and the nation. The process of selection, carried out by H.J. and other party officials, is even more rigorous than for the Napolas. The candidate must have an unimpeachable family tree going back to 1800, the family (as well as the candidate's) health history must be good, and the parents must have been active participants in 'the racial community', i.e. in the party or its formations. In the process of selection physical courage plays a large part. Candidates have to jump without hesitation into water from a height of 15 ft., to balance on a bar 20–25 ft. from the ground, and then dive into a sheet, and to suffer in silence slight injuries deliberately inflicted.

The schools charge no fees and even provide pocket money for the boys, who enter them at twelve and, until the war, had a six-year course on the lines of a secondary school, with Latin and English as the main foreign languages. The rest of the curriculum followed closely that of the *Napolas*. The teachers are chosen by the party and, by virtue of their office, become party officials and members of the staff of the Reich Youth Leader.

The special feature of these schools is that their finished products were intended to be given, after an interval of seven years, a further opportunity of training for political leadership at the three Knights'

Castles (*Ordensburgen*) at Krössinsee (Pomerania), Vogelsang (in the Eifel) and Sonthofen (in the Bavarian Alps). From eighteen to twenty-five they would do their labour and military service and then fend for themselves at a university, or in a profession or trade. Marriage during these years was to be a recommendation in the eyes of the selectors for the last and highest stage of training as a Nazi political leader. Those chosen were to spend three further years, one at each of the castles, with intervals of three months in each year during which the Junker, as these students were to be called, would be given some practical experience of administration. As in the schools themselves the training was to be largely physical, with racial theory, geo-politics, recent history and social subjects as the intellectual exercise. The war prevented this scheme being put into effect.

The schools, however, continue and it is of interest to notice the careers chosen by the first batch of 230 pupils to complete the course (1942): 67% chose political leadership as their career, 11% the armed forces, 7% technical or scientific professions, 4·6% teaching, and only 1·68% the liberal professions. Of the parents of these boys some 20% were artisans, 20% employees, 15% in the liberal professions, 13% officials of intermediate grade, the remainder being described as industrial workers (7%), peasants (3·9%) and party officials (3·5%).

It is perhaps worth recording that Heissmeyer described the *Napolas* as combining the best features of ancient Spartan education, the Jesuit college, the English public school and the old Prussian cadet school. And the *Völkische Beobachter* of 17 May 1941 wrote of the Adolf Hitler schools that 'the evil spirit (*Missgeist*) that educated the British plutocrats at Eton, Harrow, Oxford and Cambridge, stands against the free spirit of a new world which is at home at Sonthofen'.

*The Langemarck-Studium*

The scholarship system under this name was started in 1934 in memory of a regiment of untrained student volunteers, who were practically wiped out in November 1914 at Langemarck in Belgium during the German high command's effort to break through to the Channel ports. It was intended to give an opportunity of a university career to gifted young Germans who, for financial or other reasons, had been unable to obtain the necessary qualifications for entry to a university. Candidates were carefully chosen by state

and party officials, and sent to a selection camp for five days, where their characters, physique, political orthodoxy and possible future careers were considered. If successful, they were sent to a Langemarck school for eighteen months, to make good deficiencies in their past education before proceeding to a university or technical high school. In 1939 there were some 500 Langemarck students, most of whom chose technical careers; 36% of the successful candidates came from working-class families, so that the scholarships did something, though a very little in comparison with the whole problem, to open a path for clever boys of humble birth to a university education.

## Effects of the Nazi Educational System

Even before the outbreak of war in 1939 the results of the Nazi centralization and 'co-ordination' of the educational system had begun to show themselves, particularly in the universities. In 1933 the Nazis had found the universities overcrowded, and had fixed the maximum number of admissions for 1934 at 15,000, about 75% of that of the previous year. But by 1939 a positive shortage of students had been reached, the total number of students being less than half that of 1931–2, as shown in the following table:

| | Winter 1931–2 | | Summer 1937 | | Summer 1939 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Total | Women | Total | Women | Total | Women |
| Universities .. | 95,807 | 17,413 | 48,558 | 7,832 | 39,236 | n.s.s. |
| Technical colleges | 23,749 | 828 | 10,928 | 325 | 10,307 | n.s.s. |
| | 118,556 | 118,241 | 59,486 | 8,157 | 49,543 | 8,750 approx. |

Source: Compiled from *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* (Berlin, 1932–38) and from *Tatsachen und Zahlen über Deutschland* (Berlin, 1941).

This great reduction in numbers may to some degree be accounted for by the fact that, of those who successfully pass the *Abitur*, only those whose racial descent, physical fitness and record of service in the H.J. are satisfactory are admitted as students. On the other hand, the numerical restriction on entry to the universities was given up, and since September 1938 the intellectual conditions of entry have been made easier for certain classes of candidates.

Probably the main causes of the decline in the number of university students, apart from the exclusion of 'non-Aryans', have been the greatly increased number of openings, in the armed forces and in business, since the rearmament programme began; the large number of jobs available in party administration; and the increasingly marked reluctance of young Germans to enter the professions, and particularly the teaching profession. How far this last phenomenon is due to the changes introduced by the Nazis themselves it is impossible to say. But there can be little doubt that the anti-intellectualism of the whole system has tended to bring the learned professions into contempt, whilst the conditions of study in the universities are both intellectually and socially less attractive than they were before 1933.

The undergraduate has lost much of his *Lernfreiheit*, because his courses are prescribed for him and, for the minority of students with critical minds capable of doing research, the intellectual conditions in the universities, and the complete abolition of the old academic freedom (*Lehrfreiheit*) must be most unattractive. As early as 1936 complaints were being made of the lack of qualified university teachers. 'In many branches of learning', wrote Dr. Rudolph in an official publication, 'it is impossible today to find qualified assistants; indeed, in most of the technological subjects there is often not a single candidate for a vacancy'. A remarkable article in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* of 3 March 1939 said that university men could no longer hope to occupy leading positions in the state by virtue of their culture. The universities, it would seem, have been finally converted into nothing but training schools for technicians, and both the ambitious and the idealists have in consequence deserted them.

The shortage of university teachers has its parallel in shortages of both secondary and elementary teachers. In 1933 there were some 4,000 recently qualified secondary teachers in Prussia; in 1936 the figure had dropped to 2,210; in 1938 to 1,100, since when the figure has continued to fall. A similar shortage had also developed by 1938 in the elementary schools, and has become extremely acute since war began (see p. 495).

There can be little doubt, too, that the influence of the Nazi system has brought a general lowering of intellectual standards in the schools. The shortened period of study in the secondary schools must in any case have caused this result. But the greatly increased emphasis on physical training, and the claims of the

H.J. on the time and energy of both secondary and elementary scholars, have also contributed to this result.

One of the most characteristic and important features of the Nazi educational system has been the hostility which it displayed to the education of women. The old German ideal of the woman's sphere, ' Kinder, Kirche, und Küche ' (children, church, kitchen) has reasserted itself—with the omission of the middle term. Both in elementary and in secondary schools, training for home duties and for nursing have been emphasized at the expense of general culture and, both in and out of school, the duty of child-bearing has been constantly insisted upon. It is, however, equally characteristic of the Nazi readiness to sacrifice principle to expediency that, after the too dramatic fall in the number of women students at the universities (see p. 391), the shortage in man-power for the professions has led to a reversal of earlier policy, and to the encouragement of women to pursue professional studies at the universities.

Most fundamental of all causes of educational decline, however, is the rigid imposition of an exclusive and scientifically unsound philosophy of life in the interests of preparedness for war. On the one hand, true education can only flourish in an atmosphere of freedom of thought. On the other, the preoccupation of the Nazis with preparation for war has given in a broad sense a vocational bias to their whole system. Sport is pursued not to attain the *mens sana in corpore sano*, still less for its own sake, but as a toughening preparation for battle. History, geography, racial theory are taught to increase national pride, and to strengthen the individual's morale for combat. The sciences are to be pursued as branches of *Wehrwissenschaft*, the science of warlike defence, which passes easily enough into the science of attack—after all the best form of defence. In such a system, from which criticism and discussion are either banished or limited to technical ends, the higher powers of the human mind can neither be aroused nor satisfied.

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# Chapter VIII

# PUBLIC HEALTH

Introduction : Health Administration Before 1933 : Health Administration Since 1933 : Public Health Problems : Medical Personnel and Hospitals : Medical Research : Welfare (*Fürsorge*) : Health Insurance and Poor Relief : Sport and Physical Training : Eugenics : Vital Statistics : Post-war Problems of Public Health : Bibliographical Note.

## Introduction

Under the constitution of the German Empire (1871), public health, like other important subjects of legislation, was left, in the main, to the individual States (see p. 315). The Reich's health legislation was concerned with principles of general interest, such as the control of major epidemics, workers' insurance and food laws. The States, through their own administrative services, gave effect both to the Reich laws and to their own. The period of the Empire was marked by considerable advances in preventive medicine, bacteriological science, and general principles of health administration. Notable features were the discoveries of the bacterial agents of the major epidemic diseases by Koch and his disciples, their practical application to the control of these diseases by Kirchner, vaccine prophylaxis by Pfeiffer, antitoxic sera by Behring, and the origin of chemotherapy by Ehrlich. By the time the Weimar Republic began, the control of infectious diseases and sanitation were well in hand. But the aftermath of the war of 1914–18 and the inflation provided new, very serious problems ; these included shortage of housing, care of the millions of war victims and of widows and orphans, increase of tuberculosis and venereal diseases, impoverishment of the middle classes, bankruptcy of most charitable organizations and steadily growing unemployment. To the solution of these problems of social hygiene, i.e. welfare of the individual, the governments of the Reich and the States, at first predominantly socialist, applied themselves wholeheartedly. Social hygiene was taught in the universities and practised by every administrative unit. Existing welfare organizations were subsidized, and new ones established, by the governments and municipalities. In the newly formed Prussian Ministry of Public Welfare the enlightened chief of the medical department, Gottstein, was the leading spirit of this development. The general principles of legislation and administration conformed to those of the Empire. The out-

standing feature of Reich legislation in the Weimar Republic is the law on juvenile welfare (1922), the keynote of which is its famous opening paragraph: 'Every German child has the right to be brought up to physical, mental and social fitness'.

The Third Reich started with a totally different ideology. 'We regard the nation as a biological organism which, being a higher unit, is not limited to being the sum of all the individual members of the nation, and is not an abstraction. In its totality it is a living entity, a body of such preponderance that compared with it the life of the individual is of no import' (Schnell). The Nazis coupled this conception with their fixed idea of the superiority of the Nordic race. Their ideal resembled that of the cattle breeder—to produce the maximum number of pure-bred stock of the highest standard of health and vigour. Every official, every member of a profession (with few exceptions), every person in the auxiliary health personnel, every sport instructor, etc., had to be of Nordic race. Welfare measures were for this race; for the 'inferior' (mainly the Jews) there remained at best some form of poor relief. Laws and decrees were passed by the central government alone.

## Health Administration Before 1933

### *The Central Reich Health Administration*

The constitution of 11 August 1919 gave the Reich legislative authority over the welfare of the population in general and of its various groups (e.g. mothers, infants, older children, adolescents, etc.), as well as over health, trading in foodstuffs, industry, mining, insurance, protection of public order and security, veterinary surgery, protection of plants against disease, etc. It was also empowered to make laws on the general lines of housing, municipal and agricultural settlements, etc. Conforming to these legislative powers the Reich supervised the execution of its laws by the individual States. These rights were exercised by the Chancellor and his Ministries.

The Reich Ministry of the Interior dealt with public health, sanitary police, the control of infectious diseases, trade in food and drugs, the training and examination of doctors, dental surgeons and pharmaceutical chemists, and matters connected with public welfare and poor relief.

Under its direct control was the Reich institute of health (*Reichsgesundheitsamt*), which advised the Ministry on all health matters,

compiled the official health statistics, and gave guidance in popular health instruction. It contained a great research institute which for a time was directed by Robert Koch. There was also an advisory council, the *Reichsgesundheitsrat*, consisting of about seventy-five representative scientists, physicians and technical experts; on request it also advised the authorities of the various States.

The Reich Ministry of Labour dealt with social insurance, industrial hygiene and the welfare of the workers and employees.

The health of the armed forces was under the separate control of the Ministries concerned.

Great powers were therefore vested in the Reich, but before 1933 it made tactful and sparing use of them, leaving much, perhaps most, of the detailed work to the legislation and administrative control of the individual States. Consequently, there has in the past been much diversity in the practical execution of health work. Similarly in research there was no central planning and much overlapping, as most of it was performed independently by various institutes of the Reich and the States. But these drawbacks were offset by the advantage implied in the strenuous competition of the individual States and their leading scientists and administrators to achieve the best results, each in his individual manner. When therefore the Nazi government abrogated the sovereignty of the States and centralized the administration, it made use of the work performed and the experience gained by the individual States during half a century.

*The Prussian State Health Administration*

The area of Prussia is 62%, its population 60% of that of the Reich. It has on the whole been foremost in public health administration. For these reasons its public health organization is described in detail. Before 1933 Prussia was divided into the city of Berlin and twelve provinces, each under an *Oberpräsident*. The provinces are subdivided into a varying number (mostly three) of *Regierungsbezirke* under a *Regierungspräsident*. The smallest administrative unit is the *Kreis*, corresponding to an English urban or rural district. The rural kreis is under a government official (*Landrat*), the urban kreis under a burgomaster. Each of the larger cities, corresponding to the English county boroughs (*kreisfreie Stadt*), forms an independent administrative unit under an *Oberbürgermeister*. Public health administration conforms to this scheme.

After 1919 there was a special Ministry of Public Welfare which

dealt with public health, sanitary police, housing, settlements and welfare. It was staffed with whole-time medical officers (*Ministerialräte*). The Ministry was advised by a State health council and controlled a number of research institutes (see p. 440) and *Medizinaluntersuchungsämter* for routine bacteriological tests.

The *Oberpräsident* of each province was advised by a board composed of physicians and lawyers. On his staff was a whole-time medical officer (*Ober-Regierungs- und Medizinalrat*). The *Regierungspräsident* had on his staff a whole-time medical officer (*Regierungs- und Medizinalrat*) and a chief factory inspector (*Gewerberat*). In the urban and rural districts and the cities the medical officer of health was immediately subordinate to the administrative head (burgomaster or *Landrat*). In communities of over 5,000 inhabitants health committees had to be formed. Their work was mainly advisory. All medical officers were State officials, paid by the government, and entitled to pensions on retirement. With few exceptions they were whole-time officials.

The medical officer of health (*Kreis-Medizinalrat*, formerly *Kreisarzt*) was the actual centre of all health activities in his district. He supervised all public health measures ; he was the local government's official expert on forensic medicine, medical officer to the police, and official referee. The work performed by these men was of a very high standard. From them were recruited the higher grade medical officers in the regional and central government.

The training of the medical officer of health consisted of three months' courses in bacteriology and hygiene, pathological anatomy and forensic medicine in a university institute, a three months' whole-time course in welfare at one of the three academies of social hygiene (now called *Staatsmedizinische Akademie*), six months' practical work and three months' work as house-physician in a mental hospital. The examination (written, practical and oral) embraced medical legislation and administration, hygiene and bacteriology, forensic psychiatry, forensic medicine and toxicology. Candidates could enter for the examination twice only. Successful candidates who had had five years' experience in general practice were appointed, first as assistant, then as full medical officers of health. In many rural districts welfare work was carried out under the medical officer of health by a communal officer, *Kreiskommunalarzt* ; many of these officers had also passed the examination. In more densely populated districts school and welfare work was entrusted to lower-grade medical officers (often

part-time) with specialist training, such as in tuberculosis, venereal diseases, midwifery, and pediatrics. It was considered desirable for such persons to have passed through the three months' course of an academy of social hygiene.

In marked contrast to this complex bureaucracy of highly trained medical officers was the relative paucity of 'non-commissioned officers'. For his field work the medical officer of health had to rely chiefly on the services of (mostly part-time) disinfectors, men or women, recruited from every walk of life. They passed through a fortnight's theoretical and practical course in a 'school for disinfectors', mostly attached to the hygienic institute of a university, which ended with an oral examination. The medical officer of health supervised their work, and periodically they were called up for three days' refresher courses. Besides performing disinfection at the bedside of infectious patients nursed in their homes and final disinfection at the end of the illness, they helped in collecting specimens for bacteriological examination. Only in a few progressive districts had the endeavour been made to appoint persons with better training to posts similar to the English sanitary inspector.

## Health Administration Since 1933

### *Central Administration*

Most of the public health administration in Germany is now controlled by the Reich Ministry of the Interior, which has absorbed the Prussian Ministry of the Interior. The Prussian Ministry of Public Welfare was abolished in 1933. The duties of the Reich Ministry of the Interior connected with public health are as follows: (1) Execution of the law on the simplification of public health (1934); (2) care for heredity and race, research on heredity, and population policy; (3) control of the curricula of doctors, dental and veterinary surgeons, pharmaceutical and foodstuff (analytical) chemists; (4) education, examination and post-graduate instruction of the nursing and laboratory personnel; (5) regulation of professional status of doctors, etc.; (6) medical officers of health; (7) welfare measures requiring central control; (8) school hygiene; care for (9) the tuberculous, (10) the sick, (11) cripples, (12) the blind, and deaf and dumb; (13) general hygiene; (14) control of infectious diseases (immediately subordinate to this section are the state institutes of hygiene and the state bacteriological laboratories (see p. 440)); (15) control of manufacture and sale of sera

and vaccines; (16) execution of the vaccination act, control of the state lymph laboratories; (17) execution of the laws on foodstuffs, etc.; (18) medicines; (19) hospitals; (20) public baths; (21) Red Cross; (22) mental disease; (23) disposal of the dead; (24) physical training; (25) popular health instruction; (26) medical research; (27) Reich office for family research.

Several scientific bodies are attached to the Ministry, viz. (*a*) the *Reichsgesundheitsamt* (Reich health office), whose director is also the head of the former Prussian research institutes (see p. 440); (*b*) an advisory council on population and racial policy (*Sachverständigenbeirat für Erb- und Rassenpolitik*).

A special body, linking up the health work of the government with that of the party, is the Reich council on public health (*Reichsausschuss für Volksgesundheitsdienst*) with committees for maternal and child welfare, care of cripples, control of alcoholism and drug addiction, nutrition, tuberculosis, venereal diseases, cancer, medicines, hospitals, professional hygiene, first aid.

Other Ministries concerned in public health are (1) the Reich (and Prussian) Ministry of Labour, controlling social insurance and industrial hygiene; (2) the Reich (and Prussian) Ministry of Science, Education and Popular Instruction, controlling the universities, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society for the Promotion of Science, and the training of doctors and social workers; and (3) the Reich Propaganda Ministry, with a department for public health and welfare. The Reich Ministries for War and for Air have independent control of the health of the fighting forces. The Air Ministry was also responsible for A.R.P., but lately this has been taken over by the police.

*Provincial Administration*

The public health administration in the provinces and in the *Regierungsbezirke* has undergone no material change since 1933, and is substantially the same as that described in the State of Prussia (see p. 425).

*District Administration*

In the past the medical officer of health was overwhelmed with the increasing amount and complexity of administrative and practical work, much of which he had to perform almost single-handed. The Nazi regime added to these problems those of race and heredity, but introduced new machinery by establishing for

every urban and rural district a health office (*Gesundheitsamt*) with branch offices in larger towns. In March 1943, there were reported to be 1,100 *Gesundheitsämter*, with 2,600 whole-time and 10,000 part-time medical officers. In most instances the health office is directly controlled by the State authorities, in some cases it is administered by the city in which it is situated. The personnel consists of the medical officer of health (now called *Amtsarzt*) as director, his deputy, assistant medical officers, secretarial staff, health visitors, technicians, sanitary inspectors, disinfectors, nurses and probationers. The duties of the office comprise, in addition to the entire health and welfare of the district, a department of heredity and race which establishes genealogical tables up to the grandparents and a card-index on hereditary biology. All the local welfare committees are under the chairmanship of the *Amtsarzt*.

*Health Administrative Machinery of the Nazi Party*

The work of public health administration by the central, regional and district authorities is supplemented and in great measure duplicated by the various Nazi party offices which had been developed long before the accession of the party to power. There is, therefore, considerable overlapping between the offices of the government and those of the party. Of late years some simplification has been achieved by making the head of each government department the chief of the corresponding party office.

The party's central office for public welfare (*Hauptamt für Volkswohlfahrt*) is directed by the *Reichsgesundheitsführer*. In 1943 this was Dr. Conti, chief of the health department in the Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Conti is also the leader of the German doctors, dental and veterinary surgeons (*Reichsärzteführer*) (see p. 437). Thecentral office has departments for public health, welfare (including assistance to children and young persons) and health propaganda. All private organizations dealing with the health and social welfare of the population are under the control of a central party organization (the *Nationalsozialistische Volkswohlfahrt* or N.S.V.). Both the N.S.V. and the winter help (*Winterhilfswerk*) are under the supervision of the *Hauptamt für Volkswohlfahrt*. This complicated arrangement holds good for the subordinate regional and local ramifications.

Another chief office of the party, the Labour Front (*Deutsche Arbeitsfront*), is 'the organization of creative Germans working

with head or hand'. Its leader is Dr. Ley. One of its departments deals with the health problems of the worker and provides for medical and dental treatment in factories and workshops. Under war conditions the factory doctor (*Betriebsarzt*) has very important duties to fulfil. The Strength through Joy movement (*Kraft durch Freude*) is also supervised by the Labour Front.

Health propaganda is organized by a branch of the Propaganda Ministry, which secures wide publicity through the press, radio, cinema, leaflets and posters. The Labour Front also conducts its own propaganda.

## Public Health Problems

### *Housing*

The prevalent type of dwelling-house in Germany has always been the three- to five-storeyed house with two or more flats per storey. Hence there is a high number of inhabitants per house (especially in the eastern parts of the country) with all the hygienic drawbacks resulting.

The war of 1914–18 left a shortage of about a million dwellings, much of which was made up by one-family houses built in the suburbs. Nevertheless, the dwelling-house with many storeys remains the characteristic of most German towns.

Reich legislation concerned itself mainly with post-war stabilization of rent and with a rent tax intended for the construction of new buildings. But in addition there has been extensive legislation by the individual States dealing with the housing problem. The Prussian housing law (1918) empowered local authorities to enact planning measures, provide open spaces, and erect small dwelling-houses and buildings of public utility; it directed all districts with more than 10,000 inhabitants to issue police ordinances concerning housing hygiene. The larger towns had to open offices for the allocation of dwellings and for the control of housing hygiene.

Good swimming-baths exist in a large number of towns. The German association for public baths (*Deutsche Gesellschaft für Volksbäder*) has done much for their establishment.

### *Food Control*

Food control is dealt with in the Reich by the Ministries of Agriculture and of the Interior. In 1879, a law on the traffic in food, beverages and articles of general utility was enacted with the object of protecting the public against dangerous or adulterated

articles. Most of the detailed control was left to the States whose Ministries of Agriculture have issued numerous orders. Each town has a municipal abattoir directed and staffed by qualified veterinary surgeons. The control of dairies is the duty of special officials appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture. The medical officer of health has the right to inspect all premises used in the preparation and sale of food. Animals slaughtered outside the abattoirs must be inspected by special officials. All home and imported pigs are compulsorily examined for trichinosis, in rural areas by specially trained inspectors (*Trichinenschauer*).

The abattoirs of the larger towns have well equipped laboratories for pathological and bacteriological examination of specimens of meat. For chemical examination of foodstuffs, etc., there is a central laboratory in Prussia, besides a large number of smaller regional and municipal laboratories. Many problems of forensic medicine and toxicology are dealt with there. An order of the Reich (1894) specified the conditions for the compulsory examination of analytical chemists employed in such laboratories (*Nahrungsmittelchemiker*).

*Control of Water Supply and Sewage Disposal*

The control of water supplies is laid down by the Reich law (1900) on dangerous epidemic diseases (see p. 432). Until the great water-borne cholera epidemic in Hamburg in 1892, public opinion even among doctors was hardly interested in these problems. At that time Hamburg was still supplied with the unfiltered water of the Elbe river into which the unpurified sewage of Hamburg and Altona was discharged. This disaster led to a thorough overhaul of all the German waterworks and to numerous orders by the Reich and the States. At present most or all waterworks are run by public authorities or water boards and are very satisfactory. Exceptions, however, still occur, as was shown by the severe typhoid epidemic in Hanover (1926), which was proved to be due to sewage contamination of the water supply.

Sewage and refuse disposal is centrally regulated to some extent by the law quoted above. Special laws for preventing pollution of rivers have been enacted by Württemberg (1901), Bavaria (1907), Saxony (1909), Baden and Prussia (1913). These laws are to guarantee the quality of sewage effluent discharged into the rivers. Excellent work has been done, as in the densely populated area of the river Emscher, a tributary of the Ruhr, by the Emscher water

board. The very difficult problem of disposing of the enormous quantity of domestic and industrial waste into the small river Emscher has been satisfactorily solved after much patient research. A Prussian research institute, the *Landesanstalt für Wasser-, Boden-, und Lufthygiene* in Berlin, advises the government and local authorities on problems of water supply and of sewage disposal.

*Notifiable Diseases*

The Reich law on dangerous infectious diseases (1900) orders the notification of every diagnosed or suspected case of, or death from, leprosy, cholera, typhus, yellow fever, plague, and smallpox; anthrax and a number of others have since been added. The sanitary police and medical officers of health are given the widest powers for combating the diseases, including separate isolation of suspects and contacts, disinfection, special control of waterworks, food establishments, etc., and the closing of insanitary premises and of schools. Every case must be notified immediately to the central authority.

For all other infectious diseases the States have made corresponding laws, e.g. Prussia in 1905; but some of the less common diseases are not notifiable in every State.

The number of cases of certain infectious diseases notified in Germany during three recent years are tabulated as follows:

| Disease | 1936 | 1937 | 1938 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Typhoid and paratyphoid fevers | 6,089 | 6,806 | 6,152 |
| Undulant fever .. .. .. | 15 | — | — |
| Scarlet fever .. .. .. | 124,570 | 117,544 | 114,219 |
| Diphtheria .. .. .. | 148,279 | 146,733 | 149,490 |
| Dysentery .. .. .. .. | 5,055 | 7,545 | 5,255 |
| Acute poliomyelitis .. .. | 2,241 | 2,723 | 5,747 |
| Cerebro-spinal meningitis .. | 1,355 | 1,574 | 1,822 |
| Encephalitis lethargica .. .. | 222 | 291 | 296 |
| Anthrax .. .. .. .. | 74 | 90 | 84 |
| Leprosy .. .. .. .. | 3 | — | — |
| Measles .. .. .. .. | 1,843 | * | * |
| Whooping-cough .. .. .. | 3,126 | * | * |
| Influenza .. .. .. .. | 19,433 | * | * |
| Trachoma .. .. .. .. | 566 | 697 | 535 |
| Puerperal fever : | | | |
| post-abortive infection .. .. | 3,894 | 3,015 | 2,843 |
| post-partum infection .. .. | 4,059 | 3,402 | 3,000 |

* No figures available.

Source: *League of Nations: Annual Epidemiological Report for the year* 1938 (Geneva, 1941), *passim.*

*Note.*—There were no cases of typhus, cholera, plague, smallpox or yellow fever in the years 1936–8.

*Smallpox.*—The Reich vaccination law (1874) orders compulsory vaccination of every child during the calendar year following its birth, and the revaccination of every schoolchild during the calendar year in which it completes its twelfth year. Any unsuccessful vaccination must be repeated in the following year and, if again unsuccessful, in the third year. Every recruit to the armed forces is revaccinated. Only a small number of children evade the law—in 1935, 3·4% at vaccination, 0·6% at revaccination. Smallpox, which caused a severe outbreak after the Franco-Prussian war (1870–1), has practically disappeared from the country. There was only a small outbreak with a low fatality rate after the war of 1914–18. No special hospitals for smallpox are therefore provided.

*Tuberculosis.*—In Prussia, but not in the Reich as a whole, every 'infective' case and every death from pulmonary or laryngeal tuberculosis is notifiable. The Medical Officer of Health works in close co-operation with the tuberculosis welfare organization.

*Venereal Disease*

Though venereal disease is not directly notifiable by law in Germany, under a comprehensive Reich law (1927) every person who knows, or has reason to suspect, that he or she is suffering from syphilis, gonorrhœa or soft chancre, must undergo treatment by a qualified medical practitioner. The responsibility for the treatment of minors rests on the parents. Arrangements must be made by the local authority for free treatment of needy patients. The local health authority may require 'persons suspect of being infected and of spreading the disease' to undergo medical examination. Patients suspected of spreading the disease can be forced to submit to treatment, if necessary in hospital. Persons who know, or have reason to believe, that they are infected, and cohabit or marry, are liable to three years' imprisonment. Only qualified doctors may treat these diseases. The doctor must explain to each patient the nature of the disease, its infectivity, and the above-mentioned penalty. He must notify every patient who interrupts treatment or 'specially endangers his environment by his profession or personal circumstances'. Close co-operation is required between the medical and the special welfare organizations (see p. 429). If a wet-nurse fails to produce a medical certificate of freedom from venereal disease on starting employment, both she and her employer are liable to punishment. No person suffering from venereal disease may suckle a strange child. A syphilitic

child may only be suckled by its mother. A child suffering from other forms of venereal disease may be suckled by a stranger only after the child's condition has been fully explained to her.

These regulations, especially rigorously enforced by the Nazis, helped to combat venereal diseases. At the end of 1940 a number of amendments and additions were made to the law of 1927. Any physician who sends an incorrect report to the health authorities in regard to a venereal disease patient may be imprisoned up to two years. All prostitutes in large cities have to submit to examination for cutaneous and venereal disease once a week, and the reports are sent to the health authorities. Further, concealment of syphilis in a married person has long been recognized as a valid reason for divorce.

*Port Health*

The health of dock-workers is safeguarded by provisions of the industries order (*Gewerbeordnung*) (see below), whilst the Reich law on dangerous infectious diseases (see p. 432) contains the necessary measures for preventing the introduction of such diseases into the country from ships, their passengers, crews and cargoes. Each port has at least one port medical officer (*Hafenarzt*) entrusted with the supervision and execution of the necessary measures. They are appointed by the States concerned—the Free and Hansa cities of Hamburg, Bremen and Lübeck, and, for the smaller harbours, by Prussia. Gangs of trained rat-catchers board every ship hailing from a plague-infected port and send the carcases to special plague laboratories for examination. Extermination of rats on ships is mostly carried out by Nocht's carbon monoxide method ; it is always done if the ship has had a case of plague or an infected rat on board, and often at the request of the owners as a preventive measure. Otherwise the quarantine regulations conform to international agreement. In Hamburg there is a large hospital connected with the institute of tropical diseases, which deals solely with cases of disease or accident connected with ships and harbour workers.

*Industrial Health*

The chief laws of the Reich dealing with industrial health are the law for the protection of industrial workers (*Reichsgewerbeordnung*, 1900) and the law on child labour (*Kinderschutzgesetz*, 1903). The problems of industrial health are dealt

with centrally by the Reich Ministry of Labour. The practical work of factory inspection before the Nazi regime was in the hands of the States who employed a large number of factory inspectors (*Gewerbeinspektoren*) and assistants (*Gewerbeassessoren*); they supervised measures for the prevention of accidents and saw that the factory worked in conformity with its licence; they investigated complaints of neighbours, instituted the necessary measures for lighting, and supervised the occupation of juvenile and female workers. They were subordinate to a chief factory inspector, *Regierungs-Gewerberat*, on the staff of the *Regierungspräsident*.

The machinery was complicated by the fact that the medical officer of health participated in factory inspection, especially where special dangers to the public were involved. Representatives of the accident insurance corporation (see p. 446) were also empowered to supervise the measures for accident prevention.

About 1930 Prussia and some other large States appointed a small number of medical specialists (*Gewerbe-Medizinalräte*) to act as consultants in health matters to the *Regierungs-Gewerberat* and to the factory inspectors.

In the Third Reich the welfare and health of all workers is under the control of the health section of the party's organization, the Labour Front. Special doctors for industrial establishments (*Betriebsärzte*) are appointed to deal with the health of the workers.

## Medical Personnel and Hospitals

The following figures show the numbers of persons engaged in medical work in 1938: 49,907 medical practitioners (3,520 women), 10,035 unqualified practitioners, 14,833 dental surgeons, 15,101 pharmaceutical chemists, 24,377 midwives, 101,879 qualified sisters and nurses, 30,409 unqualified nurses, 7,852 qualified infants' nurses, 1,478 monthly nurses, 938 instructors in physical training of patients (rehabilitation), 14,318 qualified and 6,414 unqualified dental technicians, 6,158 qualified and 5,274 unqualified masseurs, masseuses, etc., and 5,767 disinfectors.

### *Doctors*

Prior to the outbreak of war in 1939, the course of study for a degree in medicine at a German university lasted for five and a half years. Examination regulations are uniform for all universities. The final examination, a serious ordeal, is written, oral and practical,

and lasts about two months. For each part of the examination candidates may sit twice only. After the examination the candidate has to work as a probationer (*Medizinalpraktikant*) in an approved hospital (part of the time may be spent in a scientific medical institute).

A preliminary course of practical nursing in a hospital for six months before commencing studies has been introduced by the Nazis. Practical training after the final examination now consists of six weeks' service in a factory or on the land, and six months as a *Medizinalpraktikant*.

On receipt of a certificate of satisfactory progress which is hardly ever withheld, and without any further examination the qualification (*Approbation*) is granted. Most qualified practitioners subsequently obtain the degree of *Dr. med.* by handing in a thesis, and by passing an easy examination in three selected subjects. Foreigners may obtain the *Dr. med.* without the qualification examination on the ground of a thesis and after passing an examination in all subjects. There are no post-graduate or other examinations, excepting that for medical officers of health (see p. 426).

Chambers of doctors (*Ärztekammern*), chosen by all qualified practitioners of the region, represented the interests of the profession and supervised the conduct of its members ; they had disciplinary rights somewhat akin to those of the General Medical Council in Britain. In addition, the chamber granted the permission to use the designation of specialist (*Facharzt*) to doctors who had been engaged for about four years as resident medical officers in a hospital dealing with the particular group of diseases.

The difficulties between the panel doctors, who represent the majority of German practitioners, and the sickness insurance corporations are discussed on p. 445. They are comparable to those of the British panel doctor. Two great associations of panel doctors, the association of medical societies (*Ärztevereinsbund*) and the *Hartmannbund*, carried on the fight energetically for decades.

The Nazi regime has brought considerable changes conforming to its totalitarian outlook. The Reich order for doctors (1935) decreed that qualification must be withdrawn if the candidate (i) had been deprived of his civic rights (a provision of the penal code) ; (ii) had proved to be ethically unreliable, e.g. had committed severe penal or moral offences ; (iii) had by a professional court of honour been declared unworthy to practise medicine ; (iv) had lost the capacity to practise through infirmity or physical

or mental disability; and (v) if the candidate by reason of his or his wife's ancestry was unfitted to become a State official, and if at that time the proportion of non-Aryan doctors exceeded the proportion of non-Aryan individuals in the total population. In practice Jewish doctors have for several years been banned from treating Aryan patients. This has been modified owing to the very serious shortage of doctors during the war. Violation of professional secrecy is strictly punished, unless the secret is disclosed ' in fulfilment of a legal or moral duty, or for any other purpose justified by a healthy popular conviction (*gesundes Volksempfinden*) and if the threatened right is paramount '.

The association of medical societies and the *Hartmannbund* were dissolved and replaced by the German association of panel doctors under the direction of the leader of Reich doctors. All the old chambers of doctors were dissolved and replaced by a new hierarchy. It is headed by the leader of German doctors (*Reichsärzteführer*), appointed and dismissed by the Führer himself. He appoints and dismisses every member of his advisory council (*Reichsärztekammer*) and the leaders of all regional councils. The latter have similar rights with regard to their regional councils, the *Ärztekammern*.

Thus the *Reichsärzteführer* represents the peak of a pyramid of the entire hierarchy with the absolute right of appointing and discharging his immediate subordinates, and each of them has similar rights over his subordinates, until the base of the pyramid is reached. The head of the health department of the Ministry of the Interior, Dr. Conti, is at the same time head of the party's health office (*Reichsgesundheitsführer*) and *Reichsärzteführer* (see p. 429). The same central control applies to every other branch of medical and nursing work, non-qualified practitioners, dental and veterinary surgeons, pharmaceutical chemists, midwives, nurses, infants' nurses, laboratory and X-ray technicians. Nobody is admitted to any of these bodies who is not Aryan and, if married, has not an Aryan wife, is not politically reliable, ' of good repute ', and professionally qualified by passing through a strictly defined course of studies and a State examination.

Shortage of doctors, a serious problem for every nation in wartime, is very grave for Germany, owing to the ruthless weeding-out of Jewish and other 'politically unreliable' doctors in Germany and in the occupied countries, the conscription of doctors into the armed forces and the particular difficulties of health work in the vast

occupied territories. While in peace-time one doctor served about 2,000 persons, this figure in the eastern parts was estimated by a Nazi source during 1941 as one to 12–15,000. More recently (December 1943) an unofficial estimate of 20,000 patients to every doctor has been given.

*Unqualified Practitioners*

In the past, Germany was one of the two European countries which did not by law forbid quackery. Quacks have always flourished and a few of them have markedly contributed to medical progress, e.g. Priessnitz. The vast majority of them, of course, were nothing but charlatans trading on the credulity of a public ready to be deceived. In the early part of this century their number was estimated to be at least a quarter of that of the qualified doctors. The first step against them was taken by the Weimar Republic which forbade the treatment of venereal diseases by any unqualified person.

The attitude of the Nazis to this question is interesting. A law of 1939 requirès every unqualified practitioner (*Heilpraktiker*) to obtain a licence. This is only given to persons over twenty-five years of age, who have already been in practice for several years and do not simultaneously carry on any other profession or craft. They are under the immediate control of the *Reichsärzteführer*. New *Heilpraktiker* will not as a rule be licensed, but persons showing a special aptitude for medical treatment are admitted after due examination to a shortened course of medical training.

*Dental Surgeons*

Dental surgeons study for three years in the dental surgery department of a university, pass a qualifying examination similar to, but simpler than, that for doctors (*Approbierter Zahnarzt*) and may obtain the degree of doctor in dental surgery (*Dr.med.dent.*) on conditions similar to those for the *Dr. med.*

*Auxiliary Medical Personnel*

Midwives receive one and a half year's theoretical and practical training in one of the regional lying-in hospitals and must pass a state examination. They are called up for periodical refresher courses. Before 1933, nurses received their training (usually about four years) in schools run by various religious orders, by the Red Cross and by other lay organizations, after which they passed a state examination. A shortened course of instruction for nurses

specializing in the care of infants and young children (*Säuglingsschwester*) was given in a number of children's hospitals and in the Kaiserin Auguste Viktoria Haus in Charlottenburg.

The control of the nursing profession has been a particular care of the N.S.V. (see p. 429). The whole nursing personnel is now selected according to Nazi ideology and its training is directed specifically towards physical culture. It is expected to render valuable aid in extending the Nazi outlook. The nurses are to inculcate into the patients and their relatives the need for purity of race, fecundity of families, and healthy upbringing of the children. To this end, doctors, teachers, midwives, nurses, health visitors are to perform co-operative work in order to secure a strong and healthy race of pure Aryans. The intrinsic weakness of the system appears to be the totalitarian method of converting doctors and nurses into party agents. The system of selection favours the mediocre yes-men, the training stresses the body, not the mind, and tends to suppress individuality. The subordination of the profession to a single autocratic leader will tend to limit severely the development of any unusual talent and, as a result, the system is likely to lower the efficiency of health administration as a whole.

*Hospitals*

In Germany voluntary hospitals are comparatively few and unimportant. The larger hospitals are either controlled by the State, viz. all the university teaching hospitals, or by State or province, e.g. lying-in hospitals, mental hospitals, and the sanatoria and convalescent homes of the *Landesversicherungsanstalten* (see p. 446), or by the accident insurance corporations (rehabilitation hospitals), or by the municipalities. Infectious diseases are treated in separate blocks of the municipal hospitals.

In 1938, out of 4,792 hospitals there were 3,196 general hospitals (twenty-four with over 1,000, 543 with 151 to 1,000, and 1,043 with 51 to 150 beds); 187 sanatoria for tuberculous adults, 31 for tuberculous children, 154 hospitals for infants and children, 47 orthopædic, 102 ophthalmological, and 36 dermatological and V.D. hospitals.

## Medical Research

The medical faculty of each German university is provided with institutes for the various theoretical branches and hospitals for the different specialities. Each institute or hospital is directed by the professor holding that particular chair and staffed with assistants

chosen by him. Research is dominant in the institutes and plays a very important part in the hospitals; everywhere it overshadows the routine teaching work. The young graduate comes in touch with it when preparing his thesis. From the keenest of them the professor selects his assistants who, if successful, remain in that position for years and are expected to devote much of their time to research. The best of these, after submitting a further thesis, are admitted by the faculty as *Privatdozenten*, i.e. unpaid junior lecturers. From them are recruited the *Ausserordentliche Professoren* or lecturers who may advance to salaried posts.

When a professor is to be appointed to a chair, the faculty nominates three of the best men available and the ministry usually appoints one of them. In the choice of a professor scientific merit is the primary, teaching experience a subsidiary, consideration. The *Ordentlicher Professor* is a State official, receiving a salary, and entitled to a pension on superannuation; there are widow's and orphan's pensions for all these government posts. Professors are almost always called from other universities so as to secure fresh methods and prevent favouritism. Similar principles govern advancement in the large municipal hospitals where scientific work is encouraged.

The Reich and States have established several institutes devoted to research alone. Chief among them are the *Reichsgesundheitsamt* in Berlin (bacteriology and hygiene), the *Institut Robert Koch* (bacteriology—now prominent in typhus research) and the *Landesanstalt für Wasser-, Luft-, und Bodenhygiene* (hygiene) in Berlin, the *Staatliches Serotherapeutisches Institut* in Frankfurt-am-Main (founded for Paul Ehrlich, carrying out serological and chemotherapeutic work), the *Institut für Schiffs- und Tropenhygiene* in Hamburg (famous for its research on malaria and on other tropical diseases), and the *Institut für Krebsforschung* (cancer research) in Heidelberg. The *Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft* for promotion of science has established numerous specialized institutes in Berlin, some of which deal with medical subjects such as physiology and biochemistry (formerly under Warburg and Neuberg respectively).

In addition the large chemical firms like I.G. and Schering have established munificently equipped research laboratories which co-operate with some of the State institutes, as in chemotherapy. From the I.G. laboratories originated many of the best chemotherapeutic remedies for malaria and trypanosomiasis, and also prontosil, the first of the sulphonamides.

Since the advent of the Nazis the whole texture of scientific workers has profoundly changed. Many of the ablest scientists were dismissed because they were Jews or democrats or otherwise *personæ ingratæ*. Political favouritism is now in many cases the key to academic success. It is too early to prophesy the permanent influence of these changes on scientific life and work, but the first decade of the Nazi regime has undoubtedly been comparatively sterile.

## Welfare (*Fürsorge*)

As in most other countries, ' welfare ', as distinct from poor relief, has gradually evolved from voluntary organizations, religious or undenominational, ministering to the needs of certain groups of the population (mothers, infants and young children, the blind, the deaf and dumb, cripples, and epileptics), or to the control of certain diseases (tuberculosis, venereal diseases, alcoholism, and drug addiction). Part of their work was institutional, but most of it was conducted in welfare centres and through health visitors. The Weimar Republic considered welfare as one of its chief objects in public health activity, and Prussia united all health work in the newly formed Ministry of Public Welfare. The States and provinces and the larger towns gave substantial grants and were thus enabled to supervise and control the welfare work in their areas.

A Reich decree (1927) required the establishment of welfare boards—regional (*Landesfürsorgeämter*) by the States or provinces, and local (*Bezirksfürsorgeämter*) by the urban and rural districts. The former were responsible for institutional treatment of the insane, idiots, the epileptic, the deaf and dumb, the blind, cripples, and for the education of children endangered by bad homes. The local boards were entrusted with welfare and health work including poor relief. The *Jugendamt* formed an important part of the local organization.

As a general rule, the welfare organizations were supposed to carry out investigations, to give general advice and to perform follow-up care, but not to give treatment which was the domain of the family doctor. The personnel consisted of doctors with specialist training and of welfare nurses (health visitors). The latter did not receive a uniform training. For those engaged in child welfare, an order of the Prussian Welfare Ministry (1920) required candidates to have passed the State examination for general or infant nurses or that for kindergarten teachers, or to

have attended a two years' course in a women's social school, or to have worked successfully in welfare for three years. They then passed an examination in their special subject, worked for a year as probationer, and after completing their twenty-fifth year could be appointed welfare nurses.

*Maternity and Child Welfare*

Before the war, women were not allowed to work in industries favouring miscarriage or prematurity. The Reich law on the occupation of women before and after confinement (1927) provided for most groups of insured women and for every case of need the cost of a midwife, free medical treatment when required, a confinement grant, and sick pay for ten weeks, of which six must be immediately after the confinement. Nursing mothers receive an additional grant for the first twelve weeks. No working woman may be given notice by her employer during the six weeks before and after her confinement.

The famous Reich law on juvenile welfare (1922) guaranteed the right of every child to an education which would render it fit physically, mentally and socially. Education is the primary right and duty of the parents. Where this duty is not fulfilled, the state takes charge. To this end, youth boards (*Jugendämter*) were established in every urban and rural district. Their work was to be co-ordinated by regional boards (*Landesjugendämter*). These were to be controlled by a department of the Reich Ministry of the Interior (*Reichsjugendamt*), advised by the Reich council for juvenile welfare (*Reichsbeirat für Jugendwohlfahrt*). Owing to the inflation, which reached its height in 1923, not all these boards were constituted, but the local boards were established in practically every district.

The chief duties of the *Jugendamt* were the care of foster-children, co-operation with the public guardian, the juvenile courts, and institutions for endangered and delinquent children, and supervision of juvenile workers. They were to give to minors any aid required and, above all, to establish centres for the welfare of mothers (including ante-natal care) and all groups of minors. Their work was done in close collaboration with the local private welfare organizations.

School health work was the duty of the municipal or communal school doctors (many of them whole-time officers), assisted in larger communities by special school nurses.

*Other Branches of Welfare*

Special welfare centres, usually under the same roof as those for maternity and child welfare, were established for tuberculosis, venereal diseases, the blind, the deaf and dumb, alcoholics, and cripples. Most of them were run by old-established voluntary societies, such as the German central committee for the control of tuberculosis, the German association for the control of venereal diseases, various anti-alcohol societies, and the German association for cripple welfare. The last of these had a large rehabilitation and treatment hospital near Berlin, the *Oskar-Helene Heim*, which is said to have been closed by the Nazis.

A Prussian law (1920) required every urban and rural district to establish and maintain cripple welfare centres; every doctor, teacher, and every other welfare organization had to notify to the cripple welfare centre all cases showing early signs of crippledom.

*Changes in Welfare Organization under the Nazis*

Under the Weimar Republic, the state was mainly a benevolent helper of the various organizations whose activities it co-ordinated and where necessary aided financially. Their work was performed by committees or by boards of management representing the various bodies interested—clergymen, judges, doctors, teachers, representatives of the state and community, the nursing associations, and philanthropists. The Nazis naturally found it difficult to weed out from such committees all individuals not conforming to their political and racial ideals. Here also they introduced the rigid leadership principle. Thus for maternity and child welfare the *Jugendamt* had to surrender its important duties connected with ante- and post-natal care and infantile and child welfare to the *Gesundheitsamt* (see p. 429) under the control of the medical officer of health. He is *ex officio* chairman of all societies concerned with welfare. The former boards of management retain only an advisory function. Religious ministers and experts of private welfare organizations have been eliminated. The boards consist of the guardianship judge, a male and a female teacher, the local leader of the party welfare agency (the N.S.V.), and two delegates, one from the Hitler Youth, the other from the League of German Girls.

By March 1943 there were reported to be 55,000 consultation and welfare centres for infants, toddlers and the *Hilfswerk Mutter und Kind* (assistance for mother and child) in Greater Germany;

25,000 of them were departments of the local *Gesundheitsamt*, i.e. state controlled, the others were party organizations belonging to the N.S.V.

A new scheme of tuberculosis welfare came into force about the same time. All the existing organizations were dissolved and the Reich tuberculosis council (*Reichstuberkulose-Ausschuss*) assumed complete control. The whole welfare work is now in the hands of social insurance and the Reich tuberculosis council. On application by the *Gesundheitsamt* (local) or *Landesfürsorgeamt* (regional office) assistance on a very comprehensive scale is given to the poor and middle-class. Thus a family with two children, on a yearly income of not over 9,600 Rm., is provided for under this scheme. In addition to free treatment by a doctor, in a hospital or sanatorium, provision is made for total economic assistance (rent, food and education of the children) during the entire period of the patient's diminished working capacity and without any time limit. This assistance is given for all members of the household. It is provided by the *Landesfürsorgeamt*, and no repayment can be demanded. It is not known, however, on what conditions, as of ' political reliability ', the local or regional offices grant the application. The scheme would obviously lose much of its value, both for maintaining the individual family and for safeguarding the community, if any such discrimination were practised. The need for workers in war industry has, however, invalidated much of this scheme of treatment. It was reported by Dehoff (*Deutsches Tuberkulose-Blatt*, April 1942) that about 60% of the 400,000 cases of open pulmonary tuberculosis and 80–90% of stationary cases of this disease were now employed.

New laws on venereal diseases were reported at the same date to be in preparation. But the number of V.D. consultation offices (1,300 in Greater Germany) is still remarkably low, as compared with that of the maternity and child welfare centres.

Each branch of welfare is carried out in local councils (*Arbeitsgemeinschaften*) organized on strict party lines; the *Arbeitsgemeinschaften* for each branch of welfare are governed by a central council (*Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaft*). All the *Reichsarbeitsgemeinschaften* are subordinate to the Reich council of welfare controlled by the Minister of the Interior.

How the whole plan of Nazi welfare works cannot be definitely stated. But obviously any system of public welfare requires elasticity and adaptability to local conditions; it needs the personal

touch of the sympathetic friend rather than the state-directed official, and above all it wants the initiative to experiment. This must be seriously impaired by too rigid centralization and by authoritarian control.

## Health Insurance and Poor Relief

Germany was the first country to introduce compulsory health insurance—sickness insurance (1883), accident insurance (1884), and old age and invalidity insurance (1889). These laws were followed by others on insurance of employees (1911), miners' pensions and unemployment (1927). The entire social insurance system is uniform throughout the Reich; it is controlled centrally in the *Reichsversicherungsamt*, subordinate to which are *Landesversicherungsämter* in the Prussian provinces and other States.

### *Sickness Insurance*

Sickness insurance is compulsory for every worker and employee with a maximum yearly income fixed according to the current price level. The employer pays two-thirds, the employee one-third. Benefit includes twenty-six weeks' free medical and dental treatment, medicines, and from the fourth day of the illness sick pay (about one-half of the average wage) or free hospital treatment, as well as a family allowance and a small sum at death. Women workers receive the cost of their confinement. Most insurance corporations give free treatment and medicine to the insured person's dependants.

The sickness insurance corporations—autonomous, but state controlled—are either local (*Ortskrankenkassen*), or for certain undertakings (*Betriebskrankenkassen*), guilds (*Innungskrankenkassen*), mines (*Knappschaftskrankenkassen*), or corporations resembling the British friendly societies (*Ersatzkrankenkassen*). In 1936 there were 4,727 *Krankenkassen* insuring 21,506,689 persons, with an income of 1,533,689,000 Rm. and an expenditure of 1,523,738,000 Rm.

Antagonism between doctors and insurance corporations is proverbial. In Germany, the chief demands of the doctors were for adequate remuneration and for free choice of doctor. In spite of bitter conflicts, which culminated in 1901 in a strike of the majority of doctors against the *Ortskrankenkasse* in Leipzig, only the latter demand has been universally fulfilled.

Probably the new arrangement of the Nazi party, which subordinates all questions of panel practice to one medical head of

the profession, the *Reichsärzteführer*, will have improved the working conditions of the panel doctor considerably.

*Accident Insurance*

Undertakings of similar nature are compulsorily formed into insurance corporations (*Berufsgenossenschaften*) whose duty it is to publish ordinances for the prevention of accidents and to compensate the workers for accidents. Contributions are levied only from the employers. The term accident includes, since 1925, illness due to the chief industrial poisons, ankylostomiasis and professional cancer.

The patients receive cost of treatment and sick pay and in case of persistent incapacity a pension up to two-thirds of their previous earnings. In case of institutional treatment, the dependent relatives receive an allowance; in case of death the funeral expenses and widow's and orphan's pensions are paid. Most of the large corporations have established special hospitals staffed by experienced surgeons and orthopædists and provided with rehabilitation facilities.

*Status of Accident Insurance in* 1936

| Corporations | Undertakings | Number of insured persons |
|---|---|---|
| 63 industrial .. .. | 1,251,754 | 13,166,618 |
| 35 agricultural .. .. | 4,950,800 | 13,516,000 |
| 170 communal .. .. | 60,452 | 3,374,409 |

Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich*, p. 462 (Berlin, 1938).

For all these corporations the income in 1936 was 355,803,000 Rm., the expenditure on compensation and treatment 285,003,000 Rm., and on administration 64,057,000 Rm.

*Old Age and Invalidity Insurance*

This insurance group is administered regionally by the Prussian provinces or by the other States through special offices (*Landesversicherungsanstalten*). Every person liable to sickness insurance is also compulsorily insured against old age and invalidity. Employer and employee pay equal shares.

Old age pensions are due at sixty-five, invalidity pensions to insured persons whose earning power has fallen below one-third of its previous level, provided that they have paid contributions

for at least 200 weeks. Normally, therefore, a person incapacitated by chronic illness will be compensated for the first half year by the sickness corporation, and then for the rest of his life, or for the period of his incapacity, by the invalidity insurance.

The far-seeing policy of the *Landesversicherungsanstalten*, led by that of Hamburg, aimed at preventing a great deal of invalidity by establishing preventive institutions. Chief of these were the tuberculosis sanatoria; actually the majority of these institutions are run by the *Landesversicherungsanstalten*. In addition, they provided convalescent hospitals, rehabilitation facilities, centres for the treatment of venereal disease and for cripple welfare; and they subsidized the associations combating alcoholism.

Of the total expenditure of old age and invalidity insurance in 1936—1,214,135,000 Rm.—712,222,000 Rm. was for sick pay and 45,315,000 Rm. for such institutional treatment.

*Other Social Insurances*

Other schemes of social insurance concern assistance to employees with an income above the limit of sickness insurance (*Angestelltenversicherung*), miners' pensions (*Knappschaftliche Pensionsversicherung*) and unemployment insurance (*Arbeitslosenversicherung*). The former grants sick pay and allowances, the others give only financial assistance.

The 1927 law introduced compulsory insurance of all wage-earners against unemployment. Benefit was paid under the act, for the first time after fifty-two weeks' work during the last two years; subsequent benefits were payable after twenty-six weeks' work. Benefit started three to fourteen days after the registration of unemployment and was paid for not more than twenty weeks. The sickness, invalidity and salaried employees' insurances contributed to the payments. For persons working short-time correspondingly lower benefit was paid. As unemployment increased, a further 'emergency relief' was given to those who had exhausted the right to benefit, were able and willing to work, were unemployed without their fault, and who could show need, for which a means test was required. The number of insured persons in 1933 was 12,381,853, the amount of benefit paid was 1,758,633,000 Rm.

*Poor Relief*

By the law of 1924, poor relief was organized by the States through state and local public assistance unions (*Fürsorgeverbände*).

The scope of assistance included (1) war victims, widows and orphans; (2) persons who had ceased receiving pensions from the social insurance; (3) persons with a very small private income (e.g. inflation victims); (4) provision of employment for seriously disabled and other persons unable to earn their living; (5) needy young persons; (6) maternity cases; and (7) general assistance for persons not covered by other assistance schemes. Benefits included maintenance, medical aid, rehabilitation, maternity aid, general and vocational training for young persons, and for the blind, deaf and dumb, and cripples.

The number of persons receiving outdoor relief on 31 March 1938 was 1,699,548, its value was given as 710,934,000 Rm. During 1936, 1,340,174 indigent persons received a total of 136,830,449 days' treatment in medical institutions and homes for the aged.

A special form of relief, started by the Nazis, the winter help (*Winterhilfswerk*), gives food, fuel, clothing, bedding and household utensils to the needy. In 1937–38, 8,931,456 persons received such help, valued at 417,169,000 Rm.

## Sport and Physical Training

Since 1900 German interest in sport, in the English sense as opposed to the older gymnastics (*Turnen*), has greatly increased. In addition to the growth of upper class clubs for golf and tennis, the German football league (*Deutscher Fussballbund*), founded in 1900, had reached a total of 890,000 members in 1929.

The Weimar Republic supported physical training strongly, as did the Education Ministries of Prussia and of most of the other States. In addition to the development of physical training in schools and universities, the Reich Ministry of the Interior had a department for popular hygiene (*Volksgesundheit*), which was advised by a committee representing both the Reich government and the large sports associations. These voluntary bodies had a central organization, the *Deutscher Reichsausschuss für Leibesübungen*, or D.R.L. (Reich committee for physical exercise), which represented thirty-eight large organizations with over six million members, and included representatives of the Reich, the States, the universities, and a number of co-opted members. The D.R.L. introduced sports badges for those who attained a certain level in athletics, organized Reich youth sports competitions, and held the *Deutsche*

*Kampfspiele*, a kind of national 'Olympic Games', every four years after 1922. With the help of the Reich and the States it founded the *Deutsche Hochschule für Leibesübungen* in Spandau in 1920, which prepared its pupils for a Reich diploma in physical training. The D.R.L. also represented Germany at international sport contests, including the Olympic Games.

A great development of working-class associations for sport took place after the ban on Socialism was lifted in 1890 (see p. 216). In 1893, the *Arbeiter-Turn-und-Sportbund* (workers' gymnastic and sport association) was founded and, under the Republic, the central commission for workers' sports and physical training (*Zentralkommission für Arbeitersport und Körperpflege*) in Berlin arranged the first International Workers' Olympiad in Frankfurt-am-Main in 1925, and was a member of the socialist workers' sports international. Though weakened by the split between socialists and communists, it remained an important body till 1933.

The advent of the National-Socialists to power resulted in the imposition of centralized control upon all the organizations engaged in physical training. Frick, as Minister of the Interior, appointed Hans von Tschammer und Osten, a party member since 1929, as *Reichssportführer* (July 1933). Von Tschammer und Osten dissolved all the working-class organizations and handed over their property to the Labour Front, and in 1938 converted the D.R.L. into the *National-Sozialistischer Reichsbund für Leibesübungen* (N.S.R.L.), which was given the task of controlling the physical education of the German people in so far as it was not carried out by the state or the party. Since 1938, therefore, all German sport and physical training has been under the authority of the Nazi state, the party and its formations, and the N.S.R.L. In the schools and universities a special department K (*Körperliche Erziehung*) of the Reich Ministry of Education deals with it, the Nazi students' association being made its agent in the universities, with sole responsibility for all sports competitions.

The Spandau Institute was made in 1937 'the sole training institute for teachers and leaders in the field of physical education', and was renamed the *Reichsakademie für Leibesübungen*. It is under the combined control of the Ministers of the Interior and of Education and its president is the Reich sports leader.

In addition, all the major party organizations have their own sports organizations. The S.S., the S.A., and the Hitler Youth use

physical training as a means of ' schooling the body in the fighting spirit and of cultivating the military spirit in all sections of the nation ', and the most important annual event of the Hitler Youth was the Reich youth contest (*Reichsjugendwettkampf*). In addition, the Labour Front has founded sports communities in factories (*Betriebssportgemeinschaften*), of which there were 20,000 in 1939, and the Reich food estate has its own physical training school for the farming population at Castle Neuhaus.

The full *Gleichschaltung* (co-ordination) of all sports activities was secured by a decree issued by Hitler on 23 April 1936. A Reich sports office was created in the Ministry of the Interior, with von Tschammer und Osten, the Reich sports leader, at its head. It was given power to control all sports activities, both professional and amateur, which did not already fall under the control of the state or the party. The complete centralization of control over all forms of physical training and sport can best be realized by a list of the offices held by von Tschammer und Osten before his death in 1943. He was Reich sports leader, Under-Secretary-of-State in the Ministry of the Interior (1941), president of the Reich academy of physical training, leader of physical training of German youth and of the chief office for sports in the S.A., trustee for physical training of the ' Strength through Joy ' organization and for the factory organizations of the Labour Front.

The effects of the Nazi regime on sport and physical training have been, therefore, to convert it from a free and voluntary activity into an organized state or party activity and, particularly amongst the youth, to emphasize the aspect of military training (*Wehrsport*) at the expense both of the recreational idea and of the most suitable exercises for the individual from the point of view of his health.

## Eugenics

Eugenics was a favourite topic of teaching and discussion in the Weimar Republic, but the successive governments introduced no practical measures excepting income-tax alleviations and increased pay for families with several children, and a bachelor's tax.

In the Nazi state can be seen a travesty of eugenics resulting from a combination of a well-reasoned population policy with an irrational racial policy. This is shown by a number of laws relating to racial purity, the health of offspring, and measures for increasing the population.

*Racial Purity*

Every full citizen must be of German or cognate blood and, if he is married, the same applies to his spouse. Only citizens have a right to decide on state legislation. Persons belonging to other races are treated as aliens. The law for ' the protection of German blood and honour ' (1935) forbids marriage and sexual intercourse between Jews and persons of German or cognate blood. Hybrids with three Jewish grandparents rank as Jews. Hybrids of the first degree (with two Jewish grandparents) may marry only persons of the same degree, or Jews. Hybrids of the second degree (with one Jewish grandparent) may marry none but Aryans, so as gradually to dilute their children's proportion of Jewish blood.

*Health of Offspring*

The law on healthy marriages (1935) forbids marriage if either partner (1) suffers from an infectious disease which would seriously endanger the health of the partner or offspring; (2) has been placed under temporary or permanent guardianship; (3) suffers from a mental disturbance which would render the marriage undesirable for the community; or (4) suffers from a hereditary affliction, unless the other partner is sterile. The law requires medical examination and certificate of health by the district health office (*Gesundheitsamt*). Pre-nuptial consultations are required before a marriage loan (see p. 452) can be granted.

The law on the prevention of offspring with hereditary disease (1933) defines as such (1) congenital idiocy, (2) schizophrenia, (3) manic-depressive psychosis, (4) hereditary epilepsy, (5) Huntington's chorea, (6) hereditary blindness, (7) hereditary deafness, (8) severe hereditary malformations, and (9) severe alcoholism. Persons suffering from such affections, even if unmarried, must be sterilized. Pregnancy must be interrupted if one of the parents is thus afflicted, and, if possible, sterilization is to be performed. The procedure is decreed by special regional courts of law on the proposal of the affected individual, his (her) guardian, the head of a hospital or prison, or the medical officer of health. There is a higher court of appeal.

The authentically reported ' mercy killings ' of weakly infants and infirm persons might be enumerated among the measures intended by the Nazis to be eugenic. They appear, however, also to have a strong economic aspect, as intended to relieve the community of the burden of unproductive individuals.

*Measures for Increasing the Population*

A law of 1933 grants marriage loans up to 1,000 Rm. to young, healthy and needy couples. The loans are repayable in monthly instalments. For every child born of the marriage, the loan is reduced by a quarter. In the first ten years about two million such loans were granted, totalling 1,127,330,000 Rm. A law of 1935 provides further aid (up to 100 Rm. per child) to families with more than four healthy children under sixteen years. Income-tax exemption, which had been a prominent feature in the Weimar Republic, was considerably increased by the Nazis. The effect of these measures on the birth-rate is shown in the table of vital statistics.

## Vital Statistics

The German States have central statistical offices; returns forwarded from these are co-ordinated at the Reich statistical office and are published in the *Reich Health Office Bulletin* and in *Medical Statistical Notes*. Causes of death and movement of the population are to be seen in the Reich health office weekly bulletin of birth and death statistics for towns of more than 100,000 inhabitants, and in a similar monthly bulletin for towns of 15,000 and over. Statistics of all infective diseases, not only those compulsorily notifiable, are published every three years by the Reich health office, but the mere fact of some of the diseases not being notifiable makes the returns of these very unreliable.

Births are notifiable orally to the local registrar within one week, by the father or by the attending midwife, doctor, or by any other person present, or by the mother (as soon as she is well enough), in this order of responsibility. If the child is stillborn notification must be given by the next working day. The municipal statistical offices forward their figures of births and deaths direct to the Reich health office, and the registered figures, after correction, are published by the central statistical office.

The birth-rate, the general death-rate and the infant mortality rate of Germany for the years 1922–39 are given in the following table; corresponding figures for England and Wales are inserted for comparison.

*Comparison of Vital Statistics for Germany and England and Wales*

| Year | Birth-rate per 1,000 population | | General death-rate per 1,000 population | | Infant mortality. Deaths of infants under 1 year per 1,000 live-births | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Germany | England and Wales | Germany | England and Wales | Germany | England and Wales |
| 1922 | 23·0 | 20·4 | 14·4 | 12·8 | 117 | 77 |
| 1923 | 21·2 | 19·7 | 13·9 | 11·6 | 120 | 69 |
| 1924 | 20·6 | 18·8 | 12·2 | 12·2 | 99 | 75 |
| 1925 | 20·8 | 18·3 | 11·9 | 12·2 | 96 | 75 |
| 1926 | 19·6 | 17·8 | 11·7 | 11·6 | 94 | 70 |
| 1927 | 18·4 | 16·6 | 12·0 | 12·3 | 90 | 70 |
| 1928 | 18·6 | 16·7 | 11·6 | 11·7 | 83 | 65 |
| 1929 | 18·0 | 16·3 | 12·6 | 13·4 | 90 | 74 |
| 1930 | 17·6 | 16·3 | 11·0 | 11·4 | 79 | 60 |
| 1931 | 16·0 | 15·8 | 11·2 | 12·3 | 78 | 66 |
| 1932 | 15·1 | 15·3 | 10·8 | 12·0 | 74 | 65 |
| 1933 | 14·7 | 14·4 | 11·2 | 12·3 | 72 | 64 |
| 1934 | 18·0 | 14·8 | 10·9 | 11·8 | 62 | 59 |
| 1935 | 18·9 | 14·7 | 11·8 | 11·7 | 65 | 57 |
| 1936 | 19·0 | 14·8 | 11·8 | 12·1 | 63 | 59 |
| 1937 | 18·8 | 14·9 | 11·7 | 12·4 | 64 | 58 |
| 1938 | 19·6 | 15·1 | 11·6 | 11·6 | 60 | 52 |
| 1939* | 20·3 | 14·9 | 12·3† | 12·1† | 60 | 50 |

* Provisional figures. † Excluding war losses.

Source: *League of Nations: Annual Epidemiological Report for the year* 1938 (Geneva, 1941), pp. 62 *et seq.*

The general birth-rate for Germany at the beginning of the present century was 35·6 per thousand. Except for the immediate post-1918 years, there was a steady decline until 1933, when the birth-rate was only 14·7 per thousand. After the Nazi party came to power, this decline was stemmed, and the figure has risen to 19·0 in 1936 (compare France 15·0, and England and Wales 14·8, for the same year), and to 20·3 in 1939. The increase has been partly due to marriage loans, increase of family allowances in the calculation of income-tax, direct financial assistance to those with large families, and like measures (see p. 452). A further cause has been the great increase in employment; in 1933 there were approximately six million unemployed in Germany out of a total of eighteen million 'employable' people, but by 1939 unemployment had virtually disappeared. Psychological causes, including a revival of national self-confidence, also played their part.

*Infantile Mortality*

No single figure affords a better index of the public health standard of a country than does its infantile mortality rate. In all advanced countries the decline in this rate during the past seventy years has been phenomenal. The falling birth-rate has partly contributed to this decline, but improved standards of hygiene, notably maternal and child welfare centres (see p. 443), have helped greatly. The infantile mortality rate in Germany decreased from 192 per thousand live births in 1900 to 64 in 1937.

*Causes of Death*

The table on p. 455 gives the number of deaths in Germany for 1935 and 1936 that were ascribed to each of forty-three causes of death, according to the abridged international nomenclature of 1929. Death-rates per 100,000 of population are recorded, and the corresponding rates for England and Wales in 1936 are appended for comparison. It will be seen that there are no very striking differences between the figures returned for the two countries. The death-rate from senility in Germany is more than double that of England and Wales; the reason is that in Germany important specific causes, notably diseases of the heart (where the German rate is less than half that of England and Wales), are masked by inclusion in the 'senility' group. While the rate of the group of causes 'not specified or ill-defined' is much higher than in England and Wales, it is markedly lower than in France, where in 1936 this rate was 314·3 per 100,000.

The table on p. 456 illustrates the very diverse health conditions that prevail in eleven towns in Germany; figures for all German towns with populations over 100,000 are also included. Without information about the age and sex constitutions of the different populations, no very definite conclusions are warranted. But the figures show clearly the effects of the widespread influenza epidemic in the winter of 1936–7.

## Post-War Problems of Public Health

A discussion of German public health administration up to the war may fitly end with a consideration of the problems confronting the country after the war. It is impossible accurately to forecast the future of public health in a defeated Germany, but some inferences may be drawn from the experiences which followed 1918. The chief problems are the control of infectious diseases, housing, nutrition, clothing, transport and administration.

## *Deaths in Germany for 1935 and 1936 compared with England and Wales*

| Causes of death (abridged nomenclature of 1929) | Deaths | | Rates per 100,000 inhabitants | | England and Wales (rates) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1935 | 1936 | 1935 | 1936 | 1936 |
| Typhoid and paratyphoid fever | 572 | 525 | 0·9 | 0·8 | 0·6 |
| Typhus fever | 0 | 0 | 0·0 | 0·0 | 0·0 |
| Smallpox | 0 | 0 | 0·0 | 0·0 | 0·0 |
| Measles | 1,701 | 1,843 | 2·5 | 2·7 | 6·7 |
| Scarlet fever | 1,224 | 1,313 | 1·8 | 1·9 | 1·2 |
| Whooping cough | 1,820 | 3,126 | 2·7 | 4·6 | 5·1 |
| Diphtheria | 7,613 | 7,372 | 11·4 | 10·9 | 7·5 |
| Influenza | 21,970 | 19,433 | 32·9 | 28·9 | 14·8 |
| Plague | 0 | 0 | 0·0 | 0·0 | 0·0 |
| Tuberculosis of the respiratory system | 41,106 | 40,240 | 61·5 | 59·7 | 58·3 |
| Other forms of tuberculosis | 7,573 | 7,267 | 11·3 | 10·8 | 10·9 |
| Syphilis | 2,244 | 2,334 | 3·4 | 3·5 | 2·9 |
| Malaria | 38 | 38 | 0·1 | 0·1 | 0·0 |
| Other infectious or parasitic diseases | 8,242 | 8,097 | 12·3 | 12·0 | 8·7 |
| Cancer and other malignant tumours | 97,077 | 98,693 | 145·2 | 146·5 | 162·5 |
| Tumours, non-malignant, or of which nature not specified | 5,045 | 5,295 | 7·5 | 7·9 | 6·6 |
| Chronic rheumatism and gout | 2,395 | 2,264 | 3·6 | 3·4 | 9·3 |
| Diabetes mellitus | 12,255 | 12,983 | 18·3 | 19·3 | 17·4 |
| Alcoholism (acute or chronic) | 436 | 392 | 0·7 | 0·6 | 0·1 |
| Other general diseases and chronic poisonings | 10,429 | 10,550 | 15·6 | 15·7 | 21·3 |
| Progressive locomotor ataxia and general paralysis of the insane | 3,089 | 3,241 | 4·6 | 4·8 | 3·6 |
| Cerebral hæmorrhage, cerebral embolism and thrombosis | 62,236 | 65,304 | 93·1 | 97·0 | 67·6 |
| Other diseases of the nervous system and of the organs of special sense | 20,710 | 19,229 | 31·0 | 28·6 | 27·9 |
| Diseases of the heart | 96,635 | 101,188 | 144·5 | 150·2 | 310·0 |
| Other diseases of circulatory system | 32,622 | 31,866 | 48·8 | 47·3 | 67·7 |
| Bronchitis | 11,409 | 11,142 | 17·1 | 16·5 | 43·1 |
| Pneumonia | 59,975 | 59,368 | 89·7 | 88·1 | 69·0 |
| Other diseases of respiratory system (tuberculosis excepted) | 16,653 | 16,613 | 24·9 | 24·7 | 11·2 |
| Diarrhœa and enteritis | 11,944 | 11,580 | 17·9 | 17·2 | 12·2 |
| Appendicitis | 5,258 | 5,499 | 7·8 | 8·2 | 7·0 |
| Diseases of liver and biliary passages | 12,441 | 12,496 | 18·6 | 18·6 | 9·7 |
| Other diseases of digestive system | 19,561 | 20,457 | 29·3 | 30·4 | 32·7 |
| Nephritis | 12,395 | 11,985 | 18·5 | 17·8 | 38·5 |
| Other diseases of genito-urinary system | 12,775 | 13,183 | 19·1 | 19·6 | 20·0 |
| Puerperal septicæmia* | 2,511 | 2,358 | 2·0 | 1·8 | 1·4 |
| Other diseases of pregnancy, childbirth, and the puerperal state* | 3,624 | 3,716 | 2·9 | 2·9 | 2·4 |
| Diseases of the skin and cellular tissue, and of bones and organs of locomotion | 5,251 | 5,297 | 7·9 | 7·9 | 6·8 |
| Congenital debility and malformations, premature birth, and other diseases of early infancy* | 44,717 | 44,128 | 35·4 | 34·5 | 31·7 |
| Senility | 74,600 | 71,542 | 111·6 | 106·2 | 41·8 |
| Suicide | 18,422 | 19,288 | 27·5 | 28·6 | 12·4 |
| Homicide | 854 | 785 | 1·3 | 1·2 | 0·4 |
| Violent and accidental deaths (suicide and homicide excepted) | 27,869 | 29,302 | 41·7 | 43·5 | 42·4 |
| Causes of death not specified or ill-defined | 14,727 | 14,461 | 22·0 | 21·5 | 2·9 |
| Total | 792,018 | 795,793 | 1184·4 | 1181·6 | 1213·9 |

* Rates per 1,000 live births.

Source: *League of Nations: Annual Epidemiological Report for the year* 1938 (Geneva, 1941), p. 68. The deaths are classified into the forty-three categories of the 'Abridged International List of Causes of Death' (1929). Provisional figures are available for 1938, but revised and corrected statistics do not go beyond 1936.

## *Some Vital Statistics for Eleven German Towns*

| Town | General Statistics | | | | | | Death-rates per 100,000 inhabitants | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | General mortality per 1,000 | | Infant mortality per 1,000 live births | | Birth-rate per 1,000 | | Typhoid and para-typhoid fevers | | Diphtheria | | Influenza* | | Pulmonary tuber-culosis | | Tuber-culosis other forms | | Pneumonia and broncho-pneumonia* | |
| | 1936 | 1937 | 1936 | 1937 | 1936 | 1937 | 1936 | 1937 | 1936 | 1937 | 1936 | 1937 | 1936 | 1937 | 1936 | 1937 | 1936 | 1937 |
| Berlin .. | 13·1 | 12·8 | 61 | 59 | 14·1 | 14·1 | 0·5 | 0·9 | 7·3 | 6·7 | 7·1 | 25·2 | 75·7 | 76·8 | 6·3 | 5·6 | 93·5 | 112·1 |
| Breslau .. | 12·1 | 12·2 | 60 | 58 | 17·3 | 16·6 | 0·2 | 0·2 | 20·3 | 4·7 | 11·5 | 44·8 | 77·2 | 80·3 | 10·6 | 10·5 | 58·5 | 61·2 |
| Dresden .. | 12·3 | 12·1 | 49 | 53 | 12·1 | 12·4 | 0·6 | 0·2 | 6·3 | 3·8 | 6·6 | 32·0 | 67·6 | 61·2 | 9·4 | 6·6 | 79·1 | 68·8 |
| Essen .. | 9·9 | 9·6 | 67 | 63 | 17·7 | 17·8 | 1·1 | 0·6 | 11·3 | 9·0 | 9·8 | 28·8 | 69·6 | 67·6 | 8·8 | 10·5 | 73·8 | 98·9 |
| Frankfurt-am-Main .. | 10·3 | 10·3 | 51 | 49 | 13·2 | 12·5 | 0·0 | 0·2 | 3·3 | 4·2 | 10·1 | 22·8 | 51·0 | 47·6 | 8·7 | 11·4 | 69·7 | 53·1 |
| Hamburg .. | 12·3 | 12·2 | 63 | 57 | 16·2 | 15·7 | 0·6 | 0·8 | 15·2 | 6·9 | 4·1 | 19·8 | 63·5 | 55·3 | 8·9 | 6·7 | 47·8 | 69·7 |
| Köln .. .. | 10·7 | 10·6 | 67 | 65 | 16·0 | 15·6 | 0·4 | 0·4 | 10·1 | 8·1 | 8·8 | 24·8 | 63·5 | 59·4 | 12·5 | 12·7 | 64·0 | 59·8 |
| Königsberg .. | 12·7 | 12·1 | 76 | 70 | 19·7 | 19·9 | 0·9 | 0·3 | 26·5 | 23·8 | 5·5 | 35·3 | 67·7 | 72·2 | 9·3 | 8·3 | 91·6 | 115·7 |
| Leipzig .. | 11·6 | 11·5 | 56 | 55 | 13·1 | 12·6 | 0·3 | 0·7 | 8·2 | 4·9 | 3·0 | 17·5 | 56·2 | 55·8 | 8·9 | 7·5 | 103·6 | 99·1 |
| Munich .. | 12·5 | 12·2 | 66 | 72 | 13·6 | 13·1 | 0·5 | 1·2 | 4·8 | 4·9 | 7·3 | 18·4 | 55·2 | 59·9 | 8·6 | 8·7 | 57·0 | 69·8 |
| Nuremberg .. | 11·3 | 10·9 | 51 | 44 | 14·2 | 14·0 | 0·0 | 0·2 | 18·4 | 15·1 | 6·1 | 18·6 | 62·6 | 60·2 | 7·9 | 7·6 | 70·6 | 69·8 |
| All German towns with population over 100,000 | 11·4 | 11·3 | 62 | 61 | 15·4 | 15·4 | 0·5 | 0·6 | 11·5 | 8·8 | 7·8 | 25·2 | 62·5 | 60·2 | 9·1 | 9·1 | 79·1 | 86·4 |

* The death-rates of influenza, pneumonia and broncho-pneumonia are for the years 1 July 1935 to 30 June 1936 and 1 July 1936 to 30 June 1937, each period including one complete epidemic season. All other figures relate to calendar years.

Source : *League of Nations : Annual Epidemiological Report for the year* 1938, pp. 80 *et seq.* (Geneva, 1941).

*Infectious Diseases*

Of the major epidemics the most formidable is typhus, appropriately called by the Germans 'Kriegs-' or 'Hungertyphus'. During and after the war of 1914–18 the civilian population was practically free from typhus, although severe epidemics were raging in Russia and the Balkans. This was due to rigid delousing carried out at every frontier station. Typhus is transmitted by the louse alone; a deloused patient is harmless to his environment. In the present war this immunity has not been maintained. Numerous small outbreaks, possibly started by foreign workers, have occurred in different parts of the country. A few hundred cases have already been reported in 1943 from Hamburg and Berlin. A retreat of the German armies over the eastern frontier would probably lead to a breakdown of the delousing cordon and to the introduction of louse-infested and possibly typhus-infected individuals into the country. It should be remembered that typhus convalescents may harbour the disease germs in their body for a long time after complete recovery.

Similar considerations apply to relapsing fever, which, after 1918, was even more prevalent than typhus in Eastern Europe.

Nothing is known of the occurrence of plague and cholera in Eastern Europe. Their introduction into Germany is improbable. Malaria, though undoubtedly prevalent among the German troops, is not likely to become a serious danger to the civilian population.

Of the commoner acute infectious diseases the enteric group (typhoid-paratyphoid), dysentery, diphtheria, scarlet fever, and cerebro-spinal meningitis are almost sure to flare up after the war. Bombing of cities must lead to enormous destruction of water mains and sewers, and thus to pollution of the water supplies. As about 2% of all typhoid convalescents become 'carriers' for the rest of their lives, the contamination of the water supplies with typhoid bacilli may be expected. Chlorination of the water at the works is no safeguard, as free chlorine may have disappeared from the water before it reaches the spot where the mains are fractured. The only preventive method, boiling of the water in every household, is unlikely to be performed in a population whose morale has been broken.

Similar considerations apply to dysentery, but in the transmission of this disease flies also play an important part. The campaign against flies is a very difficult problem, where a large number of houses have been destroyed and dirt and refuse predominate.

Cerebro-spinal meningitis is a definite danger, as its spread is accelerated by overcrowding. In England, it is true, no serious increase has occurred in spite of extensive shelter life in bombed cities. But where vast parts of large cities are wiped out the danger becomes immeasurably greater. It must increase further after the return of the soldiers to their already overcrowded homes. A liberal supply of sulphonamides for treatment will be helpful.

The chief menace, after this war, as after the last one, is the probability of an enormous incidence of influenza with its attendants bronchitis and pneumonia. This would lead to grave losses in the civilian population and seriously endanger the army of occupation. Great supplies of sulphonamides will be needed to cope with these diseases.

Tuberculosis will undoubtedly rise to a fresh peak owing to malnutrition, bad housing in the bombed cities and the inevitable neglect of welfare work. It is not at all likely to affect the army of occupation.

Venereal diseases, the scourge of all fighting armies, may be expected to increase considerably in the civil population. Thorough and careful application of prophylactic measures will be required to protect the army of occupation. In addition, considerable supplies of sulphonamides (for gonorrhœa) and arsenicals and bismuth (for syphilis) should be provided.

The difficulty of maintaining a satisfactory state of health in the population has been greatly increased during the war owing to the presence of some 12 million foreign workers, many of whom have been recruited from countries with a lower health standard. The examination of these recruits has shown a relatively high incidence of pulmonary tuberculosis, and the introduction of typhus into Germany may well be referred to them. The need for their medical inspection and treatment together with the war shortage of German doctors led to a serious endeavour, made in the summer of 1943, to ' persuade ' doctors in the occupied countries to look after the health of the workers' camps. A special delegate of the Führer, Brandt, has been appointed above the head of the *Reichsärzteführer* Conti ; he is responsible for the medical and health organizations and must be informed of all happenings, both in the armed forces and in the civilian field of health.

Both from the point of view of infectious diseases and of discipline these foreign workers may present very serious difficulties at the end of the war.

*Housing*

After 1918, there was a grave shortage of dwellings in Germany, although hardly a single house was destroyed by bombing. In the large towns this shortage amounted to about 8%. After the present war, the shortage will be inestimably greater and will take many years to remedy. Up to the end of October 1943, some seven million people were reported to have lost their homes through air-raids. Reconstruction of damaged buildings has become one of the most important duties of Reich Housing Commissioner (*Reichswohnungskommissar*) Ley, head of the Labour Front. Owing to the difficulties experienced in billeting, many refugees are now being housed in huts.

*Nutrition*

During the war of 1914–18 and the subsequent blockade, malnutrition was the worst affliction of the German population; it played an important part in the great post-war influenza epidemic and in the increase of tuberculosis and of rickets. In this war, similar and even worse conditions have prevailed in the occupied countries, especially in Poland, Greece and Belgium. Germany, it is true, started rationing about 1936, but thanks to extensive looting it has maintained a moderate standard of nutrition for its own population. Above all, the perils of vitamin deficiency which caused such havoc in 1918–20 have now become better recognized and moderate stocks seem to be available. Nevertheless, after a disastrous war, nutrition of the civilian population may be very difficult, particularly in view of the deplorable state of rail and road transport and the heavy problems of post-war administration.

There will also be a great shortage of household articles, especially soap, and of medical supplies and equipment.

*Clothing*

Shortage of winter clothing started during the first winter campaign in Russia when civilians were ' persuaded ' to surrender most of their warm clothing to the badly provided troops. By the end of the war the deficiency of clothing and bedding will probably be very grave, until considerable supplies of raw materials have been imported and manufactured.

*Conclusion*

It is not sufficient, however, to consider each of these problems separately; they are closely inter-related. Isolated cases of an infectious disease may arise at any time by the introduction of the specific disease germs into some individuals whose general powers of resistance are unduly low. But if the population contains large numbers of persons with a reduced resistance, the disease germs will have a far greater chance of spreading and attacking many persons. This is especially true of the agents of the respiratory infections, like the common cold and influenza. The more rapidly they spread, the more does their virulence, their power to attack, increase, until finally they become able to overwhelm the defences even of the more resistant members of the population.

It is indeed probable that after the war the general resistance of the German population will be seriously undermined. Housing difficulties, leading to overcrowding and exposure to cold, and malnutrition will surely play a great part. Particularly will this apply to the masses of persons detained in concentration camps and prisons, and the vast numbers of foreign ('slave') workers, especially when they are freed from their prisons and labour camps. In these groups epidemics may start, and from them great pandemics might spread through the population, endangering the army of occupation, and menacing the neighbouring countries.

It is also probable that the breakdown of the Nazi State will create an administrative chaos considerably more serious and prolonged than any experienced in Germany in 1918, when the Social Democrats and their bourgeois allies took over the machinery of the state after a very brief period of disorder. If the conditions favourable to epidemics already indicated are combined with political and administrative confusion, the Allied armies of occupation will be faced with a difficult task in preserving the elementary requisites of social hygiene necessary to prevent widespread epidemics, both among the occupying troops and among the civil population of Germany.

Bibliographical Note

1. Details of vital statistics are contained in the *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich* (Berlin, annually); the latest edition refers to 1938.

Publications of the Epidemiological Intelligence Service of the League of Nations contains in convenient form demographic data and statistics of notifiable diseases. The *Annual Epidemiological Report* (Geneva, latest edition 1941) contains corrected statistics in most cases up to the year 1938. Retrospective

tables are included. A table gives for thirty-five countries the number of deaths and the death-rate for each rubric of the abridged International List of Causes of Death. Other tables give the vital statistics of large towns, deaths from important communicable diseases in large towns, and specific and standardized rates of mortality by age and sex.

2. The following works deal with specific aspects of Public Health in Germany, especially in the National-Socialist State :

(*a*) Friedlander, W., and Myers, E. D., *Child Welfare in Germany before and after Naziism* (Chicago, 1940).
(*b*) Gütt, A., *Der Aufbau des Gesundheitswesens im Deutschen Reich* (Berlin, 1935).
(*c*) Malitz, B., *Die Leibesübungen in der National-Sozialistischen Idee* (Munich, 1934).
(*d*) Schnell, W., *Volksgesundheitspflege mit Rassen- und Erblehre* (Munich, 1937).

3. The official decrees relating to the medical profession in Germany are contained in the *Reichsärzteordnung* (Berlin, latest edition 1938).

4. The attitude to, and regulations concerning, Public Health of the National-Socialist Party are given in the *Organisationsbuch der N.S.D.A.P.* (fifth edition, Munich, 1940).

# APPENDIX

# GERMANY AT WAR, 1939–43

German Aims and Strategy : The Territorial Organization of Greater Germany : The Administration of Greater Germany : Racial Policy : Religious Policy : Educational Policy : The Nazi ' New Order '.

## German Aims and Strategy

By the absorption of Austria (March 1938) and by the disruption of Czechoslovakia into the annexed territories of Bohemia and Moravia (the Protectorate) and the vassal state of Slovakia (March 1939), Hitler had already created a Greater Germany before the outbreak of war. By doing so he had also very greatly increased Germany's power of waging war. Not only were the heavy industries of both countries, including the great Skoda works in Czechoslovakia, at his disposal, but the strategic danger from the Slav ' pistol pointed at the heart of the Reich ', as Bismarck had taught Germans to regard Bohemia, was removed. The Munich agreements, and Hitler's subsequent annexation of ' Bohemia and Moravia ', had sacrificed a staunch democracy and a sturdy people sincerely devoted to democratic principles, to the German appetite for domination. They had also lost, for the future allies, both the arms and men which Czechoslovakia would have put at their service. And, by their seizure of Teschen, in the hour of Czechoslovakia's tragedy, the Poles had revealed the fatal divisions amongst the Slavs in face of Teutonic aggression and had prepared the way for their own undoing. For, though there were other territories on the west (Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen and Malmédy) detached from Germany at the settlement of Versailles, it was the recovery of Danzig, the Polish territories of the former imperial provinces of West Prussia and Posen, and the lost portions of Upper Silesia, on the east which constituted Hitler's first object in making war in 1939.

But beyond this objective lay still more ambitious aims. *Mein Kampf* had revealed Hitler's desire for a final settlement of Germany's position in the west by a victory over France* as a precondition of

* *Mein Kampf*, book ii, chap. xv, ' Self-defence as Right ' (*Notwehr als Recht*).

that unhindered expansion eastwards which was to make room for the growth of German population. In one of his few unguarded moments Hitler had said, at the Nuremberg Rally of 1936, ' If the Urals with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, the rich forests of Siberia, and the unending cornfields of the Ukraine lay within Germany under the National-Socialist leadership the country would swim in plenty '. A new *Drang nach Osten*, a renewal and, if possible, a decision of the age-long struggle between Teuton and Slav, were an essential part of Nazi, as of earlier Pan-German, foreign policy.

Yet Hitler was too astute to attempt everything at once. In order to attack Russia successfully, Poland must first be swiftly destroyed before France could intervene effectively and, to secure the destruction of Poland, Russia must be prevented from making an alliance with France and Great Britain. By the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 24 August 1939, Hitler secured his immediate aim. He could now crush Poland before French and British forces could attack his strong western defences with any prospect of success. Thereafter France itself, and her British ally, would have to face the main strength of the heavily armoured and more numerous German forces. Once they had, in turn, been overcome the way would be open for the great drive eastwards, for the overthrow of Bolshevism, for the final defeat of the Slav, and for the creation of a German *Lebensraum* (living space) so extensive as to provide for an ever expanding population of Germans and to secure unchallenged supremacy for the German Reich in Europe, if not in the whole world.

It is obvious that the accomplishment of this scheme opened up still greater vistas of German expansion. Once the Germans had become masters of Europe the colonial empires of France, Belgium, Holland and Portugal would fall into their lap ; the Italian Axis ally would assist in the work of conquest but would be too weak to challenge in arms German decisions about the distribution of the spoils. And if Britain could be conquered also, as it would be reasonable to suppose she could be by a German-dominated Europe, Africa would be open to immediate inclusion in the German *Lebensraum*, whilst India and the Dominions could be conquered piecemeal and at leisure, and shared, so far as that was necessary, with the Italian and Japanese Axis partners. The history of the years since 1 September 1939 is that of the partial success and deepening failure of these schemes. It is only possible here to notice some of the main phases in that process.

*From the Outbreak of War to the Battle of Britain* (1 *September* 1939 *to* 30 *September* 1940)

The first part of Hitler's strategic plan went smoothly. The destruction of Poland, despite a gallant resistance, was accomplished within a month and without any serious attack developing on the western front. But Hitler did not gain the whole of Poland. Russian troops entered eastern Poland on 17 September 1939 on the plea that the Polish state had collapsed, and a new partition treaty, which once again temporarily eliminated Poland from the map of Europe, was signed between Germany and Russia on 28 September 1939. Germany took the western half of the Polish state (Fig. 59), but Russia regained a common frontier with East Prussia and absorbed, without having to make any serious military effort, almost as much Polish territory as Germany itself. Nor was this the only sacrifice involved in Hitler's scheme. For, during the autumn of 1939, whilst he prepared for his attack on the west, Hitler had to agree to the establishment of Russian naval, air and military bases in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, and to abandon the Finns to the Russian attack, which began on 30 November 1939. The very principle of the *Drang nach Osten* seemed to have been given up when, during October and November, Hitler repatriated the German settlers from the Baltic states. When the Finns had been forced to accept the Treaty of Moscow (12 March 1940) and the Baltic states had been incorporated in the U.S.S.R. (3–6 August 1940) it might seem doubtful whether the conquest of half Poland had been worth while. Russia now commanded the shores of the Baltic, while her troops and aircraft were within striking distance of Königsberg and Danzig, if not of Berlin. And the work of long years of German penetration towards Leningrad had been abandoned.

Yet, though the price paid had been heavy, Hitler had also gained much, for he had been enabled to throw almost the whole weight of German force upon the west. On 9 April 1940, Denmark was occupied and Norway invaded. On 10 May, Luxembourg, Holland and Belgium were attacked. By the end of May all these countries were in German hands, King Leopold of Belgium having sued for an armistice on 28 May. On 10 June Italy entered the war and the French government left Paris. On 16 June Pétain succeeded Reynaud as head of the French government and on 22 June an armistice between Germany and France was signed, which left Paris, the industrial areas of the north-west and the whole Channel

and Atlantic coasts of France in German hands (Fig. 55). With her armies disbanded, and her prisoners still in German hands as hostages of good behaviour, France seemed to retain little of her old greatness but a nominal control of her colonial empire and her fleet.





Fig. 55. The Armistice Line in France, 1940

Based on official sources.

Nothing remained to complete the first stage of Hitler's 'Grand Design' but to crush Great Britain. The silent menace of the British navy, which had already forced Hitler to order the *Graf Spee* to scuttle herself (17 December 1939), together with the skill and daring of the R.A.F. pilots, the superiority of their aircraft, and the powers of organization of their Fighter Command, frustrated

Hitler's plans during August and September 1940. When the German air force gave up the attempt to break the R.A.F. in direct combat and turned over to a long-term policy of destroying British industry and morale by night-raiding, it was apparent that immediate invasion of this country was no longer likely. A major victory had been won and a turning point in the war reached.

Yet Hitler's position, at the end of September 1940, was enormously powerful. On 27 September Germany, Italy and Japan had signed a military alliance for joint action against any attempts to interfere with the ' New Order ' in Europe or Asia. Against this combination of naval and military power, the British Empire stood alone. Even if Great Britain could not immediately be invaded it was a fair calculation that, by an intensified U-boat war and by constant air attack, her war effort could be rendered ineffectual. Meanwhile the remainder of the continent, in particular the small states of the south and south-east, could be organized under German leadership for the next stage of conquest, the attack on Russia.*

### *From the Battle of Britain to the German attack on Russia* (30 *September* 1940—22 *June* 1941)

It was to this task of bringing Hungary, Roumania and the Balkan states within the Axis orbit in order to clear their path to the south-east, that Hitler and Mussolini addressed themselves during the winter and spring of 1940–41. Already Roumania, which had repudiated the Anglo-French guarantee of her integrity on 1 July, had been forced to cede Bessarabia and north Bukovina to Russia. It was now (21–30 August) compelled to cede the south Dobrudja to Bulgaria, and, by an award of Hitler's at Vienna, some two-thirds of Transylvania to Hungary. In September King Carol was forced to abdicate in favour of his son Michael, and General Antonescu became dictator. In October a German military mission arrived in Bucharest to ' reorganize ' the Roumanian army. In November both Hungary, bribed by its acquisitions, and Roumania, for fear lest worse befall, joined the German-Italian-Japanese alliance.

* If a Moscow broadcast by a German officer, who claimed to have served on the German General Staff, may be accepted as true, Hitler decided as early as 22 October 1940 to abandon the attack on England—the operation *See-Löwe* (sea lion)—and to concentrate on preparations against Russia. The date suggested is in no way improbable.

Before Christmas 1940, Germany had thus opened her path to the Black Sea and secured new food supplies and the control of the Roumanian oil.

Meanwhile Mussolini, whether with or without German approval is uncertain, had begun to widen the strategic plan. In Africa, Italian troops had entered Egypt (12 September), and on 28 October Italian forces invaded Greece. The German drive to the Black Sea was to have its southern, Italian, counterpart in a drive to the Ægean and towards Egypt which, if successful, would cut the British Empire in two at Suez, deprive it of its oil supplies from the Middle East and, given Japanese assistance, would ultimately imperil its whole position in India, Malaya and the Dominions of Australia and New Zealand.

The winter of 1940–41 did not go smoothly for Hitler's plans. The Italians not only failed to make an easy conquest of Greece, but the Greeks advanced into Albania; and, in Africa, General Wavell's forces drove the enemy out of Egypt and, by 6 February 1941, had entered Benghazi. At the same time the reconquest by imperial forces of British Somaliland and of Abyssinia was proceeding. But, on 10 January 1941, Hitler renewed his pact with Russia; on 1 March he secured Bulgaria's adhesion to the Axis, and on 25 March that of the Yugoslav government under the Regent, Prince Paul. Although the Yugoslavs revolted against their rulers two days later and repudiated the German alliance, Hitler sent his troops into both Yugoslavia and Greece on 6 April, and by 1 June 1941, he could regard the whole Mediterranean position as restored. Yugoslavia and Greece had both been overrun.

The British and Imperial troops sent to the aid of Greece had been forced to engage in a second 'Dunkirk'; at the cost of heavy loss both in men and material, and in ships of the navy engaged in covering their embarkation. Crete was in German hands, and German troops and aircraft were coming to the aid of the Italians in Africa. Italy's failure had increased Germany's power and all Europe, save the Iberian peninsula, Sweden, Switzerland and the small strip of European Turkey lay under Hitler's control.

There had been set-backs and losses to offset the German successes. The Italian navy had suffered a heavy blow at Matapan (28 March 1940). Abyssinia had been lost by the Italians and Addis Ababa entered by the British on 15 April and by its Emperor a month later. The *Bismarck*, greatest of German warships, after sinking H.M.S. *Hood*, had itself been sunk (27 May). German

intrigues in Iraq and Syria were being foiled by prompt British action. The conquest of Yugoslavia, Greece and Crete had imposed serious losses on the Germans in highly trained troops and in aircraft, and may have held up the attack on Russia sufficiently to make the difference between success and failure in that enterprise.




Fig. 56. The German strategic plan in 1941

Facsimile of a map from a *Tornisterschrift* (knapsack pamphlet), issued by the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht*.

Yet Hitler felt secure enough, in June 1941, to develop his strategic plan further. Submarine action against British shipping was being intensified and, in fact, sank over one million tons of

British shipping alone in the three months March–May 1941. Air raids on British industrial centres continued and, despite the passage of the Lend-Lease Act (11 March 1941), Hitler could hope to neutralize its effects by submarine and air action. With the British navy stretched to its utmost limits, and with Crete in his hands, Hitler increased his assistance to the Italians in Libya. Given a swift victory over Russia the drive to Suez could be combined with one to the Caucasus before American help to Britain became a serious factor. The whole design is shown crudely but clearly in the illustration (Fig. 56) reproduced from a *Tornisterschrift* (knapsack pamphlet) written for German soldiers. On 22 June 1941, Hitler embarked on his great adventure, and German troops, tanks and aeroplanes, assisted by Finns in the north and by Roumanians in the south, fell, without warning or excuse, on the territories of Russia, with which Hitler had renewed his non-aggression pact only six months before.

*From the German attack on Russia to Pearl Harbour* (22 *June* 1941 *to* 7 *December* 1941)

Hitler's ' Grand Design ' now entered its last phase. There can be little doubt that he had calculated on a swift victory over Russia, whose forces had recently been purged of many of their senior officers and had not made an impressive showing in the Russo-Finnish war. Apart from military considerations, Hitler calculated on finding support amongst the Russian people against the ' Jewish-Bolshevik ' regime which he himself both detested and despised and which had not, he believed, deep roots in the people itself. Especially in the Ukraine, only recently collectivized and severely purged in the process, Hitler and Ribbentrop, who had supported the exiled Ukrainian nationalists for many years, hoped to find a favourable response to the German forces as they advanced.

Events have proved all these hopes and calculations false. No Russian ' Quisling ' appeared. Instead the people rallied to their government, the armies fought with extreme tenacity, and the ' scorched earth ' policy was effectively carried out. Yet the German advance into Russia was impressively swift (Fig. 57), and by the end of November 1941 Leningrad was closely invested. German forces were within fifty miles of Moscow on the west and threatened to outflank it from the south-east, and Kharkov, Rostov and the Crimea (save for Sevastopol) were all in German hands. As early as 9 October 1941, Dr. Dietrich, Hitler's press chief,

arriving straight from the Fuhrer's headquarters, announced, on Hitler's authority, to the representatives of the foreign press, that the offensive then proceeding had already resulted in Russia's final defeat. Although the Russian resistance continued the issue must have appeared to the new Japanese government of General Tojo, who became Prime Minister on 19 September 1941, to have been decided. Throughout the summer the Japanese army leaders, by their occupation of French Indo-China, had been preparing their path. On 7 December 1941, whilst the Japanese representatives were still negotiating with the United States government, their air and naval forces attacked the United States naval base of Pearl Harbour and inflicted severe losses on the American Pacific fleet. The German and Japanese 'Great Designs' had joined hands. On 7 December Great Britain, which had already entered into formal alliance with Russia, declared war on Finland, Hungary and Roumania and, on 8 December, joined the United States in declaring war on Japan. Apart from the maintenance of relations between Russia and Japan, the neutrality of Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Spain and Portugal in Europe and of the South American states, the war had become world-wide. Even before the Japanese attack the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister had issued a programme for war and peace which came to be known as the Atlantic Charter (August 1941). To this Russia and China both acceded, and with the Japanese attack the lists were set in east and west—Great Britain, Russia, the United States, China and the occupied countries on the one side; Germany, Italy, Japan on the other—for the decisive struggle which has not yet been finally decided.

*Since Pearl Harbour* (*7 December* 1941—1 *January* 1944)


The entry of Japan and the United States into the war could not directly assist Hitler's strategic plan unless he could either break the Russian resistance completely and so establish direct communication across Siberia with his ally, or, as an alternative, conquer

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* Based on official sources.

*Stages in the advance* (left) are shown by the lines numbered to correspond with the fronts as follows : 1. Start line, 28 June 1941 ; 2. End of August 1941 ; 3. End of November 1941 ; 4. Start line of the summer campaign, 28 June 1942 ; 5. End of October 1942.

*Stages in the retreat* (*right*) are shown by the lines numbered to correspond with the fronts as follows : 1. Limit of German advance, November 1942 ; 2. Line on 5 July 1943 ; 3. Line on 1 January 1944.




* Figs. 57, 58. The German advance into (left) and retreat from (right) the U.S.S.R., 1941–4

the Caucasus and extend German control to the Persian Gulf to join hands with Japan there. The only other benefit he could hope from the extension of the war was the diversion of British forces to the east and against this had to be set the immediate assistance the United States could render Britain at sea and the stimulus given by the active participation of the United States in the war to supply British and Russian war needs. In the event, despite the heavy Allied reverses of 1942, it is now clear that Hitler's direct and indirect losses from Japan's attack on America far outweighed his gains. Japanese occupation of Burma, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies has brought little relief to Germany's needs for rubber, tin and oil. The supplies which Germany had been receiving from and through Russia have not been replaced. Germany's failure to defeat Russia, and the strength of the Anglo-American naval and air forces, have reduced direct communication between Germany and Japan to a minimum. And the failure to defeat Russia has itself been largely due to the steadily increasing volume of supplies to that country from America, as well as from Britain, which have resulted from the entry of the United States into the war.

The history of the past two years, therefore, has been one of the gradual defeat of Hitler's strategic idea, and of the increasing success of the idea of his opponents. It is true that after being forced to give some ground in Russia during the winter 1941–42 a new great offensive carried the Germans far down into the Caucasus and to the banks of the Volga at Stalingrad (Fig. 57). But the victorious relief of Stalingrad by the Russians and the capitulation of the German sixth army under von Paulus (2 February 1943) had been preceded by the relief of Leningrad and has been followed by a series of Russian successes which, though not unbroken, have driven the German armies far back from their most advanced positions (Fig. 58). By the end of 1943 Russian troops had crossed the 1938 Polish border at some points. The threat to the oil of the Caucasus had been removed and, with it, the German hope of a junction with the Japanese in the Persian Gulf.

The southern arm of the great pincers directed towards the Middle East had also been broken. After fluctuating battles in the summer of 1942 Rommel, with his *Afrika Korps* and Italian forces was, indeed, able to break through to within 70 miles of Alexandria. But they were then held. And, re-equipped and reorganized, the British army began an offensive (23 October 1942) from El Alamein which, supported by the Anglo-American forces landed in French

Morocco and Algeria on 8 November, finally resulted in the capitulation of the German-Italian armies in Africa at Tunis on 13 May 1943. The bold and courageous strategy of defending Egypt and the Middle East, decided on in the darkest days of 1940, had fully justified itself. Africa was cleared of all enemy forces and, with Malta relieved, and the whole coastline of North Africa in our hands, the heavy losses suffered by the British navy in their long series of operations, with necessarily insufficient air-cover, to keep open the Mediterranean and to supply our troops in Malta, Libya, Cyprus and the Middle East at length received their reward. The invasion first of Sicily and then of Italy itself, the collapse of the Fascist regime (25 July) and the signature of an armistice between Italy and the Allies (3 September) not only sealed the defeat of Hitler's great pincer movement south-eastward, but left Germany to protect the whole coastline of the ' European fortress ' and, at the same time, to repel the advancing Russian armies.

The opening of the year 1944, when these words are written, offers the prospect of the final defeat of Hitler and the Nazis' revived Pan-Germanism. Germany's strength is still formidable enough. The skill and doggedness of her fighting men is unbroken ; the immense resources for arms manufacture of European heavy industry are still at her disposal, though constantly assaulted from the air ; the rigid and ruthless control of every form of opposition—native or foreign—by the Gestapo continues to render open revolt in the occupied countries almost suicidal. Yet it is evident that, unless the Allies become divided, the defeat of Hitler's grand strategy and the ultimate collapse of Germany itself can be regarded as certain. When that moment arrives some of the great questions of European history may receive an answer that will stand for many generations. For not only will what has probably been the most efficiently ruthless system of government ever known in Europe disappear amidst the hatred of its victims, but the struggle between Teuton and Slav will have been decided, at least for a long while, in favour of the Slav. The vision of German expansion which took definite shape in the Pan-German movement, and was revived in cruder and still more dangerous form in Nazism after the defeat of 1918, will have faded. But the Greater Germany, created and sustained by Hitler's political genius and by German skill in organization and in the art of war from 1938 onwards, will be neither forgotten by Germans nor will it disappear without leaving consequences behind.

## The Territorial Organization of Greater Germany

The process of creating *Grossdeutschland* (Greater Germany) presented the Nazi government with a whole series of problems of policy and administration. The methods of administration adopted within the conquered territories, as well as German propaganda for the ' New Order ', indicate with reasonable clearness which of their conquests the Nazis intended to include, immediately or eventually, within the body of the German Reich ; which were to be treated as ' colonial ' lands under its direct administration ;





Fig. 59. The growth of Greater Germany
Based on official sources.

and which countries were to be allowed to retain a separate national government and political life, though under an ultimate German control.

This last group includes the majority of the German-occupied countries of Europe—France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia* and Greece. Though the administration imposed by the Germans has varied considerably in these countries, there is little or no evidence that the Germans intended to annex any of

* Yugoslavia would have suffered more territorial losses than the other states because not only had the Germans annexed Slovenia, but Italian ambitions in Croatia, and Hungarian and Bulgarian claims would also have had to be satisfied.

them outright or to deprive them permanently of some form at least of national self-government. In what follows no attempt will be made to describe the system of government adopted by the Germans in these countries.* Greater Germany proper (Fig. 59) may be said to comprise, in addition to the Reich territory as it existed from 1919–32, the following additional territories :—

1. *Territories annexed to the Reich*

These are :—

(*a*) The *Saar territory*, recovered after a plebiscite held under League of Nations auspices in February 1935. Included with the Bavarian Palatinate in the *Reichsgau* Westmark, 11 March 1941.

(*b*) *Austria*, occupied March 1938, and divided into seven *Reichsgaue* in April 1939.

(*c*) '*Sudetenland*', i.e. those parts of the Czechoslovak Republic ceded to Germany under the Munich agreement, September 1938.† This was formed into the *Reichsgau* Sudetenland in April 1939.

(*d*) *Memel*, recovered by treaty of 22 March 1939 with Lithuania, and absorbed into *Regierungsbezirk* Gumbinnen, a province of East Prussia.

(*e*) *Danzig*, declared reincorporated by a law of the Reichstag on 1 September 1939, the day of the German attack on Poland. It is the capital of *Reichsgau* Danzig-West Prussia, created by decree of 8 October 1939.

(*f*) *Polish territory*, annexed after the defeat of Poland, and split up between various old and newly created administrative districts, as follows :—

1. Suwalki : included in *Regierungsbezirk* Gumbinnen, a province of East Prussia, 8 October 1939.
2. Ciechanow (Zickenau) : created a *Regierungsbezirk* of East Prussia, 8 October 1939.
3. Pomorze : included in new *Reichsgau* Danzig-West Prussia, 8 October 1939.
4. Poznan (Posen) and parts of districts of Lodz and Warsaw : converted into the new *Reichsgau* Wartheland, 8 October 1939.
5. Polish Silesia, including the district of Teschen (seized by the Poles from Czechoslovakia after Munich), was first converted into *Regierungsbezirk* Katowice and later included in the revived province of Upper Silesia, 27 January 1941.

* See the relevant N.I.D. Handbooks on the occupied countries.

† Some former Czechoslovak districts were incorporated, not into 'Sudetenland', but into Bavaria, Austria and Upper Silesia.

(*g*) *Eupen-Malmédy*, from Belgium, declared reincorporated in the Reich by Führer decree of 18 April 1940.

Taken together these incorporated territories gave Germany an additional area of some 238,000 square kilometres and an increase of nearly 22 millions in population. It is true that in the Polish territories annexed to form the *Reichsgaue* Danzig-West Prussia and Wartheland, or added to East Prussia and Upper Silesia, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants were Polish. But a policy of ruthless Germanization is being pursued, and, as regards Danzig-West Prussia, Hitler has declared that the process must be complete by 1951, by which time the remaining Poles will have to leave. Some 50,000 Germans from eastern and south-eastern Europe have been brought in to settle Danzig-West Prussia and a much larger number into Wartheland. The Polish inhabitants are condemned to serve the new settlers as long as they are required and, afterwards, to deportation to the remainder of the Polish state, which the Germans have called the General Government. For the rest these territories are treated as integral parts of the German Reich and German law is in process of being applied as uniformly as possible to them all.

2. *Territories virtually incorporated*

In addition to the territories already fully incorporated into the Reich, there is a series of territories on its borders which are clearly intended to be fully annexed and are already incorporated for administrative purposes by being placed under the civil administration of a neighbouring German unit. These are :—

(*a*) *Luxembourg*, placed under the civil administration of the *Gauleiter* of the Gau Moselland, Gustav Simon, 2 August 1940.

(*b*) *Lorraine*, under the civil administration of Josef Bürckel, *Gauleiter* and Reich Governor of Westmark, 21 September 1940.

(*c*) *Alsace*, under the civil administration of Robert Wagner, *Gauleiter* and Reich Governor of Baden, 19 July 1940.

(*d*) *Slovenia*, annexed from Yugoslavia by the treaty of partition between Germany and Italy, 8 July 1941. The country has been divided into two districts :—

1. Lower Styria : under the Reich Governor of *Reichsgau* Styria.
2. Upper Carniola : under the Reich Governor of *Reichsgau* Carinthia.

(*e*) *Bialystok*, this Polish district was placed under the civil administration of Erich Koch, *Oberpräsident* and *Gauleiter* of East Prussia in August 1941.

In all these five cases a policy of stringent Germanization is being pursued. The inhabitants have been made liable for military service and, in the case of Lorraine, Bürckel claimed to have expelled all French-speaking inhabitants by December 1940. Although, therefore, the final step of formal incorporation of these territories in the Reich has not taken place there have been frequent official statements that, after German victory in the war, this would swiftly follow. In all of them, given sufficient time, combined with Nazi methods of government, including expulsion of the recalcitrant, a complete Germanization could be hoped for.

3. *Appended Territories or Protectorates*

In addition to this central core, *Grossdeutschland* also includes two *Nebenländer* (appended territories). These are :—

(*a*) *Protectorate 'Bohemia-Moravia'*.—Hitler's proclamation of 16 March 1939 explicitly stated that 'the territories of the former Czechoslovak state occupied by the German troops in March 1939 henceforth belong to the territory of the Great German Reich and enter under its protection as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia'. Yet, side by side with the Reich Protector von Neurath, an 'autonomous' Czech government, with a President of State (Hacha) and a Cabinet of nine members in charge of different departments, was permitted to continue. Foreign policy and the armed forces were taken out of Czech hands entirely and the 'autonomy' of the Czech government increasingly limited. This process was accelerated when Neurath went on indefinite leave in September 1941. He was succeeded first by Heydrich, Himmler's deputy in the Gestapo, and when Heydrich was killed in May 1942 his place was taken by Daluege, another prominent S.S. terrorist. In August 1943 Daluege was removed and the official resignation of Neurath accepted. In their place Frick, till then Reich Minister of the Interior, was made Protector, but beside him was placed K. H. Frank,* a Sudeten German, as Minister of State for Bohemia-Moravia with the rank of Reich Minister. Frick's functions appear to be chiefly honorific for he is the 'representative of the Führer in his capacity as Head of the State'.

* He is to be distinguished from Hans Frank, Governor of the Polish General Government since October 1939.

Frank, however, is, in Frick's own words, 'in charge of government affairs connected with the safeguarding of the interests of the Reich on his own responsibility'.

Frank is head of a German Ministry of State with nine departments corresponding to, supervising and controlling the nine Czech departments of government. The two provinces have German vice-presidents; seven *Oberlandrat-Inspekteure* supervise the larger districts; the five large towns have German mayors and police presidents; and forty out of sixty-nine Czech rural districts (*Okresy*) have German district chiefs. There are German courts for Germans, and Czech courts for Czechs. But any case in which both Germans and Czechs are concerned, as well as cases affecting the security of the Reich—a phrase capable of very wide extension—is tried in German courts.

It is clear that the 'autonomy' of the Protectorate is of an extremely limited kind. Germany has kept in its own hand all effective political power. It has been able to control Czech economic life and, by severely limiting opportunities for higher education for Czechs, as well as by direct persecution of intellectuals, has struck hard at the future leaders of the nation. Despite its nominal autonomy the so-called Protectorate remains an exploited appendage of Greater Germany.

(*b*) *The General Government.*—After the conquest of Poland, and its partition with Russia (September 1939), those parts of the German share of the country which were not included in the administrative units already described (p. 475) were formed into the General Government (Fig. 60). This artificial unit included the districts of Cracow, Radom, Lublin and Warsaw, each with its own District Governor, under a Governor General, Hans Frank, who already held the rank of Reich Minister, with direct responsibility to Hitler alone. His seat is in Cracow. After the conquests made at Russian expense in 1941, Eastern Galicia (i.e. the former Polish *Voievodships* of Tarnopol, Stanislawow and Lwow) were added to the General Government.

The status of the General Government is legally almost impossible to define. It has been described in a German source as 'not a State, Colony, Dominion or Protectorate, but the Reich's own land in the East'. However its status is defined in legal terms, its situation in practice is that it resembles the Protectorate, but on a lower level. There is not even a pretence that its overwhelmingly Polish inhabitants possess, or are entitled to, any

political power or independent authority. Poles are used in the lower ranks of the administration and to some extent in local government and in the local police. But, during his period of office, Frank has made it abundantly clear to all Poles that they are to be a subject race and that, in every sphere, the interest of the Reich is paramount. Even more than the so-called Protectorate, the General Government, from whose title even the words ' of the occupied territories of Poland ' were dropped after July 1940, may




Fig. 60. Administrative divisions of Greater Germany

Based on official sources.

be regarded as politically, economically, and strategically an extension of the Greater German Reich.

(*c*) *Reich Commissariats Ostland and Ukraine.*—Two further blocks of territory acquired from Russia since the German attack in 1941 require notice. As the German line had been pushed forward during the summer and autumn of 1941, close to Leningrad, Moscow and Rostov (Fig. 57) it became necessary to organize a

form of civil administration for the great territory between East Prussia and the General Government and the area of military administration (*Rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet*) in the rear of the German armies. It has been seen that, as the advance went forward, the Bialystok district, which had been in Russian hands after the partition of Poland, was attached to East Prussia and Eastern Galicia was added to the General Government. But, by the end of 1941, a vast stretch of territory from the Baltic to the Black Sea including the former Baltic States, White Russia and most of the Ukraine, had fallen to be administered by Germany.

Hitler dealt with this problem by creating a Reich Commissariat for the Ostland, by a decree of 17 July 1941, and subsequently a Reich Ministry for the occupied eastern territories in Berlin with the Balt, Alfred Rosenberg, the philosopher of Nordism (see p. 13), as Minister. Not only the Reich Commissariat for the Ostland, with its capital at Riga, and Lohse, *Gauleiter and Oberpräsident* of Schleswig-Holstein, as Reich Commissar, but also the Reich Commissariat for the Ukraine, with its capital at Rovno and with Erich Koch *Gauleiter* and *Oberpräsident* of a much enlarged East Prussia, fell under Rosenberg's supervision.

Throughout this great area the German civil administration rapidly took over complete or partial control from the military authorities as the front moved eastwards. By the end of July this had happened both in Lithuania and Latvia, and Estonia followed in December. A German civil administration for the occupied Ukraine was also set up in August 1941, and Koch arrived there in October. But in the three Baltic States, there were, in addition to the German civil administration, native administrations sponsored by the Germans already functioning in the late summer or autumn of 1941 and these were given official confirmation of their status by a decree of March 1942. In the Ukraine, however, the Germans either could not find ' reliable ' people to form a native administration or did not regard it as desirable to encourage Ukrainian nationalism.

The administration of these two great tracts of territory has been along the lines adopted in the Protectorate or, where conditions were more similar, in the General Government. The native administrations of the Baltic states consist of civil servants rather than of ' Ministers ' and have enjoyed even less independence than that of the Czech government in the Protectorate. In Lithuania some 35,000 Baltic Germans, who had been transferred to the

Reich in the spring of 1941, have been sent back again and there have been reports of considerable efforts to settle Germans from other parts of Europe in the Lublin district of central Poland. It is possible that as their conquests in Russia opened up an apparently limitless *Lebensraum* to the Germans, they began to think not only of forming a defensive belt of reliable *Volksdeutsche* from the Bialystok area down to the Carpathians, but of more long-term schemes of eastern colonization. The present shortage of German man-power would seem to make such ideas incapable of fulfilment for sheer lack of Germans to fill the role of colonists, and the steady retreat of the German armies towards Estonia, Latvia and Poland must have robbed them of most of their attractiveness.

The importance of these occupied territories is happily diminishing. Koch's capital of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine, Rovno, is now in Russian hands and most of his sphere of administration has been recovered by the Russian armies. The Commissariat Ostland is as yet largely in German occupation, but there are signs in the Baltic states, and even in the General Government, that the Germans are beginning to show greater consideration for their subjects, as they are apt to do when defeat becomes probable. There can be little doubt, however, that if final victory crowned their efforts, the Germans would at once finally incorporate into the Reich all the territories described above as 'virtually incorporated', would continue to Germanize the Protectorate and the General Government, and would maintain their grip on the Baltic states, White Russia and the Ukraine, dominating the political life and exploiting the economic resources of the whole of this vast area. A German empire of this extent and power, surrounded by states far smaller in population and productive capacity, would be in a position to control the policy, political and economic, of all its neighbours on the European continent.

## The Administration of Greater Germany

### *Central Government*

The task of organizing and controlling the government of Greater Germany itself, of its appended territories, and of the occupied countries, as well as of making this organization work vigorously and efficiently during a period of total war, was clearly a very formidable one. That it has been accomplished with such a relatively high degree of success is evidence of the essential unity of

aim and purpose in the minds of the leaders of German government and industry. Presented by Hitler with an 'all or nothing' situation they, and the mass of the nation whether in the army or in industry, have gone 'all out' for total victory in their total war.

There is no doubt that in the German war machine Hitler has been the final authority in all questions of high policy, and there is little evidence that, even after the disaster of Stalingrad and the subsequent German defeats in Russia, he has lost his ultimate control. His removal of von Brauchitsch from the office of commander-in-chief of the army, and his assumption of that office himself, in December 1941, has openly revealed his direct responsibility for military as well as for political affairs. As the course of the war has become increasingly unfavourable to Germany, Hitler's hold on public opinion has certainly weakened. But, until the end of 1943, the increasing doubt and discontent of the home front had been answered by a strengthening of the Nazi party's control of German life in every sphere. So long as this process continues, and so long as the party leaders hang together, Hitler's own position is secure. For neither Göring, nor Himmler and still less Gœbbels, can challenge his influence either with the party or with the mass of the people. Nor is the disorganized and largely 'Nazified' officers' corps in any position to engage in military conspiracies under the watchful eyes of Himmler's Gestapo, security service, and *Waffen* S.S. divisions. As a result Hitler's authority as head of the government, the army and the party, even though less willingly accepted as a result of military reverses, remains the decisive factor in the politics of Greater Germany.

Under Hitler the Council for the Defence of the Realm forms the 'war cabinet' of Greater Germany. When it was appointed (30 August 1939) that Council consisted of Göring (Minister for Air, head of the four-year plan, Minister-President, and deputy for Hitler as *Statthalter* of Prussia); Frick,* Minister of the Interior, who had already been appointed Plenipotentiary for Administration in August, 1939; Funk, Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary for Economics; General Keitel, head of the High Command of the Wehrmacht (O.K.W.); Hess, the Führer's deputy, who was succeeded, after his flight to England, by Bormann, head of the party Chancery; and Lammers, head of the Reich

* Frick was succeeded as Minister, as member of the Council for the Defence of the Realm, and as Plenipotentiary for Administration, by Himmler in August 1943.

Chancery. These six men were given power to issue decrees with the force of law, even without Hitler's countersignature, and there appears to be no formal or legal limit to their authority. But though, in the early stages of the war, the Council was the normal legislator for Germany, there has been a tendency for ministerial orders to take the place of legislation with a resultant increase in the importance of certain Ministers (e.g. Himmler, Speer) at the expense of the Council as a corporate body.

Formally, at least, the Reich Cabinet of Ministers still exists, though it is not known whether, or how often, it meets. The number of Reich Ministers has been considerably increased since the outbreak of war. Not only have some new ministries been created, such as that of armaments and munitions (first under Todt and, after his death in February 1942, under Speer), and that for the occupied territories of the east (Rosenberg), but several men holding important offices have also been given the rank of Reich Minister, such as Hierl, Leader of the Reich Labour Service (August 1943) and K. H. Frank, Minister of State in the Protectorate. With this increase in numbers the status of Reich Minister has, it would appear, become less rather than more important since the war began. Subject to the authority not only of Hitler but also of the Council for Defence, they appear to approximate increasingly to the character of executive heads of their departments.

Their relative position in the scheme of government must also have been to some extent affected by Hitler's appointment of Reich commissars, directly responsible to himself, for various areas and subjects of government. These commissars include, in addition to Göring, as head of the four-years' plan, Ley, as Reich Commissar for Housing, Himmler, as Reich Commissar for the strengthening of 'Germanity' (*Festigung des deutschen Volkstums*), and Axmann (successor to von Schirach) as Reich youth leader. But, in addition to these, the officials in charge of certain of the occupied countries and of the 'virtually incorporated' territories already discussed are also directly responsible to Hitler alone. These are the Reich Commissars for Norway (Josef Terboven, who is also *Oberpräsident* of the Rhine Province and *Gauleiter* of Essen) and for the Netherlands (Arthur Seyss-Inquart) and the chiefs of civil administration in Alsace, Lorraine, Luxembourg, Lower Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, and Bialystok. Another body of great importance and power is the Armaments Council (*Rüstungsrat*) presided over by

Speer, the Minister of Munitions. Speer himself has been given by Hitler a large number of special commissions with wide powers and, since the death of Todt, is one of the most powerful figures in Germany. He has recently been made one of the Reich Leaders (*Reichsleiter*) of the party. He is inspector-general of roads, of water and power, of the layout and building plans for Berlin ; plenipotentiary for armaments within the four-years' plan, and for the regulation of the building industry ; as well as leader of the Todt organization and of the association of technicians. The Armaments Council over which he presides is itself composed of men of the first importance. It includes high officers from the service departments, amongst them Milch, Field Marshal of the Air Force, and General Thomas, head of the war industry section of the High Command and also of the armaments office in the Ministry of Munitions. Its other members are some of the most powerful figures in industry—Pleiger, managing director of the *Hermann Göring* works ; Roehnert, managing director of the *Rheinmetall-Börsig* works ; Zangen, managing director of the *Mannesmann Röhrenwerke* ; Röchling, Leader of the Reich Iron Union ; Vögler, of the *Vereinigte Stahlwerke* (United Steel Works) and others. Since 1942 Speer's range of activities has been still further increased. On 2 September 1943, a decree of the Führer changed the name of his ministry from armaments and munitions to armaments and war production (*Rüstung und Kriegsproduktion*) and placed the whole field of non-agrarian production under his control. As a result, Funk's Ministry of Economics has been confined to the formulation of economic policy, the distribution of consumer goods and the control of credit institutions. In a similar way, the functions of the Reich Ministry of Labour have been severely curtailed by the appointment of Sauckel, *Gauleiter* and *Statthalter* of Thuringia, in March 1942, as plenipotentiary for the employment and distribution of labour. Sauckel is directly responsible to Göring's office of the four-year plan and ' has become a dictator of labour and wages '.

It is hazardous, through the fog of war and with the necessary limitations on our knowledge which war imposes, to make definite assertions about a politico-economic system which in itself is extremely fluid and which constantly adapts itself to new situations. But it is perhaps possible to say with a fair degree of certainty that up to the end of 1943 Hitler has remained the final source of political and military policy in Greater Germany both as Führer and as

commander-in-chief; that the council for defence, the office of the four-years' plan, over both of which Göring presides, and the Armaments Council, linking Speer's munitions ministry with the High Command, are the most powerful centres of authority for the organization of industry and labour for all war purposes; and that, in all questions affecting German security, whether at home or in the occupied territories, Himmler, as Minister of the Interior and head of the Gestapo and the S.S. dominates the scene. The role of Bormann, head of the party Chancery, and undoubtedly a powerful figure himself, appears to be largely that of intermediary between Hitler and the other leaders of the party and the state. Göring's personal influence seems to have declined of late and, Himmler, Bormann and Speer appear to be the chief directors of affairs on the home front.

*Regional administration*

Beneath this central governing group, the regional organization of Germany has undergone some striking changes in response to the demands of the war without, as yet, a drastic reorganization of its older political and administrative divisions. The fifteen States (*Länder*) of 1939, with their great divergences in size and population, still survive. But the *Reichsgau*, as a unit in which the offices and areas of administration of governor and *Gauleiter* are combined, has been adopted for the newly acquired Polish territories of the east, and applied to the construction of the area Westmark on the west. Thus, including the seven *Reichsgaue* of Austria, there are now eleven *Reichsgaue* in all, side by side with the older fifteen *Länder*. It is noticeable that the newer *Reichsgaue* are much larger and more convenient areas of administration than the smaller *Länder*, or than the early party *Gaue*, especially of western Germany; that they make possible the complete co-ordination of party and state administrative areas; and that their rulers, all *Statthälter* and *Gauleiter* at the same time, are the direct agents, in their districts, of the Ministers in Berlin.

The form and character of the new *Reichsgaue* may be taken as representing a partial fulfilment of the desire for a simplification of the administrative system which was shown by Hitler's appointment of Frick as plenipotentiary for administration in 1939. The exigencies of the war have reinforced the arguments for simplification. At the outset the *Wehrkreise* (see p. 344) were taken as the units of the special war administrative machine and one defence

commissar (*Reichsverteidigungskommissar*) was appointed for each of them. All sixteen appointed in September 1939 were *Gauleiter*, who also held high state offices as *Statthälter* or *Oberpräsidenten*.




Fig. 61. The Party *Gaue* of Greater Germany, January 1944

Based on official sources.

The towns named are the seats of administration of their respective gauleiters. The forty-two *Gaue* are numbered as follows: 1. Baden; 2. Bayreuth; 3. Berlin; 4. Danzig-Westpreussen; 5. Düsseldorf; 6. Essen; 7. Franken; 8. Halle-Merseburg; 9. Hamburg; 10. Hessen-Nassau; 11. Kärnten; 12. Köln-Aachen; 13. Kurhassen; 14. Magdeburg-Anhalt; 15. Mainfranken; 16. Mark Brandenburg; 17. Mecklenburg; 18. Moselland; 19. München-Oberbayern; 20. Niederdonau; 21. Niederschlesien; 22. Oberdonau; 23. Oberschlesien; 24. Osthannover; 25. Ostpreussen; 26. Pommern; 27. Sachsen; 28. Salzburg; 29. Schleswig-Holstein; 30. Schwaben; 31. Steiermark; 32. Sudetenland; 33. Südhannover-Braunschweig; 34. Thüringen; 35. Tirol-Vorarlberg; 36. Wartheland; 37. Weser-Ems; 38. Westfalen-Nord; 39. Westfalen-Süd; 40. Westmark; 41. Wien; 42. Württemberg-Hohenzollern.

E=Essen; D=Düsseldorf; H=Hamburg; N=Nuremberg; S=Salzburg.

But the boundaries of the party *Gaue* (Fig. 61) and of the *Wehrkreise* (Fig. 63) in the Reich of 1939 did not correspond, indeed

those of the *Wehrkreise* cut across many of the existing boundaries, whether of state or party. Friction seems to have arisen at once, and in October 1939, fourteen more *Gauleiter* were appointed as mandatories (*Beauftragte*) of the existing defence commissars within their own *Gaue*. At the same time a defence committee was constituted for each *Wehrkreis* in which the various Reich and party authorities—*Statthalter*, *Gauleiter*, *Oberpräsidenten*, etc.—were combined. The situation was, however, further complicated by the creation of regional economic offices* dealing with general economic policy, food and rationing, forestry, and price control. But these economic regions, as well as the separate areas for the control of motor transport and for armament inspection, corresponded neither with the *Wehrkreise* nor the *Gaue* and also cut across pre-war areas of economic organization, such as those of the railways and posts and of the chambers of industry and trade, of handicraft and of economics.

Until 1942, therefore, considerable overlapping of areas and competences as between political, military, economic and party authorities existed. In 1940, it is true, Ley, as commissar for housing, had appointed the *Gauleiter* as *Gau* housing commissars under him. But this example was not followed until Sauckel, after his appointment as plenipotentiary for the employment and distribution of labour, nominated the *Gauleiter* as his delegates (6 April 1942) with power to supervise the labour offices of each *Gau*, and, in the same month, *Gauwirtschaftskammern* (*Gau* chambers of industry) were constituted, replacing the older chambers. Since that date the process has been carried much further by a decree of the Council for the Defence of the Reich (16 November 1942) which made the *Gau*, and not the *Wehrkreis*, the basis of the whole civil defence organization. All forty-two *Gauleiter* were appointed defence commissars and, in carrying out their duties, they use the existing Reich administrative machinery. Each *Gauleiter* has his own defence committee. The economic regions (Fig. 62) have also been adapted to the party *Gaue* though some of the economic regions in western and southern Germany (e.g. Westphalia, Bavaria, and Austria) comprise two or even three *Gaue*. Since Sauckel has also converted the *Landesarbeitsämter* (regional labour offices) into *Gau* labour offices the process of simplification has been almost completed in the spheres of economics and civil defence. The effect has been to increase the power and

* The functions of these economic regions is discussed in volume III of this Handbook.

importance of the party and its leading officials in all the aspects of war-time administration. Though the *Wehrkreise* boundaries (Fig. 63) only correspond precisely with the boundaries of a single *Gau* in the new *Reichsgaue* Danzig–West Prussia (XX) and Wartheland (XXI), the new *Wehrkreise* XVII and XVIII contain




Fig. 62. Economic regions of Greater Germany, January 1944

Based on official sources.

The towns named are the headquarters of the respective economic regions.

the whole of two and three *Gaue* respectively. It would not be difficult to remodel the older *Wehrkreise* so as to correspond with the combined area of two or more *Gaue*. Since, too, the boundaries of some Prussian provinces are identical with those of one or more *Gaue* an ultimate fusion of the areas of Reich, party, army and economic administration, obliterating the last remnants of the historic *Länder*, would represent the logical conclusion of the

process of centralization, co-ordination and simplification which has issued from the Nazi doctrine of ' Ein Volk, Ein Reich, Ein Führer '.

Such a complete rationalization of administrative areas throughout the Reich is unlikely to be carried through, however, so long as the




Fig. 63. The *Wehrkreise* (military regions) of Greater Germany, January 1944
Based on official sources.

The numbering is that of the official German system. Although the highest number is 21, there are only seventeen indicated ; the reason for the absence of numbers 14, 15, 16 and 19 is not certain.

war lasts. For it would not only arouse local loyalties against the regime but would also involve the dismissal of many of the old stalwarts of the Nazi movement whose services were rewarded, in 1933, with posts as *Statthalter* or Minister in the *Länder*. But there can be little doubt that, given victory, the Nazis would complete the co-ordination of the administrative areas and that the *Reichsgau*,

as realized in Danzig-West Prussia and Wartheland, would provide the model unit. Even in defeat the most lasting influence of the Nazis upon Germany may prove to have been their creation of a strong centralized government as a necessary expression of national unity, and their partial realization of a more rationally organized set of areas of regional government than that presented by the historic boundaries of the *Länder*. The Nazis were not the first in this field. The *Bund für Erneuerung des Reiches*, which existed before 1932, had similar aims. In addition the whole trend of economic life in the modern state runs counter to the preservation of local boundaries based solely on the dynastic possessions of dynasties which have disappeared.

## Racial Policy

The creation of Greater Germany has given the Nazis full opportunity, of which they have taken advantage, to apply their racial theory (see pp. 13–17). Their anti-semitism had already been given practical expression within Germany during the years 1933–39. A long series of enactments was passed which gradually closed almost all avenues of education and of earning a living to Jews and to 'non-Aryans', i.e. to half- or quarter-Jews. The Nuremberg Laws of September 1935 deprived them of citizenship, and before 1939 they were legally forbidden to practise as stock-brokers, doctors, chemists, dentists, lawyers, professors or teachers, veterinary surgeons or auctioneers. The attempt of a young Jew to assassinate a German diplomat in Paris (November 1938) was met by a series of still harsher measures. A pogrom began during which 150 synagogues were burnt and thousands of Jewish businesses destroyed. The Jewish community was fined a milliard Reichsmarks and a law was passed forbidding any Jew to own a business or to be an independent craftsman after 1 January 1939. Before war broke out in September 1939 the Jewish community in Germany had already been deprived of almost every right save that of bare existence.

Since war began Nazi treatment of the Jews, not only of Germany but of all the occupied countries of Europe, has been ruthlessly carried to the point of the physical destruction of large sections of the Jewish race. From all the occupied countries, as well as from Germany itself, great numbers of Jews have been sent to Poland and to the eastern occupied territories. When they did not die rapidly enough of disease or starvation in the Polish ghettos many

were removed by Himmler's orders and exterminated by specially trained execution squads. In December 1942, ' the State Department in Washington gave figures showing that the number of Jews who had been deported to the east or who have perished since 1939 in Axis-controlled Europe ' was about two million. Since then very many more have died of hardship or have been put to death. The operations of the *Gestapo* against the Jews have been given legal cover by a law of 1 April 1943, under which the estate of a deceased Jew passes to the state, and by a subsequent decree which gave the police power to deal with Jews at their discretion, without any appeal to the courts being allowed. Whether or no a Jew is allowed to remain in Germany depends wholly on his ability to make a bargain with his persecutors or on his utility to the Nazi party and Reich.

The blind fanaticism and complete inhumanity with which the Nazis have applied this part of their racial doctrine leaves no doubt that the threats of their leaders must be taken literally. When Ley declared (4 December 1942) that it was the Nazi intention to ' go on waging this war until the Jews had been wiped off the face of the earth ' there is no room to doubt that he meant precisely what he said and that he represented faithfully the intentions of Hitler and Himmler, in whose hands lay the decision as to the policy and the method of executing it. The responsibility of the Nazi leaders, as well as of their specially trained agents, for the callous slaughter of defenceless Jewish citizens both of Germany and of many other lands is direct and undeniable.

The doctrine of Aryan superiority has also formed an element in the policy adopted towards the Slavonic peoples who have been brought under Nazi rule. Nazi treatment of undeniable Nordics, for example in Norway, has been harsh enough. But in Czechoslovakia, Poland, occupied Russia, and Yugoslavia their cruelty to the subject populations has been very much worse. Yet it is uncertain to what extent racialism, rather than the resistance offered in these countries, or the mere desire to exterminate a population whose land is coveted, is responsible for Nazi brutality. It may be guessed, too, that some degree of shame vis-a-vis the United States and the neutral countries, and even a reluctant sense that their victims were more civilized than they, have somewhat restrained Nazi brutality in the Scandinavian and western occupied countries. The fact that Greece, a non-Slav country, has been treated no less harshly than the Slav populations in general, and more harshly

than the Czechs, suggests that it is the degree of resistance offered to Nazi rule rather than racial theory which is decisive.

This view is borne out by the fact that in the territories annexed to the Reich from Poland at least two interpretations of the policy of Germanization (*Eindeutschung*) have been observed. On the one hand the more fanatical S.S., whose opinion is voiced in the *Schwarze Korps*, were opposed until recently to any attempt to convert non-Germans into Germans and desired to see the annexed territories settled by true Germans imported for that purpose. It is, however, evident both from German newspapers and from the declarations of *Gauleiter* Forster of Danzig-West Prussia that another school of thought desired, if only for practical reasons, to recover for 'Germanity' all those of mixed Polish and German blood. Since Himmler has now formed *Standarten* of the *Waffen S.S.* from the occupied territories of the west and the *Prinz Eugen* regiment has been recruited from the Balkan countries the *Schwarze Korps* itself has been moved to rebuke the 'narrow-minded Germans' who jeer at the '*Volkspolacken*' who, though their German may be imperfect, are ready to serve the Reich. It would appear, in fact, that even Himmler and the S.S., under pressure of the shortage of manpower, are ready to abandon the pure Aryan creed and to accept the doctrine attributed to Gœbbels—'He is an Aryan whom I call an Aryan'.

There is, therefore, reason to suppose that, given victory, the Nazis would have abandoned racialism as an exclusive theory and moved towards pure imperialism. But, though non-Germans might have been granted some form of Reich citizenship on giving proof of their readiness to accept Nazi leadership, it is probable that there would have been various categories of citizens and degrees of citizenship. The pure Germans would have composed the first class, those of mixed or foreign blood would have been relegated to lower categories. In this way racial doctrine and the necessities of political imperialism could have been reconciled. Such a classification has, in fact, already been used in drawing up the *Volksliste* (list of the folk) in Danzig-West Prussia and Wartheland.

## Religious Policy

Towards the Churches the Nazi policy already described (pp. 51–62) has remained unaltered. Considerations of patriotism restrained the Catholic bishops from protest against Nazi anti-Christian policy in the early days of the war but, since March 1941, the number and

volume of such protests have grown. When the attack on Russia began the episcopate refrained from adopting the attitude of Nazi propaganda that the new war was a ' crusade '. And in December 1942 the Catholic bishops sent a sharp protest to the Reich government against the persecution of both foreign and German Catholics in the annexed territories. They said that ' a wall of bitterness and hostility is being erected around Germany ' and added that ' one cannot lay the foundations of a new and better Europe whilst destroying Christianity '. Again, in August 1943, the annual conference of the hierarchy at Fulda issued a pastoral letter condemning the anti-Christian teaching in the schools and the obstacles and restrictions imposed on religious observance. These protests have remained unanswered and appear to have had no restraining effect upon Nazi behaviour in occupied Poland, where churches have been desecrated and the priests bitterly persecuted.

Individual bishops, especially those of Münster (Count Galen) and of Berlin (von Preysing), have also made bold and notable pronouncements against various aspects of Nazi policy at home. Count Galen's denunciation of the policy of so-called ' mercy killings ' leaves nothing to be desired for clarity or force. But it is necessary to observe that no condemnation has come from the German episcopate as a whole, or from any member of it, of the Nazi policy of conquest as such.

The Evangelical Churches of Germany are in worse case than the Catholics. Much of the work of the Confessional Church has to be carried on underground and the mass of Evangelicals seem to display a certain apathy in the controversy between the German Christians and their more orthodox opponents. But the general conditions of the Evangelical Churches may be judged from an address by Bishop Wurm of Württemberg—a former compromiser (see p. 57)—at the opening of a regional church conference at Stuttgart in July 1941. ' Where is the courage ', he asked, ' which is the ornament of German manhood if the only argument which counts is the Gestapo ? Since the beginning of the war one measure has followed another aiming at the expulsion of the church from its proper work '. He went on to complain of the high percentage (75%) of clergy called up ; of the closing of clergy training colleges ; of the stoppage of the circulation of Christian literature among the troops ; of the prohibition of baptisms in lying-in hospitals ; and of decrees forbidding prayers in schools and the printing of new bibles.

It is clear from the protest of Bishop Wurm and from the utterances of Catholic leaders that the war has brought no cessation of the anti-christian policy most strongly represented by Rosenberg, Himmler, the S.S. and its paper *Schwarze Korps*. Though the Nazi leaders have refrained from adopting any of the small neo-pagan bodies as representing their views, they do not appear to have abandoned their ultimate aim of creating a purely German-nationalist church. If the following quotation from a 'Training Letter', said to have been widely circulated in August 1942, is correctly attributed to Martin Bormann, that aim continues to be held in the highest Nazi quarters. 'Nazism and the Christian *Weltanschauung* are irreconcilable concepts. . . . Our philosophy is of a much higher order than Christianity, which in essential points originates from Judaism. For these reasons we Nazis must refuse to promote or support either the existing or any future Christian faith, and in this respect no discrimination can be made between the Confessions. The Evangelical Church, no less than the Roman Catholic, is our enemy'.

## Educational Policy

### *Elementary Education*

In the field of elementary education the chief change since the war has been made in the training of elementary teachers. The teachers' academies of the Weimar Republic had been renamed by the Nazis and their curricula had been 'Nazified' before war began. But in 1941 a drastic change was announced, which was put into effect by a decree of 1 April 1942. The *Hochschulen für Lehrerbildung* (colleges for teachers' training) were converted into *Lehrerbildungsanstalten* (teachers' training institutes). The requirement of secondary education as a preliminary to the elementary teacher's career was abandoned. The course now provided was to last five years for candidates from an elementary, three for those from a middle, and only one for those from a secondary school. The students were to be selected by headmasters or Hitler Youth leaders, and all candidates had to pass through a recruiting camp (*Musterungslager*), officered by H.J. officers, in which their political reliability and personal character would be tested and intensive indoctrination in Nazi ideas provided. The new teachers' training institutes have been given a thoroughly military character. Teachers and taught both wear uniform and discipline is on military lines. The change represents the abandonment of the

idea of ' liberal education ' for elementary teachers and, at the same time, a closer party grip on the future training of the young. By the end of 1942 there were 221 of these institutes in Greater Germany with a total of some 30,000 pupils.

They have not, however, sufficed to fill the gaps caused by mobilization and retirement, whether compulsorily or from age. As a result, retired teachers, including even some of those dismissed for political reasons, have been called back to work and those reaching the age of 65 have been forbidden to retire. In June 1943 the Mayor of Breslau said that the average age of teachers in the city was 60 but that the total of teachers was only one-third of the pre-war number.

To remedy this situation a new class of ' school helpers ', drawn from both sexes between the ages of 19 and 30, has been created. They must have had intermediate education, but are given only a three-months' course before starting work. After two years' practical work in a school they are then to be given a further nine months' training in a teachers' training college. Of the first 7,000 applicants only some 800 were admitted to the entrance examination, and many of the applicants are girls from the B.D.M. (League of German Girls) or from the Labour Service. In addition to these school helpers, war-wounded N.C.O.s possessed of certain technical training have also been appointed to assist in the elementary schools. Yet the shortage of teachers is still serious.

*Intermediate Education*

It is at the next stage of education, the *Mittelschule* (intermediate school) that the most radical change has been introduced into the German educational system since the war began. In November 1940 Hitler himself announced that the Austrian type of school known as the *Hauptschule* was to be made universal throughout the Reich and a decree issued by Rust, Reich Minister of Education, on 28 April 1941 gave effect to this policy. That decree insisted on the vocational character of education and the nature of the new *Hauptschulen* was to be subordinated to this aim. The education at these schools is free and compulsory. The really revolutionary feature of the change was that the pupils for the *Hauptschulen* were to be selected from the elementary schools by the education authorities and that the parents would have no say in the matter. Moreover the pupils in the *Hauptschulen* might be either still further promoted to a secondary school or sent back to an elementary

school. It is evident that pressure will be used to make children who have been given a specialized training in a *Hauptschule*, enter the career for which they have been trained and, indeed, an educational writer quoted by the *Kölnische Zeitung* (2 April 1941) has frankly said that compulsory educational selection must result in compulsory careers. The plan has evoked considerable controversy in Germany and has been attacked as subordinating education to the needs of industry and as moving towards a regime in which infants in arms will be stamped as ' reserved for Müller and Co.'. The fact that transfer from the *Hauptschulen* to secondary schools is rare has also been a frequent ground of complaint.

*Secondary Education*

No radical changes have been made since war began in the general system of secondary schools. But a new type of school, under S.S. control and direction, has been created in the *Deutsche Heimschulen*, state boarding schools intended primarily, it would seem, for the children of army officers and party and Reich officials whose duties involve them in frequent changes of residence. A number of recognized ' private ' boarding schools have been converted into *Heimschulen* and the Evangelical theological seminaries of Württemberg have also been taken over for this purpose. By January 1944 there were forty-five such schools under the direction of Heissmayer, the high S.S. officer in charge of this development, and some fifty-five more under his trusteeship (*unter Betreuung*). It is evident that these schools form another, though less specifically political, series of special training centres side by side with the Napolas and the Adolf Hitler schools (pp. 416–18), but under the direct control of the S.S. In July 1943, they were called by Heissmeyer ' fortresses of the great Germanic Reich '. It should be added that these *Heimschulen* may be either elementary or secondary in type.

The only other significant development in secondary education since the war seems to be in the creation of the *Wirtschaftsoberschule*, apparently modelled on the lines of the Austrian *Handelsakadamien*. They offer a three years' course and concentrate on ' commercial subjects '. Their aim is to train the officers of industry and to ' penetrate the European space in industry and administration with Nazi principles '. For the most part these schools, of which about fifty are in existence, have been confined to southern Germany. They have been met with criticism on account of their vocational character and because they run

counter to the general simplification of the types of secondary school hitherto pursued by Rust.

*University Education*

The pressure of war was naturally most quickly felt in the universities. In 1939 all but five universities and two *Technische Hochschulen* were at first closed, though they began to reopen in October and were all at work again by the summer of 1940. In addition their number was increased by the taking over of two colleges at Danzig, of the universities of Strasbourg and Poznan (Posen), which were thoroughly Germanized, and by the opening of a new technical high school at Linz in Austria.

The number of students which, under the impact of mobilization, fell greatly in 1939, recovered to 50,000 in 1940 (as against 60,000 in the last pre-war semester) and, since then, has been announced as 80,000. This figure, however, includes those who matriculate from the armed forces and, therefore, the only reliable figures of students actually studying at the universities would seem to be those for women (33,000) and for foreigners (12,000). The Nazi pre-war policy of discouraging the higher education of women has evidently been abandoned while the war lasts.

Some men have been released from the armed forces for short courses at the universities and efforts have been made on a considerable scale to provide both correspondence courses and lectures for the would-be students serving in the army. Not only in the occupied countries of the west and north but even behind the Mius front in Russia such courses have been given.

*General effects of the war on Education*

Even in the controlled press of Germany evidence of dissatisfaction with the Nazi educational system has manifested itself. The pressing demands of the Hitler Youth on the time and energy of the pupils in schools led to an agreement in February 1941 between the Reich youth leader and the Minister of Education under which 'the time of the children was partitioned between them, leaving something over for the family'. Nevertheless in November 1941 a writer in the *Kölnische Zeitung* criticized the system severely, not only on the grounds of the demands on the time of the pupils made by the H.J., but also because of the subordination of education to the political and economic necessities of the state. Even Baldur von Schirach, in November 1941, spoke of the necessity of a general education and Rust himself was forced

to utter a warning against underestimating the value of educating the intellect. It is significant, too, that an inspector of the education section of the army said that both military and technical authorities preferred recruits with the general background of knowledge and the higher level of intellectual training provided by the *Gymnasien* to those from the more vocational but narrower types of school.

The demands on the time of university students for war work have also been very severe and many of them (some 22,000) have had at least part of their energies directed into such activities as that set by the Propaganda Ministry of ' searching the history and culture of all peoples, including the English, for arguments against England ' as well as to scientific research bearing on armaments and munitions. Although the reduction of vacations to six weeks in the year was abandoned in 1941 much of the time restored was earmarked for work in munition factories, agriculture, civil defence or other types of war work.

To the pre-emption of the scholar's time by the H.J., the Nazi *Studentenbund*, or other Reich and party agencies, must be added all the dislocation caused by the shortage of teachers and of training material, and by air raids, with the evacuation of population, as well as the destruction of buildings which they involve. The total mobilizations of 1943 have resulted in still further interferences with the educational process and the use of boys of 15–16 in anti-aircraft units, salvage squads, and other services can only result in a still further lowering of educational standards. The strictly intellectual loss is not, however, the most serious feature of the situation of German youth. There is much evidence of a growing lawlessness amongst boys and adolescents which has already called forth strong measures from both party and Reich. The H.J. now has disciplinary courts and, in addition to the ordinary juvenile delinquency courts, the police have recently been empowered to take discretionary action against young offenders and to detain them in police camps (*Jugendschutzlager*) for an indefinite period. Meanwhile the local party leaders have tried to throw the blame for a morally undisciplined youth on the parents, whose authority the party and the Hitler Youth have systematically undermined in past years. It would seem evident that the Nazi hostility to the family, and their contempt for the moral influence of religion, has begun to bear fruit in a generation which has been hardened and toughened in the Hitler youth, but has become cynical and ungovernable in the process.

In at least one university, Munich, a more encouraging symptom has appeared. In February 1943 Hans and Sofia Scholl, of Münich, and Christian Probst, of Innsbruck, were reported to have been summarily executed for plotting high treason. Later it became known that Professor Kurt Huber and others had also been executed. From a manifesto issued by the accused it appears that they had taken a concerted stand against the Nazi suppression of free opinion and the systematic deception of the nation practised by the party. It is impossible to say how many other students in the universities share this intellectual revolt against the Nazi subordination of truth to the purposes of the state and party. But it is not improbable that the future leaders of a saner Germany may arise from amongst the present body of students who have watched, and are watching, the subtle and widespread evil consequences of an educational system which makes readiness for war its dominating aim.

## The Nazi 'New Order'

The reasons for the failure of the Nazi educational system are also those for the failure of their propaganda for a 'New Order' in Europe. Warlike self-assertion of the German people for its own ends of material gain and greatness at the expense of other peoples could not be combined with any programme of a common good of all European peoples, for the one aim contradicted the other. The idea of a New Order has taken many different shapes in the hands of different Nazi propagandists, and has fluctuated in character in accordance with the military successes and failures of the German forces. Hitler and Gœbbels have been notably vague in their references to it, particularly since the Russian war began, and in 1943 the whole subject has tended to drop out of Nazi propaganda.

At the core of all New Order propaganda lies the idea of a Greater Germany, surrounded by a *Lebensraum* (living space) which would comprise all Europe, including the Ukraine, and to which Africa would also be attached. The position to be occupied by the other nations has been envisaged in many different ways. In May 1941 Hitler indicated that economic rather than racial considerations would be at the basis of the structure. But in 1942 Werner Best, chief of the legal department of the Gestapo, wrote a long article in which the idea of leadership by the 'master race' was prominent, and in May–July 1942 both Mussert in Holland and Quisling in Norway put forward the idea of a union of the Germanic races as

the basis of the New Europe. An alternative principle, more congenial to Germany's non-Germanic allies, was suggested by Dr Dietrich, the Nazi press chief, in 1941. This would be to base the rights of the nations within the New Order on their contributions to its creation. Thus Fascist Italy and Falangist Spain could have been found positions worthy of their services to the Nazi cause.

The whole idea of a New Order founded by the Nazis has failed of its purpose, not only because it was so patently devised to secure German dominance, but also because of Nazi behaviour in the territories they control. Not only in the east of Europe but in Scandinavia and the western countries they have exhibited so gross an incapacity to understand the point of view of other peoples, such a naive greed for their own economic and material advantage, such a faith in repression by force, so little appreciation of spiritual and moral values, that their programme for Europe, so far as it ever had any coherence, has made almost no appeal. In 1940–41, after the fall of France and before the attack on Russia, Germany had a faint chance, in the immense discouragement which then prevailed, of effecting the moral as well as the material conquest of Europe. Her leaders and administrators did not take it and, with the strain on her economy consequent upon the attack on Russia, the opportunity passed.

Germany is still undefeated and her strength in defensive battle is still extremely formidable. But, unless disunion amongst the Allied Nations cripples their efforts, it appears certain that her defeat must come. Yet, even if she were victorious, the basic principles of the Nazi state, and the persistent characteristics of the German people, make Germany the least suitable country to construct a New Order in Europe. A doctrine of perpetual war, of race superiority, of hostility to all forms of Christianity, of indifference to truth except in so far as it serves German power; a people, blunt in its perceptions, thorough but humourless, physically both brave and tough but without mental independence or civil courage—this combination is ill adapted to create a harmonious political system out of the many highly individualized nationalities of which a German-controlled Europe would then be composed. In truth, neither the Nazi idea of the state, nor any other pure nationalism, can offer a unifying principle to Europe or to the world.

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